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Abstract 
Through an ethnographic study of a cross-border aid organisation, this thesis examines 
problems that go to the heart of the politics of humanitarian aid. At a time of significant 
political change in Burma, members of the Back Pack Health Worker Team had to 
grapple with questions that have shaped the history of humanitarianism but continue to 
raise complex political and ethical dilemmas. The Back Pack Health Worker Team - or 
Back Pack, as it is commonly known - is a Non-Government Organisation made up of 
indigenous medics who provide healthcare to ethnic minority communities in Burma's 
disputed border areas. Ten years after its creation in 1998, Back Pack had become an 
influential yet controversial player in the politics of aid to Burma. 
This thesis explores how humanitarian actors, systems and practices can at different 
times be defined as legitimate or illegitimate. It examines ways in which an 'embodied 
history' of violence can influence the worldviews and actions of humanitarian actors, as 
well as institutions that develop in a particular context to mitigate human suffering. 
Back Pack's 'humanitarian struggle' unites the provision of aid with a politico-moral 
vision, itself tied to the life experiences and embodied histories of state violence of its 
.. 
founders and members. This humanitarian struggle implies an attribution of legitimacy 
to some socio-political actors in Burma rather than others. For over a decade, it was 
endorsed by international donors and political actors. At a time of significant 
(geo )political change, however, international-level attributions of legitimacy to different 
socio-political actors in Burma shifted, with significant impacts on an already polarised 
and emotive politics of aid. 
This ethnographic study highlights the importance of analysing systems through which 
aid works from the perspective of values attributed to these systems by actors at 
different scales of analysis and in relation to wider political and geopolitical changes. It 
focuses on the complex and often-invisible webs of local organisations, international 
NGOs, donors and other socio-political actors, which can develop in a cross-border and 
extra-legal context - a context where co1npeting constructions of syste1ns as legitimate 
or illegitimate, humanitarian or not humanitarian are highlighted. It is in such a context 
and at a time of significant (geo )political change that constructions of 'licitness' can 
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become most pertinent and that divergent and shifting attributions of value by actors at 
different scales become particularly significant. Finally, the thesis links this analysis to 
a conceptualisation of hu1nanitarianism as an unequal 'politics of life' and 'politics of 
value'. It thus highlights ways in which actors differentially situated in an international 
system of 'humanitarian government' can be involved in contests over the attribution of 
value not only to human lives per se, but also to the systems and practices that enable 
the government of these lives. 
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Introduction: An ethnographic study of the politics of cross-
border humanitarian aid 
On the outskirts of Mae Sot is a dusty compound, surrounded by concrete walls. A Thai 
flag above the heavy metal gate belies the presence of an organisation made up of 
individuals considered illegal by the Thai state. To a newcomer, there is no indication 
that this gate opens into the headquarters of the Back Pack Health Worker Team ( or 
Back Pack, as it is commonly known), one of the largest and most influential groups 
supporting cross-border aid in conflict-affected and remote parts of Burma's 
borderlands. And yet, this compound is the geographic and socio-political nexus of a 
system, which came to be promoted as an alternative model for humanitarian action 
where more conventional approaches were claimed to have failed ethnic minority 
communities in Burma's border areas. 
The politics of humanitarian aid 
The politics of humanitarian aid is a complex and often emotive issue, central to a 
multi-billion dollar global aid industry - or so I argued in a presentation prior to 
beginning fieldwork on the Thai-Burma border. But until I had worked with Back Pack 
in Mae Sot, I did not grasp the extent to which the debate around cross-border aid in 
particular is politicised and polarised. I also did not appreciate the impact that this 
would have on my existence in the field, memorably as a researcher who was told early 
on by one of Back Pack's leaders that she could not "sit on the fence". 
Through an ethnographic study of a cross-border aid organisation, this thesis explores 
issues that go to the heart of the politics of humanitarian aid. At a time of significant but 
uneven and contested political change in Burma, Back Pack members had to grapple 
with questions pertaining to political neutrality, humanitarian intervention and state 
sovereignty, and legitimate humanitarian representations, systems and practices. Such 
debates have shaped the history of international humanitarian systems, but continue to 
raise complex and often unresolved political and ethical questions. Back Pack's case 
thus highlights problems at the heart of humanitarianism, of how and why hu1nanitarian 
actors are involved in promoting particular 'motivated truths', and of the often unequal 
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values attributed to human lives within an international system of 'humanitarian 
government' involving a multiplicity of actors with sometimes conflicting agendas 
(Fassin 2007b; 2012; Redfield 2006). By focusing on the evolution of cross-border aid -
and on shifting attributions of value to this system - the ethnography highlights ways in 
which local-level actors, systems and practices can be (re)defined as legitimate or 
illegitimate, humanitarian or not humanitarian. 
This thesis therefore focuses on the evolving politics of aid on and beyond the Thai-
Burma border, a context shaped by a history of conflict and political violence. Drawing 
on anthropological tools and methods, it investigates the socio-political development of 
a system supporting healthcare to communities in areas where international aid agencies 
were historically denied access (Duffield 2008). It explores the experiences and 
worldviews of men and women implementing cross-border aid, and analyses ways in 
which local-level actors attempt to influence a politicised and often emotive debate. As 
well as analysing what is at stake in an evolving politics of aid to a country undergoing 
political change, the thesis identifies what this ethnography reveals in terms of 
humanitarian systems more generally, and ways in which different actors as well as 
wider structural factors can impact on an unequal politics of life and politics of value 
(Fassin 2007b; 2012). 
Inspired by the writings of anthropologists such as Paul Farmer and Didier Fassin, the 
ethnography situates the life stories, understandings and actions of individuals and 
groups in relation to wider historical and structural factors, including the deep-seated 
inequalities in which they are embedded (e.g. Farmer 1996; 2004; Fassin 2007; 2012). It 
explores the 'logic' of humanitarian actors and systems, as well as ways in which 
individuals' and groups' histories, experiences and worldviews influence particular 
discourses and practices of humanitarianism. Such an exploration is particularly 
valuable in an international system of 'humanitarian government' (Fassin 2012), which 
in recent decades has placed increased emphasis on funding local organisations to 
implement aid programmes - organisations, which can be linked in various ways with 
socio-political movements (Atlani-Duault 2005; 2009). 
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In a situation characterised by protracted conflict, violence and competing claims to 
socio-political legitimacy, this type of analysis becomes all the more important. Socio-
political violence profoundly influences people's identities, as well as their ways of 
being and acting in the world (Feldman 1991; Nordstrom and Robben 1995). An 
embodied history of violence, as the concept is developed by Fassin (2007; 2008), can 
also shape institutions that develop in a particular context to mitigate human suffering. 
Indeed, violence and suffering not only shape the worldviews and actions of those 
designated as victims - the aid beneficiaries - but can also profoundly influence 
humanitarian actors and institutions, particularly when humanitarians are both victims 
of political violence and agents in a system developed to mitigate its effects. As 
described in this thesis, the Back Pack medics are at the sa1ne time victims of state 
violence and humanitarian actors responding to this violence. An embodied history of 
state violence profoundly influences Back Pack's organisational ideology and 
positioning in an evolving politics of aid. And at the international level, the Back Pack 
medic comes to represent a particular subjectivity: that of the humanitarian as victim, 
whose history of suffering can mobilise legitimacy for a 'humanitarian struggle'. 
This study ultimately demonstrates the importance of considering the systems through 
which humanitarianism works from the perspective of values attributed to these systems 
by actors at different scales of analysis and in relation to wider political and geopolitical 
changes - a perspective, which is generally given little attention in analyses of 
humanitarianism. Such an investigation, however, can be important for understanding 
how particular actors, systems and practices may or may not come to be defined as 
humanitarian. Both official and academic studies of aid also pay relatively little 
attention to the complex and often invisible ( or 'under the radar') webs of local 
organisations, international Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), donors, and other 
socio-political actors that can develop in a cross-border and extra-legal context. Yet it is 
frequently at the margins of sovereignty and of state definitions of legality that some of 
the political and ethical dilemmas of humanitarianism become most pertinent. And it is 
within networks that operate through these marginal spaces, and at times of significant 
(geo )political change, that competing constructions of systems as legiti1nate or 
illegitimate, humanitarian or not humanitarian can become most significant. 
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Humanitarian aid to Burma: a polarised debate 
In the Burmese context, the aid debate is linked to the country's volatile history, 
competing claims to socio-political legitimacy and evolving international (geo )politics 
(Duffield 2008). Until recently, Burma was renowned for a military junta, which had 
repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to use brute force, surveillance, propaganda and 
draconian laws to preserve its predatory grip on power. When I began fieldwork in 
2009, conflict between state forces and ethnic nationalist groups had been ongoing for 
over sixty years in parts of the borderlands (Smith 2007; South 2008). Ethnic minority 
communities had been subjected to systematic and widespread abuses by armed state 
and non-state actors. Communities in these areas historically had little to no access to 
basic healthcare and education, and their livelihoods were constantly threatened. As part 
of its counter-insurgency campaign, moreover, the Burmese state restricted or banned 
humanitarian access to civilian populations in unstable border areas for most of this 
period (Duffield 2008; Rae 2007; Stover, et al. 2007). 
The Burmese junta's violent repression of the 1988 democracy uprisings and denial of 
the results of the 1990 elections led to international condemnation, sanctions, and 
isolation of what came to be seen as a pariah state (Pedersen 2008a). But historically, 
little international consensus existed concerning how best to improve the lives and 
livelihoods of communities in areas where the state denied humanitarian access 
(Duffield 2008). Conflict-affected, displaced and impoverished communities in 
Burma's disputed borderlands were defined as in need of humanitarian aid; where 
policy makers, donors, aid workers and analysts differed was in defining the 
mechanisms through which these needs should be met. 
Cross-border aid is when assistance is provided through systems, which cross a state 
border to access people living within a situation defined as a humanitarian crisis. On the 
Thai-Burma border, the te1m is used to describe a wide range of systems and 
programmes that generally developed from the 1990s onwards to support the continued 
provision of services to ethnic minority communities in unstable and remote areas 
(Beyrer and Lee 2008). Cross-border aid enables international funding, supplies and 
✓ 
technical know-how to be channelled to groups working inside Burma from logistics 
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and management bases on the other side of the border. It is implemented without 
approval from the Burmese state and, in conflict areas, typically involves working in 
cooperation with groups referred to at the international level as non-state armed actors 
(Duffield 2008; South, et al. 2010). 
The main alternative model through which humanitarian needs in Burma's borderlands 
can theoretically be met is through state-sanctioned assistance: aid is provided by 
organisations such as NGOs or United Nations agencies, which operate within the 
parameters defined by the Burmese state. But due to state restrictions, international aid 
organisations historically had little access to Burma's borderlands. Since the late 1990s, 
a number of powerful donor countries funded cross-border aid, on the premise that 
vulnerable populations were unable to access aid through more conventional 
mechanisms. But the situation on the ground and in the wider region evolved during the 
1990s and 2000s, and by the time I began fieldwork, this premise was being questioned 
(Duffield 2008; South, et al. 2010). The debate around cross-border aid - and the 
politics of aid to Burma more generally - had also become increasingly polarised. 
At stake in the debate around cross-border aid is the question of who should deliver 
assistance and how. In the Burmese context, the debate is fundamentally political and 
linked with decades-long conflict over who is a legitimate political authority. Aid today 
is also a multi-billion dollar industry, in which the careers and reputations of people 
sometimes far removed from a humanitarian crisis are at stake. So politics, money and 
power are key components of the debate. But for Back Pack medics and leaders, there 
are other concerns - and finding out what is at stake for the people on the ground is 
essential in order to understand why the debate around cross-border aid developed into 
one where, by the time of my fieldwork, it had become almost impossible not to take 
sides. The evolving debate also reveals crucial issues in an international politics of aid, 
which has evolved substantially in the past century but in which humanitarian actors 
and systems continue to be faced with co1nplex political and ethical dilemmas. 
7 
Research questions: legitimate humanitarianism in an evolving politics 
of aid 
Through an ethnographic focus on the Back Pack Health Worker Team, this thesis seeks 
to explore how and why local-level actors, systems and practices come to be defined as 
legitimate or illegitimate, humanitarian or not humanitarian. 
The thesis analyses ways in which a local organisation is affected by and tries to 
influence an evolving political and moral economy of aid. It explores the impact of a 
history of political violence, protracted conflict and competing claims to legitimacy on 
the worldviews and actions of local humanitarian actors. It also investigates the impacts 
of these historical and political factors on institutions that develop out of such a context 
to mitigate human suffering. It analyses the evolution of systems labelled as 
humanitarian within a complex and dynamic (geo )political context. It explores the 
values attributed to these systems at different times and by different actors within an 
unequal system of international 'humanitarian government' - and in so doing, it 
highlights the sometimes-conflicting 'logics' behind these values. 
In addressing these issues, the thesis illustrates political and ethical dilemmas that can 
arise when international frameworks and agendas are applied to the realities of a local-
level, long-lasting and evolving conflict situation. It illustrates how local perceptions 
and frameworks can at different times clash or converge, adapt to or attempt to alter, 
evolving priorities and frameworks for policy making and action at the international 
level. As such, it seeks to advance theoretical understandings of humanitarianism, by 
focusing on systems that have evolved for over a decade in the domain of what one 
Back Pack leader calls the 'legal-illegal' - a domain where sometimes conflicting 
constructions of actors, systems and practices as legitimate or illegitimate are 
highlighted. The analysis of such construction processes is particularly important, 
moreover, in an international context, which has witnessed the proliferation of actors, 
syste1ns and practices laying claim to the label of 'humanitarian', but in which there is 
an ongoing lack of consensus as to the legitimacy of different models or practices of 
humanitarianism. 
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The ethnography: a positioned interpretation 
Back Pack evolved as a product of and response to what its leaders call the 'chronic 
emergency' in Burma's borderlands. The organisation was initially a response to scaled-
up conflict and displacement in eastern Burma in the 1990s - in particular, in Karen 
State - and to the destruction and depletion of healthcare services previously supported 
through systems administered by ethnic nationalist organisations 1. To support 
healthcare in re1note and conflict-affected communities, Back Pack's founders drew on 
existing networks and socio-political systems in different 'ethnic states'. Their vision 
was to strengthen local networks and capacities, which they hope will provide the basis 
for future generations' health systems in a Burma in which the rights and freedoms of 
ethnic minority communities will be fulfilled. Over the years, Back Pack also evolved 
significantly beyond the provision of emergency medical aid in Burma's eastern 
border lands. 
By the time I began fieldwork in late 2009, Back Pack had grown into the largest cross-
border aid organisation supporting medical services and primary healthcare in Burma2. 
The organisation is also considered unique for a number of reasons. First, in contrast to 
a number of organisations operating in the borderlands and that are affiliated with one 
ethnic nationalist group, Back Pack is a multi-ethnic organisation, which at the level of 
its target areas is better understood as a network building on and bridging between 
systems in diverse community contexts within different states and divisions of Burma. 
Second, Back Pack targets communities not accessed by other service providers. Back 
Pack medics therefore work in some of the most remote and dangerous parts of the 
border areas, and have attracted much attention from journalists looking for a good 
story, foreigners wanting to help the people of Burma, as well as the occasional 
'hellhole junkie'. Finally, since its origins Back Pack has been linked into a network 
comprising powerful individuals and groups whose influence extends far beyond the 
Thai-Burma border and who enabled the organisation to access increasing amounts of 
1 The evolution of healthcare systems in relation to political and military changes in these areas is described in 
Chapters 2 and 3. 
2 As illustrated in this thesis, however, Back Pack's leaders contest and seek to redefine the label of 'cross-border aid' 
- a label that is considered misleading and that can have significant political consequences. 
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international funding and political support. 
From its humble beginnings, Back Pack thus grew into an influential actor on and 
beyond the Thai-Burma border, and into a model promoted for humanitarian action 
within and beyond Burma's 'chronic emergency'. By the time of my fieldwork, the 
organisation was often viewed as the archetypical model of cross-border aid. A 
government donor agency representative once said: "when we talk to back-donors about 
cross-border work, they immediately think about Back Pack". A decade after its 
creation, and largely as a result of its growing influence and reputation, Back Pack had 
also become central to the debate around cross-border aid and was therefore a highly 
pertinent case study in the politics of aid to Burma. 
Between December 2009 and March 2012, I conducted ethnographic research with 
Back Pack members while also working as a volunteer in their head office in Mae Sot, 
on the Thai side of the Thai-Burma border. This period was one of significant albeit 
uneven and contested political change in Burma. Changes in Burma - as well as wider 
regional and international (geo )political shifts - brought to the fore key tensions in an 
evolving politics of aid. In particular, ways in which different actors, systems and 
practices could come to be (re )defined as humanitarian or not humanitarian were 
highlighted. This thesis therefore focuses on a particular timeframe, as well as events 
and evolutions leading up to it. Developments in Burma, the wider region and the 
politics of aid after March 2012 are beyond the scope of this analysis. 
A year before I began fieldwork, Mark Duffield described a polarisation of discourses 
in relation to Burma, with those on different 'sides' of a politicised debate similarly 
claiming to speak on behalf of the Burmese people in what had become an 
internationalised battle of legitimacies (Duffield 2008). This polarisation, which 
influences the debate around cross-border aid, is also reflected in the names used to 
describe the country: 
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Even the nan1e of the country has become paii of a classificatory process. In 1989 
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the forerunner of the 
SPDC3, as part of a wider process of renaming, changed the colonially imposed 
'Burma' to what it argued was a more authentic 'Myanmar'. While this change has 
been accepted by the county's regional neighbours, and to a large extent internally, 
many political opponents, advocacy groups and Western governments pointedly 
retain the name Bunna as an invocation of the continuing struggle for liberal values 
(see Callahan 2007: ix-xi). The danger of a polarised discourse, however, is that 
even a name carries the risk of instant classification as friend or foe (Duffield 2008: 
12). 
While recognising the politicisation of names and the polarisation of positions that these 
can reflect, I have chosen to use Burma as the name of the country, and Rangoon as that 
of its former capital. I have done so to reflect the terms used by the men and women I 
worked with during my fieldwork, and whose stories and perspectives are presented 
through the following chapters. This decision also reflects the self-conscious 
positioning of a researcher who, as already mentioned, was told that she could not "sit 
on the fence". As further discussed in Chapter 2, the ethnographic account presented 
here thus remains a "positioned interpretation", but one which seeks to enlighten a 
politicised and often-emotive debate and to understand why, in such a context, not 
taking sides could often mean being branded as an enemy (Masse 2006: 941 ). 
The resulting ethnography seeks to acknowledge and recount the experiences of 
violence often expressed through the register of suffering by men and women I worked 
with, as well as analysing the ways in which suffering can become a political object. It 
thereby attempts to avoid a reduction of human suffering that either ignores ways in 
which it can be instrumentalised, or fails to recognise its reality for those whose life 
experiences are expressed in these terms (Fassin 2012; Kleinman and Kleinman 1991). 
The analysis has, however, been framed within the recognition that - as a foreign 
researcher not having experienced the reality of violence that has shaped the 
worldviews of Back Pack's members - I only ever had access to the narration of these 
experiences, to the observation of ways in which individuals perform their daily lives, 
and to these individuals' rationalisations of the evolving context in which they work. In 
3 The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) was the official name of the Burmese military government from 
1997 to 2011. 
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other words, as Fassin argues, "with the tools available to social science, we have 
access only to the culturally significant expression of these affects" - and of the 
construction processes of which these affects become the object (Fassin 2012: 203). 
Back Pack's 'humanitarian struggle' - as it was described to me by one of the 
organisation's leaders - cannot be understood in isolation from the individual life 
stories and collective experiences of its founders and members. This humanitarian 
struggle, like other humanitarian systems before it, unites the provision of aid with a 
political and moral mission (e.g. De Waal 1997; 2010). For close to a decade, it was 
endorsed by powerful international donors and political actors. At a time of significant 
yet uncertain change, however, attributions of legitimacy to different socio-political 
actors in Burma shifted, with significant impacts on an already-divisive politics of aid. 
This study highlights these shifts and their consequences, as well as illustrating how 
local-level actors, systems and practices can at different times be defined as 
humanitarian or not humanitarian. It thus raises political and ethical questions that go to 
the heart of the nature of humanitarianism. And it links these questions to an analysis of 
the often unequal values given to human lives - and to systems that enable the 
government of these lives - by an international system of 'humanitarian government' 
involving a multiplicity of actors with sometimes conflicting agendas and frameworks. 
Throughout this thesis, I employ the terms discourse and practice, drawing on ways in 
which the concepts were developed by Michel Foucault, while recognising limitations 
to Foucauldian approaches4 (Foucault 1979; 1980; 1982; 1990). Many anthropologists 
have drawn on F oucauldian theory to conceptualise aid systems as regimes of 
rationality, and explicit or implicit reference is often made to Ferguson's 
conceptualisation of aid as an anti-politics machine (Ferguson 1990). Humanitarianism 
has also been analysed as a new form of biopolitics, but while such approaches open up 
a fertile domain of investigation, they tend to avoid what Nicolas Rose calls the politics 
of life itself, and the ways in which this is associated with inequalities between human 
beings (Fassin 2006; 2007b; Rose 2001 ). This thesis therefore draws on approaches, 
-+ Limitations to Foucauldian approaches are mentioned below and fu~ther described in Chapter 1, which discusses the 
theoretical frameworks, concepts and tools mobilised in this research. 
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which highlight the ways in which humanitarian discourses and practices can attribute 
different values and meanings to human lives (Fassin 2007b; 2009; 2012). 
Another approach derived from F oucauldian theory consists of exam1n1ng the 
construction and subjectification of subjects through discourses and practices of 
humanitarianism - and aspects of this approach are useful for the research at hand. 
However, Foucauldian approaches have a tendency to reduce the subject to a type of 
'docile body', at once the product of power and forever bound to regimes of rationality 
and patterns of conduct that allow for no agency outside the terms of the dominant 
discourse (Giddens 1984). Instead, it is a key intention of this research to recognise and 
engage with human agency in its complex manifestations and inevitable limitations, 
without however falling into the trap of ethnographic 'thinness' and of reducing all 
human action to resistance (Brown 1996; Ortner 1995). As Sherry Ortner argues in her 
influential critique of the frameworks of resistance developed by James Scott and others 
(Scott 1989), "resistors are doing more than simply opposing domination, more than 
simply producing a virtually mechanical re-action. They have their own politics" 
(Ortner 1995: 176-177). And it is precisely these types of politics that this thesis aims to 
explore, as well as the ways in which the politicised subjectivity of the Back Pack 
1nedic might transect and transcend common humanitarian discourses and practices. 
Within this overall approach, the reader will note a heavy reliance on the writings of 
Didier Fassin. There are a number of reasons why I have drawn heavily on Fassin's 
work. First, Fassin's concept of embodied past allows for an understanding of the ways 
in which a history of violence and suffering can shape individuals' and groups' ways of 
being and acting in the world (Fassin 2007; 2008). Second, Fassin reorients Foucault's 
work to emphasise a politics of life inequalities (Fassin 2007b; 2009), which allows for 
a conceptual linking of systems of human government to issues of violence, suffering, 
inequality and injustice. Third, Fassin analyses 'humanitarian government' as a politics 
of suffering, acknowledging people's very real experiences of violence expressed 
through suffering, as well as recognising and analysing the ways in which this suffering 
can become a political object (Fassin 2004b; 2007c; 2012). And finally, Fassin 
conceptualises humanitarianism as a politics of life, through which different meanings 
and values are attributed to human lives - he thereby applies his reorientation of 
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Foucauldian analyses to the study of humanitarian systems, discourses and practices 
(Fassin 2007b; 2012). 
Fassin's work is therefore particularly useful for conceptualising and analysing the 
actors, systems and practices of humanitarianism. Through a particular ethnographic 
study, this thesis seeks to draw on and extend his work, notably by focusing on 
humanitarian systems in the realm of the 'legal-illegal' and in relation to the sometimes 
divergent values given not only to human lives but also to systems that enable the 
government of these lives within a shifting (geo )political context. It also seeks to 
analyse ways in which humanitarianism, as a form of collective action, can be framed 
within a broader political struggle and search for social justice, and within attempts to 
obtain recognition for a particular system of values and associated politico-moral 
worldview. 
The thesis thus investigates ways in which actors differentially situated in an 
international system of 'humanitarian government' - a system that can traverse the grey 
zones of borderlands and (il)legality - can be involved in contests over the attribution of 
value not only to human lives per se, but also to systems and practices that enable the 
government of these lives. As mentioned above, this study demonstrates the importance 
of analysing systems and flows through which humanitarian aid works from the 
perspective of values attributed to these systems by actors at different scales of analysis 
and in relation to wider political and geopolitical changes. In particular, comparing and 
contrasting state definitions of legitimacy ( defined in terms of legality) with social 
definitions of legitimacy ( defined in terms of (il)licitness) enables a fuller understanding 
of the functioning, development and evolution of cross-border aid, and of evolving 
politics of aid more generally. Such an analysis draws on work by Abraham and van 
Schendel, who highlight the need to transcend state-centric frameworks and analyse 
constructions of (il)licitness through different actors' attributions of value to systems 
and flows in which they are involved (Abraham and van Schendel 2005). 
It is in the grey areas of the borderlands and at the peripheries of states' definitions of 
legality - in the marginal spaces that enable cross-border aid to function - that 
constructions of (il)licitness can become most pertinent (Abraham and van Schendel 
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2005). It is also within such marginal spaces and at times of significant (geo )political 
change that the sometimes divergent attributions of value by actors at different scales to 
systems that enable the government of human lives come to be highlighted. Attributions 
of legitimacy are linked to the values that actors attribute to such systems. In the 
ethnographic example presented in this thesis, values ascribed by Back Pack members 
to different actors, systems and practices are shaped by a history of violence. These 
values can clash or converge at different times with the frameworks and agendas of 
more powerful actors in an unequal system of 'humanitarian government' (Fassin 
2012). The legitimacy that those more powerful actors attribute to different actors, 
systems and practices is, moreover, crucial in determining whether and how these come 
to be defined as humanitarian. 
Thesis outline 
Chapter 1 provides a brief history of international humanitarian systems and practices, 
as a way to situate the ethnographic study within wider debates on the nature and 
practice of humanitarianism. The chapter then outlines theoretical frameworks, concepts 
and tools utilised in the analysis. It describes how the thesis draws on, engages with and 
seeks to relate two main bodies of theory or conceptual frameworks: concepts from 
anthropological attempts to understand violence and suffering; and concepts from a 
critical anthropology of humanitarian discourses and practices. These two conceptual 
frameworks correspond roughly to Part 1 and Part 2 of the thesis, but the intention is 
also to demonstrate ways in which they can be put into dialogue. In particular, the thesis 
demonstrates how an analysis of historical factors behind agents' attributions of value to 
the actors, systems and practices they encounter in their daily lives can enable a better 
understanding of humanitarianism, of its actors and systems, and of dilemmas they face. 
Chapter 2 outlines the historical backdrop and methodological approach for this 
research. It describes the context for the emergence of cross-border aid on the Thai-
Burma border and for fieldwork conducted with Back Pack between December 2009 
and March 2012. After decades of conflict and political instability, this period was one 
of potentially significant change for the people of Burma. National, regional and 
international shifts that occurred at this time were also essential to understanding an 
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evolving politics of aid. The chapter then describes the research methodology, which 
included long-term participant observation within Back Pack, as well as targeted 
interviews, discourse and narrative analysis, and research into what the organisation's 
leaders call their local-global partnerships. The chapter also details practical and ethical 
challenges negotiated during and after fieldwork, and discusses 'taking sides' as a 
methodological approach and personal response to working with people whose lives are 
framed by a history of violence, oppression and injustice. 
The next five chapters encompass the research findings and an ethnographic account of 
Back Pack's system of cross-border aid at different levels, from the local to the global. 
The first two of these chapters (Part 1) focus on the individual and communal histories 
of the men and women who became part of Back Pack. They describe the ways in 
which these histories are central to the creation of an organisation that was and 
continues to be profoundly influenced by the politico-moral worldviews of its founders 
and members. Chapter 3 describes Back Pack's history and evolution up until the 
beginning of my fieldwork and within the wider politics of aid to Burma. Chapter 4 
focuses on the life stories of different individuals within the organisation, and examines 
the influence of a history of conflict and violence on their worldviews and actions; it 
also analyses the institutionalisation within Back Pack of what is then revealed to be a 
particular vision of and for the world. 
Chapters 5 to 7 (Part 2) focus on the politics of aid at different levels, as well as 
analysing cross-border aid from the perspective of the values and legitimacies attributed 
to different socio-political actors and systems by agents at different levels and in 
relation to (geo )political changes over time. In Chapter 5, two case studies are used to 
illustrate the ways in which Back Pack works in different target areas, and to highlight 
difficulties in applying internationally defined concepts such as neutrality or 
impartiality to a context shaped by decades of state violence, conflict and competing 
claims to socio-political legitimacy. This chapter also puts forward an analysis of the 
systems that cross-border aid works with and through, which takes into account local-
level actors' attributions of value to the systems in which they are involved. Chapter 6 
continues this analysis, as well as describing Back Pack's local-global partnerships and 
ways in which these enable the organisation's leaders to access international support. It 
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discusses the meaning of donor funding for those on the ground and potential costs that 
it might entail, as Back Pack's leaders seek international legitimacy for their 
'humanitarian struggle'. Chapter 7 describes events after Burma's first elections in over 
twenty years, and ways in which an evolving politics of aid can entail shifting 
attributions of legitimacy, as well as attempts by powerful actors to redefine principles 
and practices labelled as humanitarian. 
The Conclusion provides a discussion of the key findings of this research in relation to 
the questions and issues identified above. It examines what this particular ethnographic 
study reveals in terms of anthropological understandings of the politics of humanitarian 
aid, in terms of dilemmas and possible tensions in international humanitarian systems 
and practices, and in terms of ways to understand and potentially move beyond what is 
revealed throughout the following chapters to be an emotive and polarised debate. 
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CH 1: Humanitarianism, Victims and Politics: conceptual 
debates and approaches 
This research consists of an anthropological study of a local NG05 on the Thai-Burma 
border dedicated to providing what is commonly referred to as cross-border aid. 
Whether this type of NGO - and its ideology, systems and practices - might be 
qualified as 'humanitarian' was itself an issue of contention during my fieldwork. 
Tensions around the label 'humanitarian' and what it might confer in tum highlighted 
sometimes conflicting frameworks and agendas in an evolving politics of aid. The 
debate around cross-border aid, however, has to be understood in relation to the history 
of and contradictions in international humanitarian systems, evolving national, regional 
and international politics, and the individual and communal histories of the men and 
women involved. 
This chapter provides an overview of debates and identifies approaches useful for 
addressing the research questions outlined in the Introduction. The first part of the 
chapter briefly reviews the genealogy of humanitarianism as it is more narrowly 
understood - as an international regime that evolved largely out of medical aid in 
conflict situations - in order to highlight competing frameworks and recurring tensions. 
The second part draws on two domains of anthropological theory, which are related in 
this research - the first e1nerging from medical anthropology's engage1nent with 
violence and suffering, the second from anthropological studies of humanitarian actors, 
institutions, systems, discourses and practices. This section identifies approaches useful 
for conceptualising the perspectives and actions of individuals and groups who are at 
the same time subjects of political violence and agents in a system developed to 
mitigate its effects - the focus of this thesis being on Back Pack members, Back Pack as 
an institution, and the interplay between individuals, institutions and wider 
humanitarian systems. Finally, the chapter proposes an analysis of hu1nanitarian actors, 
5 Back Pack members and partners refer to the organisation as a Community-Based Organisation (CBO), reflecting 
its positioning as representative of the community (see Chapters 3-4). For the purpose of analysis, however, I use the 
more general term Non-Government Organisation (NGO) - referring to an organisation that is distinct from the state 
and market - and I draw on elements of the literature on NGOs, which are described below. 
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institutions, systems, discourses and practices, which takes into account a diversity of 
standpoints and frameworks, and relates the perspectives and actions of those on the 
ground to an evolving international political and moral economy. 
A. Humanitarianism and politics: historical dilemmas, ongoing 
tensions 
[E]very concept of humanitarianism, like every concept of what it means to be 
fully hu1nan, has a history and, more impo1iant, a historical context that we ignore 
at our peril (Rieff 2002: 67). 
Humanitarianism has often been claimed to embody an ethic of humanity, uniting a 
search for inclusion of the 'other' within a common humanity with a refusal of 
indifference in the face of human suffering. For Rony Brauman, former president of 
Medecins Sans Frontieres, humanitarian action thus concretises an ethic of solidarity, 
extending a fraternal hand to victims above and beyond ideological or other divides; 
humanitarianism is not a political issue and should remain distinct from politics 
(Brauman 2000). Such definitions, however, risk obscuring ways in which 
humanitarianism inevitably raises complex political and ethical questions. 
Contemporary humanitarian systems are generally described as having developed out of 
the provision of emergency n1edical aid in conflict situations and the birth of the Red 
Cross at the end of the nineteenth century. Their philosophical underpinnings, however, 
can be traced further back6. The anti-slavery movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries notably united a commitment to the idea of social reform with an ethic of 
active co1npassion tied to Enlightenment notions of individualism, Western liberalism 
and Christian 1norality (Redfield and Bornstein 2011 ). And it is a similar moral logic of 
compassion - emotive corollary and ethical response to human suffering - that is 
described as characterising the humanitarian 'reason' or discourse that came to 
dominate contemporary international politics ( de Senarclens 1999; Fassin 2012; Revault 
6 The historical evolution of humanitarianism as a philosophy has been analysed in particular by de Senarclens and 
Revault d' Allones (de Senarclens 1999; Revault d'Allonnes 2008). Detailed and critical genealogies of contemporary 
humanitarian systems have also been developed by a number or'analysts (e.g. Fassin 2004b; 2012; Rieff 2002; 
Ryfman 1999; 2008). 
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d'Allonnes 2008). 
Although it had historical precedents, "the project of nineteenth-century 
humanitarianism refashioned a matter of virtue into a moral and legal category focused 
on health care" (Redfield 2011: 59). After the creation of the Red Cross in 1864, the 
world wars and evolution of conflict during the twentieth century reinforced the 
perceived need to institutionalise systems for providing relief to conflict-affected 
populations ( de Senarclens 1999). The interwar and post-World War II period saw the 
development of international and inter-governmental humanitarian systems, laws and 
practices; but even in early stages, the task of relieving conflict-affected populations 
was often relegated to emerging charity groups and associations, rather than 
government or inter-government systems. And as the configuration of international 
relations evolved, so too did definitions of effective and legitimate humanitarian 
systems and practices. 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 created the 'humanitarian space' of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in that they "established the legitimacy of a 
neutral third party on the battlefield - the aid givers" (Rieff 2002: 69). The medical 
neutrality of these aid givers theoretically entails protection under International 
Humaniarian Law (IHL) 7, as long as they demonstrate impartiality in the provision of 
assistance (Kalshovan 2007). The ICRC endorses the Funda1nental Principles of the 
Red Cross, which include humanity, impartiality and neutrality (Pictet 1979). But while 
the definition of these principles is seemingly straightforward 8, their interpretation and 
implementation is complex and often contested. The history of contemporary 
international humanitarianism can to an extent be read through disagreements and 
7 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, along with the declarations and treaties following 
the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, provide a framework for what is now commonly referred to as International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL). The 'Hague Law' is concerned with the conduct of hostilities and establishes the principle 
of distinction between civilians and military targets - non-combatants being civilians as well as combatants who are 
sick or injured. The Four Conventions and their Additional Protocols are concerned with the treatment of victims of 
war, including wounded and sick members of armed forces, prisoners of war and civilians. The Geneva Conventions 
are addressed to states and "in so far as they reflect international customary law they are binding on all states, 
whether or not they are parties to the Conventions" (Makintosh 2000: 4 ). 
8 Impartiality entails non-discrimination in the provision of aid, operationally translated into distribution of aid being 
proportional to need and level of urgency; neutrality is generally understood as not favouring any party to conflict, 
not allowing resources or areas under the control of the aid group to be used by warring pa1iies, and a duty of 
tolerance towards all parties to conflict (Abel 1998; Plattner 1996; Terry 2002). 
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divisions concerning these principles - neutrality typically being the most contentious 
(Curtis 2001; Redfield 2011; Rieff 2002; Slim 1997; Weiss 1999). As revealed in 
following chapters, debates around cross-border aid on the Thai-Burma border often 
focus on the neutrality or non-neutrality of actors laying claim to the label 
'humanitarian'. At the international level, however, such debates are far from new. 
The ICRC was constituted "around a moral response to the suffering of wounded 
soldiers and a commitment to circumspect operational neutrality" (Hutchinson 1996; 
Redfield 2011: 58). Historically, ICRC's neutrality has also translated into a code of 
confidentiality - "the corollary of the authorization for it to intervene in conflict 
situations was an implicit secrecy clause"9 (Fassin 2012: 205; Leader 1998; Plattner 
1996; Redfield 2006). Ethical dilemmas of this stance were highlighted when it 
transpired that ICRC staff knew about the concentration camps during World War II, 
but concealed this knowledge to preserve access to prisoners (Rieff 2002; Terry 2002). 
But it wasn't until the Biafran war in the late 1960s that dilemmas around neutrality as 
confidentiality famously led to a split in the international humanitarian movement, 
when a group of French doctors broke away from ICRC to denounce what they saw as 
complicity to genocide. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) was created from this 
movement, with a vision to render humanitarianism borderless and independent from 
states (Redfield 2005; 2006). So while ICRC built itself around the emerging order of 
sovereign nation-states, MSF had implications of an "assertive moral vision that 
suggested humanitarian needs took precedence over political order" (Redfield 2006; 
2011). Over time, MSF also became associated with the figure of the humanitarian as 
witness: 
Whereas silence had long been seen as the condition for gaining authorization from 
all parties to the conflict to bring aid to military and civilian groups, to the extent 
that it had become virtually synonymous with neutrality, nongovernmental 
organisations were now on the contrary asserting not only their right but also their 
duty to speak publicly about abuses, crimes, and more broadly the breaches of the 
9 The ICRC, however, does now recognise exceptions to the interpretation of neutrality as confidentiality (Harroff-
Tavel 2003). And indeed, as described in Chapter 2, in the Bmmese context the ICRC broke with its traditional 
stance of silence to denounce violations of International Hmnanitarian Law and state restrictions on access. 
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laws of war they were observing (Fassin 2012: 200). 
MSF's temoignage implies an act of witnessing motivated by the refusal to accept 
human suffering; it is typically presented as deriving from universal moral obligation, 
rather than being linked to the pursuit of specific political objectives (Redfield 2006; 
2011) 10• Through its more outspoken brand of humanitarianism, MSF unites medical 
service provision with the promotion of what Redfield calls a 'motivated truth' - a truth 
that is intended to mobilise action and that combines 
assertions of universalized moral sentiment and opinion with those of specific 
expertise, suggesting a modified relationship with traditions of objectivity and 
neutrality whereby truth might be proclaimed in open association with a point of 
view (Redfield 2006: 5). 
For the likes of Rony Brauman, the role of humanitarianism, in addition to providing 
aid, is then to identify and denounce human suffering (Brauman 1996). But as discussed 
below, naming and publicising suffering can raise complex political and ethical 
dilemmas (Fassin 2012; Redfield 2006; Truchon 2007). The history of humanitarianism 
also needs to be understood in relation to choices that different actors and institutions 
make between the imperative of providing aid and that of de])ouncing suffering; while 
so1ne see these as conflicting, others see both as key to humanitarianism (Redfield 
2011; Rieff 2002). As illustrated in following chapters, Back Pack can be seen to fit 
within the second, more outspoken vein of humanitarianism, uniting witnessing with the 
provision of aid to conflict-affected populations; but in contrast to an international NGO 
like MSF, Back Pack is also tied to the history and politico-moral vision of a particular 
socio-political movement. 
The Biafran response is also worth mentioning here in relation to another contentious 
concept in the history of humanitarianism: ingerence or the 'right to interfere'. In 
10 Redfield describes MSF's complex relationship with neutrality, with the organisation simultaneously embracing 
and denying different aspects of the concept (Redfield 2011 ). MSF still maintains neutrality in its Code of Conduct 
and emphasises operational neutrality in the implementation of aid; but temoignage breaks with the Red Cross 
interpretation of neutrality as confidentiality. This aspect of MSF's work, Redfield argues, may not have been as 
pivotal to the organisation's beginnings as is commonly thought; but temoignage is now central to MSF's 
institutional ideology (Redfield 2011) 
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Biafra, NGOs provided aid in violation of state sovereignty and through cooperation 
with non-state armed actors, to access civilians who were denied assistance through a 
state-imposed blockade. Norwegian Church Relief initially sent aid from the Portuguese 
island of Sao Tome in planes that were also used to carry weapons to the Biafrans 
(thereby violating Nigerian airspace and risking accusations of arms smuggling); the 
NGO justified this as made necessary by the blockade, which it denounced as an illegal 
weapon of war (Perouse de Montclos 2009). By June 1969, a consortium of some thirty 
European and American NGOs had been joined by secular organisations like Oxfam 
and Save the Children, and were channelling aid to the Biafran enclave in violation of 
Nigerian sovereignty. Perouse de Montclos contends, however, that these organisations 
ignored negative side effects of their actions: 
The part played by humanitarian aid is reduced to the attempts to break the 
blockade and to advocate a right of intervention in order to save starving children 
(ibid.: 70). 
The humanitarian response is argued to have legitimised the struggle for independence 
by Christian Igbo secessionists, who were erroneously portrayed through the 
international media as victims of genocide (De Waal 1997; Perouse de Montclos 2009). 
The response also provided material and financial support to the secessionists, who 
were able to perpetuate their struggle to the detriment of civilian populations (De Waal 
2008; Perouse de Montclos 2001; 2009; Smillie 1995). These factors led analysts such 
as De Waal to argue that humanitarian NGOs were misled by and reinforced the 
military position and political legitimacy of the non-state armed actors (De Waal 1997). 
The concept of humanitarian intervention was not new 11 . But Biafra provided the first 
significant example of humanitarian aid provided by international NGOs - some of 
which had powerful government back-donors - in violation of sovereignty and through 
a non-state party to conflict, as well as raising issues to do with aid feeding into conflict. 
Subsequent international responses to conflict situations gave increased credence to the 
notion of a 'right to interfere' (Saillant 2006; 2007). In Ethiopia in the 1980s, for 
11 As emphasised by an increasing number of analysts, humanitarian discourses have long been used in foreign 
diplomacy and to frame international interventions (e.g. de Senarclens 1999; Perouse de Montclos 2009; Rieff2002). 
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example, assistance was channelled to the Eritrean Relief Association and Relief 
Society of Tigray - which acted under the protection and authority of the Eritrean 
People's Liberation Front and Tigrayan People's Liberation Front - to populations 
argued to be deliberately starved as part of the Ethiopian anny's counterinsurgency 
campaign, and where official aid and the international media were manipulated by the 
Ethiopian state (De Waal 1994; 1997; Duffield and Pendergast 1994). 
Humanitarian interventions were, moreover, taking place in an evolving international 
context. The Biafran response took place during the Cold War, when NGOs had to 
abide by the considerations of Realpolitik (De Waal 2007). The NGO movement's 
boom in the 1970s-80s contributed to a 1nultiplication of actors who often went where 
more traditional humanitarian organisations could or would not go, and sometimes 
chose to work with non-state parties to conflict (Saillant 2007; Spearin 2008; Weiss 
1999). With the end of the Cold War, humanitarian and development NGOs were often 
left to fill the vacuum left by world powers' disengagement fro1n 'un-strategic' 
countries (Curtis 2001). The post-Cold War period also meant a more interventionist 
approach to international relations (Curtis 2001; De Waal 2007). 
By the 1990s, the claim to a 'right to interfere' on humanitarian grounds had migrated 
from nongovernment to government terrain (Allen and Styan 2000; Redfield 2011 ). A 
different global situation had also emerged, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the blurring of inter-intra-state warfare. 'Traditional' humanitarian models, which 
presume access on the basis of authorisation from a sovereign state power, were 
increasingly perceived to fall short (Weiss 1999). Indeed, the Geneva Conventions and 
Red Cross model largely presume civilian populations caught between warring state 
parties, rather than conflicts involving non-state actors and in which civilian populations 
are often deliberate targets of military operations (Duffield 1998; Macrae 1998; 
Redfield 2011; Rieff 2002). It was also in the 1990s that international politics were 
marked by increased humanitarian justification for military action and moves to 
legislate a moral 'right to intervene' (Fassin 2012; Redfield 2011; Saillant 2007). 
In the post-Cold War context, influential actors had indeed begun to promote an 
interventionist humanitarianism, which could bypass sovereignty in the name of 
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mitigating human suffering (Rieff 2002; Saillant 2006). Bernard Kouchner popularised 
the framework developed by legal scholar Mario Bettati, who defended a right to 
intervene when governments violate the rights of their peoples. Bettati 's vision was of a 
new interventionist world order, which would ensure unfettered access by humanitarian 
organisations to those in need (Allen and Styan 2000; Bettati 1992; 1996; Rieff 2002). 
During his time as Secretary General to the UN, Kofi Annan promoted a doctrine of 
state sovereignty as responsibility: states are deemed accountable to the international 
community for how they treat their people (Annan 1999; 2001 ). The principle of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was accepted at the 2005 UN World Summit -
superficially substituting the earlier concept of a right to intervene with that of a duty to 
protect12 (Chandler 2007). Supporters of the principle saw this as signifying the end of 
unbridled sovereignty and the concretisation of a global space of rights and 
responsibilities; but huge gaps remained between what Habermas calls norms and facts, 
the terrain of which was - and continues to be - negotiated by politics (Habermas 1996; 
Rieff 2002; Saillant 2006; 2007). 
For Rieff, ideas of an interventionist humanitarianism and sovereignty as responsibility 
are utopian and based on flawed assumptions of an international community and system 
of enforcement: 
The international institutions - first and foremost, the UN - and international treaty 
regimes are not the expression of community but of power. But just because these 
institutions exist does not mean any moral consensus exists, and, at least barring 
the institution of serious enforcement mechanisms, it seems unlikely that these 
regimes will ever have much force (Rieff 2002: 9). 
History demonstrates that when a state engages in systematic abuses against civilian 
populations and/or denies humanitarian access - as in Burma, as described in following 
chapters - international laws in themselves are insufficient (Rae 2007; Saillant 2007). 
12 The principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), itself an attempt to put Arman's idea of sovereignty as 
responsibility into a practical framework, was crystellised through a 2001 Canadian government-sponsored report on 
what were described as 'human rights protection operations', to replace the controversial notion of 'humanitarian 
intervention' (Chandler 2007; IDRC 2001). However, and as argued fwiher below, the importance of the R2P 
framework should not be overstated and there have been multiple examples of it being ignored by world powers. 
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While R2P was claimed to institutionalise a 1noral order prioritising individual rights to 
protection, "it appears that the shift towards intervention under the 'responsibility to 
protect' is as much a pragmatic response to changes in Realpolitik as it is a response 
based on concern for the world's victims" (Chandler 2007: 72). In the absence of a 
global governance and enforcement system, intervention is contingent on the 
(geo )political decisions of powerful states in an evolving balance of power (Chandler 
2007; Slim 1997; Woodward 2001). 
Since the logical extension of a consistently implemented R2P would involve world 
powers in dozens of humanitarian interventions around the world (backed by the 
threat/use of force), world powers typically intervene only when it is comparatively safe 
to do so and/or when their interests are at stake (Rieff 2002). The decision to channel 
aid in violation of sovereignty and in partnership with non-state parties to conflict - as 
in Biafra in the 1960s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, and Bosnia and Somalia in the 1990s, to 
cite some famous cases - is similarly contingent on political decisions of world powers, 
rather than consistent enforcement of international frameworks 13 . Even when 
intervention might be guided by a solidarity politics rather than clear (geo )political 
payoffs - as in the American intervention in Sudan in 2005-8 (De Waal 2010) 
intervention remains "dictated by 'might' rather than 'right"' (Chandler 2007: 72). 
From the 1990s onwards, humanitarian intervention was nevertheless increasingly 
prevalent as a moral framework for political action (Curtis 2001; Saillant 2006; 2007): 
Over the past two decades, humanitarian intervention has increasingly become part 
of the management of world affairs, Far from the traditional model of the Red 
Cross, which was both intimately bound with scenes of war and in principle neutral 
with regard to protagonists, conte1nporary forms of humanitarian action, however 
diverse, have in common a certain degree of difficulty in situating themselves in 
relation to military actors. Indeed, from Bosnia to Afghanistan, from Rwanda to 
Iraq, the very notion of "military-humanitarian" intervention has become a 
commonplace of the rhetoric used to justify what were previously known as "just 
13 It is also worth noting that, despite the recognised changes in the nature of modern warfare, international 
frameworks remain for the most paii concerned with state and not non-state actors (Bellal, et al. 2011). 
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wars" (Fassin 2012: 189). 
In Bosnia, humanitarian action was described as a method to keep the Bosnians where 
they were, containing flight into neighbouring countries where W estem powers would 
need to take care of them (Duffield 1994a; Rieff 2002). Here and in other contexts such 
as Rwanda during and after the genocide, humanitarian action became a substitute for 
military or political intervention - effectively letting world powers 'off the hook' (De 
Waal 1997; Duffield 1994a; 1999; Hendrickson 1998). Humanitarian discourses also 
framed military interventions and so-called preventative wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan 
and Iraq (De Waal 2007; Fassin 2012; Hoffman 2004a; Pugh 1998; Rieff 2002). And 
indeed, by the end of the early 2000s, analysts were describing humanitarian action as 
increasingly tied to political objectives 14, "becoming an integral part of donors' 
comprehensive strategy to transform conflicts, decrease violence and set the stage for 
liberal development" (Curtis 2001: 3; Duffield 2001; Fox 2001; Macrae and Leader 
2002). Yet at the same time, 
humanitarianism has become so much a master idea in the rich world that it cannot 
be viewed, even in the context of war, as merely an instrument policy makers 
deploy when it suits their purposes but to which they have no loyalty (Fassin 2012: 
234). 
By the 1990s, examples demonstrating that aid can feed into the political economy of 
conflict had also multiplied (Curtis 2001; Leader 1998; Perouse de Montclos 2001 ). The 
types of dynamics outlined above for the Biafran conflict were repeatedly encountered 
in situations where humanitarians tried to address human suffering 15 . In particular, 
events in Rwanda in the lead up to and aftermath of the genocide shook 
humanitarianism to its core (Polman 2010; Prunier 2009; Terry 2002). Humanitarians 
14 At a 2001 conference examining what were then considered to be new dimensions in the relationship between 
humanitarian aid and politics, experts identified a number of factors contributing to what they described as 
humanitarian assistance being increasingly used as a strategic tool to fulfil political objectives. These included: 
geopolitical changes; the changing nature of conflict; a redefinition of security that placed development at the heart of 
global security concerns; the perceived failings of humanitarian action in a number of emergencies; and domestic 
policy considerations of donor governments (Cwiis 2001). 
15 Many analysts have discussed the multiple ways in which humanitarian aid can 'do harm', particularly by feeding 
into the political economy of war - (e.g. Anderson 1996; 1999; Brauman 1996; De Waal 1997; Duffield 1999; 
Hendrickson 1998; Hoffman 2004b; Leader 1998; Macrae 1998; 1"999; Perouse de Montclos 2001; 2009; Polman 
2010; Reed, et al. 2004; TeITy 2002; Vaux 2001). 
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increasingly admitted that their assistance could become "intertwined with the forces 
that drive the conflicts that prompted the aid in the first place" (Anderson 1996: 344) -
whether it was usurped by state or non-state fighters, fed into war economies, 
legitimised belligerents, or became a cover for international political/military action or 
inaction. Far from operating in a simple world of "wicked warlords, suffering and 
innocent victims, and noble aid workers" (Rieff 2002: 33), humanitarians had to 
contend with complex and generally unfamiliar situations in which they had to make 
often difficult political and ethical choices, and in which aid inevitably impacted on 
power relations at play (Jewsiewicki 2007). Increasing pessimism took hold of many in 
the humanitarian world who, as encapsulated in the title of a book by MSF Australia's 
founder, questioned whether humanitarianism was not 'condemned to repeat' its errors 
(Terry 2002). At the same time, humanitarian actors increasingly argued that traditional 
principles of neutrality and independence were problematic if not impossible to apply 
(Curtis 2001; Slim 1997; Weiss 1999): 
As all the cases illustrate, however, by the fact of their participation aid 
organisations were necessarily implicated in the larger political picture, particularly 
when in receipt of funds from governments pursuing a political agenda. Whether 
they acknowledged it or not, unless they intervened equally on both sides of a 
conflict or ensured that their aid accrued no benefit to a warring party - something 
impossible - aid organisations were supporting one side by default (Terry 2002: 
220-221). 
For some, any truthful implementation of Anderson's Do No Harm principle meant the 
death of humanitarianism (Anderson 1996; 1999; Macrae 1998; 1999). Others 
multiplied efforts to refine humanitarian practices in light of historical failures, with 
programmes like SPHERE16 and atte1npts to operationalise the Do No Harm framework 
- arguably technocratic answers to political problems (Rieff 2002). At the same time, 
humanitarianism was asked to do ever more, with the rise of rights-based approaches 
and actors inside and outside the industry calling for humanitarianism to take on a role 
16 Established in 1997, the SPHERE project combines a new Humanitarian Chaiier and Minimum Standards in 
Humanitarian Response and aims to improve the quality of humanitarian assistance and the accountability of 
humanitarian actors to their constituents, donors and affected populations. http://vvww.sphereproiect.on41'. - last 
accessed 12 September 2012. 
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1n peace building, social reconstruction, development and other problems early 
humanitarian systems were never created to cure (Cox and Pawar 2006; Macrae 1998; 
Stockton 1998). By the end of the twentieth century, a crisis of humanitarianism had 
arguably emerged from a mismatch between what humanitarians were able to do and 
what they were expected or expected themselves to do (Rieff 2002). Critiques of 
humanitarianism multiplied, the industry was marred by an apparent identity crisis, yet 
humanitarianism continued to expand and proliferate (Barnett and Weiss 2008; Weiss 
1999). By the time Back Pack was created in 1998 on the Thai-Burma border, 
humanitarianism as an ideal had achieved unprecedented reach and authority; yet 
[ a ]11 of its historic certainties - the neutrality so prized by the ICRC, the notion that 
aid should be fundamentally apolitical and should have no other agenda than 
service and solidarity - are being questioned by aid workers themselves, as well as 
by outside critics (Rieff 2002: 24). 
B. Towards a theoretical toolkit: anthropological approaches 
The simplified outline above provides a historical and conceptual background for issues 
discussed in this thesis. It highlights ongoing tensions and divisions around 
humanitarian principles and practices, unresolved dilemmas concerning links between 
humanitarian and political/military actors, as well as ways in which (geo )political 
considerations - rather than consistently implemented humanitarian laws or :frameworks 
- remain key to international humanitarian interventions. Such contextualisation is 
particularly important for the ethnographic example presented in this thesis. Indeed, at a 
time of significant but uneven and contested political change in Burma, Back Pack 
members had to grapple with questions concerning political neutrality, humanitarian 
intervention and state sovereignty, and legitimate humanitarian representations and 
practices - debates, which have shaped the history of international humanitarian 
systems but continue to raise complex and often unresolved political and ethical 
questions. 
While important for situating this research, critiques by humanitarian experts and 
analyses of tensions in humanitarian systems often do insufficient justice to the 
rationalities behind the actions of the individuals and groups involved (Fassin 2012). 
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This research is therefore inspired by anthropologists like Redfield, Mosse, Fassin and 
Atlani-Duault, who ground analyses of aid practices, institutions and syste1ns within an 
ethnographic focus on those within these systems 17 (e.g. Atlani-Duault 2005; Fassin 
2012; Mosse 2005a; Redfield 2005; 2012). Ethnography, moreover, enables a combined 
focus on the lives and worldviews of humanitarian actors with attention to inequalities 
underlying international politico-moral economies. Fassin provides examples of such an 
approach (e.g. Fassin 2007b; 2012), and as outlined below, this thesis draws heavily on 
but also seeks to extend his work - notably by focusing on humanitarianism in a 
particular space, at the margins of state definitions of legality, where considerations of 
legitimacy and value become particularly important. 
In order to address the research questions outlined in the Introduction, and to explore 
ways in which some of the recurring dilemmas of humanitarianism play out within in a 
particular socio-political context, concepts from two bodies of theory are mobilised -
the first emerging from anthropologists' engagement with human suffering, the second 
from critical analyses of aid systems and institutions by anthropologists as well as 
humanitarian and development experts. Conceptualising humanitarianism as a mode of 
governing precariousness and a politics of life (Fassin 2012), this thesis explores the 
perspectives of actors whose deployment and redefinitions of humanitarian discourses 
and practices need to be understood in relation not only to the 'ethnographically visible' 
- to employ Farmer's expression - but also in light of historical factors and an evolving 
international politico-moral economy (Farmer 2004). 
Throughout the thesis, I employ the terms discourse and practice, drawing on ways in 
which these concepts were developed by Foucault, while recognising limitations to 
Foucauldian approaches 18 (Foucault 1979; 1980; 1982; 1990). Anthropologists have 
17 Within anthropology, increasing attention has been paid in the past decade to the heterogeneous discourses, 
practices and actors grouped together under the label 'humanitarian'. Saillant, Atlani-Duault and Vidal, among 
others, have summarised evolutions and approaches in the anthropology of humanitarianism (Atlani-Duault 2005; 
Atlani-Duault and Vidal 2009; Saillant 2007). 
18 Foucauldian history problematises the creation and subjection of subjects; it has often been interpreted as history 
without agency (Giddens 1984; Grillo 1997; Rossi 2004). Yet a closer reading of Foucault's later work in particular 
reveals that this interpretation is perhaps misleading (Crossley 1996). In The Subject and Power, Foucault thus 
outlines the necessary interrelationship between agency and power, arguing that power is in fact only possible by 
virtue of agency: power requires a free actor in order to act upon his actions, or to conduct his conduct (Foucault 
1982). 
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often drawn on F oucauldian theory to conceptualise aid systems as regimes of 
rationality, and explicit or implicit reference is sometimes made to Ferguson's depiction 
of aid as an anti-politics machine (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1990; Grillo 1997; Saillant 
2007). Humanitarianism has also been analysed as a new form of biopolitics 19, but 
while such approaches open up a fertile domain of investigation, they tend to avoid 
what Rose calls the politics of life itself, and the ways in which this is associated with 
fundamental inequalities between human beings (Fassin 2006; 2007b; 2012; Rose 
2001 ). As described below, this thesis therefore draws instead on approaches 
highlighting ways in which humanitarian discourses and practices can attribute different 
values and meanings to human lives (Fassin 2007b; 2009; 2012). 
Another approach derived from Foucauldian theory consists of exammmg the 
construction and subjectification of subjects through discourses and practices of 
humanitarianism, and aspects of this are useful for this research. However, Foucauldian 
approaches have a tendency to reduce the subject to a type of 'docile body', product of 
power and forever bound to regimes of rationality and patterns of conduct that allow for 
no agency outside the terms of the dominant discourse20 (Giddens 1984). Instead, it is a 
key intention of this research to recognise and engage with human agency in its 
complex manifestations and inevitable limitations, without however falling into the trap 
of ethnographic 'thinness' and reducing all human action to resistance (Brown 1996; 
Ortner 1995). As Ortner argues in her critique of concepts of everyday resistance 
developed notably by James Scott (Scott 1989), "resistors are doing more than simply 
opposing domination, more than simply producing a virtually mechanical re-action. 
They have their 01,vn politics" (Ortner 1995: 176-177). 
Within this overall theoretical approach, this thesis draws on specific concepts and 
19 Anthropologists who have drawn on Foucauldian approaches to problematise humanitarianism as a new form of 
biopolitics include for example Redfield and Pandolfi (Pandolfi 2002; 2003; Redfield 2005) . 
2° Foucauldian theory has been criticised for its tendency to portray subjects as passive and devoid of agency. But as 
already mentioned, in The Subject and Power, Foucault outlines the necessary and fundamental interrelationship 
between agency and power, arguing that power is in fact only possible by virtue of agency (Foucault 1982). The very 
notion of power then presupposes some form of agency, and to reduce the Foucauldian subject to a mere ' docile 
body' is arguably to take works such as Discipline and Punish out of their wider context in Foucault's investigation 
of history as the creation of particular forms of subjects and parti{ular types of subjectivities (Foucault 1979; 1980; 
1982; 1990). 
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frameworks developed by a number of anthropologists, as well as humanitarian and 
development experts. The following sections outline these concepts and frameworks -
with the order in which they are addressed roughly following the movement of 
discussion in this thesis: from the individual and communal level, via the institutional 
level and a particular 'humanitarian encounter', to the level of an international 
'humanitarian government' conceptualised as a politics of life and politics of value. 
1. Humanitarianism and suffering 
Humanitarian discourses and practices are inevitably linked with attempts to define, 
respond to and represent human suffering (Barnett and Weiss 2008; Fassin 2012; Fassin 
and Bourdelais 2005; Saillant 2007; Truchon 2007). Drawing on medical 
anthropologists' engagement with suffering, as well as recent anthropological studies of 
humanitarianism, this research relates people's (hi)stories of suffering to ways in which 
suffering might be represented or constructed through discourses and practices of 
humanitarianism. It thus acknowledges the lived realities as well as the political 
significance of suffering (Fassin 2012). 
a. Suffering, violence and the embodiment of history 
This research focuses at an individual level on men and women whose life stories are 
framed by personal and communal experiences of violence, oppression and injustice. 
Through mechanisms described in this thesis, they become part of a system labelled as 
humanitarian and can be seen in various ways to bridge between, redefine and 
potentially challenge popular representations of 'victims' and 'humanitarians'. To 
enable an analysis of such processes, I will briefly review anthropological approaches 
useful for conceptualising the experiences, understandings, and choices of people whose 
worldviews are framed by histories of violence, and for analysing humanitarianism as a 
politics of suffering and victimhood. This is particularly important because, as revealed 
through following chapters, individual and collective histories of violence and suffering 
are vital to Back Pack's functioning, institutional ideology and positioning within an 
evolving politics of aid. 
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In American medical anthropology, the concept of social suffering21 was crystallised 
through the publication of three collective volumes: Social Suffering, Violence and 
Subjectivity, and Remaking a World: Violence, Social Suffering and Recovery (Das, et 
al. 2001; Das, et al. 2000; Kleinman, et al. 1997). Social suffering is said to "collapse 
old dichotomies - for example, those that separate individual from social levels of 
analysis, health from social problems, representation from experience, suffering from 
intervention" (Kleinman, et al. 1997: x). Social suffering thus 
brings into a single space an assemblage of human problems that have their origins 
and consequences in the devastating injuries that social force can inflict on human 
experience. Social suffering results from what political, economic and institutional 
power does to people and, reciprocally, from how these forms of power themselves 
influence responses to social problems (Kleinman, et al. 1997: ix). 
Violence and Subjectivity explores violence as that which makes suffering social: the 
experience of violence causes suffering, yet this cannot be limited to the immediate 
moment when violence is inflicted; experience comes also to be composed of memory, 
at once individual and collective, and of representations both intimate and shared (Das, 
et al. 2000). Anthropologists might then attempt to uncover individual and collective 
memories or histories of violence, as in the approach developed by Fassin and described 
below (Fassin 2007; 2008). And although faced with an incommunicability of pain 
arising from asymmetry of access to experiential knowledge22, 
[ f]rom the perspective of theories of social suffering, such a preoccupation with 
individual certainty and doubt simply seems a less interesting, less important 
question to ask than that of how such suffering is produced in societies and how 
acknowledgement of pain, as a cultural process, is given or withheld (Kleinman, et 
al. 1997: xiii). 
21 In Et la Souffrance Devient Sociale, Didier Fassin reviews the evolution of notions of suffering within medical 
anthropology (Fassin 2004a). 
22 Examples of suffering's relegation to the realm of the unsaid can be found for example in the work of Das (1997), 
in the collective publications by Nordstrom and Robben (1995) and McLean and Leibing (2007), as well as in 
ethnographies of political violence by anthropologists such as Langer (1997), Skidmore (2004; 2009) or Nordstrom 
(2004). ~ 
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The concept of social suffering is also analysed in terms of ways it can be detached 
from human experience and instrumentalised for political and economic ends. Arthur 
and Joan Kleinman thus demonstrate how cultural representations of suffering can be 
appropriated by particular actors or political institutions: 
The existential appeal of human experiences, their potential to mobilise popular 
sentiment and collective action, and even their capability to witness or offer 
testimony are now available for gaining market share (Kleinman, et al. 1997: 1; 
Kleinman and Kleinman 1991). 
As described below, the instumentalisation of suffering has been analysed as one of the 
politically and ethically ambiguous aspects of humanitarianism - and indeed a discourse 
of suffering and victimhood is revealed through this thesis as essential to Back Pack's 
ideological coherence, as well as to the organisation's practices and positioning in an 
evolving politics of aid. But before moving on to a more detailed discussion of literature 
useful for analysing the instrumentalisation of suffering, I will outline approaches to 
understanding impacts of violence - often expressed through the register of suffering -
on the worldviews and actions of individuals and groups. 
Anthropologists such as Feldman describe the formative nature of violence, which 
shapes people's perceptions of who they are and what they are fighting for across space 
and time (Feldman 1991). Nordstrom and Robben, in their introduction to Fieldwork 
under Fire, contend that violence affects "constructs of identity in the present, the hopes 
and potentialities of the future, and even the renditions of the past" (Nordstrom and 
Robben 1995: 5). Scheper-Hughes, however, warns us that: 
In writing against cultures and institutions of fear and domination, the critical 
thinker falls into a classic double bind. Either one attributes great explanatory 
power to the fact of oppression (but in doing so one can reduce the subjectivity and 
agency of subjects to a discourse on victimisation) or one can try to locate the 
everyday form of resistance in the 1nundane tactics and practices of the oppressed, 
the weapons of the weak23 (here one runs the risk of romanticising human suffering 
23 Here, Scheper-Hughes is referring to James Scott' s 'weapons of the weak' (Scott 1989) . 
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or trivialising its effects on the human spirit, consciousness, and will) (Scheper-
Hughes 1992: 533). 
A possible solution is presented through Fassin's work on HIV/AIDS in South Africa. 
Fassin draws on phenomenology24, the paradigm of social suffering, and a critique of 
unequal global power systems lodged within a political economy perspective, to analyse 
the 'embodiment of history' - that is, 
the way in which individual trajectories and collective histories are transcribed into 
individual and collective bodies, in terms of affects and emotions, disease and 
comfort, mourning and pleasure. In other words, it is the way through which social 
structures and norms inscribed in the long term of historical changes impose 
themselves on men and women, both in their everyday existence and in the 
meaning they give to their life and actions (Fassin 2008: 316). 
The immediacy of the past in the present involves both the inscription of history - in 
terms of its structural inequalities, its violence, its injustices - into the lives and bodies 
of the present, as well as the elaboration of representations, discourses and narratives 
accounting for the course of events: "we may attempt to articulate what I have proposed 
to name condition (life embedded in the economic and social reality), on the one hand, 
and experience (life lived both individually and collectively) on the other" (Fassin 2007: 
226). Moreover, "[t]here is no discontinuity between the two, since the historical 
condition informs the experience of history and reciprocally the latter gives its meaning 
to the former" (Fassin 2008: 317). Through his analysis of South African memories of 
apartheid, Fassin highlights the senselessness of opposing history to memory as truth to 
error or even as objectivity to subjectivity, and calls on us to examine the 'politics of 
memory' (Fassin 2008). The 'politics of memory' brings together the two different 
levels of 1nemory distinguished by Ian Hacking - namely, the memory that is 
'communal' and plays a major role in group identity based on founding events, and the 
24 To develop this concept, Fassin draws on Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, which brings forth the 
body proper as the immediate presence of the subject in the world, on Bourdieu's theory of the habitus, which 
provides a conceptual framework to consider the production and reproduction of socio-political inequalities, as well 
as broadening his conceptual apparatus by including the collective dimension of the Durkheimian social body and by 
drawing attention to the historical dimensions of cultural proces~es as theorised by Elias (Bourdieu 1990; Fassin 
2007; 2008 ; Merleau-Ponty 1962). 
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other which is 'personal' and has to do with clai1ns of knowledge about individual 
traces of the past (Hacking 1995). For Fassin, the 'politics of memory' are located at the 
intersection of the communal and personal (Fassin 2008) - and indeed, in the 
ethnography presented in this thesis, a politics of memory brings diverse individuals 
together within an institution, the ideology of which reflects personal and communal 
histories of violence. 
In When Bodies Remember, Fassin applies his concept of embodied history to an 
analysis of the politics of HNI AIDS in post-apartheid South Africa (Fassin 2007). The 
HN epidemic highlights the persistence of the past in the present, especially the 
continued relevance of racial divides: 
For children born in South Africa under apartheid, knowing the world in black and 
white is initially the consequence of their daily experience, which naturally 
depends on their own perception of the colour spectrum; only in a secondary 
intellectual move can they develop an analytic approach to justify or criticise racial 
inequality (Fassin 2007: 177). 
Fassin takes us into the lives of those suffering from the disease and restores them as 
agents within unequal power systems, whose actions and reasonings need to be 
understood in light of their lifeworlds and the embodied past by which these are 
informed (Fassin 2007). The framework of embodied history allows for recognition of 
the effects of violence and deeply embedded structural inequalities on the individual's 
understanding of and actions in the world, but it is not deterministic. 
Drawing on this framework, the agency of individuals ( and, possibly, of the institutions 
these individuals create) whose worldviews are framed by an embodied history of 
violence 1night then be understood as circumscribed by this history - yet there is still 
the possibility of agency. Fassin's analysis, however, implies that an embodied history 
operates on a more or less subconscious level to guide individuals' and groups' 
worldviews, choices and actions - just like Bourdieu's habitus has generally been read 
as implying a notion of agency in which the actor relates to socio-historical factors in an 
unconscious way (Bourdieu 1990; Giddens 1984). It can then be asked whether actors 
such as the Back Pack medics - and the collective actor that they create through their 
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coming together - might be able to not only develop a critical distance in relation to 
knowledge of the world 'in black and white', but might also utilise that critical distance 
to guide their actions and choices in a lived present. Indeed, the following chapters 
describe the ways in which Back Pack members' vision of and for the world is 
profoundly influenced by an embodied history of violence; at the institutional level, this 
embodied history is not only a basis for the organisation's ideological coherence, it is 
also deployed in a politics of victimhood that seeks recognition of and legitimacy for an 
articulated version of history and a specific vision of and for the world. 
b. From suffering to humanitarianism as a politics of victimhood 
As Saillant highlights, analyses of humanitarianism lead us to ask why the suffering of 
some counts more than the suffering of others, and how some victims come to be 
remembered while others are forgotten (Saillant 2007). Ways in which intolerance and 
indifference to human suffering are defined are historically and socio-politically 
contingent (Fassin and Bourdelais 2005; Fassin and Rechtman 2007). Through various 
writings, Fassin analyses the creation of the victim as a subject worthy of aid, notably 
through the medicalisation of distress and discourses of suffering and trauma (Fassin 
2004b; 2007c; Fassin and D'Halluin 2007; Fassin and Rechtman 2007). Other 
anthropologists have also looked at the production of the victim-subject whose image, 
based on tropes of suffering and compassion, becomes mediatised for instrumental 
purposes (Boltanski 1993; Erner 2006; Foxen 2009; Kleinman and Kleinman 1991; 
Truchon 2007). 
Discourses of suffering and victimhood have sometimes been described as sanitising 
violence and suffering, and depoliticising humanitarianism by reducing the latter to 
technical operations and ignoring longer-term political drivers of crises (De Waal 1997; 
2008; Foxen 2009). They can conceal inequalities between aid givers and receivers, and 
reinforce images of victims as powerless or even pathological (Fassin 2012; Malkki 
1995; Zarowski 2004). But while analyses of the construction of suffering or 
victimhood - and associated processes of subjectification - are enlightening, they can 
themselves reinforce an image of powerlessness (Saillant 2007). 'Victims' and those 
aiding them often use discourses of suffering as a moral basis to rally support and 
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access resources (Fassin and D'Halluin 2007; Salis Gross 2004). And it is in the 
suffering of those embodying violence that testimonials of injustice often find symbolic 
power (Fassin 2004b; 2007c; Fassin and Rechtman 2007). So while Englung argues that 
"in the overwhelming majority of actual situations, human beings detest the fate of the 
victim", adopting a position of victimhood - as illustrated through Back Pack's case in 
this thesis - can also be empowering (Englund 2005: 12). 
Fassin's recent studies are useful for conceptualising subjects and subjectivities 
constructed and negotiated through discourses and practices of humanitarianism. Fassin 
notably examines how, through their advocacy work, organisations like MSF establish 
themselves as witnesses, crystallising an unequal relationship between humanitarians 
who speak and victim-subjects who are spoken for25 (Fassin 2004b; Fassin 2007c) -
In doing so, they illuminate, transform, simplify and dramatize the words of those 
they represent, in line with their ultimate objective, which is not so much to 
reconstitute an experience as to construct a cause. This construction is based on the 
legitimate principles of humanitarian intervention: the defence of victims and the 
appeal to emotions. [ ... ] Even if they attempt to analyse the political issues 
involved in the situations they face, the register in which they set their public 
testimony corresponds logically to the way in which their legitimacy is constructed 
in the public arena: it is that of compassion. They speak of bodies, of wounds, of 
suffering (Fassin 2012: 221-226). 
Fassin defines political subjectivation as "the production of subjects and subjectivities 
possessed of political meanings within social interactions" (Fassin 2012: 202). 
Analysing constructions, through medicalised discourses, of the subjectivity of the 
traumatised Palestinian youth, his analysis goes beyond the essentialisation of suffering 
and the moralist critique of a victi1nization of victitns. It also recognises that violence 
can be understood through other lenses than suffering and trauma, and that people can 
25 Other humanitarian organisations - paiiicularly organisations that have emerged from specific socio-political 
movements - try to avoid such distinctions, so Fassin's analysis of MSF should not be taken as a general point about 
humanitarian organisations but rather an ethnographic example of a particular type of process that can be engendered 
through humanitarian witnessing. This example is particularly useful for conceptualising Back Pack's humanitarian 
witnessing and the ways in which the organisation differs from an international NGO such as MSF, notably by 
collapsing distinctions between the victim and humanitarian through the figure of the victim-medic, as described in 
Chapter 4. 
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have multiple identifications - the Palestinian youth can be presented or present himself 
as a victim, a combatant, a martyr, etc. Referring to Judith Butler, he argues that the 
production of political subjects is inscribed in an irreducible tension between 
subjectivation and subjection: it "consists precisely in this fundamental dependency on 
a discourse we never chose but that, paradoxically, initiates and sustains our agency" 
(Butler 1997: 2; Fassin 2012: 203). Here - and given the relevance of this study in light 
of ethnographic data presented in following chapters - it is worth quoting him at length: 
humanitarian testimony contributes to forming victim subjectivities to which social 
agents must make reference, including when they seek to make a demand for 
justice heard - in other words, precisely when they wish to move beyond the logic 
of compassion. This political subjectivation passes through a twofold operation in 
which the rules of the game are imposed [ ... ] and through which these rules can be 
appropriated or even diverted (local actors adopt but adapt the vocabulary and 
representation they have not chosen but of which they can still make use). 
Humanitarianism was tending to produce a form of subjectivity devoid of historical 
subject. Palestinians took over this subjectivity precisely in order to demand what 
they were being denied: the status of political subjects (Fassin 2012: 222). 
Fassin is not alone to have discussed the condition of victimhood, but his approach is 
particularly useful for analysing the subjectivity of the Back Pack medic - a figure who 
will be revealed to bridge between and potentially transcend common representations of 
'victims' and 'humanitarians', creating a more complex and potentially controversial 
political subjectivity. Fass in' s approach also recognises the reality of individuals' and 
groups' experiences of violence, as well as the potential instrumentalisation of suffering 
and victimhood - with discourses of victimhood then being potentially empowering for 
the collective victim represented through an organisation such as Back Pack . 
., 
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2. From individuals to institutions in the 'humanitarian encounter' 
Back Pack was created by individuals whose life stories are framed by experiences of 
violence, oppression and injustice. As illustrated in this thesis, these experiences are 
central to the values and ideology that guide Back Pack's actions within a particular 
'humanitarian encounter'. In order to analyse Back Pack as an institution, as well as 
possible tensions that emerge when an organisation born of a particular socio-political 
context is institutionalised as a humanitarian actor accessing international donor 
funding, analyses ofNGOs and their values and accountabilities are also useful. 
a. NGOs as values-based organisations 
Humanitarian NGOs can be understood as values-based organisations, promoting a 
particular vision of and for the world (Edwards and Sen 2000; Kilby 2004a; 2006; 
Lissner 1977). Lissner's concept of Weltanschauung, which he argues is central to the 
functioning of voluntary associations, encapsulates this idea: 
The Weltanschauung refers to the general outlook on the world - what the French 
would call "la optique" - on the basis of which agency policy-makers interpret 
trends and events. It emanates from religious beliefs, historical traditions, 
prevailing social norms, personal experiences, and similar basic sources of human 
attitudes (Lissner 1977: 74). 
Values are also central to NGO legitimacy - the latter, for Atack, concerning "moral 
justifications for political and social action" (Atack 1999: 855). Kilby thus argues that 
NGOs' values provide the basis for their legitimacy as advocates for social change, as 
well as determining the type and scope of their work (Kilby 2004a). 
As Saillant notes in her introduction to a collection of anthropological studies of 
humanitarianism, increasingly diverse and complex arrays of actors, systems, 
ideologies, and practices are grouped together under the label 'humanitarian' (Saillant 
2007). Such diversification entails complex compositions of agents, values and 
alliances, which need to be analysed for their specificities and in relation to 
international humanitarian systems and frameworks (Atlani-Duault and Vidal 2009; 
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Conoir and Verna 2002; Dauvin and Simeant 2002; Saillant 2007; Verna 2007). Dauvin 
and Simeant' s analysis of humanitarian organisations and networks suggests that these 
are animated by a great deal of debate, revealing a plurality of values, actors, political 
perspectives, motivations and practices of humanitarianism (Dauvin and Simeant 2002). 
With the multiplication and diversification of actors described as humanitarian, and the 
proliferation of agencies working in contemporary wars, there has also been decreasing 
clarity and consensus in the identification and interpretation of principles to guide 
humanitarian action (Curtis 2001; Slim 1997) - and indeed this lack of consensus is 
essential to understanding the debate around cross-border aid on the Thai-Burma 
border. So instead of abiding by a strict interpretation of the ICRC 's traditional 
principles, humanitarian actors now adopt a range of positions between neutrality and 
solidarity (De Waal 2007; Weis£ 1999). 
The heterogeneity of humanitarian actors should not, however, be taken for granted. 
Other analysts point instead to an increasing homogenisation of NGOs, driven by the 
international political agendas of donor countries on which they depend for funding, as 
well as other external pressures (e.g. Duffield 2001; Fowler 2007; Hulme and Edwards 
1997; Spearin 2008). The study at hand focuses on a local NGO that emerged from a 
particular socio-political context and came to be linked into a network of international 
NGOs and donors. It then beco1nes essential to explore the specificities of this local 
NGO 's own 'brand' of humanitarianism - and the values and Weltanshauung this is 
associated with - as well as ways in which it might be compelled to fit into definitions 
of humanitarianism, which are elaborated by actors with perhaps diverging frameworks 
and agendas. 
A number of anthropological and sociological studies have analysed humanitarian 
NGOs as social institutions or networks with their own values and associated social 
structures and forms of solidarity. Verna's comparative analysis of humanitarian NGOs, 
for example, argues that divergent modes of operation can be linked to their founders' 
different visions of the world (Verna 2007). The founders' cultural, religious and 
political backgrounds are important in determining the types of interventions deemed 
valuable and possible, particularly during the organisation's beginnings. Over time, this 
initial Weltanshauung- to use Lissner's phrase (L1ssner 1977) - may evolve in reaction 
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to political pressures, both internal and external. Verna's analysis is particularly useful 
for this study: the following chapters illustrate ways in which Back Pack' s 
Weltanshaung is shaped by the formative experiences and embodied histories of its 
leaders and members, as well as how this vision might come under pressure from 
diverse fronts. 
Another useful study is Malkki' s ethnographic research among Finnish men1bers of the 
ICRC. Makki demonstrates that even within this bastion of first generation 
humanitarianism, there can be a multiplicity of concomitant forms and associated 
historiographies of humanitarian action (Malkki 2007). She demonstrates that 
'humanitarianism' can be driven by culturally specific forms of social solidarity, which 
coexist with the type of generalised human solidarity often assumed to be key to 
ICRC 's ideology. Rather than justifying their actions as driven by a vocation to serve 
humanity, staff members more commonly relate these actions to a concept of 
international professionalism linked with a culturally specific model of solidarity. Verna 
and Malkki's studies thus highlight the value of analysing the politico-moral visions as 
well as the forms of solidarity that can become pivotal to the crystallisation of actions 
and institutions qualified as humanitarian. 
In her ethnography of an international aid agency, Atlani-Duault argues that"[t]he 
dichotomy between locals and internationals, or that between NGOs and international 
development agencies, does not provide a satisfactory aid to the understanding of the 
discourses and practices of the world of development in the field. Developmentalist 
configurations26 exist in networks and must be apprehended as such" (Atlani-Duault 
2005: 34). It is through these networks that Atlani-Duault follows the development of 
an institutional ideology, which comes to frame the agency's programmes. She traces 
the construction over time of this ideology in and through collaboration, modification 
and contestation between practices, actors, organisations, and principles, which at times 
conflict and at others converge. Moreover, 
26 Atlani-Duault draws on de Sardan ' s developmentist configuration, defined as a complex ensemble of institutions, 
fluxes and actors, for which aid constitutes a resource, a job, a market, a stake or a strategy ( de Sardan 2001 ). 
The quotes included in this section are my translations of Atlani-Duault's original French publication (Atlani-Duault 
2005). 
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[ d]iscourses and practices are interlinked. The former are constructed through the 
latter; the latter are nourished by the former. Following this construction therefore 
requires fallowing over several years the internal debates, the oppositions, the 
changes in course, the reversals in position and their reasons, the areas that are 
beyond debate and the reasons of their apparent untouchability (ibid.: 38). 
Atlani-Duault's approach is particularly useful for analysing ways 1n which an 
organisational ideology might become most visible and be elaborated through its 
implementation and through the challenges it faces in an NGO's day-to-day workings. 
Her analysis also highlights the creative freedom of actors, anchored in but 
simultaneously enabled by their historical and cultural context, as well as an evolving 
palette of discourses and practices. As analysed by other anthropologists of aid27, local 
actors pursue their own agendas through choices that need to be understood within their 
historical and cultural context, but are realised through opportunities that become 
available as they learn to manipulate the discourses of aid. Another example of this type 
of analysis is provided by Rossi's ethr1ography of a rural development project in Niger 
(Rossi 2004; 2006). Rossi illustrates how agents can adopt a critical stance vis-a-vis aid 
interventions, and unfold strategies commensurate with their positioning within a 
Bourdieusian field28 formed by the 'development encounter', conforming to, 
manipulating, or trying to redefine the terms of these interventions (Rossi 2004 ). 
These studies present additional tools for analysing Back Pack as an institution, which 
as discussed in following chapters is part of a multi-tiered network described as local-
global partnerships. They suggest ways of conceptualising how specific systems of 
knowledge and practice might influence 'humanitarian' ideologies and actions; how 
institutional ideologies might develop and evolve through contestations and 
confrontations; and how agents unequally situated within what might be conceptualised 
27 Comparable approaches, which recognise the agency of local actors within unequal encounters created by aid 
programmes and systems, have also been developed by other anthropologists who have focused on aid and NGOs, 
such as David Masse, David Lewis or Benedetta Rossi (e.g. Lewis 2010; Lewis and Masse 2006; Rossi 2004; 2006). 
28 Bourdieu argues that all human action takes place in social fields - i.e. the various spheres of life, which have their 
own rules, regularities and forms of authority (Bourdieu 1977; 1984; 1990). The configuration of a particular field at 
any one time is determined by the distribution of capital among actors occupying different positions within it - this 
distribution determines agency; yet actors also continually reconfigure the field by pursuing agendas aimed at 
distinguishing themselves from others (Bourdieu 1977; 1984; Wacquant 1998). 
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as an unequal 'humanitarian encounter' can utilise, challenge and redefine discourses 
and practices of humanitarianism. 
b. NGO values and the problem of multiple accountabilities 
While hu1nanitarian NGOs can be understood as organisations promoting a particular 
vision of and for the world, many analysts also point to increased professionalisation of 
the 'aid industry', with humanitarian organisations compared to businesses comprising 
moral entrepreneurs who compete for market shares on an increasingly stringent aid 
market (e.g. Collowald 2002; De Waal 2007; Gross-Stein 2008; Le Naelou and Freyss 
2004; Pandolfi 2002; Terry 2002). These processes can be conceptualised as potentially 
impacting on an NGO such as Back Pack's ability to promote its specific vision of and 
for the world, with dilemmas often highlighted through the problem of multiple 
accountabilities. 
With humanitarianism's increased professionalisation, itself driven by increasing 
competition for government donor funding and tighter government regulation, it has 
been argued that some NGOs have adopted increasingly technocratic approaches, and 
that "[t]hose who intervene are no longer the representatives of victims but the 
specialists in their problems. Those "helped" are no longer those represented with a 
voice to be heard, but rather objects of expertise" 29 (Collowald 2002: s.p.; Eyben 2010). 
The extent to which particular NGOs might be analysed in these terms depends on a 
range of factors. Some NGOs might instead be seen, for example, to resist dependency 
on government donors, reject aspects of professionalisation and instead defend an 
ideology of volunteerism (e.g. Redfield 2012). However, govern1nent donors remain 
key sources of funding and make increasingly stringent demands for accountability and 
transparency, and for NGOs' programmes to be demonstrably evidence-based and 
effective (Gross-Stein 2008; Jordan and van Tuijl 2006). This push for accountability 
and resulting technocratic approach to aid programmes has been argued to have 
sometimes absurd consequences: 
29 My translation (Collowald 2002: s.p.). 
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Theoretical and contested concepts such as civil society, capacity or policy become 
reified and then numbers assigned to the reification e.g. 'state the number of 
policies influenced'. Answers are required to absurd value-for-money questions in 
which institutions are considered as if they were motor cars.30 
Goetz and Jenkins define accountability as relational, since it entails being answerable 
to others within a relationship of power (Goetz and Jenkins 2004). In other words, "[t]o 
apply accountability principles means to define who has the power to call for an account 
and who is obligated to give an explanation for their actions" (Newell and Bellour 2002: 
2). Donors' demands for accountability then often result in tension between the 
'upwards' accountability of NGOs and their accountability to beneficiaries - and, when 
the NGO originates from a social movement, to the constituents of this movement 
(Gross-Stein 2008; Kilby 2004a; 2011; O'Dwyer and Unerman 2008). 
As Kilby and others have noted, the implementation of results-based management using 
externally-determined tools and processes can leave little space for significant 
participation of beneficiaries or NGO constituents in project design, planning, or 
implementation (Kilby 2004b; 2011; Wandersman, et al. 2000). A managerial approach 
can "weaken or kill participation, ownership and local self-reliance" (Chambers, et al. 
2001: 2). Studies of 'empowerment' have highlighted that while increased prominence 
of the latter as a stated ideal of aid programmes suggests that NGOs should be 
accountable to their beneficiaries, managerial approaches instead suggest increased 
accountability to donors at the expense not only of beneficiaries but also of the NGO 
staffs ability to determine programme priorities and design (Kilby 2004b; 2006; 2011). 
Results-based management processes tend to "centre control ( and power) with the 
donor, the source of resources, while e1npowerment endeavours to do the opposite" 
(Kilby 2004b: 208). 
Recent efforts at the international level - led notably by advocates of the Big Push 
Forward31 - to render donors and international agencies accountable to beneficiary 
30 htto:!/hausercenter.org/iha/2010/10/11 /the-big-oush-back/ - last accessed 19 February 2013 (Eyben 2010). 
, 
31 The Big Push Forward is an "informal international network of practitioners seeking constructive ways to advance 
conceptually and methodologically development aid's support of a fairer world, beyond the naffow bureaucratic 
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populations have the potential to mitigate some of these dynamics ( e.g. Eyben 201 O; 
Guijt 2010). But it remains important to analyse an organisation's ability - and/or the 
ability of individuals within the organisation - to set agendas, define priorities and 
influence outcomes, and to question what impacts donor requirements for accountability 
and transparency might have on the organisation's values and ability to implement these 
values. In Back Pack's case, such a questioning is important, in terms of highlighting 
possible conflicting accountabilities and agendas, as well as assessing the ways in 
which - in a changing (geo )political context - increased demands for 'monitoring and 
evaluation' might be linked with changing donor definitions of legitimate humanitarian 
practices and systems. 
At the international level, analysts have often noted increased collaboration between 
larger humanitarian NGOs and donor governments on which they depend for funding 
(e.g. Duffield 2001; Fowler 2007; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Saillant 2007; Spearin 
2008; Terry 2002). Rieff and others describe some European NGOs such as Oxfam and 
MSF as differing significantly from their American counterparts32, most of which 
historically took cooperation with the government for granted. During the Cold War, 
USAID funding for NGOs in Asia thus played a central role in the struggle for 'hearts 
and minds'; and in the post-Cold War period, the rhetoric of American NGOs 
"continued to reflect the US government position, which now asserted a foreign policy 
based on globalisation, free markets, democratic openings and human rights" (Charny 
2004; Rieff 2002: 114; Stoddard 2003). 
Analysts have also described a withering of NGOs' abilities to present alternatives to 
government donors' agendas, particularly within a context of increasing 'securitization' 
of the international aid system in the post-9/11 period, with aid placed alongside foreign 
protocols that assume guaranteed predictable outcomes". It was created out of discussions at a meeting at the Institute 
of Development Studies in September 2010 as 'the Big Push back' against what a number of influential development 
practitioners saw as a nan-owing of what is valued and how value is measured. htto://bigoushfon:vard.nct/about - last 
accessed 16 January 2013. 
32 Rieff argues that the International Rescue Committee (IRC) - refen-ed to during the Cold War as IRCIA by 
European aid workers - like "many other mainline US relief organisations, collaborated so intimately with the organs 
of the American government that knowing where the NGO ended and the government agency began was always 
difficult to determine and remains so" (Rieff 2002: 114). British and French NGOs, in contrast, often had a history of 
fiercely guarded independence from and/or opposition to states. 
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politics and diplomacy as part of the 'integrated solutions' of world powers (Fassin 
2012; Fowler 2005; Macrae and Leader 2002; Slim 2004; Spearin 2008): 
In the light of the ever deepening reliance of NGDOs33 on official forms of aid, 
serious questions arise from the growing integration of overseas development 
assistance (ODA) into a comprehensive security strategy for the West. Such a 
strategy is not uniformly employed by each donor country within the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Nevertheless, the contours 
of an emerging development for security agenda (DfS) seem likely to shape the 
possibility ofNGDOs either offering or becoming alternatives (Fowler 2007: 112). 
More generally, Fassin speaks of a "humanitarianisation of international cns1s 
management and the parallel politicization of the nongovernmental humanitarian field" 
(Fassin 2012: 224). It might then be asked whether it is the case that "[t]he most 
powerful NGOs, while claiming their autonomy, are often subservient to the dictates of 
their donors, the governments and inter-intergovernmental organisations, even though 
they assert the autonomy of thought and action of civil society" (Saillant 2007: 8). 
These questions, as revealed in following chapters, are important for unravelling the 
politics of aid - particularly in a context where a local NGO gains access to government 
donor funding via international NGOs that to greater or lesser degrees might be seen as 
instruments in those donors' foreign policies (policies, which might at different times 
clash or converge with the local organisation's Weltanshauung). 
33 I.e. Non-Government Development Organisations. Fowler incYudes relief agencies in his analysis of NGDOs 
(Fowler 2007). 
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C. International 'humanitarian government': politics of life and 
politics of value 
For Fassin, a moral economy centred on 'humanitarian reason' came into being in the 
last decades of the twentieth century and is associated with "[a] mode of governing that 
concerns the victims of poverty, homelessness, unemployment, and exile, as well as of 
disasters, famines, epidemics and wars - in short, every situation characterized by 
precariousness" (Fassin 2012: x). This 'humanitarian government' is distinguished by 
the deployment of moral sentiments in contemporary politics: "humanitarianism has 
become a language that inextricably links values and affects, and serves both to define 
and to justify discourses and practices of the government of human beings" (ibid: 2) 34 . 
As such, 'humanitarian government' includes the actions of NGOs, states, international 
agencies and individuals. 
Fassin also notes of humanitarianism that "[ e ]mpirically, it is a notion with variable 
morphology, a sort of ethical object with high added value, to which many agents lay 
claim in order to define and justify their actions" (ibid: 189). Its temporality is that of 
emergency; its object is to save lives - "the powerful legitimacy with which it is 
invested derives from the fact that it can point to those rescued from death due to 
famine, epidemic, or injury" (ibid: 189) And "it operates in both the emotional registers 
and the registers of values, what people feel and what they believe" (ibid: 189). Yet 
humanitarianism is fundamentally paradoxical, uniting a politics of inequality with a 
politics of solidarity - "[t]his tension between inequality and solidarity, between a 
relation of domination and a relation of assistance is constitutive of all humanitarian 
government" (ibid: 3). Taking into account these tensions, he argues, we need to 
analyse processes through which 'humanitarian government' not only accords value to 
bare life in Agamben' s terms, but also designates those lives worth saving and accords 
differential ontological value to different human lives (Agamben 1998). 
Fassin thus analyses humanitarianism as a politics of life - "politics that bring into play 
34 Fassin defines government in a loose sense, as procedures and actions to manage, regulate and support the 
existence of human beings (Fassin 2012) 
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differentiated meanings and values of human lives" (Fassin 2012: 226). Theoretically, 
in the face of suffering, "humanitarian organisations call for a politics of life that re-
establishes solidarity between human beings and gives equal value to lives" (Fassin 
2012: 241). Yet Fassin's study of MSF's decision-making concerning the maintenance 
of operational staff in Baghdad during the US invasion demonstrates ways in which, 
although supposedly dedicated to a preservation of life per se, humanitarian agencies 
establish hierarchical distinctions between lives to be risked (the humanitarians) and 
those to be saved (the victims) (Fassin 2007b; 2012). Within the former, there are also 
hierarchies of value, the lives of local staff being more readily sacrificed than those of 
international experts. Humanitarianism can also be analysed as a politics of life 
in the sense that, first, it takes as its object the saving of lives, which presupposes 
not only risking others but also selecting those that have priority for being saved 
(for example, when drug supplies are insufficient); and second, it champions 
causes publicly, which implies not only neglecting other ones but also constructing 
them by choosing the best ways of representing the populations assisted (for 
instance, as victims rather than resistance fighters) (Fassin 2007b; 2012: 226). 
While drawing on this approach, this thesis also seeks to expand Fassin's analysis of the 
attribution of values within and through humanitarian systems. It does so by focusing on 
humanitarianism at the margins of state definitions of legality, where differential 
attributions of value to the systems and flows in which actors are involved become 
pa1iicularly pertinent (Abraham and van Schendel 2005). The thesis thus investigates 
the ways in which actors differentially situated in an international system of 
'humanitarian government' - a system that can traverse the grey zones of borderlands 
and (il)legality - can be involved in contests over the attribution of value not only to 
human lives per se, but also to systems and practices that enable the government of 
these lives. 
To enable such an analysis, the thesis draws on work by Abraham and van Schendel, 
who highlight the need to transcend state-centric definitions of legality and instead 
discuss consttuctions of (il)licitness through different actors' attributions of legitimacy 
to systems and flows in which they are involved (Abraham and van Schendel 2005). 
Attributions of legitimacy are linked to the values' that actors attribute to such systems 
50 
and flows. In the ethnographic example presented in this thesis, values ascribed by Back 
Pack members to different actors, systems and flows are shown to be shaped by an 
individual and collective memory of state violence and oppression. These values can 
clash or converge at different times with the frameworks and agendas of more powerful 
actors in an unequal syste1n of 'humanitarian government'. So although Abraham and 
van Schendel's conceptual framework was developed from an analysis of transnational 
criminal networks and flows, this thesis demonstrates that an adaptation and expansion 
of this framework allows for a better understanding of cross-border aid on the Thai-
Burma border, of evolving politics of aid to a once-pariah state, and of the politics of an 
unequal system of international 'humanitarian government'. 
D. Summary of an approach 
The ethnographic study presented through this thesis needs to be contextualised within 
the historical evolution and recurring dilemmas of humanitarianism - and in particular, 
within unresolved tensions concerning the relationship between humanitarianis1n and 
politics. As described in the first part of the chapter, debates concerning ways in which 
aid can potentially 'do harm' are far from new, as are humanitarian dilemmas in 
contexts where civilian populations are deliberate targets o( state violence and/or are 
denied access to aid. Historical precedents suggest that humanitarian interventions are 
contingent on political and geopolitical considerations. Interpreting hu1nanitarianism as 
a pure 'ethics of humanity' or as a global 'business' ignores the political nature of 
humanitarian aid, even when this is presented as neutral and impartial. But 
'humanitarian government' is also part of a fundamentally unequal political and moral 
economy, and it is within this understanding that particular humanitarian systems and 
practices need to be explored (Fassin 2012). 
The diverse approaches summarised above are useful for understanding an ethnographic 
context where individuals, activist movements, local and international NGOs, 
transnational networks, and international geopolitical interests shape a particular 
'humanitarian encounter'. Through this thesis, two main do1nains of theory are brought 
into dialogue - the first emerging from 1nedical anthropology, the second from critical 
anthropological analyses of humanitarianism. With these conceptual tools, the thesis 
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explores the possible impacts of an embodied history of violence on the worldviews, 
perspectives and choices of humanitarian actors and systems. Drawing on ethnographic 
examples mentioned above, the thesis analyses the discourses and practices of 
humanitarian actors and NGOs - both within Back Pack and within a specific 
'humanitarian encounter' formed by its local-global partnerships, where actors pursue 
sometimes conflicting, sometimes converging agendas, which need to be understood in 
their historical and socio-political context. The actions of local-level actors are related 
to international frameworks and definitions of humanitarianism, as well as evolving 
(geo )political considerations. And anthropological approaches to humanitarianism as a 
politics of victimhood are utilised to examine constructions and contestations of 
humanitarian subjects and subjectivities. Through these combined approaches, the 
thesis thus explores the contemporary multiplicity of discourses and practices of 
humanitarianism, and the ways in which differentially situated actors grapple and 
engage with sometimes contradictory frameworks in what can be understood as an 
unequal politics of life and politics of value. 
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CH 2: From Burma to the Border: background and 
methodology 
A few years ago, I knew little about Burma's disputed borderlands. I was working for 
an INGO in Bangkok that specialises in capacity building for emergency management. 
The INGO secured funding to invite two medics fro1n Mae Tao Clinic and one from 
Back Pack to a training in Public Health in Complex Emergencies. Participants from 
countries as diverse as East Timor, Ethiopia, Burma, Sudan, Indonesia, India and 
Thailand all worked in providing healthcare to displaced populations. Most were local 
staff of NGOs working in emergency situations and a key e1nphasis of the course was 
on sharing experiences. 
One afternoon, the Back Pack medic showed us a video. The film, with English-
language voiceover, showed grainy, jerky footage of medics trekking through the 
Burmese jungle, large woven baskets of medication on their backs, tending to pregnant 
women and children displaying classic signs of malnourishment. It highlighted a 
'chronic emergency' in Burma's border areas, driven by government disinvestments in 
health and human rights abuses targeting ethnic minority communities. A man injured 
by a land1nine, carried in a makeshift stretcher by a team of medics, was just one of the 
casualties of decades of conflict and abuse. In a context where local populations lacked 
health services and international organisations were denied access, Back Pack was 
described as providing basic healthcare. But the narrator explained that the medics were 
at risk: several had been killed by Tatmadaw35 soldiers, others by landmines; and 
although Back Pack was providing lifesaving care, only a political resolution to conflict 
and abuses would end the suffering of ethnic minority com1nunities. At the end of the 
video, the lights came on. The room was quiet. One participant - a tall Sudanese 1nan 
who had previously told us of the time he was kidnapped while working in Darfur -
rose, walked to the front of the room, and embraced the Burmese medic. 
Like many others when they first hear about Back Pack, I became fascinated by this 
35 Tatmadaw is the official Burmese name of the Myanmar Armed Forces. 
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model of 'hu1nanitarianism', where local medics considered illegal by the Burmese state 
provide healthcare in the absence of international aid and seem to embody the 
dedication and selflessness often claimed to be lost in the modem aid industry. After 
learning more about Burma's disputed borderlands, I went to Mae Sot, on the Thai-
Burma border, and met with Back Pack's leaders. They agreed for me to conduct 
research in their organisation. In this chapter, I will outline the context and approach for 
the resulting research - the historical and political backdrop to Back Pack's story, and 
the methodology for research into what I quickly found is a polarised, politicised and 
often emotive issue. 
A. The evolving politics of aid to Burma 
The debate around cross-border aid needs to be understood in the context of Burma's 
volatile political history and evolving international politics and policies towards the 
once-pariah state. Until recently, Burma was portrayed in Western media as almost a 
caricature of the Orwellian state. The junta had repeatedly demonstrated its 
ruthlessness, using brute force, surveillance, propaganda, censorship and draconian laws 
to preserve its predatory grip on power. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was and remains an 
international icon of peaceful struggle for democracy and human rights. To many, this 
was Burma: a land of good versus evil, where democracy and human rights would 
hopefully triumph in the end. But in recent years, the analysis of political change in 
Burma and of appropriate methods to deliver aid within this complex and dynamic 
context became so polarised that at times it seemed almost impossible to get a balanced 
picture of reality in the Golden Land. 
1. Conflict in border areas 
The time during which I conducted fieldwork, between December 2009 and March 
2012, was a time of significant albeit uneven and contested political change in Burma. 
Repressive military dictatorships had been in power since General Ne Win's coup in 
1962. The junta - under the name first of State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC) and then the more 'friendly'-sounding State Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC) - was infamous for its iron-fisted grip on yower and repression of democratic 
uprisings. The most notorious of these were the 1988 student-led uprisings and the 2007 
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Saffron Revolution, both of which ended in brutal military crackdowns and the arrest, 
imprisonment, and killing of demonstrators. In the country's border areas, conflict had 
also been ongoing for decades, but had typically received less international attention. 
Since British decolonisation in 1948, Burma's ethnic minorities have been largely 
marginalised from national politics36 . A succession of Burman-dominated regimes 
implemented a "policy of Burman ethnocentrism and Burmanisation", and attempted to 
extend control over ethnic minority groups in the country's resource-rich borderlands 
(Callahan 2003; Fink 2001; Gravers 2007; Pedersen 2008b: 56; Rae 2007; Skidmore 
2004; South 2008). Conflict between state forces and ethnic nationalist groups began in 
the late 1940s. Most notoriously, the Karen National Union (KNU) and its armed wing, 
the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), launched its struggle for independence in 
194937 (South 2011). In the early 1960s, following General Ne Win's military coup and 
in response to the central government's rejection of federalism, conflict spread between 
state forces and other ethnic nationalist movements in border areas (Smith 2007). 
In 1965, Ne Win initiated the Four Cuts Policy in areas where resistance groups were 
active, designated as black or brown zones38 (Callahan 2003). The Four Cuts Policy 
became the blueprint for counterinsurgency strategies throughout the following decades. 
The aim was to cut flows of funds, food, information and recruits between resistance 
groups and local communities, and to increase state control over economically useful 
populations and regions (Callahan 2003; Rae 2007). Forced displacement of civilians 
from contested areas to relocation sites more firmly under state control became central 
to this policy, often accompanied by confiscation of land and property, physical and 
sexual violence, summary executions, forced labour and compulsory contributions to 
36 The Bunnans or Barnar were and remain the majority ethnic group in Burma, but a great number of ethnic 
minorities occupy approximately half of the country's land area, predominantly along the borders. The larger ethnic 
minority groups include the Karen, Karenni, Chin, Kachin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan (a description of the political 
history ofBurma's main ethnic minority groups is provided notably in South 2008). 
37 The KNU 's aim was initially independence. Since 1976, however, the KNU has called for a federal system rather 
than an independent Karen State (South 2011). 
38 The SLORC and later the SPDC classified regions in the 'ethnic states' into three different categories: white zones 
were those under Tatmadaw control; brown were contested areas; and black were areas over which the Tatmadaw 
had little to no control. The latter were designated as free-fire zones, where the military was instructed to shoot 
anyone - soldier or civilian, armed or unarmed - on sight (Rae 2007). 
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the Tatmadaw (Hull 2008; Rae 2007). Since the late 1990s, Tatmadaw battalions were 
also required to be self-sufficient, prompting troops to 'live off the land', appropriating 
food and other supplies from local populations and further exacerbating conflict, 
displacement and impoverishment in already unstable areas (South 2008). 
Over half a century of conflict led to increasing militarisation of a complex array of 
state and non-state actors in border areas (Smith 2007). After 1989, a number of armed 
ethnic nationalist groups negotiated ceasefires with the government. In the second half 
of the 1990s, this resulted in an increasingly complex patchwork of armed groups, as 
resistance movements splintered and a number of armed groups or factions of existing 
groups negotiated ceasefires while others continued active resistance (Callahan 2007; 
Smith 2007; South 2008; 2011). Ceasefires enabled groups to retain arms, to maintain 
localised control over parts of the borderlands, and to finance their armies through 
control and taxation of trade or trafficking routes. At the same time, ceasefire groups 
provided the state with a means of indirect control over resource-rich areas and vital 
trade routes (Duffield 2008). 
Groups that continued to engage in armed resistance throughout the 1990s and 2000s 
included the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S), the Karenni National Progressive Party 
(KNPP), the Chin National Front (CNF) and the Karen National Liberation Army 
(KNLA). The KNLA - armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU) - became the 
largest resistance group in Burma, continuing to fight the Tatn1adaw along the border 
with Thailand. It was, however, severely weakened after a faction of its troops broke 
away and formed the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) in 1994, ostensibly in 
reaction to discrimination by the KNU/KNLA's Christian leadership against the 
Buddhist rank and file of the Karen insurgency (South 2008; 2011 ). Shortly afterwards, 
the DKBA signed a ceasefire with the government and was instrumental in 
orchestrating the 1995 fall of Manerplaw, former KNU/KNLA headquarters. After the 
fall of Manerplaw and scaled-up Tatmadaw offensives in Karen State in the second half 
of the 1990s, the KNU/KNLA retreated further towards the Thai border, and increasing 
numbers of Karen and other ethnic minority communities fled to camps for Internally 
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Displaced Persons (IDPs) along the border or shelters for people fleeing fighting 1n 
Thailand39 . 
When I began fieldwork in late 2009, there was a feeling among rnany activists on the 
Thai-Burma border that things would never change for the better. Popular uprisings had 
been crushed, the results of the 1990 elections - won by Aung San Suu Kyi's party, the 
National League for Democracy - had been denied, and many members of the 
democratic opposition were in prison or exile. There appeared to be an increasing sense 
of desperation as armed groups like the KNLA or SSA-South vowed never to surrender 
but had lost territorial control and financial autonomy. Some 150,000 people were in 
temporary shelters in Thailand, and a whole generation was growing up in exile 40 . 
In May 2008, just days after Cyclone Nargis devastated Burma's Irrawaddy Delta 
region, the junta had also held a controversial referendum to approve a new 
Constitution. The latter was criticised for ensuring continued military rule by placing 
executive power in the hands of the National Defence and Security Council, reserving 
25 per cent of seats in Parliament for the military, providing no independent judiciary, 
and including guarantees of immunity for the military (Matthieson 2011 ). The 
Constitution also called for ceasefire groups to either lay down their arms or become 
part of a centrally-controlled Border Guard Force (BGF) (South 2011). The BGF plan 
meant that ceasefire groups would be subsumed under a centralised state army; leaders 
of these groups would become subordinate to Tatmadaw officers, and would lose 
control over trade and trafficking routes that had enabled them to maintain financial 
independence, enrich themselves and arm their troops. Throughout 2009 and 2010, the 
SPDC issued repeated deadlines for ceasefire groups to either join the BGF or face 
military reprisals. Tensions escalated in parts of the borderlands, ceasefire groups built 
up their troops and arsenals, Tatmadaw battalions were sent to reinforce strategic 
39 Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and does not legally recognise refugees within its 
borders. There are, however, currently nine Temporary Shelters for People Fleeing Fighting on Thai soil. Many of the 
people in these temporary shelters have been displaced in Thailand since the 1980s and 1990s. 
40 The number of people living in the nine temporary shelters in Thailand is a debated and controversial issue. Non-
official estimates based on feeding figures place the number at around 150,000, almost twice the official government 
figure (see notably TBBC's camp population figures: http://wvvw.tbbc,org/carnns/pcmuiations.htm - last accessed 18 
Sept 2012). Since November 2005, Thai authorities have not allowed new arrivals to register or receive any form of 
documentation, resulting in a growing population of undocumented and effectively illegal camp inhabitants. 
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positions, and there were fears that the country would collapse into all-out civil war. 
Meanwhile, in August 2010 - eight months after I started fieldwork - the junta 
announced that the country's first democratic elections in over twenty years would be 
held that November. 
2. A polarised debate and two aid paradigms 
Myamnar has been associated with war and ethnic conflict for over half a century. 
This war is now as much global as it is local. Besides physical violence, it also 
embraces a battle of ideas, identities and values. A defining feature of this 
internationalized battlespace is its polarized nature. Within this globalized arena a 
military dictatorship - the SPDC - confronts a range of external political activists 
and international human rights lobby groups. The territory upon which these 
warring parties have pitched their tents, and on whose behalf they claim to speak, 
are the peoples of Myanmar. Myanmar - or Burma - is an internationalized 
battlespace where the peoples' multiple masters have established competing 
regimes of truth and legitimacy (Duffield 2008: 6). 
Duffield describes Burma as afflicted by a chronic emergency driven by totalitarian rule 
and the exercise of arbitrary personal authority - where "people and communities are 
wantonly exposed to danger and the irrelevance of their being" - in the absence of a 
compensatory public welfare system (Duffield 2008: 2). The state's counterinsurgency 
campaign in border areas was historically accompanied by systematic and widespread 
abuses targeting civilian populations, such as forced displacement, destruction or 
exto1iion of villagers' property, forced labour and forced conscription - including 
forced conscription of child soldiers - arbitrary arrest and detention of civilians, 
summary execution, rape and torture41 . Together with decades of military (mis)rule and 
41 Widespread and systematic human rights abuses by Tatmadaw forces and their allies have been extensively 
documented by local and international organisations. In 2006, the then UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in 
Myanmar, Paulo Sergio Pinheirio, reported to the UN General Assembly that crimes such as sexual violence, forced 
labour, and child soldiering had been "widespread and systematic over the last decade so as to suggest they are not 
simply isolated acts of individual misconduct of middle or low rank officers but rather the result of the upholding of a 
system under which individuals and groups have been allowed to breach the law and human rights without being held 
to account" (UNGA 2006: 10). This assessment of human rights violations as being widespread and systematic was 
reiterated in 2010 by Tomas Ojea Quintana, the subsequent Special Rapporteur, who took the further step of calling 
for a Commission oflnquiry into possible war crimes and crimes against humanity in Burma (UNGA 2010). 
~ 
Historically less well documented are abuses perpetrated by armed non-state actors not aligned with the state, as well 
as the relationships that the latter have with populations they claim to be fighting for. This is partly due to practical 
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disinvestment in health infrastructure and services, this resulted in a context where 
violence was a fact of life and had long-lasting effects on the health and welfare of local 
communities (Beyrer and Lee 2008; Checci, et al. 2003; Lee, et al. 2006; Skidmore 
2003; Stover, et al. 2007). 
a. Humanitarian needs, access and aid to a pariah state 
There has historically been a paucity of independent data on health and other conditions 
of communities in Burma, particularly in remote and disputed border areas. Health 
aggregates for the country as a whole suggest a dire situation: outside of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Burma was second to Afghanistan for child mortality rates in 2008 according to 
UNICEF42 ; but this does not reflect conditions in remote and disputed areas, where 
organisations like UNICEF were historically denied access. Data from these areas 
generally comes from organisations with links to ethnic nationalist groups, since 
authorisation and protection from these groups are typically needed to access disputed 
areas and areas under their control. For this reason, this data is sometimes questioned43 . 
However, organisations collecting data in these areas derive credibility from many 
years' experience on the ground and endorsement by international donors and academic 
institutions. The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) publishes annual surveys 
of displacement in eastern Burma, and in recent years has investigated impacts of 
displacement on food security and poverty (TBBC 2009; 2010; 2011). In 2009, TBBC 
estimated that at least 470,000 people were displaced in eastern Burma, with at least 
111,000 hiding in the jungle 44 • As described in following chapters, Back Pack was the 
limitations in the collection of data, as well as ideological biases that have to an extent dominated Burma lobby 
groups in exile as well as human rights and activist communities. However, even the most realistic analysts tend to 
recognise that while non-state anned actors including resistance groups have also committed abuses and crimes, the 
scale and systematic nature of these is nowhere near the level of abuses perpetrated by Tatmadaw troops and their 
allies (e.g. HRW 2011). 
42 httn://vvww.unicef.org/sowc08/docs/sovvc08 table USMR,rx!f - last accessed 18 September 2012. 
43 Some people I spoke to during my research - pai1icularly INGO and donor representatives critical of cross-border 
aid - if not entirely dismissing data from groups like TBBC and BPHWT, argued that their findings are 
representative of only a small prop011ion of Burma's population. They argued that the data is biased by the fact that 
surveyors have to travel with armed escorts, which can influence information given by community members. A more 
cynical view is that these groups are publishing data that is beneficial to them in attempts to secure international 
donor funding. 
44 At the time, TBBC also estimated that some 128,000 people were displaced in government-controlled relocation 
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first organisation to conduct a systematic population-based health survey in eastern 
Burma (BPHWT 2006). The under-5 mortality rate in black zones of eastern Burma was 
found to be 221 per 1,000 live births, twice that estimated by UNICEF for Burma as a 
whole 45. 
Studies conducted by outside groups confirm that the health outcomes of communities 
in remote and contested areas are negatively impacted by protracted conflict, chronic 
poverty, abuses and instability (Belton 2007; Checci, et al. 2003; Hu, et al. 1991; PHR 
2011 ). Moreover, historically starved of funding, fragmented and lacking skilled human 
resources, official health services are largely confined to towns, missing much of the 
rural areas - including much of the ceasefire zones - where most of the population lives 
(Duffield 2008). The inability of medical personnel to support themselves on state 
salaries encourages unofficial user fees, resulting in de facto privatisation and 
effectively making healthcare unaffordable to the majority of the rural population 
(Duffield 2008). 
Compared with other countries at a similar level of development, Burma has historically 
received only small amounts of international aid (Duffield 2008; ICG 2008). The 
country's 'aid orphan' status is typically linked to international policies aimed at 
weakening and isolating the regime, and concerns that aid will be misappropriated by 
the military government (Steinberg 2010). The junta's crackdown on the 1988 
demonstrations and refusal to acknowledge the results of the 1990 elections resulted in 
international political condemnation and sanctions against the govemment46 ; Western 
sites and 231,000 in temporary settlements of ceasefise areas. However, displacement in eastern Bunna and 
elsewhere in border areas has historically been extremely dynamic and changeable. Families and whole communities 
can be displaced multiple times a year, with some able to return to their villages after a relatively short period of 
displacement, and others forced to move on from location to location (TBBC 2009). 
45 UNICEF estimated the under-5 mortality rate to be 106 per 1,000 live births - UNICEF 2006 Info by Country. 
Available at: http://\v\v\v.unicefor0i11fohvcountrv/eastasia.html (quoted in BPHWT 2006). 
46 It is not within the scope of this chapter to enter into the highly politicised debate concerning international 
sanctions against Bwma (Morten Pedersen, for example, has critiqued Western sanctions policies towards Bunna -
Pedersen 2005; 2008a). Historically, however, there has been a division of positions in relation to the desirability and 
effectiveness of international sanctions against the regime, and in the years leading up to my fieldwork international 
actors increasingly tended to advocate for engagement rather than isolation, with the US notably government 
adopting a policy of 'pragmatic engagement' in 2009. Divisions in relation to the issue of sanctions have also 
historically tended to be miITored by parallel divisions conce1ning the two paradigms for aid delivery described in 
this chapter - with advocates of sanctions typically also being opposed to aid going 'via Rangoon' (Duffield 2008). 
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countries and Japan cut financial aid; and while (with the exception of India) most 
neighbouring countries maintained political and economic ties with the junta, Burma 
became a de facto pariah state at the international level (Pedersen 2008a; Steinberg 
2010). 
While powerful Western countries attempted to isolate the Burmese junta, Burma-China 
ties grew after 1988, to a large extent compensating for Western isolationist policies 
(Chenyang 2010; Thant Myint U 2012). After the border between the two countries was 
opened in early 1990, cross-border trade between China and Burma increased, and 
China began supplying considerable military aid to the junta. Throughout following 
decades, China provided extensive economic aid and helped to develop infrastructure 
and industry in Burma through investments in the construction of dams, bridges, roads, 
ports and industrial projects, with China thereby positioning itself as chief beneficiary 
from investments in Burma's extensive oil and natural gas reserves. Historically, China 
was also the largest supplier of military aid to Burma, supplying the junta with jet 
fighters, armoured vehicles, naval vessels and weapons, as well as training for 
Tatmadaw troops. Chinese investment and economic and military support contributed to 
the country's growing influence in Burma, and to China's strategic influence in the 
Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia (Egreteau 2008) - although the Burmese Generals 
tended to have mixed attitudes towards and therefore to attempt to limit China's power 
(Thant Myint U 2012). Recent years have seen suggestions of increased tensions in the 
Sino-Burmese politico-economic relationship47 ; but links with China historically meant 
that the regime continued to benefit from international investment, trade and military 
assistance, and was diplomatically protected by China's veto in the UN Security 
Council48 (Thant Myint U 2012). 
47 Researchers have notably described ways in which the Burmese government has recently attempted to develop 
strategic and commercial relations with India, as well as improving bilateral relations with Japan and within the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). These developments have been described as shifts in Burma's 
foreign policy to avoid excessive dependence on China (Chenyang 2010; Egreteau 2008; Lall 2009) - although it has 
also been argued that Burma-India relations will never be top priority for either country (Wilson 2012). In addition, 
increasing tensions in Sino-Burmese relations are said to have been caused by the Kokang incident in August 2009, 
by the resurgence of conflict in Kachin State in June 2011, and by the halting of Chinese-funded mega-development 
projects such as the Myitsone dam in October 2011. 
48 For example, in January 2007, China and Russia vetoed a UN Security Council Resolution criticising the Bunnese 
junta's human rights record, striking a blow to the US campaign to use the Security Council to spotlight and punish 
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Low levels of assistance from W estem donor countries cannot, however, just be 
explained by international political and geopolitical considerations, but were also 
related to the policy and political environment within Burma, seen as a structural 
impediment to aid - W estem aid being more conditional on factors that in the modem 
aid industry are typically described as 'good governance' (Duffield 2008). The 
influence of external opposition and lobby groups was also key, as they often 
successfully advocated against aid going 'via Rangoon' (as state-sanctioned assistance 
was often called) on the basis that this could bolster an illegitimate regime (Duffield 
2008). Donors like the EU and US continued to provide humanitarian aid inside Burma, 
channelling aid through multilateral organisations and INGOs. But the 1990s and 2000s 
also saw increasing restrictions on aid agencies within Burma, particularly in disputed 
border areas (Stover, et al. 2007). Combined with the weakening of para-state systems 
in border areas and the influence of Burma campaign groups in the politics of aid, this 
contributed to the emergence in the 1990s of cross-border aid as an internationally 
endorsed alternative paradigm for assisting communities in Burma. 
Up until the mid-1990s, larger ethnic nationalist groups were able to maintain para-state 
systems in relatively autonomous areas under their control. Control of trade routes and 
taxation of local populations enabled the leadership of ethnic nationalist groups to fund 
social and welfare systems, while their armed forces defended the territory from 
incursions by state forces (Smith 2007). KNU-controlled areas, known as Kawthoolez49, 
were where such para-state systems were most developed, with a range of specialised 
departments created under the political leadership of the KNU (South 2011 ). 
Communities in areas under KNU control could access schools teaching in Karen 
languages and run by the Karen Education Department, as well as hospitals and clinics 
run by the KNLA's Medical Branch (KNLA-MB) and, later, by the Karen Department 
of Health and Welfare50 (KDHW). But when the KNU and its armed wing were 
repressive rule by the military junta. The veto illustrated opposition from China, Russia and a number of developing 
countries to the UN intervening in what they described as the internal affairs of a sovereign state. 
http://wwvv.washingtonpost.com/vnJ-dvn/content!article/2007/01 / J 2/ AR?007011201115 .html - last accessed 25 
February 2013. 
49 Kawthoolei is commonly translated from Sgaw Karen as 'land without evil'. 
5° Clinics and hospitals in Karen state were initially run under the overall administration of the KNU, with no clear 
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weakened by the splintering of troops that created the DKBA in 1994, and when they 
lost control of Manerplaw in 1995, the KNU faced increasing difficulties in maintaining 
its welfare systems. During the second half of the 1990s, the 'second front' was pushed 
further east, towards Thailand. By the end of the 1990s, the KNU could no longer 
finance its health and welfare programmes through taxation and control of trade routes, 
and those involved in managing these services began to look outwards for support51 . 
During the 1990s, scaled-up Tatmadaw offensives and internal splintering also 
weakened other resistance groups (Smith 2007). Much existing local-level infrastructure 
for health and education in remote and disputed areas of eastern Burma was destroyed 
or depleted; and when clinics or schools remained, the situation was generally too 
volatile and the resources too scarce for them to operate. Restrictions imposed by the 
SPDC meant that international agencies had little access to local communities (Duffield 
2008; Rae 2007; Stover, et al. 2007). Throughout the 1990s and well into the 2000s, aid 
agencies were thus denied access to many contested areas; and when granted access, 
they regularly faced countless barriers, such as delays in obtaining travel permits. In 
2005, the Global Fund withdrew from Burma, citing government interference, increased 
difficulties in accessing communities, and fears that funding would benefit the regime52 . 
Then, in 2006, the government ordered the ICRC to close its field offices53 ; the ICRC 
stated that it had become impossible to implement its work, and in 2007 broke with its 
traditional stance of silence to condemn the government's violations of international 
humanitarian law and denial of access to civilians in conflict zones. To many, Burma 
had become a case where in order to do no harm, it was better to do nothing involving 
the government. 
distinction between military and civilian departments for health. However, after the KJ\i'U/KNLA was weakened and 
could no longer afford to run its own health systems, the Karen Department of Health and Welfare was created as a 
specifically civilian administrative structure for health, which increasingly tapped into international donor funding to 
support 'mobile clinics' in Karen state (based on discussions and interviews with members ofKDHW and BPHWT). 
51 Ashley South has described in detail the history of the KNU/KNLA (e.g. South 2008; South 2011). Infonnation on 
the KNU and the historical evolution of its different departments was also collected through interviews with members 
of the KNU/KNLA, KNLA-MB, KDHW and BPHWT. 
52 httD://\vvvw.who.int/buIIet.in/vo]umes/83/10/newsl 1005/en/index.htrnl - last accessed 18 September 2012. 
However, the Global Fund's closure has also been linked to the activities of American lobby groups opposed to aid 
going 'via Rangoon' (Duffield 2008; ICG 2006). 
5" 
.) In December 2005, the government had already halted the ICRC's visits to prisoners: 
http://www.infosud.org/sQi_p.php?articie8 l 0 - last accessed 18 September 2012. 
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b. Cross-border aid and an evolving aid debate 
'Cross-border aid' refers to mechanisms developed in this context to support the 
continued provision of services in border areas. From an administrative and logistics 
base in a neighbouring country, aid crosses the border in the form of money, supplies, 
and/or technical assistance for groups delivering services to local communities; this is 
done 'under the radar', without official government approval, and can be interpreted as 
a violation of state sovereignty. In addition, aid workers who are part of systems for 
cross-border aid generally work with authorisation from and under the protection of 
political and armed groups controlling the areas in which they work. The implications 
and significance of these characteristics are discussed throughout this thesis. 
There are a number of quite different organisations and programmes in Burma's border 
areas that are grouped together under the label of cross-border aid. TBBC runs the 
largest cross-border programme, with this aspect of the organisation's work being one 
of the many open secrets on the border54 . The other heavyweight is Back Pack, which 
by the time I started fieldwork was the single largest supporter of medical assistance 
and primary healthcare into Burma along a model described as cross-border. There are 
also a number of s1naller groups supporting services ranging from health, education and 
livelihoods to human rights documentation and training, small-scale development and 
environmental conservation. Most cross-border organisations and programmes operate 
on the Thai-Burma border; but there are a number of smaller groups that use cross-
border approaches to provide assistance from Yunnan into Shan and Kachin States, and 
from northeastern India or Bangladesh into western Burma (Beyrer and Lee 2008). 
Cross-border aid is posited as an alternative to state-sanctioned assistance, where aid is 
54 TBBC was initially founded as a conso1iium of Christian NGOs providing basic humanitarian assistance to 
Burmese people fleeing conflict into Thailand. Today, TBBC is responsible for rations in the temporary shelters 
along the border, but the organisation also provides cross-border aid inside Burma's eastern border areas. This aspect 
of the organisation's work is not included in its public documentation, but is common knowledge among stakeholders 
on and beyond the border. For its Emergency Relief Assistance (ERA) programme, TBBC works through local-level 
paiiner organisations that enable cash assistance to be channelled into remote areas inside Burma. The cash 
equivalent of three months' rice supply is provided to communities who are found to have experienced significant 
shocks to their livelihoods within the previous six months. The idea of the ERA programme is to provide civilians 
with the means to support themselves within their own communities, thereby stemming further displacement and 
strengthening local economies (information based on discussions with TBBC staff; NB in November 2012 TBBC 
changed its name to The Border Conso1iium - TBC). 
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provided 'above the radar' and within parameters defined by the Burmese state. 
Historically, the two models of aid delivery were associated with opposite ends of a 
polarised and internationalised political debate (Duffield 2008): at one end were those 
who advocated sanctions and isolation of the regime, their vision of Burma defined by 
the experiences of refugees and the repression that had driven them to places like the 
Thai-Burma border; at the other were those who advocated engagement with the 
regime, the removal of sanctions, and aid 'through Yangon' 55 as not only possible but 
politically strategic. In 2008, Duffield noted a parallel "politically induced 
fragmentation" between donor governments, which were divided along a scale ranging 
"from DfID, which is the process of relocating its office from Bangkok to .Yangon, to 
CIDA which reflects the Canadian opposition to internal aid, preferring to concentrate 
its efforts on the cross-border operation" (Duffield 2008: 18). 
By the late 2000s, the main donors supporting state-sanctioned humanitarian aid in 
Burma were the EU, UK, Australia, Japan and Korea. Funding for cross-border aid was 
provided by Canada, Norway and Denmark in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the 
US in 2006. The UK conducted a review of its Burma programme in 2006 and 
subsequently allowed funding for cross-border aid (IDC 2007). Some donors like the 
US and later the UK funded cross-border aid while continuing to provide assistance 
through organisations officially registered to work in Burma; but others saw these 
models as mutually exclusive (Duffield 2008). So although cross-border aid gained 
support from the late 1990s onwards, donors were historically divided over whether or 
not to fund this system. In addition, evolving conditions in ceasefire areas and events 
following Cyclone Nargis in 2008 were seen by a number of analysts and policy makers 
to undermine the very premises of cross-border aid. 
After the ceasefires of the 1990s, communities 1n some areas were described as 
benefiting from greater stability and access to services (Duffield 2008; South, et al. 
2010). Communities in areas under Democratic Karen Buddhist Army control, for 
example, were said to have greater access to schools and healthcare facilities (South 
55 As Duffield notes, a polarised political discourse is also reflected in the use of names, with the former position 
reflected through the use of the names Burma and Rangoon, and the latter through the use of Myanmar and Yangon 
(Duffield 2008). 
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2008; 2009; 2010). In some remote areas controlled by the New Mon State Party, the 
Mon Health Committee developed basic primary healthcare systems 56 . But communities 
in ceasefire areas still lacked access to essential services and were not immune from 
abuses by state and non-state actors - instead, the ceasefires exposed populations to new 
risks of dispossession and displacement (HRW 2002; PHR 2011). 
Some areas controlled by ceasefire groups were, however, increasingly accessible to aid 
agencies - and the number of agencies operating inside Burma (including international 
and local NGOs as well as CBOs) increased from the 1990s onwards (Duffield 2008; 
South 2007). In addition, the opening up of other spaces to international humanitarian 
actors - in particular, Burma's central areas, commonly referred to as the 'dry zones' -
began to promote a picture of more widespread need, with border areas seen less as the 
exception to a more generalised chronic emergency (Duffield 2008). Meanwhile, efforts 
like the Three Diseases Fund - which began financing HIV/ AIDS, TB and malaria 
programmes in 2006 - were seen to demonstrate the possibility of delivering aid 
effectively without bolstering the regime. The most optimistic accounts still recognised 
that a lot more was needed to meet the health, education and livelihoods needs of 
communities in remote and unstable areas (AusAID 2010; Belcher 2004; Duffield 2008; 
IDC 2007); but still, a number of critics and analysts were already questioning the need 
for cross-border aid in what they saw as an evolving operational environment. 
Cyclone Nargis was a turning point in the politics of aid to Burma. Up to 200,000 
people were killed by the cyclone, which made landfall in Burma's delta and coastal 
areas on the night of 2 May 2008 (South, et al. 2011 ). Within the first few days, 
survivors were helped by individuals and groups who drew on local-level networks to 
channel basic assistance to affected areas (South, et al. 2011 ). But the government was 
slow to react, and to many it seemed that Nargis would become another example of the 
state failing its people. The government initially blocked access by international aid 
agencies to the Delta57 and detained or imprisoned many Burmese citizens who went to 
56 Based on communications and interviews with the Mon Health Committee, which falls under the administration of 
the New Mon State Party (Mon ceasefire group), as well as interviews and discussions with donors, UN and INGO 
personnel working inside Burma. ✓ 
57 A few INGOs such as Save the Children were already working on the ground when the cyclone hit, and were able 
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help the survivors (Belanger and Horsey 2008; HRW 2010). Many international 
politicians and activists responded by calling for a unilateral imposition of aid and 
invoking the Responsibility to Protect (Belanger and Horsey 2008); but according to 
some analysts this only seemed "to have reinforced the paranoid and xenophobic 
positions of 'hardliners' within the government, who responded by restricting 
humanitarian access to vulnerable communities" (Seith 2008; South, et al. 2011: 10). 
One month after the cyclone, however, access by international agencies improved, 
largely - it has been argued - as a result of diplomatic negotiations and ASEAN and 
UN pressure on the government (Creac'h and Fan 2008; ICG 2008; South, et al. 2011). 
Under the coordination of the Tripartite Core Group - comprising ASEAN, the UN and 
the Government of Myanmar - international agencies were increasingly able to 
implement programmes in the Delta. The post-Nargis response came to be seen as proof 
that aid could be delivered effectively without bolstering the regime, and that Burma 
had resilient civil society networks that could be strengthened through international 
assistance58 (ATP 2008). Nargis relief and recovery efforts were lauded in aid circles in 
and beyond Rangoon as not only proof of increased humanitarian space in cyclone-
affected areas, but also as a way to 'get the foot in the door' and increase access to other 
areas by engaging with an ostensibly more welcoming government (Creac 'h and Fan 
2008; Kurtzer 2009). 
By this time, efforts had also been made to increase dialogue between organisations 
working 'via Rangoon' and cross-border groups. In January 2007, for example, some of 
these groups met for the first time in Bangkok to discuss coordinating their health 
operations (Beyrer and Lee 2008). But at the same time and with new information 
coming from central and Delta areas, competition for funding was increasing between 
these groups (Duffield 2008). When I began fieldwork, agencies working through 
official state channels still could not access many conflict-affected and remote border 
to rapidly respond to the disaster, despite government restrictions on access (South, et al. 2011 ). 
58 Prior to Nargis, there had been a tendency of influential donors and diplomatic representatives assuming that civil 
society in Burma had been all but eliminated through decades of oppressive military rule. The initial response to 
Nargis was, however, largely spearheaded by civil society groups, which led many 'Burma watchers' to reassess this 
perception (based on discussions and interviews with donors, lobby groups and NGOs). 
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areas; the majority of the population still did not have access to adequate healthcare 
services; and the run-up to the 2010 elections marked a more restrictive operating space 
for international organisations trying to access border areas. But the changes described 
above had contributed to the increasingly prevalent view that providing aid through 
state-sanctioned channels was viable, and potentially a means to encourage political 
change by working with rather than isolating the government (ICG 2008). Increased 
political engagen1ent in recent years has also been analysed as a way to improve 
Western (and particularly US) relations in ASEAN, and to counterbalance China's 
growing influence in the Asian region (Haacke 2012). And as described in later 
chapters, incremental changes during my fieldwork further contributed to the contention 
that cross-border aid had become an obsolete model that, in an arguably evolving 
humanitarian space and changing (geo )political context, could do more harm than good. 
B. Methodological minefields: practicalities, politics and ethics of 
research on the border 
It was against the historical backdrop described above and during a time of significant 
political change as well as shifting international attitudes towards humanitarian 
assistance in Burma that I worked in Back Pack's Mae Sot office - key node in a 
network spanning from different parts of Burma's borderlands to the offices of 
international donors. In 2008, Back Pack leaders and partners published an article in 
which they described the organisation as part of a system of multi-level local-global 
partnerships (Mahn, et al. 2008). During fieldwork, I found that what were represented 
as distinct yet interlinked levels of partnerships could also be conceptualised as 
interrelated fields - in the Bourdieusian sense (Bourdieu 1977; 1984; 1990) - involving 
diverse actors, value sets and rules of engagement. Research into the 'humanitarian 
encounter' that brought these fields together required a combination of methods, as well 
as ongoing contextualisation of the details of everyday life on the border within a 
dynamic situation at national, regional and international levels. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will briefly describe the field site on the Thai-Burma border - geographic and 
political hub in the development of cross-border aid systems - before describing the 
practicalities, difficulties and ethical quandaries of research into what had become, as 
described above, a polarised debate. ' 
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1. The field site: Mae Sot and the Thai-Burma border 
Inside a nondescript walled compound on the outskirts of Mae Sot is a mish-mash of 
traditional Thai wooden houses, a couple of newer concrete buildings, and clusters of 
small bamboo huts with leaf thatching. This is where Back Pack medics live and work 
when they come to Thailand. And for members who live in Mae Sot during the year, it 
is a safe place in an otherwise hostile environment, where due to their illegal status they 
are always at risk of Thai police looking to make a quick Baht59 by demanding bribes. 
However, local authorities in and around Mae Sot are aware of Back Pack's existence 
and generally tum a blind eye to what goes on inside the compound. 
Mae Sot itself is a rapidly growing Thai border town shaped by the volatile history of 
Burma's border areas, which was described above. The town is notorious for legal and 
extra-legal trade in gems and teak, as well as black market trafficking of people, drugs 
and goods of all kinds. Its proximity to the border and refugee camps, as well as the 
presence of a large community of Burmese activists in exile and migrant workers, have 
made Mae Sot into a hub for foreign aid workers, as well as increasing numbers of 
Western volunteers - or what some more cynical people call 'voluntourists'. 
Even before the creation of the modem border between British Burma and Siam in 
1868, the area that was to become Mae Sot was at the centre of routes of trade and war 
(Pongsawat 2007). In the second half of the twentieth century, political crisis and 
conflict in Burma coincided with economic boom on the Thai-Burma border. Cross-
border trade was key to the survival of ethnic nationalist groups fighting the Burmese 
government (Pongsawat 2007). The Thai government historically supported Karen 
resistance groups as a buffer against the Burmese regime, which was seen as a threat to 
Thailand's national security. After December 1988, however, Bangkok established a 
trade relationship with Burma, and support for ethnic nationalist groups was officially 
dropped (Battersby 1998; Buszynski 1998). But elements of the buffer policy persisted 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, as Thailand continued to provide unofficial sanctuary 
to and tolerated the activities of democratic opposition and ethnic nationalist groups, 
59 Mae Sot is in Thailand, the currency of which is the Thai Baht (THB). 
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particularly the KNU/KNLA. The border economy continued to grow, with displaced 
Burmese providing unlimited supplies of cheap 1nigrant and often illegal labour for 
Thailand's industrial and agricultural development (Pongsawat 2007). 
The first big wave of Karen refugees fled to the Mae Sot area in 1984. Over the next ten 
years, as the Tatmadaw took control of areas closer to Thailand, increasing numbers of 
Karen villagers fled to Thailand, and new camps or 'temporary shelters' were 
established. After the Burmese military crackdown on the 1988 uprisings, many 
members of the '88 Generation also fled to border areas and to places like Mae Sot, 
where they continued a war of words against the military regime. The flow of displaced 
Burmese people into Thailand continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The Thai 
government attempted to reduce numbers in the camps with a programme of voluntary 
resettlement beginning in 2004; but as refugees were resettled, more people came to 
replace them 6°. 
In recent years, Mae Sot developed rapidly as the main economic gateway into Burma, 
in parallel with Thailand's shift towards prioritising economic development and trade 
with its ASEAN partner. Modern-day Mae Sot falls within Tak Province. The Asia 
Highway passes by the town, providing a key trade route benveen the two countries. 
The Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge crossing the Moei River links Mae Sot to the 
town of Myawaddy in Burma's Karen State. From its construction in 1997 to 2010, the 
Friendship Bridge was one of three official border crossings into Burma, and Mae Sot 
boo1ned as a result of investment by Thai, Burmese and Chinese traders and 
industrialists (Pongsawat 2007). But on 17 July 2010, Burma closed the border. Many 
observers linked this to the junta's frustration at Thailand providing shelter to Burmese 
opposition groups - or in the words of the Tak Governor, Samart Loifah, when I 
interviewed him in 2011, "[b]ecause they would like the Thai Government to solve the 
KNU problem in Mae Sot". The bridge remained closed until December 2011, by which 
time Thailand lost an estimated $US 2.7 million per day in trade61 . These evolving 
political and economic considerations had impacts on cross-border aid systems, which 
60 htto://wv-r\v.tbbc.org/carnos/historv.htm - last accessed 19 September 2012. 
✓ 
6 1 http://vvv,,v.dvb.no.1news/k.e\·-rnvawaddv-border-crossing-reooens/l 9055 - last accessed 19 September 2012. 
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as described in following chapters rely on the tacit approval of Thai authorities who also 
have vested interests in growing diplomatic and trade relations with Burma. 
2. Details and practicalities of the research project 
Research into the evolving politics of aid to Burma was grounded in an ethnographic 
focus on the Back Pack Health Worker Team, which by the time of my fieldwork had 
become the largest supporter of health programmes in Burma along a model described 
as cross-border aid. The bulk of my fieldwork was conducted in Mae Sot, in a particular 
type of space shared by a community of people living and working in the grey zones of 
what one Back Pack leader calls the 'legal-illegal'. While based out of a specific 
location, the research attempted to follow multi-level networks through which a system 
described as humanitarian functions; and while focusing on the stories and actions of 
Back Pack members, it sought to relate these to evolving structural forces. 
Drawing on approaches employed by anthropologists such as Fassin, Redfield and 
Mosse, ethnographic methods were employed to explore the logics and worldviews as 
well as structural factors influencing a specific type of humanitarian discourse and 
practice (e.g. Fassin 2012; Mosse 2005a; Redfield 2005). Similarly to other 
ethnographies of NGOs, the methodology for research with Back Pack comprised 
localised fieldwork within a web of sometimes-shifting relationships among diverse 
groups of people with whom I had often widely varying relationships (Atlani-Duault 
2005; Markowitz 2001 ). And as described by Markovitz of her ethnographic research in 
an NGO, dilemmas and complications in the research process - which, in this context, 
were impacted by a polarised aid debate that had also been influenced by previous 
researchers' work - "coalesce[ d] in the problem of positionality, of situating oneself as 
a researcher within a nexus of fluid interpersonal and institutional relationships, while 
simultaneously linking these evolving relationships to the variable flows of money and 
influence offered in the name of [humanitarianism ]62" (Markowitz 2001: 41 ). 
62 Markovitz's analysis focuses on development NGOs - and so the original quote included the word 'development' 
and not 'humanitarianism'. However, her analysis is also applicable to ethnographic work with humanitarian NGOs 
and is particularly relevant to the types of dilemmas and complications that I encountered during my fieldwork and 
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In order to explore the research questions outlined in the Introduction, long-term 
participant observation was combined with semi-structured and life history interviews, 
discourse or narrative analysis63 , and attention to macro-level processes. Multi-level 
networks were explored by working with Back Pack and by travelling - at times 
literally but also by drawing on methods of cormnunication employed by Back Pack 
members themselves - along interpersonal and institutional connections forming the 
backbone of cross-border aid. Information from participant observation and interviews 
at different levels of these networks was related to information derived from discourse 
and narrative analysis. The latter focused on official statements and publications by 
Back Pack and partners, internal documents of these groups, and grey literature on 
humanitarian aid more generally. This was complemented by macro-level information 
on the policies, political decisions and practices of governments and multilateral 
organisations. Along with information derived from informal socialising and 
discussions, as well as ongoing examination of various media and documentation 
sources, these diverse techniques - different forms of what Gusterson calls 
polymorphous engagement (Gusterson 1997) - enabled increasing familiarisation with 
the positions and perspectives of various stakeholders in an evolving politics of aid. 
Most of my fieldwork was conducted between December 2009 and August 2011, when 
I lived and worked in Mae Sot. This was a time of significant but uneven and contested 
change in Burma, with the November 2010 elections notably marking a turning point in 
international attitudes towards the once-pariah state. I returned to Mae Sot for six weeks 
between January and March 2012 to conduct targeted follow-up discussions with Back 
Pack leaders, office staff and medics. The total period of data collection therefore 
spanned between December 2009 and March 2012. Changes within Back Pack, as well 
as political and other changes in Burma and the wider region after March 2012 are not 
within the scope of this thesis. 
that are described below. 
63 In paiiicular, I drew on ways in which narrative analysis has been developed as a method for sociological and 
anthropological studies of organisations ( e.g. Czarniawska 1998). ✓ 
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During my fieldwork, I did not physically follow Back Pack teams as they provided 
healthcare in Burma's borderlands. This would have entailed crossing the border 
illegally and was precluded by the conditions of research; a Caucasian woman travelling 
with a Back Pack team in conflict areas would also have added to the visibility of and 
risks faced by medics and villagers. However, Back Pack leaders, management and 
office staff live and work in Mae Sot throughout the year; a proportion of the medics 
living inside Burma travel twice a year to Back Pack's office for the Six-Month 
Meetings; and other groups of medics also travel to Mae Sot at different times to attend 
trainings. Since I was not conducting research inside Burma's border areas, I had no 
direct access to communities targeted by Back Pack. I was able to meet a small number 
of villagers who had received assistance from Back Pack medics in their target areas 
and had been brought to Mae Sot for follow-up treatment. However, the focus of 
research was not on the beneficiaries of Back Pack programmes, but on Back Pack's 
members and the network that evolved to channel aid into Burma. 
From December 2009 to August 2011, I participated in the daily life and work of the 
organisation. When I began fieldwork, Back Pack's then Director adopted me as a type 
of assistant for anything requiring "pretty English" - getting me to write up what he 
dictated into e-mails, reports, proposals, presentations, and documentation for advocacy 
purposes. When he realised that like a typical anthropologist I took many notes, he 
initially asked me teasingly if I was an SPDC spy; he then often used me as a note taker 
in meetings and workshops. Later, he would jokingly introduce me as his "forced 
labour", making a deliberately ironic parallel between the use of volunteer labour in 
Back Pack and the Tatmadaw 's use of unpaid villagers to build roads or camps in the 
jungle. Working with other management or office staff often entailed helping them to 
edit their English in e-mails, reports, proposals or other documentation. Between two 
Six-Month Meetings, some of the women asked me to run informal English classes 
focusing on conversation and grammar. The leaders and staff thus tended to slot me into 
the role of the foreign volunteer, drawing on previous experiences of foreigners who 
had helped in the office. The ways in which they utilised me were in tum revealing of 
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how Back Pack has to engage with the wider gollawa64 aid world. 
An ongoing challenge was to juggle my role as a Back Pack volunteer with my role as a 
researcher, analysing and attempting to minimise the influence I had on processes I was 
participating in, while recognising that by my presence I inevitably had an impact. In 
many ways, my position was similar to the 'delicate line' that Atlani-Duault describes 
as characterising her status - bridging between actor and observer - while working and 
conducting fieldwork in a development NGO in post-Soviet eastern Europe (Atlani-
Duault 2005: 36). Like Atlani-Duault, I had to continuously attempt to distance myself 
intellectually and emotionally from processes in which I became increasingly involved, 
with this involvement being at the same time essential for gaining access, developing 
trust, and understanding the organisation's workings. And as described below, I too had 
to overcome the suspicions of many I worked with, at a time when their functioning and 
ideology were increasingly criticised. 
During this fieldwork, I took part in three Six-Month Meetings, when eighty or so 
medics from different areas of Burma stay in Mae Sot for at least a month. Between 
Six-Month Meetings, I worked with the leaders and staff who live in Mae Sot during the 
year. I observed parts of three three-1nonth Senior Medic Refresher trainings, attended 
by field workers from diverse areas. I joined other, shorter trainings held within Back 
Pack or in the offices of NGOs; these covered a number of topics - including primary 
healthcare, public health, human rights and humanitarian law, office management, and 
media and advocacy - and were attended by Back Pack leaders, office staff and/or field 
staff, depending on the topic. I also attended countless meetings, workshops and 
discussions between Back Pack members and with a range of outside actors - donors, 
NGOs, UN organisations, ethnic health organisations, lobby groups, journalists, ethnic 
nationalist groups, Thai and international politicians, and others. These interactions, to 
which I was given increasing access during my fieldwork, were essential in providing 
me with an insight into the tenor of exchanges between Back Pack members, partners, 
and other stakeholders in an evolving politics of aid. 
64 Gollavva is the Sgaw Karen term used to refer to Westerners. 
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Working with Back Pack gave me invaluable insight into the organisation and its 
functioning. As described by Markovitz, "[g]rounding research in the day-to-day work 
of NGO staff allows identification of the ways quotidian matters and interorganizational 
relations affect the design, presentation and implementation of projects, and the 
assumptions embedded in them" (Markowitz 2001: 42). This approach also allowed for 
gradual development of working relationships in a sensitive and politicised context. 
Discussing their work with staff members and finding ways with them to represent it in 
reports and other documentation enabled me to get to know them, and to gain fuller 
insight into their roles in and perspectives on the organisation. Working in Back Pack's 
office meant that I experienced the organisation's hierarchies and implicit rules, often 
learning through my own errors. It taught me the rhythm and cycles of the organisation, 
as it alternates between periods of frantic activity and lulls between meetings or 
workshops. It also taught me that working with Back Pack means being on call when a 
leader wants something done, as well as celebrating the festivals, weddings, births and 
other events that bring the Back Pack family together. 
Back Pack members who I worked with on a daily basis became key informants. It was 
through daily interactions and conversations with them that I learned the most about the 
organisation, and the lives, stories, and experiences of its members. Hierarchy, gender, 
age and other factors made it easier to get to know some members rather than others. 
For example, the younger female office workers were almost i1nmediately willing to 
discuss their lives and stories, whereas it took more time to get to know men the same 
age. Explicit and implicit hierarchies, as well as the personalities of its members, shape 
the organisation. Some people are very important in influencing Back Pack's 
functioning, and this bias is reflected in my research - they were often the 1nost vocal 
informants, just as they are more influential within the organisation. Nevertheless, I 
deliberately sought out members whose positions - for example as junior field staff or 
as members of smaller ethnic minority groups - meant that their opinions are less likely 
to be heard or that they might have different experiences and perspectives. 
Participant observation was complemented by interviews adapted to different types of 
actors. Life history interviews were used to gain understanding of how Back Pack 
leaders, office staff and medics describe and make sense of their lives and experiences. 
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Discussions with leaders, office staff and medics also focused on their understandings 
of systems they are part of and their roles within these systems, as well as ways of 
relating to communities, ethnic nationalist groups, the Burmese state, international 
humanitarian agencies and other actors. Interviews also targeted individuals and 
organisations at different levels of Back Pack's local-global partnerships, other actors 
supporting cross-border aid to Burma, as well as individuals and organisations who are 
not directly involved in cross-border aid but are influential in the politics of aid more 
generally. By the end of my fieldwork, I had conducted 120 semi-structured interviews 
with: Back Pack leaders, office staff and field staff; local and international partner 
organisations; other NGO and UN representatives; members of other cross-border 
groups; members of Burmese political and armed opposition groups; private and 
government donors; activist and lobby groups; Thai government representatives and 
military intelligence; and villagers having received assistance from Back Pack65 . 
Back Pack members are from a range of ethnic groups and speak a number of minority 
languages. Most of the leaders, management and office staff speak very good English. 
Burmese is the common language in which training programmes and health projects are 
designed and taught. English is used in the organisation's reports and other public 
documents ( as well as many of its internal documents), and in communicating with 
international partners and donors. Prior to my fieldwork, I attended an intensive basic 
Burmese course, enabled me to roughly follow trainings and discussions and to have 
basic conversations with people who did not speak English 66 . My daily interactions with 
leaders and office staff were, however, in English as the staff members used me to 
practice their language skills and were much more adept in English than I ever became 
in Burmese. Leaders and medics were also sometimes uncomfortable with speaking 
Burmese, which in most cases is not their native tongue and was imposed on them 
through the 'Burmanisation' policy of the Burman-dominated state. 
65 All interviews with Back Pack medics, leaders and office staff were conducted within the Back Pack compound. 
Other interviews and discussions were conducted in Thailand (Mae Sot, Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Fang, Mae Sariang), 
Burma (Rangoon), the UK (London), and France (Paris). A number of interviews were conducted over Skype with 
donors, GO representatives and activists based in the etherlands ~d Australia. 
66 I also attended a follow-up intermediary Burmese language course in Rangoon in 2010. 
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Interviews with Back Pack leaders, management and office staff who had good English 
language skills were conducted in English. English was also used to conduct interviews 
and discussions with members of Back Pack's partner organisations, as well as other 
stakeholders in aid to Burma, since it is the common language used by NGO workers, 
donors, lobby groups and others working in this area. Interviews with medics, villagers 
or others who did not speak English were conducted in Burmese or Karen and with the 
assistance of translators. 
When I started fieldwork, I was appointed two translators, themselves office staff 
members. It was more appropriate in these early stages to work with translators 
identified and trusted by the organisation and who understood the sensitivities of the 
context. These two women became informal research assistants and key informants, and 
their assistance was invaluable, particularly in early stages. Having insiders as 
translators probably introduced biases into the interviews, as more junior staff and 
medics would most likely have been reluctant to say certain things in front of a 1ne1nber 
of the office staff. However, this bias was to an extent compensated by observing 
people's actions and behaviours, and differences between what was said in an interview 
and said or done in other contexts. Later in my fieldwork, I was able to e1nploy an 
outside translator for interviews; she had already worked as a -translator in a training for 
Back Pack medics and understood the context, functioning of organisations on the 
border, and sensitivities of the research project; but since she was not part of Back Pack, 
she enabled me to have more open discussions with some junior field staff who might 
have been reluctant to say certain things in front of the two translators I initially worked 
with. Interview recordings were also later transcribed and translated with the assistance 
of different translators to those who originally helped conduct the interviews, enabling 
me to cross-check questions and responses against translations given at the time of an 
interview. 
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3. 'Sitting on the fence': ethics and trust on the border 
As well as being guided by ethical standards for anthropological research 67 , this 
research drew on the experiences of anthropologists having worked in contexts where 
violence conditions or has conditioned the lives of research participants ( e.g. Daniel 
1996; Feldman 1995; Harris 1997; Nordstrom 1997; 2004; 2007; Nordstrom and 
Robben 1995; Skidmore 2003; 2004; 2009b )68 : 
Anthropology of this level involves a number of responsibilities above and beyond 
those associated with more traditional ethnography: responsibility to the field-
worker's safety, to the safety of his or her informants, and to the theories that help 
to forge attitudes towards the reality of violence, both expressed and experienced 
(Nordstrom and Robben 1995: 4). 
Informed consent for conducting research within Back Pack was provided by the 
organisation's leadership prior to the beginning of fieldwork. A pre-fieldwork scoping 
visit was conducted in July 2009, in order to determine the feasibility of the research 
project and obtain initial consent for working with Back Pack69 . Back Pack's leaders 
agreed to me conducting research within their organisation, which included accessing 
information about their programmes, observing and participating in trainings, meetings 
and other events, and interviewing m_embers of the organisation. The informed consent 
agreement was initially oral, since Back Pack's leaders considered this sufficient at the 
time. It was put into writing once I had spent some time in the organisation and those 
involved in the research had a better understanding of what the project entailed. By this 
time, another researcher had also published information that was considered harmful to 
Back Pack and other cross-border groups. Making the informed consent agreement into 
a written document at this stage was part of the process of ongoing negotiation with 
67 Research ethics adhered to the guidelines provided by the Australian National University, the National Health and 
Medical Research Council of Australia, the Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and the Commonwealth, 
the Australian Anthropological Society, and the American Anthropological Association. 
68 In particular, a high standard of informed consent was maintained for all participants in this research, and 
anonymity and confidentiality were ensured so as to reduce the likelihood of potential negative consequences for 
participants. This also involved protecting and coding ethnographic material while in the field, as well as being 
sensitive to the potential uses of published and unpublished infom1ation. 
69 The organisation's leaders were at this time provided with a written outline of the terms of research . Templates for 
interviews with staff and medics were also shared with the leaders at the beginning of research. 
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Back Pack's leaders and other gatekeepers, who became nervous that I might use their 
information against them. 
Access therefore had to be renegotiated throughout my fieldwork and was contingent on 
earning the trust of Back Pack's leaders and other gatekeepers, as well as on objections 
these actors had, at different times, to my own presence and research and to the research 
of others. These objections were linked to the influence of researchers on an evolving 
politics of aid, as described in following chapters. Indeed, academic writings had by the 
time of my fieldwork fed into the politicised and polarised debate outlined above, as 
well as being accessible by and often objected to by those studied - in a manner 
comparable to the process of objection, which Mosse describes as resulting from his 
ethnographic representation of an international development aid agency (Mosse 2006). 
In such a context, 'objections' (here, to my own research but also to the research of 
others) were integral to a research process, which was contingent on and reflective of 
someti1nes shifting inter-personal and political relationships in humanitarian aid (Mosse 
2006: 939). 
As part of my agreement with Back Pack and in an attempt to further learn from 
possible responses to ethnographic representations, Back Pack's Leading Group was 
given the opportunity to comment on a draft of this thesis. This allowed the leaders to 
verify information for accuracy and sensitivity, as well as enabling them to provide 
feedback on my interpretation of the information collected. The thesis findings were 
presented orally and in writing to Leading Group 1nembers at the beginning of 2013; 
they then provided comments that were taken into account during finalisation. 
Individual participation in the research project was on a voluntary basis. Informed oral 
consent 70 was sought from every person interviewed. All individuals were informed of 
the purpose of the research and its projected outputs. Due to the sensitivity of the 
research subject and the security and other risks that individuals living and working in 
Burma's border areas could face if their personal information were to be misused, those 
70 Only in one case, when I interviewed one of Back Pack's paiiners who was particularly concerned about what I 
would write, was a written informed consent document used for a specific interview. The agreement also ensured the 
partner would be able to review any information relevant to his organisation for sensitivity and accuracy. 
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interviewed were informed of measures used to protect their confidentiality and 
anonymity. Pseudonyms have been employed throughout this thesis 71 , and no exact 
locations have been given ( e.g. of villages where the medics work). The personal and 
communal experiences of conflict, violence, injustice and sometimes physical and 
psychological torture that individuals I spoke to have lived through meant that 
interviews could potentially provoke emotional and psychological distress. Individuals 
were warned of this prior to interviews; they were informed that they did not have to 
answer questions if they did not want to and that they could stop the interview 
whenever they wished and retract any information. However, on the whole, I found that 
the people I spoke to were eager to tell their stories, no matter how distressing elements 
of them might be, and no interviewee asked for an interview to be stopped. Finally, a 
number of individuals I interviewed - representatives of NGOs, UN organisations, 
donors and lobby groups - requested to review any information directly mentioning 
their organisations for accuracy and sensitivity and were given the opportunity to do so 
before finalisation of this thesis. 
The particularities of the context, as well as the politicised and sensitive nature of the 
debate around cross-border aid, combined to create a context where the relational nature 
of epistemology, as described notably by David Mosse, became particularly evident 
(Mosse 2006). As such, the research process and knowledge that resulted from it were 
intertwined with evolving relationships with different actors, with attempts to grapple 
with complex ethical dilemmas, and with the need to balance personal allegiances and 
attachments against an endeavour to develop a more detached understanding of often 
politicised and emotive issues. 
In a situation of long-term fieldwork where the researcher is simultaneously an observer 
and a type of 'participant-insider', ethnographers have been described as becoming 
socially bound into their field sites in complex and often challenging ways (Mosse 
2006). They become increasingly 'templated' by the field (Parkin 2004: 101). But this 
71 With the exception of Dr Cynthia Maung, who is a well-known international figure, I have not used the real names 
of Back Pack medics, office staff and leaders. Instead, I have used common names from the ethnic/linguistic groups 
of the different individuals involved, as a way to reflect their cultw·al and communal backgrounds but preserve their 
anonymity. 
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is not to say that the type of fieldwork situation this research entailed was unique. 
'Participant-insider' ethnography might instead be understood as highlighting common 
characteristics of ethnographic research and knowledge. Thus David Mosse argues 
more generally that 
there is no neutral or uninvolved knowledge (' an understanding that everyone 
might share' (Jenkins 1994: 433), no sharp divide between anthropologist and 
subject, fieldwork and processes of everyday social life (Mosse 2006: 950). 
In this politically sensitive context, which has been shaped by decades of conflict, 
competing claims to socio-political legitimacy and changing regional and international 
politics, trust also had to be earned, tested, built and re-built over time. This was often 
frustrating and involved many setbacks; but over time it taught me about the power 
structures through which Back Pack works, relationships between Back Pack and 
partners, and what is at stake in the debate around cross-border aid. Working for Back 
Pack became a method to gradually earn the leaders' trust. After a while, I discovered 
that the main opposition to my presence was coming from one of Back Pack's partner 
organisations. I also discovered that Back Pack members had had previous experiences 
with researchers, which they described as betrayals of trust. These researchers had 
worked for long periods of time with groups on the border, which had welcomed them 
as people they assumed were on their side. Instead, the researchers had fed into a 
growing trend of criticism targeting cross-border aid. When one such publication came 
out, one of the leaders marched up to me and said: "You academics, you want to be 
objective. You can't sit on the fence. You have to choose." I tried multiple times to 
explain that I did not intend to use information given to me to undermine their work, but 
to understand the debate from their perspective and within the bigger picture of 
evolving politics of aid to Burma. But for people I worked with, it was a situation of "if 
you aren't with us, you are against us". 
A turning point came in November 2010, when Burma held its first elections in twenty 
years and fighting broke out across the river from Mae Sot. Over the weeks that 
followed, thousands of Karen civilians were newly displaced along the border and aid 
agencies working legally in Thailand were banned from accessing them. As described 
in Chapter 7, groups like Back Pack were left to fill the void. Suddenly, Back Pack's 
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leaders were sitting around the same table as organisations such as UNHCR. The 
leaders took me along to meeting after meeting; my role, as one person put it, was to 
translate "NGO-speak". They also used me to write up countless reports on the evolving 
situation. By this tin1e, I had worked with them for a year and they seemed to think that 
although I might still be a liability, I was also useful. In effect, the leaders were using 
me as a type of broker or translator - as conceptualised by Mosse and Lewis - in 
evolving aid networks, which in turn safeguarded my position as a volunteer/researcher 
in their organisation (Mosse and Lewis 2006). Some of Back Pack's partners continued 
to see me as a threat; but the leaders saw me as a tool they could use to their benefit. 
They hoped that I would see the world through their eyes and, through my research,. add 
academic credibility to their 'side' of the story. Eventually, it was Back Pack's leaders 
who defended my position within their organisation. For me, this demonstrated on a 
very personal level their ability to maintain control over their internal workings, while 
continuing to draw on the support of partner organisations. 
'Taking sides' was also an inevitable consequence of working with people who have 
very specific experiences and ways of seeing the world. In describing his research on 
inner-city street culture in Harlem in the 1990s, Bourgois comments on the tendency of 
most ethnographers to develop sympathies towards the culture or people they study 
(Bourgois 1995). Anthropological research is, moreover, "always "contaminated" by 
the perspective that the researcher brings to the question and by the emotions generated 
in the field" (Fine 1993: 287; Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). This is all the more the 
case when working with men and women whose lives have been shaped by a history of 
state-driven violence. And when the topic of research is politically and emotionally 
charged, it is even more important to question whether findings can - or should - be 
detached and unbiased (Sandford and Angel-Arjani 2006). 
In such cases, it becomes legitimate to question whether anthropology might not be 
restored as a humane discipline, with a role in political dialogue (Flyvbjerg 2001 ). 
Anthropologists such as Taussig, Scheper-Hughes, Nordstrom and Robben have thus 
challenged researchers to speak out against the injustices and violence they encounter in 
their work (Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Scheper-Hughes 1992; Taussig 1987). And in 
relation to her research in Burma and drawing on a history of politically engaged 
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writers, Skidmore explains, 
My fieldwork interpretations and the very framework by which I determine whom 
to interview and why are constantly embedded in a belief in the need to write 
against terror (Skidmore 2004: 33). 
Before moving to Mae Sot, I had already ( and naively, given that I did not really 
understand the situation I was stepping into) positioned myself as 'writing against 
terror'. Still, I wanted to approach the debate around cross-border aid in the most 
objective way possible, and to avoid being overwhelmed by a 'politics of truth' of the 
type described by Robben, where ethnographers are seduced into acceptance of peoples' 
accounts as the only correct version (Robben 1995). In the field, I constantly struggled 
to remain open-minded. But working with people whose worldviews are framed by 
personal and communal experiences of injustice and violence inevitably generated 
strong emotional reactions. I was on their side, even as I tried to remain open-minded 
about the wider debate. Ironically, I also found that my work with Back Pack meant 
that, when I met people whose alternative viewpoints about cross-border aid I was 
trying to take into account, they would tend to automatically assume that I had taken 
sides and embark on proving to me that 1ny 'side' was wrong. The often-emotive 
reactions of these people to my research were themselves indicative of an ongoing 
stalemate in the politics of aid to Burma - and of a parallel 'politics of truth' - despite 
claims by analysts like Duffield that the polarisation of positions was softening 
(Duffield 2008). 
After stepping out of the field, I have tried to reposition myself and to overcome the 
biases that inevitably resulted from this ethnographic approach. Drawing on 
Markovitz's reflexive approach to the ethnography of NGOs, I have tried to assess the 
ways in which "[ m ]y own tangled sense of allegiances and loyalties, which becomes 
more entangled with each field visit, reflects the shifting social and political terrain" of 
humanitarianism (Markowitz 2001: 43). I have attempted to engage in the process 
described by Bourdieu as 'participant objectification', and which comprises reflection 
on my own 'point of view' - my "personal and academic predilections, judgements, and 
aesthetics" - as the product of social conditions and professional location (Bourdieu 
2003; Mosse 2006: 949). In addition, I have attempted to reposition myself by moving 
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beyond the typical approach to the debate around cross-border aid, which is to pick one 
side of the ' fence ' and criticise those on the other. Instead, I have tried to understand 
why there is a need to take sides, and why attempting to 'sit on the fence' could make 
you an enemy. At the same time, I have tried to pay respect to men and women whose 
stories and actions were humbling for someone who grew up free from fear, and to 
reveal the fault lines of an international system that still fails to protect those most 
vulnerable to political violence. The resulting ethnography remains a 'positioned 
interpretation' (Mosse 2006), but one that aims to shed light on what was at the time a 
polarised and often emotive debate. 
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CH 3: Back Pack, Product of Burma's 'Chronic Emergency' 
Back Pack did not always have its own compound, with offices, training rooms and 
accommodation for medics and administrative staff. When Back Pack was created in 
1998, its founders worked out of the Mae Tao Clinic - often referred to as Back Pack's 
mother organisation - which since 1989 has provided healthcare to activists, displaced 
villagers and migrant workers from Burma. At the beginning, there was only a small 
handful of Back Pack staff in Mae Sot. Ten years later, Back Pack had grown into the 
largest cross-border group supporting medical and primary healthcare services in 
Burma, an influential actor in the politics of aid, and a model promoted for 
humanitarian aid in and beyond Burma's 'chronic emergency'. The organisation's 
headquarters had moved into a large compound on the outskirts of Mae Sot. As the 
number of medics working in Burma increased, so did the number of office staff; and 
new training rooms and bamboo huts with leaf thatching were built in what was 
originally a dusty field at the back of the compound. 
Back Pack's main office is now in the lower floor of a Thai-style wooden house. You 
leave your shoes at the entrance and have to be careful not to hit your head as you go 
down the steps into the sunken room. More junior office staff members are in this first 
room, sitting at computers, working on budgets and reports, playing with one of the 
'Back Pack babies', or watching YouTube videos - John Denver's Country Roads is a 
favourite. One of Back Pack's older members, also the Pastor at the nearby Karen 
Church, is teaching a new intern to type Burmese. The 'data guys' are discussing Back 
Pack's Health Information Systems with a young American woman from Global Health 
Access Program. There are health promotion posters on the walls, piles of paper 
everywhere, and a whiteboard listing upcoming meetings, trainings and an audit. On the 
pillar next to the entrance there is a calendar, printed by the Karen National Union 
(KNU), displaying a photo of severe looking KNU leaders next to Saw Ba U Gyi 's Four 
Principles: "For us surrender is out of the question; The recognition of Karen State must 
be complete; We shall retain our arms; We shall decide our own political destiny". 
At the back of the office is a smaller room, where the Director and some Leading Group 
members are working. On one of the shelves is a framed photograph showing three of 
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Back Pack's original medics and founders, much younger and skinnier than when I met 
them. They are with a tall Caucasian man, one of their long-term partners. Although 
Back Pack has grown significantly since its early days, the vision, leadership and shared 
experiences of the men in this photograph - and of those they worked with from the late 
1980s and 1990s onwards - are key to the history and development of the organisation. 
In this chapter, I will focus on this history, as well as discussing Back Pack's evolution 
in the decade after its creation. 
A. Mae Tao Clinic and the Mobile Medical Teams 
Back Pack's history is linked to that of the Mae Tao Clinic - the jaun-tha sei-khan 
(students' clinic) founded by Dr Cynthia Maung in 198972 - and to the evolving conflict 
situation in eastern Burma in the 1990s. Dr Cynthia's almost hagiographic story is well-
known on and beyond the border, and her leadership and reputation have been 
important for generating funding and political support. In Back Pack, Dr Cynthia is 
referred to as Sayan1a-gyi, or Tharamu 73 . Young women who became my friends talk 
frequently of the inspiration they draw from her seemingly tireless efforts to help the 
community, and often describe her as the mother of their family in exile. On Dr 
Cynthia's birthday, Back Pack's female staff members help cook large tubs of curry, 
which is handed out in Styrofoam boxes to dozens of men, women and children who 
attend the celebrations. Community leaders give speeches, students from the Children's 
Development Center - a school that was created as an offshoot of the clinic - sing songs 
thanking "our mother", and clinic staff, school children and members of Burmese 
partner organisations perform traditional dances. The celebrations coincide with the 
birthday of Thailand's King Bhumibol Adulyadej, national holiday when lavish 
festivities for the ageing, revered monarch are followed by Thais throughout the 
country. But in the Burmese community that has formed around the Mae Tao Clinic, it 
72 The Mae Tao Clinic was named after the tambon (sub-district) in which it is located, which is outside the Thai 
town of Mae Sot. The clinic is commonly refeITed to as Mae Tao, Dr Cynthia's Clinic or the students' clinic (jaun-
tha sei-khan in Buimese). 
73 In Burmese, Sayama literally means teacher (female) and is the honorific for female leaders and senior women. 
The suffix gyi (lit. "big") implies that the woman is senior among leaders and/or the most senior of leaders. Tharamu 
in Karen has a similar meaning to Sayama. Since Dr Cynthia and the! majority of Back Pack's management and office 
staff are Karen, she is often refeITed to as Tharamu Cynthia or simply Tharamu. 
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can be easy to forget that we are Thailand, and Dr Cynthia's birthday eclipses that of 
the Thai King. 
Dr Cynthia is a Karen physician born in Rangoon74. Before 1988, she had worked in 
various parts of Burma and in ethnic minority communities where, according to the 
official story, she became aware of the poverty, diseases and abuses faced by these 
communities, and was appalled by the lack of medical personnel and supplies. In 1988, 
she became involved in Burma's student-led protests. After the army crushed the 
demonstrations and seized power, she fled to the Thai-Burma border where she 
established contact with Karen leaders, Burmese activists, and local Thai authorities and 
church groups sympathetic to the plight of student protestors. In February 1989, Dr 
Cynthia and a small group of students opened a makeshift clinic in "a dilapidated 
building with bare dirt floors" outside of Mae Sot. In the beginning, they provided 
shelter and basic medical care to activists like themselves and young people escaping 
fighting in Burma's border areas. 
Twenty years later, the clinic had nearly 700 staff and an annual caseload of around 
90,000 patients (MTC 2010). About half the clinic's patients are now Burmese migrants 
living and working in Thailand (mostly undocumented and .so without entitlement to 
free healthcare in Thailand); the other half comprise people of all ages who cross into 
Thailand to access free healthcare. Medics describe patients coming from all over 
Burma, even cities like Rangoon or Mandalay, because they cannot access or afford 
healthcare where they live. The clinic now has an Out-Patient Department, an In-Patient 
Department, departments for child and women's health, a laboratory, a prosthetics 
centre, a dentistry clinic and an eye clinic, as well as services like counselling and a 
child care centre. It has spawned a network of sub-groups providing social and welfare 
services to the Burmese migrant community in Mae Sot 75 . And it is an important centre 
for medical and public health education, providing training to over 1,000 health workers 
74 Dr Cynthia's story is related on the clinic's website: httr,://maetaoclinicorg/about-us/dr-cvnthia-n1aung/ - last 
accessed 16 January 2012. It is also included in From Rice Cooker to Autoclave at Dr Cynthia's Mae Tao Clinic, a 
report marking the clinic's twentieth anniversary (MTC 2010). 
75 These include the Children's Development Centre (a school for Burmese migrant children), boarding houses for 
unaccompanied minors, safe houses for women, and outreach programmes targeting youths and factory workers. 
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since its creation (MTC 2010). Some medics I met through Back Pack had attended 
trainings or internships at Mae Tao before returning to work as part of Back Pack teams 
in their communities. But these trainings are not accredited, and medics trained by and 
working at the clinic are not officially recognised in Thailand or in Burma. 
The many donors, embassy staff, journalists and others who visit the clinic often ask 
about its legal status and relationships with Thai authorities. The clinic is not officially 
registered or recognised; but as Dr Cynthia explains, Thai authorities allow it to operate: 
"We can't get official agreement, we could not get official status. But at the same 
time, in this area, the clinic can operate because they know the need for the clinic 
to exist here. [ ... ] But for us, it's still difficult, because mostly the staff working 
have no legal status as well as we don't have medical license. So we could not 
become official. But still you can operate quietly and doing things good for the 
people here." 
At the time of my fieldwork, most clinic staff and medics had no documents to live or 
work legally in Thailand76 . Most also have no Burmese ID, because they lost their 
citizenship after fleeing Burma or because they come from remote and conflict areas 
where villagers are not documented. Most are therefore stateless. Medics and staff at the 
clinic - as well as Back Pack's Mae Sot-based staff - have a Mae Tao Clinic card, 
which provides a degree of local protection: when stopped by Thai police or 
immigration officials, they are less likely to have problems or are asked for a smaller 
bribe than other 'illegals'. 
Over the years, Dr Cynthia and colleagues developed relationships with local Thai 
authorities and contacts in the Thai health system. The clinic was thus able to establish 
referral syste1ns with Mae Sot General Hospital; through a sub-programme, it sends 
patients needing advanced procedures to hospitals in Chiang Mai; and it runs outreach 
programmes, sometimes in cooperation with Thai health workers, such as immunisation 
76 By the beginning of 2012, however, staff of Mae Tao Clinic and Back Pack were given ten-year residency cards, 
allowing them to stay in the Mae Sot area but not to travel beyond this area without permission. Some Back Pack 
staff members I worked with have also been registered in another sab-district, which means that they are effectively 
still illegal as they live and work in Mae Sot. 
88 
or HIV awareness in the migrant community. Local authorities and health officials 
explain that the clinic reduces the burden of an ever-growing unregistered Burmese 
population on Thai health systems, and enables disease control in a mobile and difficult-
to-access population - but they are often reluctant to speak on record of their 
collaboration, which remains unofficial and is built through inter-personal connections 
and mutual benefits. A Thai intelligence officer also admitted, 
"If there wasn't the Mae Tao Clinic, there would be many more patients from 
Burma in the Mae Sot hospital or Pawo hospital77 . Mae Tao Clinic also has good 
relationships with the high level and the international organisations, so it is better 
to work with them than to be opposed to them." 
Over time, Dr Cynthia and her colleagues succeeded 1n obtaining ever increasing 
amounts of international support for the clinic and its growing network of sub-groups. 
With an estimated budget of US $2.9 million in 2009 78 , the clinic by then received 
substantial sums from an impressive list of donors, including governments such as the 
UK, US, Canada and Australia. The clinic has also become an important voice in 
advocacy for democratic change in Burma. Dr Cynthia has received many international 
awards and is often compared to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, with some referring to her as 
The Lady of the Border 79 . The networks that Dr Cynthia and colleagues developed over 
the years with international health professionals and organisations were also 
instrumental in the creation and development of Back Pack; so too were connections 
with members of what are referred to locally as ethnic health departments. 
Prior to Back Pack's creation, Mae Tao Clinic and other groups on the border already 
supported Mobile Medical Teams (MMTs ). Dr Cynthia established the MMTs in 1991, 
as scaled-up fighting along the Thai-Burma border displaced increasing numbers of 
people who were exposed to disease and other health risks , and had little to no access to 
healthcare. Medics from Mae Tao Clinic went on six to eight week trips into Burma, 
77 There are two Thai hospitals in Mae Sot: the Mae Sot General Hospital, which is the public hospital, and Pawo 
Hospital, which is a private hospital. 
78 The budget of US $2.9 million in 2009 is just for the Clinic and its health programmes. The budgets of 
organisations like Back Pack, the Children ' s Development Center and other organisations are calculated separately. 
79 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is often referred to as The Lady. 
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travelling on foot with medical supplies. Initially, they were strangers to local 
communities; but as a former MMT medic explained, "[t]hey already had some medics 
there; we tried to communicate with them, we worked together with those medics 
there." Local medics helped the MMT medics avoid landmines and Tatmadaw soldiers, 
and gain the trust of villagers they treated and who provided them with food and shelter 
on their way. F 01mer MMT medics I met ( some of whom later became part of Back 
Pack or partner groups) were students in urban areas of Burma before getting involved 
in the 1988 uprisings and fleeing to the border. They were more educated than local 
villagers, and some were from a different ethnic group or spoke a different language to 
those they treated. Their work was difficult, dangerous, and as a foreign doctor who 
worked with them described, 
"it wasn't really very systematic about where [they went] ... It was a little bit 
haphazard at the time. And certainly the funding was extremely haphazard". 
The MMT programme ended in 1997. It had insufficient resources to meet growing 
health needs in border areas. Scaled-up Tatmadavv offensives had led to massively 
increased displacement. Field clinics set up by Dr Cynthia inside Karen State were 
destroyed or could no longer function, and it became increasingly difficult for medics 
from Mae Tao Clinic to provide healthcare in unstable areas. But as Dr Cynthia 
explained, 
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"We still had health workers in the community. So to be able to continue this 
function, from the health workers who are living and working inside - like Karen, 
Karenni, Mon - start [to] set up Back Pack programme, to become community-
based healthcare programme." 
B. Back Pack Health Worker Team: response to the situation in 
eastern Burma in the late 1990s 
From the perspective of senior medics from ethnic minority communities who founded 
Back Pack, the latter enabled their integration into a more stable and sustainable system 
than the MMTs, one that harnessed medics already living and working within remote 
areas of Karen, Karenni and Mon States80 . It also enabled them to access regular 
financial and technical support, in order to further develop local-level systems for 
health. Founding Back Pack members like Thara Law Eh - a senior medic working at 
the time inside Karen State - thus already had a sustainable community-level healthcare 
system in mind when they created Back Pack: 
"We planned to set up healthcare before '97 and '98 because there was a need for 
healthcare in the area but no healthcare existed. I had to seek help from outside. At 
that time, BRC81 organised and dispatched mobile teams, which went around and 
provided healthcare in the area. [ ... ] After going around for a month, the medics 
came back and had to report about the villagers they could reach. And they had to 
go to another area the next time. At the beginning, we ran healthcare in that way. 
Later, we thought that rather than running it that way, there should be health 
worker teams in the area in order to implement and monitor healthcare effectively, 
and to be able to respond to needs at any time. We thought that rather than having 
mobile trip, it would be better to set up a group and station it in the particular area 
all the time. That's why we set up Back Pack." 
In 1998, Back Pack was created by a small group of key individuals including senior 
medics from ethnic health departments in Karen, Karenni and Mon States, Dr Cynthia, 
and medics from the All-Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF)82. It was initially 
80 As described above, the MMTs used medics working out of Mae Tao Clinic, who went on short missions into 
Burma to provide healthcare in different areas. These trips were irregular, target areas were not consistently defined, 
and the MMT system therefore did not allow for the development of sustainable healthcare systems. Back Pack, in 
contrast, drew on local-level human resources for health - medics already living and working within clearly defined 
target areas. After being harnessed into Back Pack, these medics remain within their communities, providing a 
constant presence and enabling more sustainable and systematic healthcare delivery. 
81 BRC is the Burma Relief Center, which is described below. BRC also supp01ied MMTs in these areas prior to 
Back Pack's creation. 
82 The ABSDF is also known as the Student Army and was founded in November 1988 by student protesters who 
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run as an outreach programme of the Mae Tao Clinic. In the words of one of Back 
Pack's long-term donors and supporters, "Dr Cynthia had the ability and the vision for 
bringing people together". But the i1npetus for Back Pack's creation came from the 
depletion of existing health systems, when ethnic nationalist groups - particularly the 
Karen National Union - were weakened in the second half of the 1990s. Senior medics 
on the ground then started to look outwards for support to be able to maintain systems 
for health in remote and conflict-affected ethnic minority communities. 
It was also from connections forged in the post-'88 period between members of ethnic 
health departments in each State, student activists, and the Mae Tao Clinic that Back 
Pack was created - initially as a response to the situation in the late 1990s on the Thai-
Burma border. After the junta crushed the 1988 uprisings and seized power in Burma, 
many young demonstrators, including some of Back Pack's founders, had left their 
families behind and fled to Burma's border areas where they met with ethnic nationalist 
groups fighting the Tatmadaw. Saya Tun Aung - one of Back Pack's founders and 
Leading Group members - was among them. His story is revealing of the inter-personal 
links and of the shared experiences and common history of opposition to the Burmese 
military regime, which were later instrumental in Back Pack's creation. 
Saya83 Tun Aung's story 
"I was born in Burma, Mon state. [ ... ] When I left from Burma, I was studying 
Eighth Standard84 . In Burma, the 1988 general strikes started. [ ... ] We set up the 
camp - temporary uprising camp - in our school. Around nearly sixty - more than 
sixty students, high school and middle school students participated and stayed in 
our school. We organised to talk with the people, village by village, between the 
August to September uprising, before the military took power." 
fled to the border areas and took up arms after being trained and supplied by armed ethnic nationalist groups. 
Although financially and militarily weakened in recent years, the ABSDF continued armed struggle up until and after 
the 2010 elections in Burma. 
83 Saya (masculine) is an honorific in Burmese, literally translated as "teacher" and denoting seniority and leadership. 
84 The grades in the Bwmese education system go from Kindergarten to Tenth Standard (also called Grade Ten). At 
the end of Tenth Standard, students must pass the Basic Education Standard Ten Examination (matriculation exam) 
in order to receive their diplomas. The vast majority of Back Pack l~aders and medics left school before reaching this 
level, and only attended until Middle or Elementary School. 
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"After military took power, September 18th, we thought we cannot stay in our 
village or in our school. So we decided ... we called meeting at night, who will 
leave to the ... we call 'rebel area' [laughing] - like the KNU ... In Burmese, words 
are very simple: we call daw-kho [i.e. enter the jungle].[ ... ] Very danger for us. So 
suddenly we left at 4 am. We can't go back home [to say goodbye], so we left. [ ... ] 
At afternoon, we crossed the Billin River. The SLORC - we call SLORC, naw85? 
The SLORC came to find us at the river. One of our colleagues sank in the river. 
Once at another village, [SLORC soldiers] fired. One villager died. [ ... ] [The 
villagers] support some food ... We didn't have anything. We carried our clothes 
and our small bags. We didn't have food or anything like that." 
"After we crossed the river, then we arrived at another village, we met with the 
KNU soldiers there. They came to meet us and they take responsibility for 
travelling. We continued our trip. [ ... ] Very difficult life! We suffered lots of 
malaria. Some died, suffering the malaria. We had never seen the malaria... We 
stayed there, we started to learn the basic military training. [KNLA] trained us. Our 
aims and our emotions are very strong[ ... ]: we can get our victory, it's not so long, 
we think, two months or one month." 
"Yeh, we was, we can call 'child soldiers', but we don't understand ourselves. [ ... ]. 
After, we founded ABSDF. [ ... ] My experience is working 'Yith the ABSDF for a 
long time. Also I started learning the medical training in 1992. After that, I [was] 
working with the medical background. I [was] going to the community area, I 
treat[ed] the patients or I take care of the health services. [ ... ] My teacher is Dr 
Cynthia Maung. Also Dr Myit Cho from ABSDF leaders.[ ... ] I studied a short time 
- three months' medical training." 
"After I finished training, I go to the area, Karen State, ABSDF frontline area ... we 
working together. Also 1997, the SLORC starts a lot of offensives, the villages 
destroyed, they burned, the people cannot stay [in] their village, run to the Thai-
Burma border. [ ... ] 1998, the medics from ABSDF and the Mae Tao Clinic [ and] 
other ethnic health departments [ ... ] start found the Back Pack Health Worker 
Team. [ ... ] We start found the Back Pack programme, they take care for the people, 
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"Naw?" in Burmese is like putting "right?" or "isn't it?" at the end of a statement. A number of Back Pack's 
leaders and office staff speak excellent English but out of habit often end sentences in English with "naw?" 
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IDPs86 - we call IDPs - in inside area. So many people become the IDPs! [ ... ] The 
history is very simple, naw? ABSDF medics ... we are ABSDF medics. We joined 
with the Back Pack and start ... We working for a long time, until now." 
"We have like our dream, naw? Because that's our aim and our hope, to support 
the people or try to get our goals, like freedom. [ ... ] For me, the situation, we don 't 
see anything changed in Burma yet. Oh, we are working for a long time! Last time, 
we are young, naw? We are now older, then older, like this. The situation, when 
will [it] change?" 
Like Tun Aung, many young men and women who grew up in urban areas and had no 
previous experience of conflict were trained and armed by those they previously knew 
as the 'rebels'. Some went on to found the All-Burma Students Democratic Front 
(ABSDF) in November 1988, and fought alongside ethnic nationalist groups in Burma's 
border areas. By working together and sharing scarce resources, members of ABSDF 
and of ethnic nationalist groups created strong connections. As Saya Aung Myint, 
another ABSDF member and Back Pack founder, recalled: 
"ABSDF received many kinds of support, including technical, money ... Yeah, from 
outside. So we can provide to the local community. Mostly are in Karen State. We 
take care with our health services to the local community; we can care with our 
resources to the community - not only community but also KNLA soldiers. They 
[were] also facing sometimes some difficulties - including health, medical 
materials, so we try to provide and support. They support to the ABSDF, including 
the military training and some other kinds of training, and also they support the 
weapons - including guns and the bullets, and many kinds of military material, 
they suppo1ied the ABSDF. We helped each other, you know?" 
Among the ABSDF were many educated people, including doctors and engineers. In 
1989, doctors who had fled to border areas began training medics from ABSDF and 
ethnic health departments in the ABSDF 's headquarters near Manerplaw87 . Dr Cynthia 
86 I.e. Internally Displaced Persons. 
87 Manerplaw is in Karen State and was the headquarters of the KNU/KNLA until it was ove1run in 1995. This 
marked the end of the 'Manerplaw era' , when the KNU/KNLA h2.d control over what were referred to as liberated 
territories, and the ' second front' was then pushed back towards Thailand (South 2011) . 
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was among the trainers; some of Back Pack's founders were among her first students. 
Networks were further developed through such trainings and through the wider 
collaboration created by the convergence of student activist and ethnic nationalist 
movements. As Dr Cynthia explained, 
"through the training programme we expand[ ed] our network. Because the trainees 
[have] been trained by some trainers from ABSDF doctors, some are from Mae 
Tao Clinic, some from ethnic health departments. So to be able to establish one 
training programme, you need to bring resources from all the different groups." 
The ethnic health departments were and · remain building blocks of the Back Pack 
model. Ethnic health departments ( also called ethnic health organisations) are health 
systems under para-state structures of ethnic nationalist groups, including ceasefire and 
resistance groups. As described in Chapter 2, larger ethnic nationalist groups had 
previously supported health and welfare systems in areas under their control. Back 
Pack's creation was tied to the weakening of these groups, when they could no longer 
support clinics and medics - and in particular, to the weakening of the KNU/KNLA and 
scaled up displacement in Karen State in the second half of the 1990s. Health workers 
in KNU-controlled areas were typically trained by and worked with the Karen 
Department of Health and Welfare or the KNLA's Medical Branch 88. In Back Pack' s 
creation, senior medics from these Karen medical groups and their counterparts from 
Mon and Karenni groups were essential, since they had access to local co1nmunities as 
well as the authorisation and protection of political and armed groups in their areas. 
And so it was in the coming together of medics like Thara Poe Say - Back Pack' s 
Director when I began fieldwork - with ADBSF medics and Dr Cynthia that Back Pack 
was created. 
88 Senior Back Pack members explained that health services in Karen State initially fell under the administration of 
the KNLA Medical Branch (KNLA-MB), which ran hospitals and clinics serving mostly civilians but also soldiers of 
the Kl\TLA. The Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW), civilian health department falling under the 
administration of the KNU, later became the mechanism through which Karen medics appealed for international 
donor funding, with the civilian and military mechanisms gradually becoming more clearly defined. 
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Thara89 Poe Say's story 
"[B]efore I left from my native land, so my father is working with the Karen 
National Liberation Army - KNLA - in [Irrawaddy] Delta region. [ ... ] So because 
of my father working with the Karen National Liberation Army, the SPDC accused 
me and the whole [of] my family at the start of the Four Cuts policy, 1973 ... At the 
time, I was three years old or four years old. So 1973 or 'round about then ... So all 
my family anested by the Burmese Army. They put [us] into the jail until my 
father, they catch [him]. [ ... ] I can remember that, because of the situation was a 
bad situation. You know, during that time, because of the Four Cuts policy, always 
they come, they anest, they beating my mother, almost every week. .. before 
anested. But we are not [in] the same jail. Different jail. My sister and my mother 
are in one; and my grandfather and me, the other one. [ ... ] They killed [ my father], 
on the field. Directly killed, on the field, shoot him on the field." 
"I started learning when I was eight years old - I started study at school very late! 
But anyway, I try to study up to Grade Ten. I did not pass Grade Ten, because one 
of the essays, I wrote about the BSPP90 [laughs]. [ ... ] So everybody, we are facing 
with the oppression by the BSPP government. So we do not have no freedom. [ ... ] I 
know myself, because my father is join with the Karen National Liberation Army, 
that's why the BSPP government will not allow to me to go to the university. [ ... ] 
And also I decided myself to do struggle for our people, for freedom for our 
people. So that's why I joined with the Karen National Union since 1982. I came 
here [with] nine people. Most of the people, they are dead." 
"I tried to commitment to work for my people for the struggle for their revolution. 
And I joined with the Karen National Union, since 1982, and they appointed me to 
the hospital. [ ... ] First, it's the internship, about two months. So I do have also 
received the basic military training, six months [ ... ] 1984, I started learning the 
basic medical training in the Karen National Union headquarters, in Manerplaw. 
[ ... ] And at that time, I do have already three years' experience working in the field, 
89 Thara is the Karen equivalent of Saya. Thara refers to senior men and Tharamu to senior women. 
90 The Bunnese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) was formed by Ne Win's military regime, which seized power in 
1962. It was the sole political party allowed to exist in Burma during the period of military rule from 1964 until the 
aftermath of the popular uprisings of 1988. As Poe Say explains, during this time (and also under the rule of SLORC 
and later the SPDC), the children of those considered 'enemies' 0f the regime were prevented from pursuing their 
education in Bunna's depleted higher education system (Fink 2001). 
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in the hospital. After I finished, 1984 to '85, again I followed the advanced medical 
training, three year course, until 1987. And then after, I working in the General 
Hospital, in the Toovaloo hospital. And most of [the time], I have to go to the front 
line, the hospital." 
"After the Karen National Union withdraw from their headquarters, so we are not. .. 
the medicine could not receive from the Karen National Union there, they lost 
everything. They lose everything and financially they are shortage. So that's why 
we find a way to get the medical supplies. Finally, we heard about Dr Cynthia. So 
we tried to contact with her. And then we asked some support for small medicines. 
In 1996, so we started to contact with Dr Cynthia." 
"At that time, also Dr Cynthia sent the Mobile Medical Teams supported by 
different funding there. So finally, we had more contact with Dr Cynthia because 
we do not have any other support ... [ ... ] Finally, we decided to form the ... in order 
to unite the [ ... ] different ethnic groups and in order to standardise the health 
system, so that's why we formed the Back Pack Health Worker Team, since 1998." 
"We do have already separate: Mon Health Department, Karen Health Department, 
Shan Health Department. They want to do separate. Finally, we decided two ways: 
one is they can do themselves, directly contact to the donor in terms of the [mobile] 
-
clinic; but for the Mobile Medical Teams, we will join together. That's why we 
decided, on August 19th in 1998, to establish the Back Pack Health Worker Team, 
started in Mon, Karenni and Karen [States] ... " 
The ethnic health departments enabled health workers living and working on the ground 
to be harnessed into a system for the continued provision of healthcare to vulnerable 
ethnic minority communities; they also continued to run clinics in more stable areas by 
tapping into donor funding. In Back Pack's early target areas, a two-tiered 1nodel for the 
provision of healthcare was thus born, with Back Pack tea1ns serving the most volatile 
areas and mobile clinics91 run by ethnic health departments serving more stable areas. 
By the late 1990s, leaders in the ethnic health departments and Dr Cynthia had also 
91 The clinics run by ethnic health departments like the Karen Department of Health and Welfare are referred to as 
'mobile clinics' because when the local population is displaced, the clinic follows. Clinics are typically run in semi-
permanent structures made of bamboo and other local materials. 
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developed contacts with partners like Burma Relief Centre (BRC) who could help them 
obtain international financial and political support. BRC had been created in the 
aftermath of 1988 by individuals with links into activist and pro-democracy networks 
inside Burma, as well as the growing Burmese community in exile and network of 
international Burma lobby groups. The organisation now supports work in health, 
education, and media training, as well as emergency food distribution. For Back Pack, 
as Poe Say explained, 
"BRC is like the main funder or supporter at the beginning. [ ... ] We didn't know 
[ where BRC got funding from]. But also, funding we didn't understand - what is 
the donor, NGO, we didn't understand. We just needed supplies and the medicine!" 
As described in Chapter 6, BRC became one of Back Pack's most important 
intermediary partners, and over the years enabled Back Pack to access increasing 
amounts of international financial and political support. 
Back Pack's founders therefore came from or had connections into the pro-democracy 
movement and ethnic nationalist organisations in the borderlands. These inter-personal 
and socio-political connections were and remain essential to the functioning of 
networks, which over the years have enabled Back Pack to operate and expand in 
Burma's border areas. Back Pack was therefore the product of a particular historical and 
socio-political context. As described by Verna of NGOs elsewhere, the organisation's 
vision and work was - and continues to be - informed by the perspectives and 
experiences of its founders (Verna 2007). In particular, and as will become clearer 
through the following chapters, the leaders brought to Back Pack their politico-moral 
vision of the world - a world in which the state and its agents are the source of suffering 
for the peoples of Burma, and in which the type of federal democratic system imagined 
in the coming together of student activists and ethnic nationalist groups in the 1980s and 
1990s provides a blueprint for a political solution to conflict and oppression. 
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C. Towards sustainable primary healthcare systems in ethnic minority 
communities 
In its early days, one of Back Pack's international partners explained, Back Pack was 
kind of like a 'club' to bring together medics who had been trained through a variety of 
mechanisms and who had come to be underemployed. But Back Pack was also a way to 
run more systematic, standardised and effective program1nes. As Dr Cynthia explained, 
"through this network, we [were] able to have better information from the con1munity, 
and then better planning for future services". Back Pack's founders realised that in order 
to have a real impact on health outcomes in border areas, they needed a systematic 
approach based on data collected in the field, with standardised prograinmes and 
services and common treatment protocols. Supporting health workers within their own 
communities also promised for a more sustainable approach and more effective 
monitoring of health programmes. 
Figure 1: Relationships between Back Pack's organisational components, their roles 
and their geographic locations (BPHWT 201 Ob: 15) 
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Back Pack's leaders, manage1nent and office staff are based in Mae Sot during the 
year; the medics live and work in their co1nmunities inside Burma (Figure 1 ). Medics 
are required to have attended a minin1um of six months' Community Health Worker 
training, normally with an ethnic health department. They then have to work in their 
co1nmunities for another six months92, and to be recommended by those communities 
before being accepted as having the experience - and the backing of systems through 
which they will work - to join a Back Pack team. None of the medics who are part of 
Back Pack teams are doctors, and most have not attended accredited medical training93 . 
However, Back Pack's management take pride in the experience that their medics have 
- placing value on practical rather than purely textbook learning - and put a lot of effort 
into upgrading their skills and knowledge. One senior medic, when asked about his 
medical credentials by a foreign visitor unfamiliar with the organisation, replied: 
"I work as a doctor. I can do everything as a doctor: I can do operation, I can do 
amputation, I can take care of the landmine victims ... but I am not a doctor. I 
learned in the jungle, not in the university." 
Back Pack now runs three health programmes: the Medical Care Programme (MCP), 
Community Health Education and Prevention Progra1nme (CHEPP), and Maternal and 
Child Healthcare Programme (MCHP). Each has a Programme Coordinator, who is 
based in Mae Sot throughout the year and manages the implementation of programme 
activities in different target areas (Annex 2). Each of Back Pack's twenty target areas 
has a Field in-Charge94 - a senior medic with several years' field experience who is 
elected by the other health workers in the target area and approved by the ethnic health 
department. Field in-Charges also tend to have senior positions within ethnic health 
departments or other 'mother organisations' (which are discussed in Chapter 5), 
92 In order to gain experience, the medics are expected to go back to their communities after training, and work as 
Community Health Workers in a village, as pari of a clinic run by an ethnic health depariment or as an intern with 
Mae Tao Clinic or one of the local Back Pack teams. The significance of and socio-political mechanisms behind 
h·aining and recruitment systems ar·e fmiher discussed in Chapter 4. 
93 None of the Back Pack medics I met had gone through accredited h·aining to be doctors; but as discussed in 
Chapter 5, there ar-e a growing number of younger medics who have attended official government h·ainings to 
become Community Health Workers or Auxiliary Midwives. 
94 Back Pack tar-get areas also generally have a Second in-Char·ge, who is - as the name suggests - second to the Field 
in-Char·ge and takes on a leadership, management and decision-making role within the tar-get ar-ea. 
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enabling Back Pack to work through systems in place in its target areas. Twice a year, 
Field in-Charges travel from their areas to Mae Sot to attend the organisation ' s Six-
Month Meetings. The Field in-Charges are the link between the medics inside Burma 
and the management on the border (Figure 1). They enable supplies, money, technical 
resources and other support to be channelled to medics on the ground; they also bring 
back data and enable Back Pack to monitor its programmes. 
By 2010, Back Pack's target population was dispersed through 43 townships (BPHWT 
201 Ob). A township is divided into village tracts. Each tract is supervised by a Field in-
Charge (who is generally the MCP in-Charge), a Second in-Charge, a CHEPP in-
Charge and an MCH in-Charge. Medics are typically grouped into teams of three to 
five, with one team serving a target population of approximately 2,000 villagers. 
According to the typical Back Pack model, teams travel from one village to another 
within their designated area, providing healthcare and education. In I(aren State, Back 
Pack teams do one or two circuits on a village tract in every six month period. In other 
areas, the way Back Pack functions on the ground is sometimes different. In Mon areas, 
for example, individual Back Pack medics are embedded in different villages rather 
than travelling together around a circuit of villages. As discussed in Chapter 5, since 
Back Pack works with and through ethnic health departments and other local-level 
partners in its target areas, it adapts and moulds itself to systems on the ground - and 
Back Pack is therefore better understood as a network supporting and bridging between 
systems in different target areas. 
Back Pack initially brought together 32 teams, with 120 medics in Karen, Karenni and 
Mon States. By 2010, the organisation brought together almost 300 medics divided into 
over 80 teams, and had expanded into Shan, Kachin, Chin and Arakan States (Figure 2). 
Its target population had also increased to over 180,000 people in conflict as well as 
ceasefire areas. So while Back Pack was created as a response to the situation in conflict 
and contested parts of eastern Burma, it expanded into other conflict as well as ceasefire 
areas along Burma's eastern, north-eastern and western borders - and even into the 
Irrawaddy Delta region after Cyclone Nargis. 
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Figure 2: Back Pack target areas95 
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95 This is an adaptation of a BPHWT map of target areas in 2010. It includes the names for Burma's states and 
divisions, which were used by the British colonial administration and continue to be used in Back Pack's publications 
- for example, Back Pack refer to Karen State rather than Kayin State, the latter being used by the government. 
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In the decade following its creation, Back Pack also evolved beyond what is sometimes 
called band-aid relief and towards developing sustainable capacities for primary 
healthcare. Medics were initially trained to treat common diseases and injuries, focusing 
largely on curative care; but the leaders recognised the importance of an approach 
emphasising prevention and health education, so that communities could learn to protect 
and promote their own health. Through partnerships with foreign doctors and public 
health professionals - in particular, academics and professionals linked with Johns 
Hopkins University and later Global Health Access Program - the leaders learned more 
about primary healthcare and public health models. Today, they explain Back Pack's 
functioning as based on the principles of the 1978 international Declaration of Alma-
Ata, which reaffirms health as a human right and outlines the characteristics of a 
primary healthcare model bringing "healthcare as close as possible to where people live 
and work"96 . And as Back Pack obtained increasing amounts of funding, it was able to 
focus more on preventative approaches and on developing community-level knowledge 
and skills. Community empowerment for health became the means as well as the end of 
Back Pack's model, making it ever more attractive in an international aid system that, 
by the 1990s, placed emphasis - at least rhetorically - on community participation and 
empowerment (e.g. Chambers 1997; Craig and Mayo 1995; de Sardan 2001; Mohan 
2001). 
Back Pack's Medical Care Programme (MCP) focuses on diagnosis and treatment of 
common diseases and injuries. Since infectious diseases are the main cause of mortality 
and morbidity in Back Pack's target areas, MCP workers are trained to diagnose and 
treat common diseases in accordance with the protocols of the Burma Border 
Guidelines, a set of standard clinical guidelines adapted for health work on the Thai-
Burma border97 . The most frequently encountered diseases are malaria, 
96 ! , , ( . .. 'NT) L 1· , ' ; , < • ! < .:- I d 4 A · 1 2012 1ttp://w1,:vv,·.w,10 .mt/npr/1 11 r /oocs1c1ec.!arauon a maata.ptti - ast accesse pn . 
97 The Burma Border Guidelines (BBGs) draw on international diagnosis and treatment guidelines developed by the 
World Health Organisation, international medical literature, and the experience of NGOs working in health. The 
BBGs are updated every two or three years and are used by NGOs along the Thai-Burma border to standardise 
diagnosis and treatment. 
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dian·hoea/dysentery, acute respiratory infections, anaemia, and worm infestations. MCP 
workers are also taught trauma management and how to deal with acute injuries, 
including landmine and gunshot injuries. Some MCP workers I met can perform basic 
surgeries or dentistry work. MCP was Back Pack's first health programme; today, when 
the organisation expands into new areas, it also tends to be the first programme 
implemented by teams on the ground. 
Back Pack's second programme, CHEPP, focuses on health education and disease 
prevention. CHEPP workers run Village Health Workshops to teach community leaders 
and members to protect and promote their own health through such measures as vector 
control or hygiene and sanitation. Through School Health activities, they train teachers 
to promote 'healthy behaviours' in and beyond the classroom and they teach children 
about disease transmission and prevention. CHEPP medics also work with communities 
to build water and sanitation systems, such as latrines or water gravity flow systems. As 
part of CHEPP, Back Pack builds community capacities by training and working with 
Village Health Volunteers (VHV s ). VHV s are unpaid villagers who are taught about 
common diseases and disease prevention. They assist Back Pack medics, helping with 
Vitamin A distribution, supervising the completion of treatment courses, compiling 
population lists and monitoring water and sanitation systems. When CHEPP medics 
conduct Village Health Workshops, they work with VHV s to teach villagers about 
health and better identify local needs and priorities. VHV s also provide an ongoing 
presence in the village so that, for example, if a villager steps on a landmine, the VHV 
can provide immediate first aid, and then ref er the patient on for further care. 
Back Pack does not work with VHV s in all target areas; but in all areas, medics have 
developed local contacts and drawn on community networks that are then utilised in 
medical emergencies. Patients with severe injuries or diseases are carried on foot by 
VHV s and/or local villagers to the nearest Back Pack team; or when the patient cannot 
be moved, the Back Pack medics are fetched by the villagers to provide assistance on 
the spot. The medics provide what treatment they can and where surgery or advanced 
care is required, they send the patient to another health service provider - for example, a 
mobile clinic run by one of the ethnic health departments, a government clinic or 
hospital in the nearest town, Mae Tao Clinic, or a hospital in a neighbouring country. 
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Back Pack's most recent health programme, the Mother and Child Healthcare (MCH) 
Programme, ai1ns to reduce the high rates of maternal and infant mortality in border 
areas. Back Pack surveys in its target areas had found that most pregnant women had no 
access to maternal health services and delivered at home or in the jungle; women were 
also found to have a 1 in 12 lifetime chance of dying during pregnancy or childbirth 
(BPHWT 2006). In order to make health services more readily available to mothers and 
young children, MCH medics provide ante-natal and post-natal care, assist deliveries 
and register births. They also promote birth spacing and provide contraception to 
married women98 . MCH workers cooperate with Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) -
older women who work in their communities over generations, assisting women who 
deliver babies where there are no official health services. Women who become TBAs 
generally have little to no formal health education and most cannot read or write; they 
rely on knowledge from their grandmothers and mothers before them about how to help 
mothers before, during and after childbirth. Back Pack builds on these local resources, 
by teaching TBAs about safe deliveries and mother and child health, as well as how to 
recognise danger signs, contact the Back Pack medics in case of obstetric emergencies, 
and refer patients if Back Pack medics are not nearby. 
According to Back Pack's health access targets, · one team of three to five medics should 
serve a target population of 2,000 villagers with the assistance of ten VHVs and ten 
TBAs (Annex 2). Although Back Pack does not yet implement the MCH and VHV 
programmes in all its target areas, this is the model in relation to which Back Pack 
monitors its progress in developing a local-level primary healthcare system. 
98 Discussions with MCH workers working in different ethnic minority areas indicated that family planning is a 
sensitive issue. Many medics I spoke to about family planning maintained that there is no such thing as sex before 
man-iage in their cultures. They explained that communities are more accepting of 'birth spacing' than 'family 
planning', since the latter can be seen to clash with cultural and religious values. It is deemed inappropriate to 
distribute contraceptives to unmarried women; and the husband's consent is considered necessary in order to respect 
local customs and norms. Back Pack therefore only provides contraception to married women who do not wish to 
have any more children. 
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D. Health and human rights: Back Pack as a political actor 
The Back Pack Health Worker Team is committed to protecting and promoting the 
human right to health for all individuals and communities of Burma, regardless of 
race, gender, religion, culture, political affiliation or age. [ Guiding Principles of 
BPHWTJ 
Back Pack's policy is to target communities with no or restricted access to health 
services - whether provided by the state, international agencies or other organisations. 
This ensures that Back Pack targets populations in need of healthcare and avoids 
overlaps with other providers. It also firmly positions Back Pack as filling the gap left 
by the state's failure to meet the needs of ethnic minority communities, and by 
restrictions on humanitarian access. As one of Back Pack's leaders explained, "[i]f we 
don't provide healthcare service in our own area, nobody will come and do it": 
Back Pack combines healthcare provision with international-level advocacy. The latter 
involves cooperation with local partner organisations such as Mae Tao Clinic and 
international partners such as Johns Hopkins University Center for Public Health and 
Human Rights (JHU-CPHHR) and Global Health Access Program (GHAP). Even 
before Back Pack's creation, founding members such as Dr Cynthia had contacts with 
health professionals and academics from the US, who had often been trained at and/or 
were linked with Johns Hopkins before developing connections with Mae Tao Clinic 
and other health providers in Burma's border areas. Some of these experts went on to 
create GHAP, "a consortium of health and public health professionals, university 
faculty, technical specialists from various fields, students, and activists, who volunteer 
their time to provide support for local indigenous organisations"99 . When, shortly after 
Back Pack's creation, its leaders decided to sta1i recording health data in their target 
areas, they expanded their networks internationally by drawing on contacts in JHU and 
GHAP for technical support. As well as collecting data to plan and assess their health 
programmes, Back Pack's leaders wanted to use credible statistical methods to highlight 
the situation in their areas. 
99 http: //vv\vw.2-hap.ondabout us/who we are/ - last accessed 5 April 2012. 
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The most significant example of Back Pack's advocacy before I started fieldwork 
resulted from this collaboration between Back Pack and experts from JHU and GRAP, 
and took the form of a report entitled Chronic Emergency - Health and Human Rights 
in Eastern Burma. "The collaboration was born from a meeting of interests", a public 
health expert working with JHU-CPHHR recalled, 
"with Back Pack interested in documenting what was going on in their target areas, 
and us interested in the methodology. Hopkins and GHAP could provide the 
scientific tools to measure the burden of human rights abuses that Back Pack teams 
wanted to document. The result was Chronic Emergency, which brought more 
publicity than Back Pack had ever intended. From Hopkins' perspective, this was a 
scientific breakthrough. [ ... ] No one before was using epidemiological tools to 
measure whether human rights abuses [in Burma] were systematic and 
widespread." 
Figure 3: Selected human rights violations and human rights outcomes (from 
Chronic Emergency - BPHWT 2006: 11) 
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The report publicised the findings of a survey implemented with technical support from 
JHU-CPHHR and GHAP, and establishing many statistically significant correlations 
between health outcomes and hu1nan rights violations (BPHWT 2006). For example, 
the odds of childhood mortality were found to be increased by 2.4 if the child's family 
had experienced forced relocation (Figure 3). It was also in this report - the basis of 
Back Pack's subsequent advocacy - that the situation in eastern Burma was first 
described as a 'chronic emergency' and compared, using public health indicators, to a 
human catastrophe: 
indicators collected in IDP areas of eastern Burma bear more resemblance to other 
areas facing humanitarian disasters, such as Sierra Leone, Rwanda, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, or Angola, than those reported officially by the Burmese 
government to international organisations such as UNICEF (BPHWT 2006: 69). 
Through collaboration with experts from JHU and GHAP, the leaders thus developed a 
powerful framework for their work and advocacy. As one Back Pack founder explained: 
"Before 2002-2003, we did not understand about human rights or about the 
relationship between health and human rights. But we participated in the trainings 
and in the workshops and we saw that it really does relate! And we learned that 
even if, as health workers, we try to work to improve people's health, if the human 
rights violations continue then the health will stay bad. It is very important to speak 
out and to show what the government is doing." 
Chronic Emergency firmly established Back Pack's work within a health and human 
rights paradigm, which was gaining traction in the US and elsewhere. In this and 
subsequent publications, scientifically credible data and a medicalised discourse of 
human suffering were used to describe a health crisis driven by the military 
government's concerted efforts to oppress - and ultimately destroy - ethnic minority 
communities. Chronic Emergency demonstrated that a large proportion of Burma's 
ethnic minority communities were denied their human right to health, whether through 
the state's disinvestments in health systems, conflict and displacement, human rights 
violations, or government restrictions on access by international aid agencies. Back 
Pack was positioned as filling the gap left by an abusive state and by the failure of 
inte1national humanitarian and human rights systems to protect, respect and fulfil the 
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right to health of ethnic minority communities in Burma. 
For Back Pack's leaders - and as evidenced in Chronic Emergency - the drivers of the 
health crisis in Burma are political. So while Back Pack is positioned as filling a gap, 
the organisation's stance is that the only durable solution to the chronic emergency is a 
political one: the end of dictatorship and abuses, the establishment of representative 
democracy, and the fulfilment of ethnic minorities' rights and freedoms. For the leaders, 
Back Pack's work is inextricably tied to this political vision, and the organisation's role 
in advocacy is inseparable from its role as a service provider. As Thara Law Eh - one of 
the founders and Leading Group members - explained one day, 
"Back Pack collects the information. It reports the information about how SPDC 
causes destruction to the local people and the international community. There 
needs to be genuine federal government system to prevent the abuses from 
happening and to improve the situation." 
Since 1998, Back Pack's programmes and reputation had grown, and its leaders had 
obtained increasing amounts of international funding. The publication of Chronic 
Emergency in 2006 placed Back Pack in the spotlight as the only organisation having 
conducted a population-based health survey in volatile border areas, and therefore able 
to report on conditions in areas largely inaccessible to international aid agencies. It also 
drew increased attention to an alternative mechanism for humanitarian action, in a 
context where state-sanctioned mechanisms were said to have failed ethnic minority 
communities in border areas. A decade after its creation, Back Pack had grown into a 
key player in aid and advocacy on and beyond the border. 
E. Cyclone Nargis and the debate around cross-border aid 
When Cyclone N argis hit Burma on 2 May 2008, many senior members of Mae Tao 
Clinic, Back Pack and partner organisations were on the Thai-Burma border but still 
had family and friends in affected areas of the Irrawaddy Delta. Within the first few 
days, they drew on contacts on the ground to channel assistance to these areas. On 6 
May, they created the Emergency Assistance Team-Burma (EAT), giving a name to a 
response that emerged from individuals' desires to act as reports of the disaster reached 
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Mae Sot. EAT' s management conducted a basic needs assessment and got teams into 
Delta areas at a time when many international aid agencies were still blocked in 
Rangoon and Bangkok. EAT functioned through inter-personal connections, finding out 
which civil society groups were providing relief or able to provide relief and 
channelling funding to these groups. As news spread, other groups on the ground found 
out that they could access assistance via the border and made contact with EAT. 
Between 2008 and 2010, EAT thus provided three phases of assistance, the first 
focusing on emergency needs and later phases on rebuilding livelihoods. 
For many who became part of EAT, Nargis was another example of the junta denying 
aid to its population. By working through underground networks, they could circumvent 
government restrictions and access "those not receiving aid or not receiving sufficient 
aid from the military regime or international humanitarian operations" 100 . Those 
involved also explained that they were acting out of a sense of duty to help their people, 
particularly given their experience and ability to access funding. Thara Poe Say, for 
example, was born in the Delta and his remaining family members were affected by the 
cyclone; for him, "this is our task. The community are suffering a disaster, so we find a 
way." And although, as described in Chapter 2, increasing amounts of international aid 
did arrive in the Delta after the creation of the Tripartite Core Group, members of EAT 
were - in their eyes at least - doing no harm in a context where substantial assistance 
was needed and where they could access more remote communities not yet reached by 
INGOs. One young man I met, who had distributed EAT-funded aid in remote villages 
after the cyclone, thus explained that, 
"They [i.e. the villagers] lost all of their belongings. They didn't want to work, 
they didn 't have jobs too. So, the things that they [i.e. INGOs] give, it is not 
enough for them for one or two years, So that's why they used both the things fr01n 
us and from them [i.e. INGOs]. We gave because there wasn't enough. If enough, 
we didn't need to give." 
EAT demonstrated the ability of groups on the border to draw on their networks in 
100 htto ://v/w\v .Back Packtearn.org/?pm~e id=239 - last accessed 4 April 2012. 
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order to quickly respond to an emergency, as well as the drive that leaders within these 
groups had to help those they describe as their people. But EAT also became the centre 
of a polarised and emotive debate. In March 2009, a report entitled After the Storm: 
Voices from the Delta was published by EAT and Johns Hopkins. Based on interviews 
by EAT workers one year after N argis, it described types of relief that survivors did and 
did not receive, areas where communities got no international or government aid, 
obstructions to relief by state representatives, and human rights abuses by the military. 
It called on the EU and US as donors to continue providing aid "but such aid must be 
distributed with accountability, transparency, and respect for human rights norms and 
principles" (EAT-Burma and JHU-CPHHR 2009: 64). In the accompanying press 
release, Dr Cynthia appealed "to the international community to more carefully review 
the political reality in the delta region in the military-ruled country before further 
assistance is delivered" 101 . 
The report was interpreted by INGOs working officially inside Burma as calling for a 
moratorium on international aid to N argis-affected areas, and as denouncing all aid 
going 'via Rangoon' as bolstering the regime. When I spoke to people involved in 
compiling the report, they told me that this had not been their intention. Dr Cynthia 
responded that "[t]he CBOs here not against [aid going 'inside'] - just want to make 
sure that the assistance is transparent and good use and then also really helps the 
community". Other leaders, like Poe Say, justified their appeal in the report and press 
release in terms of the harm that aid could do if misappropriated by an abusive regime: 
"The main concern by the groups in cross-border organisations [is] to worry about 
all the money do not reach to the real community - rather than [giving] more 
benefit for the government and the military, and more buy the weapons like the 
MiG-29 or the longshots 102 they get from the neighbouring country, China, or 
something like that. .. So that's why they highlight that the humanitarian assistance 
can be harm to the ethnic community there. [ ... ] But they do not argue that don't go 
through Rangoon." 
101 http://ww\v.ihsph.edu/hurnanrights/ pdf/Afler the Stonn PressRelease.pdf - last accessed 4 April 2012. 
102 The MiG-29 is a jet fighter aircraft originally designed by the Soviet Union. 'Longshot' refers to the longshot 
rifles used by Tatmadaw troops, and supplied by China to the Burmese military junta. 
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Whether or not this was their intention, EAT members were seen as promoting cross-
border systems as the only solution where aid would otherwise be obstructed and/or 
misappropriated by the regime. The report provoked a strongly-worded reaction from a 
list of INGOs working officially inside Burma, who argued that cross-border groups 
were unfamiliar with the situation on the ground, and stated that they "found a number 
of shortcomings in the report, including its premise, methodology and most of its 
findings" 103 . The report was criticised for not recognising that, although the government 
initially restricted access to affected areas, relief had arrived rapidly through civil 
society networks and NGOs already working on the ground, and that access by 
international agencies had later increased significantly. The INGOs concluded: 
"The effect of broadly misrepresenting the situation on the ground in the Delta 
after Cyclone Nargis through the EAT-Johns Hopkins report can be to undermine 
the case for further aid to the survivors. Far from improving the situation, it will 
lead to significant further suffering for hundreds of thousands of people." 
For many people I spoke to, the publication of After the Storm and exchanges that 
followed marked a climax in the debate around cross-border aid - at least for groups 
like Back Pack. To outside observers, it seemed like both sides of an irreconcilable 
debate were mirroring each others' accusations of 'doing harm'. Those involved at the 
time later spoke of their bafflement at reactions they had not expected. One 
international expert who had worked on Chronic Emergency told me: 
"We never expected that it would create that much of a backlash. We didn't make 
anything up, we were just reporting what we found out. I think that people 
generally wanted to see a new humanitarian dawn in Burma. But for us this wasn't 
the case. And we specified in the report that the areas where we were collecting the 
data were those areas that weren't generally accessed by international 
organisations. For those groups, the reality would have been different." 
The debate around the EAT-Burma report, however, has to be understood within the 
103Joint Response to After the Storm : Voices fro m the Delta, Rangoon, Bmma, 8 April 2009, http://\,,r\v,v.intemal-
d isplacement.orn/8025 708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments )/ A 1 0A5868EE3C6DBBC 12 57 59B0045 E560/$file/ Joint+ IN 
GO+Resnonse+to+EAT-Hopldns.pdf- last accessed 2 October 2012. 
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wider context of the politicised and polarised debate around cross-border aid (Duffield 
2008). The report was interpreted as portraying a success story for cross-border aid, 
when the post-Nargis period was instead argued to have demonstrated the resilience and 
strength of civil society networks and organisations on the ground - with such networks 
and organisations in fact being what enabled EAT to channel assistance into affected 
areas. The report was then often interpreted by 'inside' groups as promoting cross-
border aid as the only legitimate model for humanitarian action in the Burmese context. 
Prior to Nargis, when cross-border groups confined their activities to border areas -
providing assistance mainly to communities that could not be accessed by international 
organisations based in Burma's urban centres - they could be seen as a temporary 
solution to a localised humanitarian impasse, and the two models of aid provision were 
not really in competition. But when cross-border groups stepped out of the border areas, 
began supporting assistance to the Delta and criticised aid provided 'via Rangoon', the 
two models for humanitarian aid came into conflict. In addition, as outlined in Chapter 
2, the months following the cyclone were hailed as a new phase in the provision of 
international aid to Burma, with increased humanitarian access and unprecedented 
cooperation with the regime. For many, this was time when donors and humanitarians 
should engage with the government and use the N argis response as a way to increase 
access to other, more sensitive parts of Burma (Creac'h and Fan 2008; ICG 2008; 
Kurtzer 2009). Criticising the government for obstructing aid and promoting covert 
assistance through systems considered illegal by the state were, in this context, seen by 
many as counter-productive and even detrimental to the work being done inside. 
F. Back Pack by 2009: influential but controversial actor in the 
politics of aid 
Back Pack is a product of a particular historical and socio-political context. The 
organisation was created through the convergence of men and women who were part of 
or had links to the Burmese democracy movement and ethnic nationalist groups. While 
it was a response to the situation in eastern Burma in the late 1990s, key inter-personal 
and socio-political connections that Back Pack later drew on had been established after 
1988, when student demonstrators worked alongside members of ethnic nationalist 
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groups. Back Pack's founders brought to the organisation their expenences and 
networks, as well as their moral and political vision of the world (Lissner 1977; Verna 
2007): the suffering of Burma's peoples is a product of state-driven oppression and 
abuses - oppression and abuses that they and their families experienced firsthand - and 
can only be resolved through a political solution, itself founded on a vision of federal 
democracy and national reconciliation that was crystallised through the comii,g together 
of democratic and ethnic nationalist movements. 
By the time I started fieldwork in 2009, Back Pack had become an influential actor on 
and beyond the Thai-Burma border. The organisation had also become central to the 
debate around cross-border aid. This was partly as a result of involvement in the 
Cyclone Nargis response; but it was also a result of the organisation's success in 
obtaining ever-increasing amounts of international funding and publicity, at the same 
time as critics saw cross-border aid as an obsolete solution in an age of claimed 
expanding humanitarian space within Burma. In 1998, Back Pack had 120 medics 
working with a budget less than 300,000 AUD; by the end of 2009, there were about 
300 medics and the projected annual budget was over 1 million AUD, with funding 
provided by major international donors. Back Pack's target areas had expanded 
significantly, and its programmes had developed as components of a systematic, 
evidence-based primary healthcare model. This model fit neatly with international-level 
trends for donor-funded aid programmes to be 'participatory' and 'empowering'. 
Back Pack's humanitarian model is also linked to an organisational ideology, which has 
its origins in the founders ' reactions to the oppression and suffering driven by the 
military state - which they and subsequent Back Pack medics experienced firsthand -
and came to be expressed through the language of human rights. Witnessing and 
experiencing systematic state-driven violence, injustice and inequalities drove the 
founders ' initial involvement in national politics, and later into the human rights 
advocacy realm. Through collaboration with partners like Johns Hopkins and GHAP, 
Back Pack leaders came to frame their work within a health and human rights discourse, 
which resonates powerfully at the international level. The health and human rights 
framework, along with a medicalised discourse of suffering, came to characterise Back 
Pack's international advocacy, with scientifically credible data demonstrating and 
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quantifying the suffering of ethnic minority communities. As described by Fassin in his 
analysis of humanitarian discourses elsewhere, statistics establish the seriousness of the 
problem, while compassion appeals to the public's emotions (Fassin 2012). 
The health and human rights discourse also enables Back Pack's positioning as filling 
the gap left by an abusive state and the failure of international humanitarian and human 
rights systems to protect and fulfil the right to health of Burma's ethnic minorities. And 
while the humanitarian obligation to assist those in need and the obligation to protect 
and promote human rights are often seen by analysts as different and even incompatible 
(e.g. Anderson 1999; Rieff 2002), Back Pack's leaders see these roles as inextricably 
linked. Back Pack is thus simultaneously positioned as mitigating the suffering of ethnic 
minority communities, and witnessing and denouncing this suffering. The health and 
human rights discourse provides a powerful framework for the 'motivated truth' that 
Back Pack publicises through its advocacy - a 'motivated truth', which as described by 
Redfield combines the demonstration of fact with the assertion of value, and where truth 
is proclaimed in association with a moral agenda (Redfield 2006). So the knowledge 
that Back Pack "produces and circulates is always undeniably motivated and built out of 
facts assembled directly in the service of humane values" (Redfield 2006: 17). 
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CH 4: Doing our Duty: Back Pack medics as victims and the 
politics of diversity 
When I started fieldwork, Thara Poe Say was Back Pack's Director. He would often 
say, "we are not the service deliverers; we are the victims; we are the community". By 
this time, Back Pack was a high-profile organisation and through popular 
representations was associated with images and values appealing on moral and emotive 
levels to international audiences. But as Back Pack members told me their stories, these 
representations were revealed to mask a complexity and diversity that needs to be 
explored in order to better understand the organisation. And when leaders like Poe Say 
embraced a position of victimhood, often understood in the literature to be 
disempowering104, they are not only expressing personal and communal histories of 
suffering; they are also positioning themselves within a polarised debate, as well as 
potentially redefining subjects of violence as politically-relevant subjectivities. 
In this chapter, I will discuss Back Pack members' life stories and impacts these have 
on their worldviews and actions, as well as on the organisation. Drawing on 
anthropological analyses of violence, suffering and victimhood, I will explore what 
these stories reveal in terms of individual and communal experiences, as well as the 
development of an organisational ideology within a context structured by violence, 
conflict and competing claims to socio-political legitimacy. I will discuss the promotion 
of 'unity within diversity' within Back Pack and from the perspective of the politics of 
aid to Burma. The examination of what are conceptualised as embodied histories of 
violence will then be revealed throughout this thesis to be crucial for understanding 
Back Pack's functioning, and what is at stake in a politicised and often emotive debate. 
And the values and politico-moral vision of Back Pack's founders and leaders will be 
demonstrated as essential to comprehending the organisation's ideology and positioning 
within this politics of aid. 
104 As described in Chapter 1, discourses of victimhood have sometimes been argued to conceal inequalities between 
aid givers and receivers, and to reinforce images of victims as powerless and even pathological (e.g. Fassin 2012; 
Malkki 1995; Zarowski 2004). 
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A. Victims and heroes: public representations and discourses 
Over a decade after Back Pack's creation, its leaders are no strangers to the 
international press or academia. To bring the 'chronic emergency' to the attention of 
international audiences, they draw on partnerships with organisations like GRAP and 
Johns Hopkins, on media connections, and on links with Burma lobby groups in 
countries like the US, UK, Canada and Australia. The health and human rights 
framework enables a scientifically credible depiction of ethnic minority communities' 
suffering; but Back Pack also draws on a discourse of victimhood common to 
humanitarianism elsewhere and appealing to the values, moral sentiments and 
emotional responses of its audiences. 
When a Tatmadaw battalion shot a woman and her two children in March 2010, Poe 
Say asked me to help write up a report to be disseminated via Back Pack's networks. 
The Field in-Charge from the area sat with me and impassively related information sent 
by the medic who had treated the patients 105 . Both children - a five month-old and a 
five year-old - had died. As requested by the leader, the report concluded, "without an 
end to these systematic human rights abuses there can be no guarantee that innocent 
lives will be safe". When I showed him a draft, the leader requested an attention-
grabbing title. We settled on Bullets have no pity for young lives: children shot by 
SPDC soldiers in Karen State. The story and its wording encapsulated the image of the 
innocent victim, highlighting the Tatmadaw's brutality. This image of innocent 
victimhood is a recurring trope in humanitarian discourses, which often rely on 
simplifications of political and historical complexities into black-and-white worlds of 
victims and perpetrators (De Waal 1994; Rieff 2002). But humanitarian discourses also 
have a tendency to construct victims as passive and ontologically distinct from the 
(active) humanitarian (De Waal 2008; Fassin 2007b; 2012; Saillant 2007). As 
demonstrated in this chapter, the subjectivity of the Back Pack medic instead transcends 
such distinctions: the medic is also victim; and Back Pack's humanitarian testimony and 
response comes to be legitimised through the position of victimhood. 
105 I later found out that the medic who treated the patients is the cousin of the woman who was shot. 
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Analysts have pointed to the often uncomfortable reliance that humanitarian 
organisations have on the media, which has a tendency to simplify and sensationalise 
politico-historical complexities (De Waal 1997; 2008; Duffield 1994b; Polman 201 O; 
Rieff 2002; Truchon 2007). In Back Pack's case, international audiences are drawn to 
stories of brave medics who risk life and limb trekking through the jungle, dodging 
bullets and landmines, to provide life-saving care to innocent victims of a brutal regime. 
As one journalist put it, "Back Pack is sexy". During my fieldwork, I lost count of the 
journalists who came through the compound to get a good story. An Alliance France 
Presse article entitled Medics dice with death in Myanmar jungle war zones 106 typifies 
the medics' portrayal in the Western media. Although sensationalist, this image isn't all 
false. Telling me their stories, medics like Saya Tun Aung often remembered friends 
and colleagues they lost: 
"I remember the two people... In the rainy season, the travel is very dangerous, 
naw? They fall down [in ]to [a] stream, died. [ ... ] Another medic from Pa An, 
SPDC shot with gun, longshot [rifle] .... Some medics working at the village, 
sometimes, SPDC troops come to see, direct fire [at them], they got injury or like 
that. We have experience, they arrest some people." 
Between 1998 and 2011, nine medics and one Traditional Birth Attendant were killed 
by Tatmadaw bullets or unmarked landmines. One medic was shot dead by Tatmadaw 
soldiers as they burned down a Karen village in July 2011, while I was with Back Pack. 
A number of medics were arrested while working in their communities, some never to 
be seen again. Two medics I met and whose stories are told in Chapter 5 were 
imprisoned for almost three months after being intercepted while on their way to assist a 
dying woman. The medics are also exposed to disease and other risks - one woman I 
met lost her baby, who died after she gave birth in difficult conditions while working 
near the China border. Medics face multiple risks and dangers in their work; but their 
leaders habitually explain that, as members of oppressed ethnic minority communities, 
they are already exposed to risks and dangers - the heroic medics portrayed in the news 
articles are already victims of a brutal regime. 
106httn://vv\v\v.2:oogie.com/hostcdnews/af1,/article/ALeqM5jpMHofV9P06UxU7vKOdAsNOFgNOQ?docid=,"CNG.e4 
,-; .-,.-8"6' ·"1 '2'~ ' 1 6'- .-6 I',-.-~-'"\ ''} ' ' 1 dllA ·12012 
.u), t •D~,oco .LCCL \cty,ceoc ieJ2 ;~._JCTJ - ast accesse pn . 
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As described in Chapter 3, another important factor in Back Pack's public image is the 
framing of the 1nedics' work within human rights and democratic values. Discussions 
with field workers, however, reveal divergences between how the management frames 
their work, and how those on the ground understand their roles, the context in which 
they work, and their actions in this context. For many field workers, human rights and 
democracy are vague concepts they learn more about only after joining Back Pack -
they aren't factors that lead them to become medics or to work with Back Pack. Medics 
who speak of rights and democracy in relation to their lives and work tend to be older, 
to have more experience with political or activist groups, and/or to be involved in the 
leadership of Back Pack or another group. Many explain that they don't really know 
what is meant by concepts of human rights or democracy; describing their lives, they 
speak instead of practical difficulties and injustices. As one medic explained: 
"To change SPDC is related to politics. We don't know the high-level political 
situation. But the leaders, they will arrange for it. But one thing is when the 
P 'Y aw 107 enter the community, for example, sometimes they ... one group comes 
and they do in one way. They ask for porters; or they ask for money by force; 
cultivation by the community or in the field; or sometimes, they kill; even if they 
don't ask permission, they take and eat - that's the food, the supplies for the 
community to eat for one year. The community gets problems." [35-year-old male 
medic, Karen State] 
Differences between frameworks or values deployed by management and field workers 
are not surprising. Back Pack's leaders are often linked with activist movements and 
have sometimes spent many years working for human rights and democracy in Burma. 
Younger medics, in contrast, live and work in isolated areas of Burma throughout the 
year, with only Field in-Charges travelling regularly to meetings in Thailand. Back 
Pack's management is also aware of divergences in field workers' understandings of 
principles within which their work was framed. One of the younger leaders often 
expressed concern that field workers might not understand "the ideology of Back Pack". 
107 P 'Yaw means "Bwmese" in Sgaw Karen and is commonly used by people from Karen communities in the border 
areas to refer to the Bwman-dominated military regime, the Tatmadaw, and ethnic Burman people (thereby 
conflating the government, its army and the majority ethnic group). 
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The management makes concerted efforts to brief field workers about international 
publications such as Chronic Emergency and to give them training in human rights. But 
these divergences nevertheless highlight the need to go beyond the often simplified and 
romanticised popular representations of the medics, to explore how different individuals 
view their lives and work, and how their perspectives might compare with 
organisational frameworks and values. 
B. Continuing the struggle: founders and older leaders 
"Sometimes we have depression - oh, we tried to do a lot! We didn't see anything 
change! Like this. But we already decide to do anything, we try to finish. [ ... ] We 
don't give up or surrender, like this. We try to win." [Tun Aung, founder and 
Leading Group member] 
Of the medics who founded Back Pack, a handful remained when I started fieldwork in 
2009. Some of the original medics had resettled; others had taken leadership roles in 
different organisations; others still had passed away. Through Leading Group elections 
every three years, older members are shuffled around and newer members given leading 
roles; but experience and networks remain core to leadership. More influential leaders 
are generally senior medics with networks into · and the organisational backing of what 
they call their mother organisations - generally ethnic health departments. As described 
in Chapter 5, these networks enable Back Pack to harness human resources and access 
communities in different target areas. Tun Aung and Poe Say, whose stories were told 
in Chapter 3, thus retained leading roles at the time of my fieldwork. 
Like Tun Aung, some founders and original medics are part of the '88 Generation. They 
often explain that as young students they knew little about politics but got caught up in 
demonstrations as these spread through Burma. Their experiences at this time and after 
fleeing to the border areas profoundly influenced the way they perceive their lives and 
work. Saya Aung Myint was among these original medics. Born into an ethnic Mon 
family in eastern Burma, he went to a Burmese-language school until 1988, when he 
joined the demonstrations. After the junta crushed the uprisings, he fled to the 
borderlands where he joined the ABSDF before being trained as a medic by Dr Cynthia 
and others. He worked with the Mobile Medical Teams and then co-founded Back Pack. 
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When I met him, he was part of the Leading Group; he lived in Mae Sot with his wife 
and son who, like him, are stateless. Several years before, he had had the opportunity to 
apply for resettlement to a third country. "I don't want to go", he explained, 
"because of ... [it took] half of my life, you know, to know the situation of the 
ethnic people and the communities who are living in the remote and the insecure 
areas. You know, when I was working at the ethnic areas, I saw many, many 
difficulties. How they can survive ... ? I know ... How do they survive? Not only 
food, you know, but also their security, and also their children's health and 
education, and also nutrition. I think very, very few people can give nutritious food 
to their children. Every day, most of the families, they eat only rice and fish paste 
and salt. So how can they survive? That is every day, I see, when I was working in 
the community level. So this is not like a story. This is the real situation in Burma. 
That 's why. [ ... ] I never applied to the resettlement or the refugee. I have no 
refugee register! Most of the people, they have refugee register. I have no refugee 
register. One day, you know, I will go back to my hometown, my country ... [ ... ] 
I'm a part of our struggle, you know? One day, I hope, we will get the peace and 
democracy and human rights and self-determination for the ethnic minorities in 
Burma. So at that time, I will go back to Burma to improve and to organise our 
community and people. [ ... ] Everyone has a responsibility, you know, to support 
and help the people who are living in Burma, because they are living with many 
difficulties and conflict [for] 60 or 70 years." 
Men and women originally from ethnic minority communities in disputed border areas, 
and who became involved in Back Pack's creation and early development, share with 
their colleagues from the '88 Generation a commitment to what they describe as the 
struggle for the rights and freedoms of their communities. But their life stories also tell 
of generations of suffering driven by the state and its armed forces. Like Poe Say, 
whose story was told in Chapter 3, some founders ahd older medics come from what are 
sometimes referred to as revolutionary families - families with members who joined 
ethnic nationalist groups. But more generally, Back Pack's founders and early members 
had all been branded as enemies of the state - whether because they or family members 
joined an opposition or ethnic nationalist movement, or simply because they grew up in 
'black' or 'brown' zones and were by definition targets in the state's counterinsurgency 
campaign (Callahan 2003). 
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Tharamu Htoo Paw is one of Back Pack's Programme Coordinators. In her mid-forties, 
she is older than most women who live in the compound throughout the year. She has a 
small wooden house at the back of the office where she lives with the youngest of her 
three children. The walls are covered in photos: her with her husband and children on 
rare occasions they are together; her husband in his uniform standing stiffly next to 
Pado Mahn Shah, shortly before the KNU leader was assassinated in Mae Sot108 ; her 
grandfather in the refugee camp where he died, having never been able to return to his 
homeland. In a community of people whose lives tell of violence, poverty, injustice, 
repeated displacement and family separation, Htoo Paw's story is not unique. 
Htoo Paw was born into a Karen family in a small village in Mon State. Her father, 
a pastor working with the KNU, was absent during most of her childhood. Two of 
her six siblings died as infants. "It was not a serious disease that made them die", 
she explained, "it was just worms." The family was very poor; they also lived in 
fear of soldiers stationed nearby: 
"My village was controlled by P 'Yaw and it was very close to the P 'Yaw camp. 
Sometimes we had to send food to them, go and build their fences, build their tents 
and we had to go and work for them very often. One time when I was small, the 
P 'Yaw patrolled into the village and on the Street they saw a cow passing by and 
suddenly they shot it and killed it. The cow owner was very upset and cried; she 
was a widow as well. At that time, I was small and knew nothing. [ ... ] Villagers 
were afraid of them all the time, sometimes they hurt villagers. Whenever they 
came into our village, they always told villagers to work for them. [ ... ] My elder 
sister's daughter, she was about seven years old and she was growing up. That 
soldier came there every day and played with the girl, kissed and played with her. 
One day he was drunk, he came and played with the girl and pointed his gun to the 
girl's head while her mother wasn't home. [ ... ] [S]uddenly the gun exploded, it hit 
the child's head and she immediately died." 
In 1983, Htoo Paw left school. She was 16 and her mother couldn't afford to send 
her to high school in the nearest town. She went to visit her uncle who was 
108 Pado Mahn Shah was Secretary General of the Karen National Union until his death on 14 February 2008, when 
he was shot by two gunmen who rode up on a motorbike in daylight to his house in Mae Sot. 
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working with the KNU in Karen State. There, she worked as a teacher until 1985, 
when her uncle convinced her to attend the first KNU medical training organised in 
Manerplaw with support from Medecins du Monde 109• She then attended the 
KNLA's military medic training before vvorking in a KNU-run hospital on the 
border for five years. Over the years, fighting in the area got worse and in 1989, 
Htoo Paw fled for the first time to Thailand. She returned to Karen State after a few 
months to continue working. There, she met the Com1nander of a KNLA Battalion 
and in January 1990, accepted his marriage proposal. But fighting flared up again, 
and again she had to flee. It wasn't until August that they were able to marry. 
By 1994, Htoo Paw had two children and fighting forced her to flee again, this time 
to a temporary shelter in Thailand where she started working as a medic for an 
INGO. Then, in 2001, Htoo Paw was sent to training at Mae Tao Clinic. At the 
time, Back Pack's leaders were looking for new Programme Coordinators. Htoo 
Paw had met some of these leaders, including Poe Say, during the 1980s inside 
Karen state. When she completed training in 2004, the leaders chose her to 
coordinate one of their health programmes. She was subsequently elected to the 
Leading Group. 
Htoo Paw now lives in Mae Sot with her youngest child, who attends school near 
Back Pack's office. Her husband works as a KNU official in Karen State. Her two 
older children live in two different refugee camps in Thailand; she sees them once 
or twice a year. She and her children are registered with UNHCR and so entitled to 
apply for resettlement. But they have no Thai ID and their UNHCR cards do not 
allow them to leave the camps. Htoo Paw describes herself as "illegal" and speaks 
often of her fear of Thai police and immigration officials. Yet despite the 
difficulties, she does not see resettlement as an option: 
"My husband, he don't want to resettlement. If he don't resettlement, if I go with 
my child, that is not [as] should be.[ ... ] Yes, also I don 't want to leave my people. I 
feel like we have many, many poor [people] in the border so if I stay here I think I 
can a little bit do more for them - I think like that. [ ... ] Their living condition is 
worse than us and if I go, only I and my family will be peaceful but others will be 
in poverty; so I would not be happy with that." 
109 At the time, the French medical NGO Medecins du Monde, was operating cross-border training programmes in 
Karen state, training medics in Manerplaw and other areas under KNU control. 
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Like Htoo Paw, older medics and leaders tell stories of displacement, poverty, disease 
and death driven by oppression and injustices perpetrated by agents of the state. Poe 
Say's early childhood memory ( described in Chapter 3) of being imprisoned in order to 
force his revolutionary father to surrender is not unique: I met other older medics with 
similar formative experiences. But more generally, older medics' formative experiences 
were of repeatedly running away from Tatmadaw soldiers, of men, women and children 
used as forced labour, of soldiers appropriating their meagre possessions, and of a life 
of fear and uncertainty, where even having enough rice to eat was never guaranteed. 
Their stories tell of learning as children to fear Tatmadaw soldiers - only 
representatives of the state that most people in their communities have ever known. Fear 
of those they refer to as 'the Burmese' and the understanding that as 'ethnic people' 
they are oppressed are deeply ingrained in their worldviews. The Burman-dominated 
state - personified through its soldiers - is seen as the source of generations of 
suffering; ethnic nationalist groups are seen as defending the people against the state 
and helping communities to survive. This is not to say that older medics are uncritical of 
ethnic nationalist groups resisting the state; but embodied histories of state violence 
contribute to a Manichean vision, in which conflict, oppression and injustices are 
framed within a bigger picture of struggle between good and evil (Fassin 2007). 
When they speak of their work, founders and older leaders often emphasise the duty to 
continue to struggle for the rights and freedoms of their peoples. Htoo Paw often said 
that she will "never give up the struggle". Poe Say spoke frequently of his "commitment 
to work for my people, for the struggle for their revolution"; this struggle is one he 
cannot give up until freedom and self-determination are granted to the ethnic peoples of 
Burma. For these leaders, working with Back Pack is an extension of a wider moral 
responsibility. The suffering they encounter through their work is an extension of the 
suffering that they, their families and generations before them have been subjected to by 
the state. And through their work, they are to a small extent righting some of the state ' s 
wrongs. As another leader explained, 
"What our Back Pack can do is that, as oppression and destruction increases in 
ethnic areas, we help as much as we can with the health problems, which are one of 
the consequences of the conflict. We can say that it is kind of supporting the ethnic 
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people not to disappear. We can do only that much." 
C. Serving the community: the younger generation of medics and 
office workers 
Over the years, Back Pack's leaders extended their programmes by harnessing human 
resources for health within an expanding and heterogeneous space designated as 
Burma's ethnic areas. The organisation now brings together medics living and working 
in diverse ethnic minority communities - including Karen, Kayah, Kayan, Mon, Lahu, 
Pa'O, Palaung, Shan, Kachin, Chin and Arakan communities - and in ceasefire as well 
as conflict areas. The leaders also recruited increasing numbers of office workers to be 
based in Mae Sot during the year. These two groups of workers have commonalities as 
well as differences with the original medics and leaders. In general, however, when I 
asked men and women from these groups what led them to become medics or to work 
with Back Pack, the most common answer was some variant of "to serve the 
community". Over time, I realised that this ostensibly self-explanatory response needs 
to be understood within its socio-political context and in relation to mechanisms that 
lead to an individual becoming a medic and/or being recruited into Back Pack. 
1. Back Pack's field workers 
Almost all medics were born and grew up in Burma's remote border areas. The majority 
live in disputed areas and as children assimilated a fear of the Tatmadaw. Their stories 
tell of villages being attacked, of repeated displacement, of food and belongings 
confiscated, of villagers used as forced labour, and other examples of everyday 
injustice. Naw Silver Paw's story110 is just one of many telling of a life of fear and 
insecurity: 
"My parents were farmers and they lived on the mountains. [ ... ] I knew that I 
always had to flee. I had to flee and stay in the jungle. Sometimes we didn't have 
food to eat. We had to eat rice porridge for about one year. I had four siblings at 
110 Naw is the common prefix for Karen women's names. 
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that time. Our father had to find food for us. Every village had to flee at that time. 
Villages were destroyed. My mother died when I was five or six years old. I had 
younger twin siblings. I had to look after them after my mother died. We didn' t 
know about health. I looked after them and both of them died." 
"My father told me about the revolution. Because of the revolution, Karen and 
Burmese fight each other. The Burmese came and oppressed the Karen. [ ... ] It 
means they want to make the Karen disappear." 
"I had to leave school in [ Grade Seven]. Because we had to work so people 
couldn't send me to school. [ ... ] The incident happened and our school was 
destroyed. After, children in the village couldn't go to school even though they 
should go. People asked me to teach; I helped them for one year. [ ... ] [T]hen I 
attended medic training. Afterwards I went back [ to my village.] [ ... ] The reason is 
that if we work in health, even if we can't work for many people, we can work for 
our family. My thought was if there is a medic in a family, we can look after our 
family health. Mostly, we live in the mountains and we don' t have medicine or 
enough health workers." [Silver Paw, 36 year-old female medic, Karen State] 
The smaller numbers of medics who live and work in ceasefire areas often explain that 
their communities are more free to work or travel without fear of attack. But they too 
speak of injustices, such as villagers being recruited for forced labour. And even when 
they themselves have not experienced violence or injustices, they still see the state and 
its army as the source of suffering for ethnic minority communities. A medic working in 
Karenni State thus still referred to government troops as -the enemy and described 
injustices that led him to join the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) before the latter 
signed a ceasefire with the government in 1994: 
"[In my village] there is an enemy group. [ ... ] Before, my father was a constructor 
but my mother was a farmer. [ ... ] I quit after middle school because there was no 
high school in my village. [ ... ] After quitting school, I joined a revolutionary group. 
I worked on hillside paddies for a year after school and after that, I joined the 
organisation [i.e. KNLP]. [ ... ] About one year after I joined, the ceasefire agreement 
was signed. [ ... ] Now there is ceasefire and people can work on their farms and can 
travel freely. There is benefit for the people." 
"When I was young, I was very interested in the people in the jungle [i.e. the 
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resistance group]. Because I felt pain when I saw my parents being forced to work 
for the military government like portering, I just joined the group [i.e. KNLP]. [ ... ] 
When they [i.e. Tatmadaw soldiers] came, every man had to run away. [ ... ] They 
forced all the men to do portering." [36 year-old male medic, Kayan ceasefire area, 
Karenni State] 
A number of medics, mostly younger men, were recruited into Back Pack from the 
medical branches of armed resistance or ceasefire groups. Men who were soldiers prior 
to becoming medics often frame their experiences within a collective history of 
resistance to oppression, mirroring the revolutionary and Manichean narratives of the 
armed groups that they - and often family members before them - had joined. One 
medic, who joined the Arakan Liberation Army before becoming part of a Back Pack 
team in Arakan State, told me: "I think that it's worthwhile to die by being involved in 
the battle for national freedom". Another, who had fought with the Shan State Army-
South (SSA-S), explained that he joined the resistance group "Because SPDC's policy 
is not the same. Their policy is not the same as SSA's. SSA helps the community. They 
work by oppressing the community." This understanding of the state and its army as the 
source of the oppression and resulting suffering experienced by ethnic minority 
communities is shared by medics who have worked with armed ceasefire groups, 
despite the fact that these groups are theoretically no longer in conflict with the state. 
One 22 year-old male medic who joined the Kayan New Land Party in Karenni State 
before being recruited into Back Pack thus explained, 
"Before getting peaceful, before stopping shooting [i.e. making ceasefire] until 
now - how to say? We are oppressed human beings. Being ethnic peoples, being 
oppressed human beings, we have to work for the community. It's not ok if we 
don't do it. [ ... ]Until I die, for Back Pack or for my community, I will work more, 
[this is] my desire." 
Most medics I met, however, had not been soldiers; most also spoke of not 
understanding politics. But protracted instability, deprivation and direct and indirect 
state violence remained facts of life that structure their worlds. These life experiences, 
moreover, cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious and other differences, allowing for 
identification with a history and memory of state-driven violence and oppression that is 
at once personal and communal (Fassin 2007; 2008; Hacking 1995). The individual 
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expenences of the medics - who, importantly, come from diverse ethnic minority 
groups, civilian or military backgrounds, ceasefire and resistance areas - then reinforce 
Back Pack's institutional Weltanshauung, a vision in which ethnic 1ninority 
communities' suffering is driven by an abusive and illegitimate state (Lissner 1977). 
The medics' very real experiences of violence and suffering can then contribute to the 
organisation's legitimacy as a humanitarian witness: the 'motivated truth' that Back 
Pack presents through its denunciation of state-driven abuses and oppression is a truth 
experienced and expressed by its members, the victim-medics (Redfield 2006). 
For most men and women I met, becoming a medic was one of a limited number of life 
options. In the remote areas where they live, there tends to be little in terms of education 
or work opportunities. Families generally do not have enough money to keep children in 
school until they graduate - and in many cases, there are no secondary schools in their 
areas. As a result, most men and women who become medics have not finished school 
and do small-scale agricultural work until they are selected for medical trainings. The 
trajectory of a 29 year-old Kayah medic is illustrative of the lack of opportunities 
medics typically face. This young woman was born in a small farming community in 
Karenni State, and fled fighting many times as a child. After leaving school, she said, 
"I went back to my village. Day by day, I did cultivation. [ ... ] After working for 
one or two years, after working in cultivation, our [mother] organisation arrived. At 
the time they arrived, there were many people who hadn't passed Tenth Standard in 
our village. Like this, there were many who had no jobs and just stayed, didn't 
continue to work. Because of not passing Tenth Standard, there were many who 
got depressed and stayed like this. This organisation arrived - it's our organisation. 
[ ... ] When they saw me they said, "Do you want to work? What can we do to 
help?" I replied [ ... ] "I am interested in medical field". [They said], "You didn't 
pass Tenth Standard. In Burma [ ... ] even after passing Tenth Standard, you will 
become a nurse only after getting high credits. You haven't passed Grade Ten. So 
how can you get into the medical field?" Then, "Yes, I know. But you asked me 
rny interest." So I answered like this. They sent me to Back Pack, Mae Tao Clinic." 
Mother organisations like the one mentioned by this medic are key to mechanisms 
through which individuals become medics and are recruited into Back Pack. At the 
organisational level - and in many individuals' explanations - the medics are described 
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as doing their duty by serving their communities. This duty is the outcome of 
advantages the medics receive, in the form of higher levels of knowledge and skills than 
others in their communities. These advantages are granted to the individual by a mother 
organisation, which selects an individual considered worthy to attend basic training in 
exchange for a commitment to work for the community. The mother organisation is 
generally the health department of an ethnic nationalist group but can also be a youth 
group or women's group or other type of civil society organisation. The worthiness of 
the individual is assessed based on existing knowledge and skills 111 and the guarantee of 
local authorities such as the village leader, who vouch for the individual and grant him 
or her permission to attend training. The individual's commitment to serve the 
community generally entails a promise to return to work in his or her community or 
with a local health organisation for a set period. The mother organisation then 
guarantees the individual's ability, trustworthiness and commitment, and becomes the 
mechanism through which he or she is later recruited into Back Pack. 
Younger medics generally receive training and are recruited into Back Pack through 
such mechanisms. In exchange for a commitment to work in their communities, they are 
chosen or approved by authorities in their area to attend Community Health Worker 
(CHW) training with a mother organisation. After typically six months' training, they 
return to work in their villages and/or with the local health organisation. The mother 
organisation later appoints them to Back Pack. The two explanations below are typical 
of many stories I was told. 
"I received medical training by the New Mon State Party 11 2. Then I had practical 
training there for a year. Next, the New Mon State Party has a health organisation 
[ ... ] in Moulemein, Thaton. I practiced there and then they assigned me here. [ ... ] 
When I first came, like I just said, I didn't know about Back Pack. I was there 
according to their [i.e. my leaders '] assignment." [25 year-old female medic, 
ceasefire area, Mon State] 
111 For example, how many years of schooling the individual has attended. Although the medics generally have fairy 
low levels of education and most have not finished school, they have to have some basic formal education to be able 
to attend Community Health Worker trainings. 
112 The New Mon State Party is the ethnic nationalist organisation in Mon state, which signed a ceasefire with the 
government in 1995. 
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"After we graduated from medical training, our leaders already worked in Back 
Pack. At that time, their workers were very few so they suggested for us to work 
with Back Pack in order to become the strength for them. [ ... ] People who led us 
worked with Back Pack, but we had to help them after the training because we 
agreed with them to work for our people in order to promote health care, extend 
our knowledge, and to benefit for the community development." [male medic, 
conflict area, Karen State] 
Often, with no accessible or affordable health services in the area, a village leader or 
other authority encourages or nominates a promising young man or woman to attend 
training with a mother organisation. For the person selected, such training offers a 
chance of higher-level knowledge and skills, as well as future work as a medic. This 
work is not a guarantee of monetary income: Community Health Workers generally do 
not receive salaries or stipends, but do receive some support - mostly of a non-
monetary kind - from villagers in exchange for treatment. In addition, if a Community 
Health Worker is recruited as a medic into an ethnic health organisation or a group like 
Back Pack, there is the possibility of a regular, albeit small, stipend. Skills and 
knowledge acquired through medical training and then Back Pack can also enhance the 
local-level prestige of the medic, who is endowed not only with biomedical knowledge 
and skills, but with materials (like medicines) not easily available locally and with 
connections into networks reaching beyond their remote and isolated communities. 
As in Silver Paw's story above, many medics recount witnessing family members, 
friends or others die because they couldn't access or afford basic healthcare. Many 
explain that they wanted to attend trainings they were selected for in order to learn skills 
with which to help sick or injured family members or friends. Others also recount how 
they sought out such trainings themselves: 
"Then after uncle died, there was no one working in health. So if I knew [ about 
health], not even for the other people but within my family, I can do for them. So I 
could look after the people around me. It's not that someone forced me to join. It 
just appeared in my mind." [25 year-old female medic, ceasefire area, Kachin 
State] 
"When we lived in our village we could see that the health standard was poor. I 
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wouldn 't have become a medic if my father hadn't died. My father died because I 
couldn' t cure him. So I wanted to care for villagers. I made myself stronger and I 
am proud of myself that I can work for my people with skills that I have." [ 48 year-
old male medic, conflict area, Karen State] 
Medics often describe their communities as lacking knowledge and skills to improve 
their health. For them, Back Pack is also a way to gain such knowledge and skills: 
"This is for my people. My people lack knowledge and I want to improve their 
healthcare and want them to become more knowledgeable." [25 year-old female 
medic, Lahu ceasefire area, Shan State] 
"Before having worked with Back Pack, there were few trainings and when 
working with them, I could get more training and more work and I could 
understand more about the job. [ ... ] Before, most villagers lacked knowledge. But 
today they are educated in health issues and sanitation. They know about their 
healthy environment, they know how to use latrines, well and water pipes - these 
things, they request from us." [32 year old male medic, conflict area, Karen area] 
Yet knowledge and skills invested in the medics binds them to a duty that some confess 
they would rather renege. One of the most frequently mentioned obstacles to developing 
sustainable health systems is the high turnover of field workers. This is generally 
explained by difficulties medics face in serving the community while supporting 
families in a context of chronic poverty and insecurity - which at the organisational 
level reinforces the value placed on those who do demonstrate commitment to their 
duty. But medics also often describe difficulties when they cannot fulfil programme 
goals or meet their leaders' expectations, and when villagers ask them for help beyond 
the provision of healthcare. A poignant example of such pressures is presented by one 
medic, who stood up in a training I attended to describe an incident he had faced two 
years earlier; his story provides a glaring contrast to the romanticised media depictions 
mentioned above: 
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"[W]hen we got there, the child was unconscious. His father who was drunk 
carried him. Also the s1nell of alcohol was so strong. Then, his father said, "Ok, 
treat, you guys, medics, if my child dies, I will kill all of you." So, my colleagues 
all got depressed. If the child died because of our treatment, we would be killed, 
then how do we dare to treat? And [ the other medics] disappeared. I was left all 
alone. Then, I explained, "Death and life are not in our hands. We are not Gods." 
[ ... ] After a couple of days, he apologised. He came back and apologised. We 
thought, "It's impossible to leave him. We definitely have to cure [the child]."[ ... ] 
Because some [medics] were angry. Like this, we were not offered food from them. 
We worked as volunteers. We wouldn't work if we are blamed like this, when it 
happens like this. [ ... ] So I discussed, at night, with my Sayas 113 , Law Eh, I 
discussed. They encouraged me. He said, "We faced a lot more than this. We help 
each other and continue working". Encouraged me like this. If possible, I decided 
to resign. [ ... ] Because we are health workers and we go for curing but the 
community comes to us and asks for personal assistance rather than health 
assistance. [ ... ] "Can you help me with this? Can you give me a bag of rice?"[ ... ] 
Because, if I continue to do more of this work, I may have mental disease, heart 
disease ... [ ... ] I have this knowledge; my organisation, my area gave me the chance 
to know these [things], there was a lot. A lot of time and money was spent. I 
thought about those [things] too. That's why I haven't resigned over the last one 
year, two years." [38 year-old male medic, conflict area, Karen State] 114 
As illustrated above, many younger medics are trained as Community Health Workers 
and recruited into Back Pack through variations of patron-client systems, which 
researchers have identified as a dominant mode of organisation in Burma 115 - and 
which are referred to in Burmese as saya-tapyit (teacher-pupil) relationships. Patron-
client relationships involve reciprocity rather than a pure command relationship (Powell 
1970). Yet the inequality at their core is described as essential in fostering a sense of 
duty in the client (Scott 1972) - a duty repeatedly 1nentioned in medics' explanations of 
their work. For almost all medics I met, a patron - in the form of a village leader, leader 
in a mother organisation, local military co1nmander, senior Back Pack medic, or other 
authority - played a key role in providing access to knowledge and skills in return for a 
113 I.e. "my leaders". 
114 The medic initially told his story in the training, and then repeated it to me in an interview. The quote is taken 
from this interview. 
115 Scott defines patron-client systems as "an informal cluster consisting of a power figure who is in a position to give 
security, inducements, or both, and his personal followers who, in return for such benefits, contribute their loyalty 
and personal assistance to the patron's designs" (Scott 1972: 92). Drawing on anthropological literature on patron-
client relations, a number of analysts have highlighted the prevalence of patron-client networks in Burma, particularly 
in the armed forces and in the post-colonial bureaucratic state ( e.g. Gravers 1999; South 2008; Steinberg 201 0; 
Taylor 2009). 
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commitment to work in the authority's area. Medics who seek out CHW trainings 
themselves rather than being nominated by local leaders still tend to work through 
patron-client relations, since they need the endorsement of local authorities to attend 
training with a mother organisation. Individual patrons then also become brokers into a 
more generalised system of reciprocity, enabled through the mother organisation, and in 
which the duty due in exchange for benefits received by the individual accrues to the 
community rather than an individual patron. After CHW training and a minimum six 
months' work in the community, the individual can then be harnessed into Back Pack 
through systems of reciprocity between the mother organisations and Back Pack, which 
are further described in Chapter 5, and which ensure the medic's trustworthiness and 
commitment. 
2. Back Pack's office staff 
Over the years, to respond to growing management and administrative needs, Back 
Pack' s leaders recruited increasing numbers of office workers to be based in Mae Sot. 
Many of the office workers had similar formative experiences to those described above 
for the founders and newer generation of medics. Naw Moo Lay's early memories are 
illustrative of such experiences, and of a resulting fear of and resentment towards the 
state and its representatives at the local level: 
"At that time maybe I am four years old, [ ... ] the SPDC attack my village. So when 
we heard the SPDC will attack - because we heard from other people or other 
authorities so they give a message to the villager[s], like that - so "be ready". So 
SPDC attack like that. And so we have to be prepare[ d] and we have to run away 
from the village, to escape, naw? So when they said "P 'Yaw hey, P 'Yaw hey! 116" so 
I never seen P 'Yaw! What's it look like? How is it look like? I don't know! I think 
that ... P 'Ycnv, it ' s like a ghost - because ifwe heard "P'Yaw hey" we have to flee. 
Because in my mind I think it's like a ghost, with long teeth and with hair, and the 
long breasts, like that. So I think, is ghosts coming, that why we have to flee. [ ... ] 
We just go in the jungle. In the jungle - we live in the jungle for two, three days. 
So when we heard the SPDC go back, the P 'Yaw go back, so we come back to our 
116P 'Yaw hey means "P 'Yaw (Bwmese) are attacking" in Sgaw Karen. 
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village, like that. It's happen too many time[s] when I was young. In my life I have 
many time[s] experience to escape from the SPDC. [ ... ] The SPDC soldier[s], they 
treat the people who are under the KNU[ -controlled area], so all are their enemies. 
So if they see, even men or women or boy or girl, they shoot. They kill all." 
Like the medics, the life experiences of office workers like Moo Lay enable 
identification with a memory and history of state-driven violence and oppression that is 
again both personal and communal (Fassin 2007; 2008), as well as reinforcing Back 
Pack's organisational Weltanshauung (Lissner 1977). But office workers generally have 
higher levels of education and have sometimes been exposed to different opportunities. 
· As a young adult in the late 1990s, Moo Lay - who unlike most Back Pack members 
finished school in Burma - fled with her family into Thailand. There, they obtained 
UNHCR refugee status, allowing them to apply for resettlement. Moo Lay spent almost 
a decade in one of the temporary shelters, where she worked for an INGO, before she 
met Dr Cynthia and asked for work with one of the organisations in Mae Sot. Back 
Pack, she explained, enabled her to work for her community and to further develop her 
professional knowledge and skills - knowledge and skills, which she also put to use 
when she later resettled to the US. 
Nan May117, like Moo Lay, was born and lived during her childhood in a conflict area. 
May was in her mid-twenties when I starting working with Back Pack. From a Shan 
family, she too fled many times from the Tatmadaw, who attacked her village for the 
first time when she was seven years old. At that time, she ~xplained, "I don't know I 
have to [be] afraid". By the time she was thirteen, her family was forced to relocate to a 
village under Tatmadaw control. They had no money to send her to the nearest school, 
so she chose to leave for the refugee camps in Thailand: 
"[My mother] said "I have no money to give money for your studies. So if you stay 
here, you cannot study anymore." But my mother said that she heard ... my uncle 
told her that in Thailand they have the camps that provide free education or 
something like that118 • So at that time, when I heard, I just had very strong emotion 
117 May's first language is Shan and she uses Nan as a prefix in front of her name -the Shan equivalent ofNaw. 
118 Nan May was referring to the education programmes run by NGOs in the temporary shelters for displaced persons 
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to come and study in Thailand. [ ... ] When I was young, I thought that when I finish 
Grade Ten I will study to be a medic or health worker, and then after that I will go 
back to my family and then help my family or the people in our village. Because, 
when I was young or until now, there are no clinics in our village and then no 
medics." 
After May finished school, she worked with a medical organisation 1n one of the 
refugee camps. Later, she obtained a scholarship to attend a two-year English education 
programme in Mae Sot. During this time, a patron working with a Karen CBO helped 
her financially; after she told him that she wanted to work in health, he introduced her 
to Back Pack's Director, who took her on as an intern. A year later, she was accepted 
into a Post-Ten 119 school in Mae Sot, on condition that she commit to working for Back 
Pack for at least a year after graduating. The one-year course taught her basic project 
management and when she returned to Back Pack, she was given more responsibility, 
then elected to the Leading Group. Although she speaks often of the importance of 
working for her community, May also mentions wanting to be free of her growing 
responsibilities: 
"To be honest, in my mind, no free time. Even I'm sick and then I have free time, 
in my mind, no free time. [ ... ] Sometimes, I think, I just want to go back and just 
stay with my Mum. It's a very happy life there ... because even your body is tired, 
your mind is free when you work just normally. Not something like this ." 
Like May, a number of office workers were born in remote and unstable parts of 
Burma's borderlands but left for Thailand where they accessed opportunities not 
available in their villages and learned skills useful for the administration of an 
organisation like Back Pack. They were generally recruited into Back Pack through 
inter-personal links and relationships of patronage. In a number of cases, higher-level 
education and skills were granted to them by a school on the border on condition that 
they commit to working with a community organisation after graduating - thus like 
on Thai soil. 
119 These are schools providing fmiher education to young Burmese people who have passed Grade Ten. The Post-
Ten schools generally prepare students for work in Community-Based Organisations or act as bridging programmes, 
preparing students for the exams they have to sit to secure scholarships for tertiary education in Thailand or another 
country. 
136 
medics in Burma, their work with Back Pack was initially an extension of their 
commitment to serve the community after accessing higher-level knowledge and skills. 
In contrast to May and Moo Lay, some office workers come from areas where they and 
their families did not directly experience conflict or abuses targeting ethnic minority 
communities. Whatever their origins, however, office staff speak often of the 
importance of working for their country and people, thereby reflecting organisational 
values. But office workers also speak of their work as a way to gain experience, support 
their families, or move into a world with more opportunities. Serving the community 
thus becomes a means to a different end, as well as or rather than an end in itself. This 
more complex mix of influencing factors is exemplified by another office worker, who 
attended school then university in Rangoon before travelling to the Thai-Burma border 
in search of a job; she worked for several years and developed her professional 
experience with Back Pack before obtaining a higher-paid job with an INGO. Before 
leaving, she told me: 
"I feel I gained a lot [ from Back Pack], because I have many friends - like you, and 
the other people - so I gained a lot, from individual[s] and from organisation. 
Like ... I can learn ... when we developing the programme[ ... ] how to become more 
effective, how to do. That's when I can learn more. And like technician people 120, 
they can provide us many things, so I can learn a lot. [ ... ] Openly, if I tell you, we 
have a low income. Here is only stipend. Very low. So every cost is becoming 
higher. To survive, only this stipend is not enough. [ ... ] I__ want to do the good 
things now, when I'm in this world, how[ever] much I can do. And at the same 
time, I [am] also thinking for my daughter, because she is a child and she don't 
have much knowledge and she need[s] many, many years to grow up." 
Thus like the medics inside Burma, office workers are motivated by sometimes 
complex combinations of factors. This is common among NGOs ( e.g. Malkki 2007; 
Redfield 2012), but in Back Pack's case it has the potential to clash with the leaders' 
emphasis on the duty to serve the community as a politico-moral responsibility. Such 
120 This refers to members of Back Pack's partner organisations such as GHAP, BRC and IRC, which as described in 
Chapter 6 provide technical support to the organisation and its members. 
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individual divergences, however, are mitigated through an institutional ideology that 
builds on and is reflective of its members' individual and communal embodied histories 
of state-driven violence and suffering (Fassin 2007; 2008). 
Like the field workers, new office workers tend to be recruited through inter-personal 
and socio-political networks, particularly patron-client systems. People ideally come 
from a mother organisation that guarantees trustworthiness and commitment. If the 
individual has no mother organisation, one of the leaders generally acts as a guarantor. 
Untrained office workers live and work in Back Pack's compound for a test period, 
when they perform various chores to demonstrate commitment. They are then trained 
and work as unpaid interns before becoming staff members with stipends. As one such 
office worker explained: 
"Someone who didn't know anything, like me 121 , was not allowed to enter the 
office. We were tested in cleaning or cooking for a month. After this, if good, if 
interested, then taught computer. And then, assigned as an intern for six months 
and then promoted as staff. [ .. . ] We check if someone is flexible or really working 
hard. [ ... ] We can call this the watching period." 
The mechanism for recruiting untrained office staff thus also entails a visible 
demonstration of commitment. For Back Pack's leaders, demonstrations of commitment 
can eclipse other aspects of an individual's contribution to the organisation. When I 
asked him what Back Pack does with staff who aren 't useful or demonstrate poor 
productivity in the office, Poe Say replied - laughing at the absurdity of my question -
"We can use what they can do: chickens 122 or somewhere. No useless for us! Chickens 
or cleaning or something ... " This idea that no committed individual is useless makes 
sense given the type of commitment the leaders seek in their staff, which is linked to the 
interpretation of their work as part of the duty to continue the struggle for the rights and 
freedoms of ethnic peoples. But while no individual is useless, some are more useful 
than others for particular aspects of Back Pack's work. 
121 The staff member was refening to individuals who have no prior training in management and administration. 
Those who do have such skills and knowledge and therefore do not need training are generally allowed into the office 
as unpaid interns for six months before becoming staff members. 
122 Chickens and often other animals such as goats, sheep or turkeys are kept in the compound. 
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The leaders explain that they need 'outside experts' to deal with increasing management 
and administrative tasks. This includes office workers like Moo Lay, who have spent 
time in one of the refugee camps in Thailand and been exposed to a greater range of 
educational and other opportunities. Such people are seen as benefiting the organisation 
with higher-level skills and education; but because they have opportunities to resettle or 
to get better-paid jobs in INGOs, they are seen as potentially less committed. The 
leaders therefore aim to recruit 70 per cent of management staff from the field. People 
recruited from target areas inside Burma ensure that Back Pack's systems are 
participatory and sustainable; they are also seen as more committed - as explained by 
one leader, "Because they are working in the field level, they feel they are facing their 
problems. They saw what the people are facing." Recruiting people from target areas 
inside Burma for management and leadership roles also mitigates some of the risks of 
losing valuable human resources to resettlement. As Aung Myint explained, 
"Five or six years ago, the human resources is not stable in Mae Sot, in border area 
- in the administration level - because of the UNHCR resettlement programme is 
very hot, very hot. Today, we sent to the Mahidol University; tomorrow, he leaves 
to the third country123 • Yeh, that thing was happened in the past. [ ... ] Since 2005, 
2006, 2007, oh! Very, very dangerous for us - for the human resources. Because 
some skilful persons, oh .... they leave with the resettlement programme. Some of 
our Programme Coordinators, oh, they leave. That's why I suggested to Poe Say, 
please recruit from the field level, you know?" 
·-
By the time of my fieldwork, a number of former leaders and office workers had 
resettled, and some others - those who had spent time in a temporary shelter and 
obtained the necessary UNHCR documents - had the option to apply. But resettlement 
remains a sensitive issue, which in tum highlights values promoted by the leaders and 
potential obstacles in their realisation. Older leaders often describe negative impacts of 
resettlement, in terms of robbing organisations like Back Pack and the wider movement 
of skilled and committed people. As Tun Aung explained, "That is a big problem for 
123 Aung Myint was referring to the case of one of Back Pack's founding members, who resettled to a third country 
several years before I conducted fieldwork. The medic had been in a leadership role and was seen to have benefited 
from the organisation's investments in his skills and knowledge, having been sent to a course at Mahidol University 
in Bangkok as well as other trainings. 
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our movement. We see resettlement programme is ... we analyse: good for the people 
[ who resettle] but apart from here, bad for us." As illustrated through the stories above, 
most older leaders explained that resettlement is not an option for them, even if they 
have documents enabling them to apply. In their explanations, they often contrast 
individual benefits of resettlement (for themselves or for their children) to communal 
benefits of staying behind - with individual benefits implicitly or explicitly posited as 
less valuable. So it was that Aung Myint also explained: 
"The people who can provide and support [only] to their respective families, it's 
not enough. If you're blind, [it's] enough. If you're dumb, [it's] enough. So you 
can see, you can hear, you can feel, oh, you cannot stay alone. You cannot stay 
alone. Because you can see the situation every day. That's why Saya Poe Say said: 
"some people have no feelings with heart", you know? If you are feeling with 
heart, you are living, staying, working together with the community." 
The issue of resettlement is often explicitly linked to that of commitment, in tum 
highlighting values the leaders promote in their organisation. As Poe Say told me: 
"Some people, like me! We come here, we commitment for our struggle, for our 
freedom. So that's why not go resettlement, no ... whatever we are suffering, we are 
facing the problems, we can continue working our job, like that." 
From discussions with other Back Pack members during my fieldwork, however, I 
knew that some were considering resettlement, and some had already applied. But those 
who told me about wanting to start new lives in third countries would do so only after 
making me promise not to tell others in the organisation. They feared being judged or 
even ostracised for prioritising their own and their families' futures over serving their 
community. This resulted in cases ,vhere people who did apply for resettlement chose 
not to notify the leadership until their application had been successful and they were 
about to leave, which created practical as well as ideological ripples in the office. The 
dile1nmas and conflicting pressures and values experienced by people faced with the 
option to resettle is perhaps most aptly illustrated by one staff member, who after telling 
me in secret about her application for resettlement, anxiously said: "But I do have the 
right to choose ... don't I?" 
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D. Unity within Diversity: health as an entry-point for national 
reconciliation 
"[T]he nature or the purpose of the Back Pack Health Worker Team, one is to 
standardise the healthcare system; second is to create the ethnic diversity or unity 
with the diversity. So that's why we still need to expand." [Poe Say, founder and 
Leading Group member] 
As revealed through the stories above, Back Pack brings together an ever-growing and 
increasingly diverse range of individuals and groups. Within this diversity, leaders like 
Poe Say seek to generate unity. This 'unity within diversity' has a number of 
implications, which need to be viewed in relation to the leaders' politico-moral vision, 
as well as the organisation's evolution in the decade following its creation. For me, a 
starting point to understanding why unity might be important was provided when 
another senior Karen medic and Back Pack founder explained, 
"If you have a small wood, it is easy to take it and do like this [ he mimes breaking 
a stick against his knee] - and it will snap! If it is bigger and you have more wood 
together in a bundle it is more difficult to break it and it will be stronger. [ ... ] If we 
have just the Karen, we are a small bundle. If we add the Karenni, Mon, Shan ... 
then we will be stronger and we can change the SPDC faster." 
In her ethnography of an aid organisation in post-Soviet Europe, Atlani-Duault 
highlights ways in which an organisational ideology is cons_tructed, reinforced and at 
times undermined through internal and external challenges (Atlani-Duault 2005). The 
organisation's evolving ideology can be read through institutional practices as well as 
observation of the "internal debates, the oppositions, the changes in course, the 
reversals in position and their reasons, the areas that are beyond debate and the reasons 
of their apparent untouchability" (ibid.: 3 8). Similarly, doxic values and elements of an 
organisational ideology - itself linked to the moral and political vision of the founders 
and older leaders (Verna 2007) - can often be read most clearly in challenges these face 
as they are performed or implemented in Back Pack's day-to-day workings. Thus 
tensions around the issue of resettlement highlight the value and meaning given to 
commitment to the duty to serve the community, with this being framed as a politico-
moral responsibility. And tensions in the realisation of 'unity within diversity' highlight 
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its significance within the leaders' politico-moral vision. 
1. The multi-ethnic Back Pack community 
Back Pack's office in Mae Sot is not just an administrative space. It is also the nucleus 
of the Back Pack community. This community functions in the realm of what Poe Say 
calls the 'legal-illegal', which - as described in following chapters - can be related to 
Abraham and van Schendel's conceptualisation of the (il)licit (Abraham and van 
Schendel 2005). In order to preserve their operational space in this realm, the leaders 
cultivate relationships with local Thai Military Intelligence and other authorities. But 
the protection afforded by these authorities does not extend far beyond the walls of the 
compound. Most staff members have been stopped multiple times by Thai police, who 
are notorious for exacting bribes from Burmese 'illegals'; some have spent time in Thai 
jails or been deported back to Burma. The illegal status of the organisation and its staff 
means that the Back Pack community in Mae Sot is geographically circumscribed. 
Interns and junior staff members live in the compound, where they share chores such as 
cleaning or cooking; older members and those with families tend to have houses or 
rooms not far from the compound, within the sprawling Burmese community that has 
grown around Mae Tao Clinic. This organisation of space contributes to a strong sense 
of community; so too does the organisation of time, with the lives of the Back Pack 
staff members following the organisation's annual cycles. 
People I worked with often describe Back Pack as a kind of family, with similarities to 
as well as differences from their biological families. In Burmese and Karen - the two 
main languages used in the office - people commonly use kinship terms to address each 
other, highlighting inter-personal relationships and hierarchies implied by those 
relationships 124. Within Back Pack, staff members often refer to each other by kinship 
terms, but these carry more weight than they would in other, less tightly-knit communal 
contexts. Younger women thus refer to Htoo Paw as "auntie", and within the 
124 Referring to people with kinship terminology is also common in other Southeast Asian societies; however, here, 
the terms carry more weight than they would in other, less tightly knit communal contexts . The kinship terminology 
as well as the honorifics employed to designate senior medics and leaders within the organisation also reflect the 
organisation 's hierarchies. 
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compound, she does have the role of a caring aunt often intimately involved in the 
personal lives of younger women - for example, mediating marriage discussions in the 
absence of a bride's biological family. New biological families are also created out of 
relationships that develop in and around the compound. During my fieldwork, May 
married a young man who she had met in the office; their wedding was held in the 
training hall at the back of the compound and was presided over by Back Pack' s 
leaders. By the time I finished my fieldwork, May's firstborn child was a new favourite 
"Back Pack baby" and she always had Htoo Paw - who she refers to as the baby's a-
pwa (grand-mother) - and a handful of aunties around to help her care for the child. 
Although sometimes from different backgrounds, Back Pack staff in Mae Sot thus 
create strong bonds through their lives together. The commonalities they find in their 
life experiences extend to their existence as illegals in a foreign land. Together, they 
take part in the daily life and work of the organisation, and celebrate the festivals , 
birthdays, weddings, births and funerals that punctuate the year. The creation of strong 
inter-personal bonds in such a tight-knit com1nunity is not unusual, particularly in a 
situation where its members are illegals in a foreign land. But to this Mae Sot-based 
community are regularly added medics from increasingly diverse areas. The Six-Month 
Meetings 125 held twice a year in Mae Sot thus bring together individuals from different 
areas and ethnic, linguistic or religious groups, and who sometimes work with groups 
theoretically on different 'sides' of political divides. So for example, the meetings bring 
together medics working in Karen conflict areas and under the authorisation and 
protection of the Karen National Union, with medics working in Mon ceasefire areas 
and under the authorisation and protection of the New Mon State Party. The ethnic 
nationalist groups these medics work under were at the time of my fieldwork on 
different 'sides' in relation to the state; their armed groups also fought at various times 
in Burma's history; and Back Pack members often say there is a lack of trust between 
Karen and Mon people as a result of this volatile past. 
125 The medics do not just come to Mae Sot for Six-Month Meetings but also for trainings, during which time they 
live and work in similar conditions to those of the Six-Month Meetings. During my time in Mae Sot, fo r example, the 
management organised three Senior Medic Refresher Trainings. Some twenty to thirty health workers from different 
target areas lived together in the Back Pack compound for three months. However, the Six-Month Meetings bring 
together medics from all Back Pack's target areas, and are the most regular events in the Back Pack calendar. 
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Some medics I spoke to had never met people from different areas or ethnic minority 
groups before working with Back Pack. They described the meetings as enabling them 
to get to know people whose histories and cultures they weren't originally familiar with. 
As a Shan medic explained, 
"I had only seen one Karen lady, my Sayama126 • When I came here, I met with 
Karen. I hadn't seen Kayan too. When I came here, I met. I knew about their 
language, religion and customs." 
During the meetings, some sixty or more men and women from different areas work, 
study, eat, and sleep in the compound. Through the leaders' arrangements with local 
authorities, the compound provides them with localised protection from arrest and 
deportation. Most medics have no papers allowing them to be in Thailand legally and so 
tend not to go far beyond the compound. The confinement of medics from different 
areas, ethnic groups and socio-cultural backgrounds within this space during four to six 
weeks every six months contributes to a sense of wider community: 
"I would like all other people to see that all our Back Pack team members stay 
under the same roof and eat in the same place. This is the reason why I would like 
to work with the Back Pack" [39 year-old male medic, Chin State] 
"It's easy. We can speak. We make friends with those who have different 
languages, here we have the same target and work for only one goal, then it's 
easier. Shan, we are the same, same life, you see. Karen, same. It's easier to make 
friends. [ ... ] We eat rice together, talk, it just takes a moment. It's very easy." [28 
year-old male medic, Shan State] 
While living and working as part of the bigger group, medics continue to express their 
ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistic and other differences. So although Burmese is the 
common language for trainings and meetings, outside of the meeting hall medics speak 
their own minority languages. They also celebrate their own cultural or religious events. 
This expression of diversity is encouraged by the leaders, who explain that the Six-
Month Meetings are also an opportunity for medics to share their cultures and 
126 Literally ''teacher" (female), but can also refer to female leaders. 
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traditions. To coincide with Leading Group elections, the leaders organise what they 
call cultural events, when medics perform a traditional dance or song and showcase 
their different cultures. Emphasis on diversity is important, moreover, given the 
common experiences and embodied histories described above. Whether they grew up in 
conflict or ceasefire areas, the medics' life stories describe discrimination, injustice or 
abuse as a result of belonging to an ethnic minority group. Medics who live in areas 
under the control of government or ceasefire groups often described not being allowed 
to attend school taught in their minority languages; others sometimes spoke of 
resistance groups as fighting for the preservation of their languages, cultures and 
traditions. By enabling and encouraging diversity, Back Pack is thus protecting and 
pro1noting precisely what its members see as repressed or destroyed by the state. 
The embodiment of a personal and communal history of state violence also reinforces 
the sense of community between diverse groups. As illustrated through the stories 
above, a cross-cutting theme is that of having suffered or witnessed the suffering of 
loved ones at the hands of agents of the state. Even medics who live in ceasefire areas, 
have worked with ceasefire groups, and/or have not directly experienced conflict or 
abuses, speak of the state as driving the suffering of generation after generation of 
ethnic minority communities. Through their interactions, medics from different areas 
come to identify with a wider community defined as ethnic and oppressed, in opposition 
to a state defined as unjust in its treatment of ethnic peoples. When I asked him what he 
meant by his community, a Kayan medic responded: 
"My community means who? The place where we stay, it includes Karen, Kayah, 
Shan, Mandalay division - the communities who stay there, all are my community. 
Not only Karen, not only my Kayan. Karen, Shan, Kayah - communities who are 
in this area are our community. All communities who are oppressed are our 
community." [22 year-old male medic, Karenni State] 
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2. The significance of diversity 
For the leaders, fostering inter-ethnic unity is an essential part of Back Pack's role. As 
described in the Ten Years Report, an international publication marking Back Pack's ten 
year anniversary: 
"collaboration between health providers from different ethnic groups and different 
regions of Burma, all working towards the same goal of building a healthy society 
in Burma, fosters the promotion of broader health policy and the development of an 
equitable health system, as well as greater inter-ethnic unity and trust. BPHWT 
hopes that such collaborative work helps to lay the foundations of a peaceful, 
democratic Burma, one in which such health providers will continue to play a key 
role" (BPHWT 2010b: 13). 
Inter-ethnic unity is seen as key to developing systematic and effective healthcare 
systems. But for the leaders, health is also an entry point for national reconciliation. 
Within the wider Burmese opposition movement, national reconciliation - along with 
the trope of inter-ethnic unity - is identified as necessary to overcome decades of 
conflict and military rule (Smith 2007). For senior members of groups like Back Pack, 
national reconciliation is also tied to a model of democratic federalism in which the 
rights and freedoms of ethnic minorities will be fulfilled; and it is linked to the need to 
rebuild the inter-ethnic trust and solidarity, which they see as having been destroyed by 
the state. As Aung Myint told me, "when we get the independence from the British 
government, [SPDC] use that kind of strategy: divide and rule policy among the ethnic 
groups". 
The practical and ostensibly apolitical nature of healthcare is then argued to enable 
ethnically diverse and politically divergent groups to come together: 
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"[I]n the healthcare organisations they can do more openly about that - even 
though there are some other political limitations. For example, at the time, the Mon 
National Health Organisation in the Mon area, the New Mon State Party, and 
SPDC, the Burmese Almy, they have ceasefire agreement already. And Karenni 
area - that we collaborate with that group - they also have the ceasefire agreement 
between Burma Army, the SPDC, and KNPLF 127• But the KNU area, the Karen 
Health and Welfare Department, they still have fighting. Even though we do have 
the difference or the limitations with the political situation, we can join together." 
[Poe Say] 
While it might initially seem surprising that Back Pack includes individuals and groups 
working under the administration of ceasefire organisations, leaders like Poe Say often 
explained that "ceasefire does not mean peace", that communities in ceasefire areas 
have "the same suffering", and that ceasefire groups are still engaged in the struggle for 
the rights and freedoms of ethnic peoples, albeit a political rather than armed 
struggle128. The 'unity within diversity' that the leaders seek is therefore framed within 
a particular worldview, in which the state is the source of suffering for ethnic minority 
communities and the reason why reconciliation is needed in the first place. 
By working in diverse communities and in ceasefire as well as conflict areas, Back Pack 
can provide healthcare services to diverse communities in need, build inter-ethnic unity, 
and also demonstrate inclusiveness and representativeness. As Poe Say put it: 
"Actually we would like to show the international community, for the donors ... so 
we can see the Back Pack Health Worker team as a whole group, as all the ethnic 
health workers from there. So we can see the Back Pack Health Worker Team is 
the whole picture. Back Pack is everything, like that." 
The leaders can then, in an explicitly diverse yet united voice, denounce oppression and 
abuses by the state. The 'motivated truth' described in the previous chapter is then all 
the more powerful in that it is a multi-ethnic truth, and not just a truth pertaining to one 
127 The KNPLF is the Karenni National People's Liberation Front, which signed a ceasefire with the SPDC 
government in 1994. 
128 The argument that ceasefire groups are still engaging in the struggle for the rights and freedoms of ethnic peoples, 
however, extends to some ceasefire groups but not others, or to some groups at particular times and not others. So the 
New Mon State Party is seen by the leaders as perpetuating the struggle - and indeed Back Pack works with medics 
who have been trained by, recruited from and work under the protection of the Mon National Health Committee. But 
the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) - which split from the KNLA in 1994 before signing a ceasefire with 
the government - was generally criticised by the leaders as being a "tool of the SPDC", perpetuating the suffering of 
local populations. Later in my fieldwork, when a faction of the DKBA refused to join the Border Guard Force and 
launched attacks against government troops of the day of Burma's elections in 2010, this faction was seen as having 
rejoined the fold. 
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ethnic group or one target community (Redfield 2006). Unity - and the positioning of 
Back Pack as representing Burma's diverse minorities - is also linked to the legitimacy 
that, as described in following chapters, Back Pack's leaders seek at the international 
level, not only for their work but also for their politico-moral vision. And from the 
perspective of evolving politics of aid to Bu1ma, inclusion of ceasefire groups is 
significant, since - as described in Chapter 2 - claimed improvements and increased 
humanitarian access in ceasefire areas had often been said to eliminate the need for 
cross-border aid. By supporting medics in ceasefire areas, Back Pack not only responds 
to community needs but demonstrates the need for cross-border aid and continuing 
suffering of communities in these areas. 
3. Threats to unity 
Unity within diversity is, however, constantly threatened. Back Pack's history and 
evolution have led to a recognised Karen majority in the organisation. During my 
fieldwork, the number of teams working in Burma increased to over 80, with medics in 
increasingly widespread and diverse areas. But over 50 per cent of teams are in Karen 
State, meaning that about half the medics live and work in Karen communities; most 
also work in areas under KNU/KNLA control. For Back Pack's leaders, this majority is 
understandable: Karen State is where large-scale conflict and displacement took place 
in the late 1990s, when Back Pack was created; it is easy to access from the Thai 
border; and Back Pack's founders - many of whom are Karen - have connections into 
health systems administered by the KNU, enabling them to recruit medics and run 
programmes with the authorisation and protection of local-level political and military 
actors. So in Karen state, there is not only the need, there is the capacity. 
The majority of Back Pack's leadership also consists of ethnic Karen individuals, who 
often have senior positions in and/or strong links into Karen mother organisations. Most 
office workers are also Karen. Again, this is attributed to the organisation's history and 
evolution, as well as practical concerns to do with capacity, geography and security. Poe 
Say also explained the reproduction of a Karen majority in the leadership as linked to 
the nature of democratic systems: 
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"So when you look at the democracy, majority is always dominate. This is 
de1nocracy way. [ ... ] Let's say, for example, the Back Pack Health Worker Team, 
[ ... ] more have capacity, more have the health workers, in Karen areas. More field 
areas, again. And then when you elect them, more Karen people in the Leading 
Committee129• This is the nature of the democracy's weak point. [ ... ] That's why 
we are concerning not only the democracy, but also we should keep in the mind, to 
recognise always for the minority rights." 
The leaders make concerted efforts to correct the tendency that their systems have to 
perpetuate the majority's dominance. For example, they help organise Community 
Health Worker trainings for areas with insufficient capacities for health, in order to 
develop the human resources necessary to run health programmes; in the longer term, 
they argue, this will promote greater balance in the distribution of Back Pack teams in 
different areas and in the leadership. But some members of non-Karen groups still claim 
that Back Pack is a predominantly Karen organisation in which they are under-
represented. A senior Mon medic once told me: 
"On the Back Pack? You were not able to make changes [ ... ] because most ethnics 
are not located in Mae Sot, so most ethnics are not able to participate here 
permanently. Only Karens are here; they're in majority; so for that, even you try to 
make challenges ... [shrugs] Decision is through the major[ity] vote." 
From the international perspective, there is also a perception among some circles that 
Back Pack is not only predominantly Karen, but also preqominantly KNU. This is 
partly linked to issues described above; but it is also a politically influential 
(mis)representation of a more complex reality in Back Pack's target areas. These issues 
will be further discussed in following chapters, as will be detrimental impacts this 
representation has, in terms of Back Pack's legitimacy as a humanitarian organisation 
speaking for and providing services to Burma's diverse ethnic minorities. 
Diversity therefore has practical and political aspects; but diversity also threatens to 
129 Each of Back Pack's twenty target areas is given three votes in the elections for Leading Group members . Since 
approximately half the target areas are in Karen State, this means that Karen medics automatically have the majority 
of votes. 
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undermine the type of unity sought by Back Pack's leaders. One of the necessary 
limitations to unity is that, when the medics leave Mae Sot, they return to their own 
systems and ways of functioning. Htoo Paw once told me, "When they get back to their 
land, they are on their own and not concerned with us anymore." So while Back Pack 
fosters a strong sense of community in its Thailand-based staff, the wider Back Pack 
community remains a looser and potentially more fragile network. Individuals and 
groups on the ground retain their own systems, agendas and motivations - and 
involvement in Back Pack is not necessarily driven by the type of commitment sought 
by the leaders. A Mon medic once told me, out of earshot of Back Pack's leaders, 
"Why the ethnic [groups] would like to work with the Back Pack? Because they 
need supplies! If they are able to seek their own supplies, they would not come -
especially me!" 
E. Discussion: embodied histories, organisational ideology and the 
multi-ethnic victim 
In the first part of this chapter, I related an incident in which a mother and her children 
were shot by Tatmadaw troops. The incident was reported by Back Pack's leaders as an 
example of abuses that members of minority groups are systematically subjected to by 
agents of the state. But when the Field in-Charge reported details of the incident -
illustrating her explanations to me with photos of the children's bloodied and mutilated 
bodies - she was not making a political point. She was in a clinical fashion describing 
an extreme example of what is, for her, an everyday reality. This reality of violence 
operates along a continuum from direct physical assault to everyday forms of 
dispossession, displacement, insecurity, disease and other manifestations of injustice 
(Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004). For men and women working with Back Pack, 
moreover, it is a context in which responsibility for the suffering of ethnic minority 
communities can and should be ascribed. This context, as described by Duffield, is 
characterised by the precariousness of life (Duffield 2008). Or as Htoo Paw told me 
sadly one day, "Burmese people are easy to kill". 
The stories of men and women who became part of Back Pack commonly tell of having 
suffered or v.ritnessed the suffering of loved ones as a result of injustices perpetrated by 
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agents of the state against ethnic minorities. Even when they themselves have not 
directly experienced conflict or abuses, the state's oppression of and injustices against 
ethnic minority communities are part of an embodied history, as the concept is 
described by Fassin, which is assimilated through their formative experiences and 
which manifests itself in various forms in their own lives (Fassin 2007; 2008) - for 
example through their ingrained fear of and resentment against the state and its soldiers, 
their families' poverty and insecurity, or their inability as members of marginalised 
communities to access education or work opportunities. Past suffering is thus inscribed 
into the lives and bodies of the present, as well as in the elaboration of representations 
and narratives accounting for the course of events (Fassin 2008). 
As revealed through the stories and explanations above, this embodied history 
contributes to a worldview in which the state is the source of individual and communal 
histories of suffering. Back Pack members - who often come from different areas and 
have sometimes diverse life experiences - also come to identify with a wider 
community defined as oppressed by a state defined as unjust in its treatment of ethnic 
peoples. Identification with a wider cormnunity defined as ethnic and oppressed by the 
state is an essential component of Back Pack's organisational coherence and ideology. 
Back Pack members' embodied histories of state violence thus provide a basis for 
shared understandings and visions of the world, and for Back Pack's institutional 
ideology. 
As illustrated through this chapter, commitment is a key theme in Back Pack. At the 
organisational level, commitment is framed in terms of the duty to serve the 
community. For the leaders, this duty is tied to the responsibility to continue the 
struggle for the rights and freedoms of Burma's peoples. As described in Verna's 
comparative anthropological study of humanitarian NGOs, the political and moral 
vision of the organisation's founders and early leaders was crucial in the organisation's 
creation; but over time, an organisation's founding values or ideology can also come 
under increasing pressure from internal and/or external sources (Verna 2007). Over a 
decade after its creation, Back Pack's organisational systems can still be read as a 
performance of the founders' and older leaders' political and moral vision, with value 
ascribed to democratic principles and a unity within which individuals and groups can 
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express their ethnic and other diversity. As an organisation, Back Pack can then be read 
as a performance (albeit an imperfect one) of the leaders' hoped-for future democratic 
and federal Burma - a vision, which originated in the coming together of democratic 
and ethnic nationalist movements after 1988. 
In order to do justice to the complexity revealed by the medics' stories, however, it is 
also necessary to recognise the diversity of experiences that commonalities can 
sometimes conceal, and to take into account the ways in which structural and other 
contextual factors can influence choices available to an individual, and his or her ability 
to act on those choices. For men and women I met, becoming a medic or getting 
involved in Back Pack was influenced by a number of factors. For field workers, 
becoming a medic is often one of a limited number of opportunities available in a 
context shaped by decades of systemic violence, and the trajectories that lead them to 
work with Back Pack are influenced by a number of different and sometimes conflicting 
factors. Structural determinants - in the form of conflict, poverty and inequalities -
generally limit an individual's options from the outset. Within this context, socio-
political networks and inter-personal relationships - including patron-client 
relationships - become key (Scott 1972). And thus individuals from diverse areas and 
ethnic minority communities come to be linked into Back Pack through culturally 
specific forms of social solidarity (Malkki 2007). 
The stories above illustrate how individual interests and motivations can compete or 
combine with structural factors - the individual's agency being enabled as well as 
limited by structural determinants and power constellations. They also highlight the 
need to move beyond overly simplistic interpretations, whereby agency is reduced to 
various forms of resistance. Drawing on James Scott, some analysts argue that cross-
border aid promotes everyday forms of resistance against the Burmese state (Phan and 
Hull 2008; Scott 1989). But while Back Pack medics and staff often speak of 
themselves as being considered by the state as rebels or enemies, and while they see the 
state and its agents as the source of their communities' suffering, they do not 
necessarily see their work as an act of resistance. Some Back Pack members do frame 
their actions within a narrative of resistance; but many also speak of their work in more 
practical and creative (and less reactive) terms. And as will be described in Chapter 5, 
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they often find ways to evade and overcome restrictions on their activities - rather than 
resisting the state - and to work with people within state systems. More generally, those 
who are often interpreted as mechanically resisting an oppressive force also have their 
own politics and agenda (Ortner 1995). As the stories in this chapter illustrate, this 
agenda can vary depending on whose perspective is considered. 
In one of Back Pack's publications, local-global partnerships enabling cross-border aid 
to support community health systems are described as empowering indigenous medics 
(Mahn, et al. 2008). This idea of empowerment is core to Back Pack's model: Back 
Pack is posited as a mechanism to empower local communities to protect and promote 
their right to health; the Back Pack medics, members of these communities, are the 
objects and agents of this empowerment. But the issue of empowerment needs to be 
viewed in relation to the opportunities available to the individual, the individual's 
ability to act on these, and systems through which such opportunities can be realised. 
The question of empowerment - and what empowerment means for different people -
also relates to the values ascribed to opportunities and actions by different agents and by 
the structures within which their agency is possible. For Back Pack's leaders and 
founders, value is ascribed to continuing the struggle for the rights and freedoms of 
ethnic peoples - often, as suggested in the descriptions above, to the expense of 
individual or family concerns. Within socio-political systems through which Back Pack 
functions, value is given to serving the community, itself tied to a specific form of 
reciprocity. But for an individual, value might also be given to knowing how to prevent 
a neighbour from bleeding to death; beco1ning a respected member of the community; 
finding work elsewhere then in a paddy field that can be destroyed at any moment; or 
having access to opportunities that might enable a 'way out'. Competing value systems 
therefore also begin to emerge from the stories above - with different possible 
meanings concealed within what is referred to as the duty to serve the community. 
The issue of empowerment - albeit this time at the organisational rather than the 
individual level - can also be viewed through the lens of victimhood, and here I wish to 
return to Poe Say's contention that "we are not the service deliverers; we are the 
victims". As illustrated through the stories in this chapter, the subjectivity of the Back 
Pack medic can be seen to transcend and transect the co1nmon ( and largely mythical) 
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tropes of the passive victim and active aid worker: here, the aid worker is also the 
victim of state violence, the one who suffers is also the one who acts to mitigate 
suffering. The positioning encapsulated in the statement "we are the victims" thus 
collapses the distinction between the medics and those they help. The Back Pack 
members can then speak on behalf of the victims because they are the victims. This is 
significant in that, as Duffield notes, Burma's internationalised battleground involves 
competition over the legitimacy to speak on behalf of Burma's people (Duffield 2008). 
With the strength of their position coming from the very real suffering that they and 
their communities have experienced, Back Pack's leaders can mobilise a discourse of 
victimhood that operates simultaneously on moral and emotional registers and that can 
generate significant symbolic capital at the international level (Fassin 2012). 
Through this positioning, leaders like Poe Say are also potentially redefining subjects of 
violence into politically significant subjectivities. So while humanitarian discourses and 
practices have been critiqued for producing "a form of subjectivity devoid of historical 
subject", here the subjects of violence are taking over the subjectivity of the victim in 
order to publicise a history of state-driven violence, which they see as the source of 
their individual and communal suffering, and therefore also to advocate their own moral 
and political vision of the world (Fassin 2012: 222). A key tension then begins to 
emerge: the subjectivity of the victim - like that of the humanitarian - tends to be 
constructed within international humanitarian systems as apolitical (Fassin 2012; Rieff 
2002). But here, the politicised subjectivity of the victim-humanitarian emerges as a 
figure that might fit uncomfortably with the types of subjectivities typically constructed 
through international humanitarian discourses and practices. 
In addition to developing primary healthcare systems at the local level and advocating 
for political change at the international level, Back Pack aims to foster 'unity within 
diversity' . As described in this chapter, a strong sense of community and even family is 
created between the individuals who live and work in Mae Sot during the year. During 
Back Pack's Six-Month Meetings, field workers join the office staff within the walls of 
the compound, to an extent fostering a wider pan-ethnic community within which 
diversity is actively promoted. This unity within diversity has practical as well as 
political implications. For Back Pack's leaders, health is an entry point for national 
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reconciliation. Diversity is also important from an international advocacy perspective: 
by including increasingly diverse communities in their target areas, Back Pack's leaders 
can, in an explicitly diverse yet ostensibly united voice, denounce oppression of ethnic 
minority communities by the military state and call for political change in Burma. They 
can thus promote a 'motivated truth' (Redfield 2006), which becomes ever more 
powerful, the more representative it is shown to be. 
Yet unity within diversity also has inherent risks and limitations. The ways in which the 
leaders manage such limitations and mitigate risks inherent in the diversity they 
promote are particularly telling, in terms not only of the creation of unity between 
diverse groups but also in light of the organisation's ideological coherence and in the 
context of evolving politics of aid to Burma. The management of minority groups 
within the organisation and attempts to define and generate commitment within Back 
Pack highlight the extent to which 'unity within diversity' is framed by the leaders' 
politico-moral worldview (Atlani-Duault 2005; Verna 2007). It also exposes an inherent 
tension in the leaders' ideal: the more inclusive Back Pack becomes - bringing together 
increasingly diverse ethnic minority groups, as well as groups that are sometimes on 
different 'sides' of political divides - the more Back Pack can speak on behalf of the 
multi-ethnic but similarly oppressed victims of Burma's military regime; but the more 
diverse Back Pack becomes, the more the unity and the type of commitment valued by 
the leaders is potentially at risk. 
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CH 5: Back Pack is Something, Back Pack is Nothing 
"Actually we would like to show the international community, for the donors ... so 
we can see the Back Pack Health Worker Team as a whole group, as all the ethnic 
health workers from there. So we can see the Back Pack Health Worker Team is 
the whole picture: Back Pack is everything, like that. Back Pack is something: 
when you go to the second level, some are belong to the departments or the local. .. 
So some are belong to the community, directly by the community. And then going 
to the field level, they know: Poe Say is Poe Say. Law Eh is here; they don't know 
Law Eh is a Back Pack - like that [laughing]. Law Eh is ... their village is [ village 
name], they take care [ of] their people. So this is 'nothing', around the community. 
That's why, when the external monitoring, when they ask: "How many times did 
you see Back Pack?" "No" - they didn't know the Back Pack, but they see Law Eh. 
Law Eh is the health worker from their own community." [Poe Say, founder and 
Leading Group member] 
It was during a meeting with a GHAP fellow who was helping compile Back Pack's 
Ten Years Report that I first heard Poe Say say "Back Pack is everything, Back Pack is 
something, Back Pack is nothing". He was re-explaining to the young American how 
medics work in their areas and was becoming frustrated with her difficulty in grasping 
something that to him is self-evident - that is, at the level of different target areas in 
Burma, Back Pack is like a network enabling resources to be channelled to systems 
already in place in those areas; and at the community level, Back Pack effectively 
disappears and in its place are individuals known to their local communities as health 
workers, rather than as members of an organisation called Back Pack Health Worker 
Team. This system of functioning is commonsensical to Back Pack's leaders, given the 
contexts and frameworks within which they work; but to international actors, it can 
seem confusing and (for some) contrary to the way an organisation labelled as 
humanitarian is expected to work. 
In this chapter, I will focus on exploring in more detail what Poe Say meant, as a way of 
analysing Back Pack's functioning within its target areas. Drawing on two case studies, 
I will examine relationships between medics, Back Pack and other diverse actors in 
Burma, including non-state and state actors. I will discuss what such examples reveal, in 
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te1ms of how partnerships for health are operationalised within a politically complex 
and volatile context. I will assess ways in which Back Pack and its medics relate to the 
state and its actors at the local level and, in so doing, will introduce the controversial 
issue of neutrality. Finally, in light of these and other examples, I will highlight 
shortcomings of the categories of 'legal' and 'illegal' for describing the functioning of 
cross-border aid, and suggest a conceptualisation that takes into account actors' 
attributions of legitimacy to the systems and flows in which they are involved. 
A. Back Pack is nothing 
In order to illustrate how Back Pack functions on the ground, I will first describe two 
case studies from different parts of Karen State. I have chosen these cases, firstly 
because the majority of Back Pack medics work in Karen areas and, secondly, because 
criticisms of cross-border groups on the Thai-Burma border tend to focus on their links 
with the KNU/KNLA. For example, in an international conference in 2011, a 
representative of one of the organisation' s long-term donors was overheard saying that 
Back Pack is a "hearts and minds programme for the Ki"1\JU". The donor withdrew 
support from cross-border groups less than a year later, as part of a move to redirect 
funding towards programmes in areas of eastern Burma claimed to be increasingly 
accessible from 'inside ' . This donor ' s allegation reproduced a common 
misunderstanding about cross-border groups like Back Pack: that they work only in 
areas controlled by resistance groups like the KNU/KNLA. And as demonstrated in 
following chapters, the contention that Back Pack is a "hearts and minds programme for 
the KNU" is also significant within an evolving politics of aid, which entails shifting 
attributions of legitimacy. 
Case 1 describes two medics who were detained by Tatmadaw troops one year after 
Burma's November 201 0 elections. The medics work in a mixed administration area, 
where the KNLA had historically continued resisting state control 130 . Case 2 concerns a 
government-trained medic in1plementing Back Pack programmes in an area controlled 
130 As described in the case study below, peace negotiations were initiated between the new Burmese government and 
the KNUIKNLA in January 2012. At the time of interviews conducted with these two medics, however, the peace 
negotiations were uncertain and the situation remained unstable and potentially volatile. 
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by forces of the Tatmadaw and Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), with the 
KNLA continuing low-level resistance. By the time of my fieldwork, such contexts -
where local actors negotiate a complex and dynamic patchwork of authorities and 
armed groups - were increasingly common in Burma's borderlands and had come to 
represent a significant proportion of Back Pack target areas. 
Like all Back Pack's target areas, these contexts are at the margins of state control, 
where practices of statehood visible to communities have historically generally been 
limited to predation and the exercise of arbitrary force. Borderlands, as described by 
Abraham and van Schendel, are also where "It ]he political and geographic limits of 
sovereignty imply the presence of competing authorities, whether other states or non-
state ideological affiliations" (2005: 23 ). Such areas have historically seen a flourishing 
of systems and flows, which are typically characterised as illegal by the Burmese state 
but can be conceptualised as licit, as defined by social attributions of legitimacy (ibid.). 
Case 1: Are you a ringworm medic? 131 
Saw Waw Lay and Naw Hsa Moo are both in their twenties, and grew up in small 
villages in Karen State's Pa Pun district. Both describe childhoods shaped by conflict, 
poverty and insecurity, and left school at an early age. Waw Lay was sent by his village 
leader and his brother, a KNLA Commander, to medical training with the Karen 
Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW). Hsa Moo also attended training with 
KDHW and, when I met her, had worked for seven years in-a KDHW clinic and had 
been sent twice on trips with a Back Pack team based out of this clinic. In early 2011, 
Waw Lay was sent to work with the same team. Every six months, the team travels to 
twelve villages, providing healthcare. Each trip takes two months, after which the 
medics return to work in the clinic until they receive supplies for the next trip. 
131 When the two medics described in this case study were detained by Tatmadaw troops in November 2011, Back 
Pack contacted me in Australia, where I had gone after my longest stint of fieldwork. When I returned to Mae Sot in 
early 20 I 2, I was fortunate enough to meet the medics, who had been released two weeks earlier. Back Pack's leaders 
agreed that I interview them so that they could record and learn from the case; they also agreed to me using the 
interviews for my research. I spoke with both medics individually over several days and conducted separate 
discussions with their leaders and members of other organisations involved in negotiating their release. 
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The Back Pack team's target villages are remote and villagers have to travel long 
distances over dangerous terrain to access the government hospital in the closest town. 
The nearest health service is the KDHW clinic, which for many villagers is several 
days' walk away. To provide healthcare to such villagers, the Back Pack team works 
with local authorities. Way Lay explained: 
"For the village heads, whenever we go around, they arrange food and a place to 
sleep. For the head of the village tract and Secretary [ of the Karen National 
Defence Organisation] 132, they take security for us. If the P 'Yaw sees us bringing 
the medicines when we go around, they will make trouble for us. [ ... ] We have to 
worry about that because when they see us, we cannot show the [ medical] 
certificate from Burma. When they look at medicines, the medicines are not from 
Burma. They misunderstand you, that you work for here133 . They think you work 
for here. They think you are a soldier. They think you are a military medic. [ ... ] Our 
clinic coordinator communicates with the head of the village tract we will go to. 
[ ... ] If the situation is good, we enter [the village] but if it's not good, we stay 
outside. [ ... ] We have never gone with the KNU. If we go, people take security for 
us. They don't bring any guns with them. They just bring walkie-talkie. [ ... ] When 
we go to a village, they already know. When we go, the village head informs 
villagers that medics are coming. [ ... ] If [the villagers] ask "Who are you?" we just 
tell them "I am a medic. We come around to look after patients." [ ... ] I don't tell 
[ where the medicines are from] because it is in our own village and they already 
know. They already know that we work for the clinic." 
On 27 November 2011, the two medics were providing healthcare in a village when 
Waw Lay's cousin came to find them - his wife had given birth less than a month 
before and was very sick. Near by KNLA troops informed the medics' in-Charge that 
Tatn1adaw soldiers were on patrol and that it was too dangerous to travel to the cousin's 
village. But, as Waw Lay explained, 
132 The Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) was formed in 1947 as the first armed wing of the KNU. The 
Burmese government outlawed it in 1949 and attacked its units. The KNDO was eventually relegated to policing and 
taxing roles within the KNU and the main fighting role given to the KLNA. The KNDO continues to operate in some 
areas as a village-level security group (South 2011). 
133 This interview was conducted in Mae Sot, on the Thai side of the border. Often, when I spoke to medics while 
they were in Thailand, they refen-ed to the resistance as "here", Mae Sot having become a notorious base for Burmese 
opposition and resistance groups in exile. 
160 
"[my cousin] came and told us "You should go. If you don't go, 1ny wife will die." 
We could not think and went. We went and did not yet arrive at his hut. The anny 
arrested us in the jungle before we arrived. [ ... ] The P'Yaw pointed at us with guns 
and we had to stay quietly. We didn't have anything. In our bags, we carried one 
[Blood Pressure] Monitor, one or two pens and 180,000 [Kyat] 134• There were ten 
silver Baht coins. They asked for my cigarettes and I gave them. When I gave 
them, they saw that [ my cousin] was carrying the medicines 135 and they arrested us 
directly. [ ... ] They said, "Are you military medics?" They accused you directly of 
being a soldier. [ ... ] I answered and told them "No". They questioned me: "Are you 
a ringworm medic?" I told them "No". [ ... ] I told them that I am a community 
health worker." 
When they were intercepted, the medics and villager were alone and unarmed. The 
soldiers found their medicine and a Travel Order from the KNU Township Secretary, 
which had been provided to Waw Lay so that he would be given safe passage through 
KNLA checkpoints while implementing Back Pack's programmes in his area. The 
soldiers accused the medics and villager of being part of the KNLA, tied the1n up, and 
marched them to a Tatmadaw camp where they were imprisoned. 
Over the following weeks, Hsa Moo was separated from the men, interrogated multiple 
times and told that her presumed links with the KNLA could lead to life in jail. She was 
asked where she works and which organisation supports her; she explained that she 
didn't know who provides medicines but that they come from abroad; she said that she 
is a volunteer health worker and not part of any organisation:. The commanders asked 
about the KNU/KNLA and if she travels with soldiers when providing healthcare. As 
she later told me, 
134 Until April 2012, the Burmese currency - called the Burmese Kyat - had very different values according to the 
official and black market exchange rates. From 2001 to 2012, the official exchange rate varied between 5.75 and 6.70 
Kyat per US Dollar. However, the black market rate more accurately took into account the standing of the national 
economy, and at the time of this interview was estimated at around 830 Kyat per USD. 180,000 Kyat would therefore 
have been w01ih around 217 USD. 
In April 2012, the Central Bank of Myanmar announced that the value of the Kyat against the US Dollar would float, 
setting an initial rate of 818 Kyat per USD - httn://wv.rw.bbc.co.uk/ncws/business-1758 J l l5 - last accessed 26 
February 2012. 
135 Waw Lay's cousin was carrying the medics' medicines, wrapped in a traditional Karen sarong. 
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"They asked "You stay in Mae Sot and how do you go to the field to provide 
medicine? How do people contact you?" I told them people communicate with 
walkie-talkie. [ ... ] The Thara [i.e. Field in-Charge] contacts [KNLA]. They 
contact each other. [ ... ] I told them we go without soldiers. We go only with 
villagers [for carrying medicines]." 
The commanders also asked Hsa Moo about a Tatmadaw soldier imprisoned by the 
KNLA, who she had been called to treat several days before her arrest136 : 
"Because I had gone to see the P 'Yaw who was arrested by KNU soldiers, so they 
said I had contact with KNU. [ ... ] "You went and kwa137 my soldier who was 
arrested, right?" I replied to him, "Yes". And he said "Why did you go and kwa?" I 
told him "I am volunteer health worker. I go around and provide treatment to 
patients." [ ... ] They asked "Why did you go and treat him?" I told him "I was 
asked to go so I went because he is a patient." He said something and it seemed 
like I had contact with KNU." 
Waw Lay was also repeatedly interrogated about his links with the KNU/KNLA: 
"He asked me [ ... ] : "Where did you go and attend the training?" I told him that I 
attended training at Ee Thu Hta 138 . [ ... ] He said "Do you know the Brigadier of the 
[KNLA] 5th Brigade?" I told him that I heard about him, but I did not know him. 
He told me "It is not true that you do not know. You are telling us a lie. You tell us 
honestly. If you do not tell us honestly, your life will end here. Your life will end 
tonight." I thought it does not matter even if my life ended here. I am not a rebel. I 
am not a murderer. [ ... ] He asked me "Did you have a gun when you attended the 
training?" I told him "We did not have a gun." "Did you carry a gun?" ''No, I did 
not." "Can you plant landmines?" "No, I cannot plant. We attended the training for 
community health. Guns were not involved."'' 
136 The soldier had lost his leg because of a landmine injury and had gone to hospital in Pa Pun town for treatment. 
On his way back to his battalion, he was caught by KNLA soldiers, who on 24 October called Hsa Moo to attend to 
the soldier's infected wound. She returned once, two days later, to provide follow-up treatment. After this, she was 
herself detained so unable to continue to treat the patient. 
137 Kwa literally means "to look" in Sgaw Karen but in this context also means to examine and treat. 
138 Ee Thu Hta is an IDP camp inside Karen State, near the Thai-Burma border. KDHW medical trainings are 
regularly conducted in this camp. 
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Negotiations at different levels were attempted to secure the medics' release. Their 
village leaders acted as guarantors, attempting to convince the Tatmadaw that the 
prisoners were not part of the KNU/KNLA. But time and time again, the village leaders 
were told that the medics' fate was up to higher-level authorities, not the troops holding 
them. Back Pack's leaders attempted to draw on international protection mechanisms to 
put an end to what they described as the medics' arbitrary detention and denial of their 
medical neutrality. With guidance from an International Humanitarian Law expert who 
had provided Back Pack with training a few months earlier, they sent case reports to the 
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention - but received no response. They requested 
assistance from the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Myanmar - after two weeks, they received a vague response saying that he would work 
on the issue. They contacted government donors, such as the US, who pledged to raise 
the issue through diplomatic representatives in Burma. They contacted UNHCR 
representatives in Thailand who in tum contacted their counterparts in Burma, but were 
told that UNHCR had limited ability to act. They contacted the ICRC in Rangoon, but 
were given a similar response. 
By January 2012, Waw Lay's cousin had been released and the two medics had been 
moved from camp to camp, interrogated multiple times, and consistently accused of 
being 'rebels'. During most of the time, they were held separately. Hsa Moo was 
handcuffed for part of her detention; Waw Lay was shackled and chained to a wooden 
bench day and night139. Then, on 19 January, the medics were told that a ceasefire had 
been signed with the KNU /KNLA. They were released and a celebration was held, to 
which local authorities, military representatives and religious leaders were invited. The 
medics were given 150,000 Kyat140 each and new sets of clothes. Waw Lay was 
wearing one of the new shirts he had been given when he told me, 
139 Waw Lay's leg was encased in a wooden leg clamp, which was then locked with three bolts and chained to the 
wall. His arms were bound in front of him with chains. Chains were wrapped five times around his body and then to 
the wooden bench he slept on. He was allowed off the bench only to go to the latrines, when he would be 
accompanied by two guards, his hands still chained together. 
140 150,000 Kyat would have been worth around 180 USD according to the black market exchange rate at the time. 
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"Then, [the Commander] said "We will release you today because your leaders 
from above made peace and we are happy. You and we are now friends. You can 
work as medics when you go back. It is good to do as medics." But he said "You 
should not connect with KNU."" 
Due to their arrest, the medics did not reach the sick woman; she died two days later. 
Five villagers went to bury her but were stopped by Tatmadaw troops and accused of 
collaborating with the KNU/KNLA. When he returned to his village, Waw Lay found 
out that, 
"They questioned the villagers who went to bury my cousin's wife. They burned 
Coffee Mix141 bag and poured [the melted plastic and meta[J on their legs. Then, 
they took a needle and stabbed them. They cut that one's leg. They cut one toe off. 
They cut and the leg was about to be cut off. Only a little bit left. One [ of the men] 
is lost and no one could find him. There were five villagers and one disappeared 
and only four left. Until now, people could not find him." 
After his release, Waw Lay said he would continue working because there are not 
enough medics in his area. He had been afraid that the Tatmadaw would not release him 
and during his detention was worried for his wife, who at the time of our interview was 
nine months pregnant with their first child. Hsa Moo said that throughout her detention, 
she feared being raped by soldiers notorious for sexual violence against ethnic minority 
women; on the first night, she was told "If someone tries to do something to you, don't 
scream". She was less sure that she will continue working - without a government 
medic card, she was afraid that she will be arrested again. She told me, 
"I can't think of whether it is good or not good to continue this work. They told me 
"If you go back, don't be involved with those people. If you contact with Karen ... " 
[ ... ] The danger will be less if I go back and live as a normal villager. [ ... ] For us, 
we are health workers so they detained us." 
This story illustrates partnerships that medics work through to be able to access local 
141 Coffee Mix is instant coffee with milk powder and sugar. It comes in individual servings, in a foil and plastic 
wrapping. 
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communities, as well as beginning to demonstrate what is meant by "Back Pack is 
something, Back Pack is nothing" and implications this may have. It highlights the 
difficulty of applying internationally-defined principles such as neutrality to a context 
where systems through which aid reaches local communities are shaped by a history of 
protracted conflict, violence and conflicting claims to political legitimacy, and can 
mean that medics are automatically branded as illegal enemies of the state. As such, it 
also highlights limitations in applying state-centric definitions of legality to the systems 
that medics work with and through to provide healthcare in their communities. The 
significance of this story is discussed in more detail below; but here I will first present a 
contrasting case study, which will enable further discussion of these themes. 
Case 2: We work with understanding 
Naw Paw Lay was 28 when I first met her 142. She was born in a small village in Pa An 
district, and was raised by her mother and grandparents. She went to school in a nearby 
town but left after Grade Five as her family could not afford the fees. After three years 
working in her family's hillside rice paddy, she decided to attend training at a 
government midwife school. Before she did the training, 
"there were mothers who had hypertension and who couldn't go to hospital 
because it was far away, about five to six miles from my village. There was no one 
to take them to hospital, so mothers who had hypertension and who had difficulties 
in giving birth mostly died. So we discussed with the villag~-head that we should 
have someone who can help with this." 
Paw Lay explained that although there were Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) in the 
area, they often didn't know how to recognise and refer obstetric emergencies. Due to a 
lack of skilled health workers, transportation difficulties, and the cost of healthcare at 
the nearest government hospital, women with obstetric e1nergencies often could not 
142 I met Paw Lay several times during my fieldwork, when she came to Mae Sot for Six-Month Meetings as well as 
trainings in the Back Pack compound. I conducted two semi-structured interviews with her - at the beginning and at 
the end of my fieldwork. I was also able to have more informal discussions with her during her stays in the 
compound and to observe her in trainings and meetings. She thus became a key informant whose case I was able to 
follow over time. 
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access care in time. With the 100,000 Kyat143 her family saved up for the fees, Paw Lay 
attended auxiliary midwife training - since, unlike midwifery training, participants need 
only basic education levels. After obtaining her certificate, she returned to work in her 
community; but unlike a midwife, she got no government posting or salary; she was 
expected to support herself by charging villagers for medicines and care. 
Paw Lay started helping a midwife posted by the government to a village near hers. The 
midwife implements a UNICEF immunisation programme, which started in the early 
2000s, vaccinating pregnant women and children against polio, tetanus, hepatitis B and 
TB. Beyond these vaccines, however, it was difficult for the women to access medical 
supplies. Then, in 2008, Paw Lay met Thara Chit Htoo, a senior Back Pack medic who 
was training TBAs in the area: 
"[He] asked me [to work with Back Pack] because I live and work in the village. 
He thinks that I am suitable and have the skills to do this. [ ... ] I knew the situation 
of my village. The village didn't get enough support, like medicine. I thought it 
will be better if I come and work myself. With the plan in my mind that every 
villager would get medicine, I came to be involved. [ ... ] The important things were 
that when he v1ent to my village, he did TBA training and provided [TBA] kits 144 • 
When I went to join, he showed me how to use [ the kits]. [ ... ] TB As are happy to 
have the gloves and use them for their work. We also got some supplies. Before, 
we didn't get anything." 
Paw Lay now implements Back Pack's Mother and Child Health Programme in five 
villages, going three or four times a month to each village. There are two other Back 
Pack medics working in the area. Twice a year, the medics conduct Village Health 
Workshops together; the rest of the time, they work separately. Paw Lay also trained 
two TBAs in each village in safe deliveries and in recognising and managing obstetric 
emergencies. With the help of her village leader, she set up a small clinic that she runs 
with medicines received twice a year from Back Pack. Despite also receiving a stipend 
143 100,000 Kyat would have been wo1ih around 120 USD according to the black market exchange rate at the time. 
144 Back Pack medics distribute kits to TBAs, which include basic supplies such as gloves, scissors and plastic sheets 
for deliveries. 
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of 1,000 Baht145 a month from Back Pack, Paw Lay struggles to survive: 
"When I get to the villages, some [villagers] come to me for treatment. Some are 
poor and sometimes they don't have money to buy milk powder for their children. I 
see that and feel pity for them. So I hand some money to them sometimes. [ . . . ] 
Some have goodwill toward us and give us [money]. But we don' t take it. [ ... ] We 
have to see their situation. Some villagers are not rich. So we don't take. Some 
come to give us vegetables. They come to give us because of their goodwill." 
Paw Lay still helps the government midwife in providing antenatal and postnatal care, 
and in implementing the UNICEF programme: 
"We work together when we have to inject vaccine, give children vaccine and 
vitamins, and do the health education in the schools. If she doesn't have enough 
medicine, I give her the medicine from Back Pack. I supplement her medicine if 
there are eighty students but she has only four or five hundred medicines. If the 
medicine I have is not enough, I combine with her and work. [ ... ] The midwife is 
Karen. She knows we work with Back Pack. But we have understanding between 
each other and don't let the superiors know about this. She said to me, "Sister, if 
we work with understanding, there is no problem". So we negotiate with each other 
and work. But she doesn't let the superiors know. We work with understanding." 
Since 2000, Paw Lay's area has been occupied by DK.BA and Tatmadaw troops. 
Although this means that UNICEF was able to initiate an immunisation programme, 
villagers also face many difficulties. After Burma's 2010 -elections, the area also 
became the site of renewed conflict between the Tatmadaw and a faction of the DK.BA, 
which refused to join the Border Guard Force. As Paw Lay explained, the "current 
situation is not good ... " 
" ... Not good means there are many groups in my village. There is KNU, DKBA 
and SPDC. When SPDC comes, fighting always happens. This makes the villagers 
afraid. [ ... ] They shoot. When SPDC comes, they don't ask anything and they shoot 
into the village if there are KNU in the village." 
145 1,000 Thai Baht is roughly 30 AUD or 30 USD, depending on the current exchange rate. 
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Unlike many medics working for Back Pack in unstable areas, Paw Lay never 
communicates or travels with armed groups. Instead, for her protection, she uses her 
auxiliary midwife card: 
"Some of [the Tatmadaw soldiers] may know that I am a midwife. But they don't 
know that I work for Back Pack. [ ... ] I don't dare tell them that I work for Back 
Pack. When I go and take care of mothers who have given birth and who are sick, I 
have the card. [ ... ] I am the same government's personnel like them. So they can't 
say anything to me." 
Yet Paw Lay is still afraid of the Tatmadaw. Local villagers know her only as a local 
midwife - she never mentions that she receives support from Back Pack, for fear that 
the information might reach Tatmadaw soldiers. But despite the risks involved, she 
values Back Pack's assistance: 
"After the 1nedicine arrives, I can treat patients for free. It is also good for them. 
They don't have to buy or go to other places anymore. I am happy for my villagers 
because help doesn't come from other places except this one. [ ... ] There will be 
trouble if like that [i.e. if Back Pack stops support]. Some villagers are very, very 
poor. When they are ill, they can't go directly to the hospital. They don't have 
money and it is not possible for them to go. If the support stops, everyone will be 
in trouble. [ ... ] After joining with Back Pack, I came to know more. [ ... ] The new 
things I learned are giving medicine like vitamins and anti-parasitic drugs to the 
mothers who have given birth and pregnant women. When I was attending training 
on Burma side, I didn't know about the medicine. I was not taught about that." 
When I last saw her in mid-2011, Paw Lay was planning to get married. Fighting had 
increased in her area and she told me: 
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"I will not continue working if the political situation gets worse and there is 
difficulty with travelling. If we can travel, it is okay to go around, I think I will 
keep working. [ ... ] If there is no conflict, I mean there is no fighting, I will always 
be happy. If the situation becomes complicated, if SPDC comes and the fighting 
breaks out, I don't have desire to work anymore. My mind becomes very confused. 
One thing is that I have work to do for my villagers and another thing is the 
fighting of the groups." 
This second story further illustrates what is meant by "Back Pack is something, Back 
Pack is nothing". It highlights partnerships that Back Pack works with and through in a 
ceasefire area, and how the organisation taps into human resources for health at the 
community level - including 1nedics who have attended government training and 
obtained documents enabling them to provide healthcare legally. It provides an example 
of how local-level connections can be created between state and para-state systems for 
health. Yet it also illustrates ongoing fear and distrust of agents of the state. Finally, it 
also suggests limitations in applying state-centric definitions of legality to systems that 
medics work with and through to provide healthcare in their communities. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I will discuss these themes, as well as those raised by the 
previous story. 
B. Partnerships for health: working with and through local-level 
systems 
Looking at how Back Pack medics work, it is possible to explore the functioning of 
partnerships and the operationalisation of trust within local-level health systems, which 
became mechanisms for the delivery of international aid to communities in Burma's 
border areas. Academic writings highlight trust as central to the functioning of health 
systems and cooperation among people to reach common goals ( e.g. Gilson 2003; 
Illingworth 2002; Thiede 2005). Academic discussions of trust tend to focus on 
calculations of risks and benefits - generally from the perspective of rational choice 
·-
tnodels ( e.g. Evans and Krueger 2011; Gambetta 2000; Luhmann 2000; Warren 1999) -
or on the social production of trust through structures in which individuals are 
embedded (e.g. Gilson 2003; Illingworth 2002; Misztal 1996; Torche and Valenzuela 
2011; Warren 2001). 
As revealed through Back Pack medics' stories, however, ways in which individuals 
perceive different actors and systems, and the impacts of an embodied history of 
violence on these perceptions, are also important considerations. Attention to these 
dimensions of partnerships is important, particularly in a potentially evolving context, 
where donors were at the time of my fieldwork re-evaluating approaches to assisting 
communities affected by decades of conflict and instability. In following sections, I will 
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first discuss how Back Pack medics work with and through local-level systems, and 
how working relationships can be created with unlikely partners; I will then discuss the 
medics' perceptions of diverse actors and systems, leading to a re-conceptualisation of 
cross-border aid that takes into account attributions of legitimacy by those involved. 
Back Pack recruits medics like those described above, who live and work in their 
communities. This enables Back Pack to harness and strengthen local-level capacities 
for health and to implement programmes through people who know the languages, 
cultures and politics of those communities. The medics are described as known and 
trusted by their communities. They work with and through local-level health systems, 
and with authorisation from and often the protection of political and armed groups in 
their areas. As Law Eh - Back Pack's new Director146 - explained, 
"We have to implement our healthcare work by dealing with all responsible people 
in the area. The people we approach are the local authorities, local armed groups 
and religious leaders. [ ... ] Back Pack team leader directly contacts with the local 
health department. The local health department decides where and which area 
should be Back Pack team." 
Most medics are trained by and recruited from ethnic health departments - the health 
systems under the administration of ethnic nationalist groups. These mother 
organisations then become mechanisms through which Back Pack accesses its different 
target areas. As one of Back Pack's founders put it, "Without the health departments -
the local health departments - the Back Pack may not survive; so they are relying on 
each other." Back Pack is, as Poe Say described, "something": a mechanism or system 
of networks to channel various types of capital in the form of funding, medicines, skills 
and technical support to systems inside Burma, which have the human capital to 
implement health programmes. Given the heterogeneity of Back Pack's target areas, the 
mechanism for healthcare provision that to outsiders is known as Back Pack can look 
very different from one area to another. The cases above thus illustrate how Back Pack 
supports medics in two different socio-political contexts, both in Karen State. 
146 Leading Group elections were held in 2011 and Law Eh replaced Poe Say as Director. Poe Say then became 
Secretary of the Leading Group. 
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Approximately half of Back Pack's teams work in contested areas of Karen State. In 
these areas, as Law Eh explained, 
"If not all, most health workers doing the jobs for Back Pack are from KNU health 
department. [ ... ] They are KNU health workers ... some medics working for Back 
Pack are from KNLA and KNU health department 147• [ •.• ] If they work for Back 
Pack, they are Back Pack's staff. If they leave Back Pack, they become the staff of 
their organisations. Like some KDHW workers, they also work for Back Pack. If 
they quit Back Pack, they become KDHW workers again. Other areas such as Mon, 
Karenni and Shan, they also do the same thing." 
Many medics implementing Back Pack programmes in Karen State were, like Waw Lay 
in Case 1, trained by and recruited from KDHW - the civilian health department under 
the administration of the KNU. When implementing Back Pack programmes, they 
target remote and unstable areas, with KDHW clinics serving more stable areas. A 
number of other medics I met had been recruited from the Medical Branch of the 
KNLA. One such medic explained, 
"In our area, we cure the patients if we have the patients, but sometimes, if the 
soldiers go to the frontline, we have to go with them. [ ... ] Sometimes, we aren't 
free. For instance, if our leaders need us somewhere, we have to go to them and we 
have no time to go with Back Pack. [ ... ] Back Pack workers are mixed; they are 
military health workers, villager health workers and they are under KNU. We 
cooperate and work together." [30 year-old male medic, Karen State] 
As Gallant describes of transnational crime but in an analysis applicable to this 
discussion, "[i]n-law or outlaw status was determined by the nature of the relationship 
of a group to the state at any specific point in time" (Gallant 1999: 40). In areas of 
contested sovereignty such as Case 1, Back Pack can be conceptualised as a mechanism 
to support community-level health systems that, because they operate under the 
authority and protection of an ethnic nationalist group in conflict with the state, 
147 As explained in Chapter 2, prior to the fall of Manerplaw in 1995, the KNLA's Medical Branch managed most 
clinics and hospitals in areas under KNU control. KDHW was created later, when the KNU/KNLA was weakened by 
scaled-up Tatmadaw offensives and could no longer maintain its health and welfare systems. KDHW became the 
civilian health department, tapping into international funding to support health programmes out of mobile clinics. 
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automatically tend to be considered by the latter as illegal and part of the enemy. 
Elsewhere in Burma's contested borderlands, Back Pack teams also work in areas 
controlled or partly controlled by other ethnic nationalist groups in conflict with the 
state, such as the Karenni National People's Liberation Front, the Shan State Army-
South, the Arakan Liberation Army or the Chin National Front. In those areas too, Back 
Pack works with and through ethnic health organisations and under the authority and 
protection of an ethnic nationalist group, defined as illegal by the Burmese state. 
One of the most common misunderstandings about Back Pack, however, is that the 
organisation works only in areas controlled by resistance groups. In fact, Back Pack 
also works in areas controlled by ceasefire groups, such as the New Mon State Party, 
the Pa-O National Organisation, the Kayan New Land Party, or the Kachin 
Independence Organisation 148 . Mon Back Pack medics, for example, are trained by and 
recruited from the Mon National Health Committee (MNHC), which comes under the 
administration of the New Mon State Party. The MNHC becomes a type of cover for 
implementing Back Pack program1nes in remote Mon communities; or from the 
perspective of those within MNHC, Back Pack is a mechanism to obtain free medicines 
and training in a context where, although they can function legally and theoretically 
obtain support from government or international organisations inside Burma, 
communities in remote areas still lack comprehensive, affordable and accessible 
healthcare services. In ceasefire areas, ethnic health organisations that Back Pack works 
with and through function legally under the administration of ethnic nationalist 
organisations no longer branded as 'rebel' groups. Rather than supporting the systems 
themselves, Back Pack is then a mechanism for health workers within those systems to 
access additional resources with which to support remote and underserved communities. 
In target areas where there is no ethnic health organisation and/or where the group in 
control of the territory can't or won't ensure access and protection, Back Pack recruits 
individuals who are part of civil society organisations - and again becomes an 
underground mechanism for supporting medics 1n remote and underserved 
148 The ceasefire between the Bmmese government and the Kachin Independence Organisation/Kachin Independence 
Army, however, collapsed in June 2011 and fighting has since been ongoing in Kachin State. 
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communities. For example, in Lahu communities in remote parts of Shan State that are 
controlled by a militia group, a young woman I met who was initially trained as a 
government midwife implements Back Pack programmes under cover of a civil society 
organisation that has worked in the area for many years. Back Pack can thus support 
healthcare for communities in the area without working with the Lahu militia, which is 
allied with the state and considered hostile by the Shan State Army-South - and Back 
Pack has to cooperate with the latter to run programmes elsewhere in Shan State. Since 
they work 'under the radar', medics in such areas typically do not want their mother 
organisations named, and often become nervous when outsiders attend Back Pack's 
meetings or ask about their work. 
In Case 2, Paw Lay lives and works in a rural area of Karen State where she, like Waw 
Lay and Hsa Moo, has to negotiate multiple authorities. But her area is more fully under 
state control. Practices of statehood are not limited to the exercise of force and attempts 
to extend predatory control, but include the provision of basic services in urban centres 
and the facilitation of initial access into rural areas by international agencies like 
UNICEF. But since government health services come at a high cost and services 
provided by international organisations remain limited, people in remote villages such 
as Paw Lay's still lack access to comprehensive, accessible and affordable healthcare. 
During my fieldwork, I met a small but growing number of medics who, like Paw Lay, 
live and work in such areas and had attended government training before being 
recruited into Back Pack. Since they have official accreditation, they can travel and 
provide healthcare - in the eyes of state actors, legally. However, like Paw Lay, they are 
generally sent to work as unpaid volunteers in their communities and are part of no 
official system through which to obtain medical supplies, training or other support. 
Back Pack enables medics like these to access such resources, allowing them to provide 
free healthcare in their communities. 
Whether in conflict, ceasefire or mixed administration areas, medics work with and 
through village-level authorities to implement programmes in target communities. This 
is described as essential for the creation of trust: 
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"We can say that the communities believe/trust149 us. Now, we discuss with the 
villagers first before we go to give the training in their area. First, we enter to a 
village and info1m them about giving the training. After that, we discuss and ask 
the agreement from them, what we should do to bring a good result. [ ... ] When we 
are going to give medical training, we always work with religious leaders, village 
heads, and school teachers because most of the villagers believe/trust those 
people." [30 year old male CHEPP worker, Karen State] 
Many medics, like Paw Lay and Waw Lay in the stories above, are initially selected or 
endorsed by their village leaders to be trained as medics. Before beginning programmes 
in a village, the medics then obtain authorisation from and seek the input of the village . 
leader and, often, the village health committee - a committee comprising respected 
villagers, who help the medics identify needs and implement programmes. Thereafter, 
as described by Waw Lay in Case 1, the medics inform the village leader before going 
to the village; the leader tells the medics whether it is safe to enter and then gathers the 
villagers. Teachers, religious leaders and other respected people in the community are 
also essential, for example helping with Village Health Workshops or the dissemination 
of information about disease transmission and prevention. 
The recruitment of medics from communities in which they work and ways in which 
medics function with and through local-level health and socio-political systems mean 
that Back Pack effectively disappears at the community level: Back Pack is nothing. As 
in the cases above, medics I met often explained that community members generally do 
not know (and probably don't care) where they receive healthcare from - beyond 
knowing, as described in Case 1, that Waw Lay is a local health worker. During my 
fieldwork, for example, I met a villager from Karen State who was blinded in one eye 
by shrapnel from a landmine. Thara Tin Oo, a senior medic in his area, treated him and 
brought him to Mae Sot, where he hoped that surgeons at Mae Tao Clinic could restore 
his sight. The villager knew Tin Oo well: eight years before, while tending to his 
family's rice paddy, he had been shot by Tatmadaw soldiers; Tin Oo amputated his arm 
and treated him then too. Aside from these two occasions, the man had never accessed 
149 Trust and believe are the same word in Sgaw Karen. So this can be translated as "the communities believe [in] us" 
or "the communities trust us". 
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healthcare. He knew that Tin Oo worked with another person (in fact a Village Health 
Volunteer), but he did not know the difference between their roles or which group they 
were part of. He was just grateful, he said, to have been given treatment when he 
needed it. And although Mae Tao's surgeons were unable to restore his sight, he was 
thankful that Tin Oo had paid for his travel to Mae Sot and tried to help him. 
Medics often explain their relationships with communities as a system of mutual 
reliance. The mechanics of this system were summarised by one medic, who explained, 
"If they go to the community, so they need the community to help them, like to 
organise the place or the people ... like transportation, communication ... So for 
that, so, the health worker[s] have to rely on the community. But the community, 
they have to rely to the health worker[s], because they need healthcare services. 
When they sick, or they have something problem, so they need the health worker. 
So they are rely on each other." 
Some medics explain that villagers come to them rather than government medics - if 
any work in the area - because the latter are outsiders who don't understand local 
languages and customs, and cannot be trusted because they work for the government. 
But more generally, for the medics, trust is demonstrated in practical ways: by villagers 
anticipating their visits, returning to them for healthcare, and putting in practice healthy 
behaviours they teach them. Like Paw Lay, medics often explain that villagers rely on 
them because they provide free healthcare in a context where people have little access 
-
to official services and/or cannot afford such services. Medics often contrast themselves 
with people trained by the government who make a living by selling medicines to 
villagers in remote areas, as Paw Lay was told to do after her auxiliary midwife 
training. So in the area described in Case 1, there is also a man who has attended 
government health worker training; but Waw Lay explained that he is not reliable 
because he makes money selling 1nedicines to villagers who often cannot pay and, when 
they do, develop drug resistance or other problems as a result of being misdiagnosed 
and given inappropriate medication. 
Medics explain that they, in tum, rely on local communities. As in Case 1, they rely on 
village leaders who ensure security, notify villagers of their arrival, help implement 
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programmes, and organise food and accommodation. They rely on villagers, who give 
them information about Tatmadaw troop movements, and whose food they eat and 
homes they sleep in while they travel from village to village. Many medics also explain 
that villagers help them carry medicine and other equipment as they travel around their 
target areas. Villagers aren't paid for this work, but the medics describe it as different to 
the portering that community members are forced to do for armed groups: villagers 
carry the supplies in exchange for these being used for their benefit150 . Medics also 
explain that while villagers do not pay them for treatment - which distinguishes them 
from government health workers - they sometimes give them local produce or even 
cash. The medics, however, generally don't consider this to be payment. They explain 
the healthcare they provide as non-commercial, since gifts they receive from villagers 
are considered part of this system of reciprocity, in which villagers help the medics to 
survive while the medics work for them. 
This model of reciprocity is central to Back Pack's functioning with different actors 
within its target areas. It also explains the attitudes of some older leaders, who argue 
that medics should rely on community support, not stipends from the organisation. So 
as Aung Myint - one of Back Pack's founders and Leading Group members - told me, 
"Community support our health workers and medics. They, medics, you know, 
enter to the village, ah, many people come around the health worker, very 
crowded! Oh, headache, dizzy, abdominal pain, ah! Sick! Oh! Many kinds of. .. So, 
after that, they give you some vegetables, some chicken, some kinds of snack. .. so 
we don't need any stipend or salary. We can survive with the community -
community and the service provider look like fish and water. Fish and water! No 
community, you cannot survive." 
In the medics' explanations, reciprocity with local communities 1s the basis for the 
150 As an outsider relying on the medics' descriptions of their functioning in target communities, it is easy to 
romanticise their systems - and it must not be forgotten that the medics work with and through socio-political 
authorities in their areas, who can ensure not only access and protection but also compliance to the medics' requests, 
for example, to carry medical equipment. Some outsiders I spoke to questioned the voluntary nature of community 
members working as po1iers for the medics, particularly if the medics are travellirig with armed escorts. However, all 
medics I spoke to maintained that the villagers who help carry medical equipment do so on the basis that this will 
benefit their communities, and generally as a result of an agreement between a senior Back Pack medic and local 
authorities such as village leaders in the target area. It is this type of reciprocity that in the medics' explanations is 
central to the way they function at the community level. 
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partnership that they see as necessary to improving community members' health. This 
partnership is enabled by medics who originate from within communities targeted in 
their health programmes, and who work with and through local authorities and socio-
political systems. 
As illustrated in Paw Lay's story in Case 2, relationships of reciprocity can also develop 
between individuals who are part of theoretically opposed systems. Paw Lay's status as 
a government-trained auxiliary midwife acts as a type of cover for the implementation 
of Back Pack programmes in an area controlled by the Tatmadaw and DKBA. For her, 
Back Pack becomes a mechanism to obtain various forms of capital such as free 
medicines and training. And while Back Pack's leaders don't communicate with the 
DKBA - since the latter is allied with the state and in conflict with the KNU/KNLA -
Paw Lay has developed an understanding with local troops. As Paw Lay' s Field in-
Charge explained: 
"For Paw Lay to be able to come here, she has to report to village head and the 
DKBA whether she can come here or not. She can come here when she is 
permitted. They have to explain [to the DKBA]: "We do this work, it is not for 
fighting each other. We work for the villagers. If you see that this is good, we will 
do". [ ... ] The reason is some families of the DKBA come and stay there, so ,ve 
have to look after them as well. Some who have families there understand us". 
Paw Lay became part of Back Pack's network - and thus part of the system labelled as 
cross-border aid - but continues to work with a government midwife implementing a 
UNICEF programme. The relationship the women have is mutually beneficial. Paw Lay 
obtains free medicines from Back Pack, with which she provides mother and child 
healthcare under cover of her status as the midwife ' s assistant. She trains TB As in safe 
deliveries and pre- and post-natal care. The TBAs, with birthing kits provided by Back 
Pack, go on to help the government midwife. And since UNICEF often provides 
insufficient drugs for its immunisation programme, Paw Lay supplements the 
programme with drugs from Back Pack. The ways in which the two women help each 
other and complement each other's resources demonstrate the extent to which macro-
level distinctions between cross-border aid and state-sanctioned mechanisms can 
collapse at the local level. Local agents, far from being passive channels for the 
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implementation of aid, tap into multiple mechanisms to obtain resources with which to 
provide services to their communities. And in a context where it can be difficult to trust 
anyone, this case shows that working relationships can be built between individuals 
who are part of theoretically opposed systems. 
Paw Lay is not the only medic who has developed local understanding with armed allies 
of the state or government medics. Paw Lay's Field in-Charge explained that, elsewhere 
in his area, the state has started distributing Vitamin A and deworming medication to 
young children. Local medics who had already been implementing Back Pack 
programmes in the area came to an agreement with the government health workers: 
"They started [this project] and we made an understanding with their medics. We 
told them, "You and us, we are same health workers. If the Burmese government 
takes [ responsibility for children] from 1 to 5, we will take for children from 6 to 
12 [years old], so that we don't duplicate." But as you know about the Burmese 
government, if they knew that these medics are working together with our health 
workers, they would arrest these medics. There is danger for them. We have to do 
it with understanding. [ ... ] Firstly, we told them, "There is fighting and let it be. 
This won't give benefit to the people. We are health workers, I am Karen and you 
are Karen. Even though you work for the government, we will unite to improve the 
health situation in our village. We will do secretly for not harming the civilians." 
We explained to them like this. They do, but they work in fear." [Chit Htoo, Field 
in-Charge, Pa An, Karen State] 
Local-level arrangements between people who are part of theoretically opposed systems 
have also developed in other areas. For example, during my fieldwork, Back Pack 
medics in Shan State began trainings for local TBAs in partnership with government 
midwives. In Chin State, Back Pack medics working under the protection of the Chin 
National Front receive safe passage from Tatmadaw soldiers after providing treatment 
to the latter's families; these medics also cooperate with health workers implementing 
disease control programmes under the state-sanctioned Three Diseases Fund. Such 
examples of local partnership are important; but so too are the far greater number of 
medics who explained that they have tried to work with government health workers but 
the latter are afraid to do so, that government medics will report their activities to state 
authorities, or that they remain afraid of being caught and punished by state forces. And 
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when, for example, a working relationship does develop between a medic like Paw Lay 
and a government midwife, this horizontal partnership is only possible with the latter 
concealing information about it from her vertical superiors. So while trust can develop 
out of horizontal relationships of reciprocity between people who are part of state and 
para-state systems, fear, lack of trust and other impacts of a history of conflict and 
violence remain fundamental barriers dividing those systems. 
Analyses rooted in rational choice theory see trust as a calculation that the actions of 
others will outweigh risks and costs involved in trusting them ( e.g. Creed and Miles 
1996; Evans and Krueger 2011; Gambetta 2000; Gilson 2003; Luhmann 2000; Warren 
1999). Strategic calculation of costs and benefits can to an extent explain Back Pack's 
functioning with and through ethnic health departments, the inter-reliance between 
villagers and medics, or the understanding between Paw Lay and the government 
midwife. Cases where Back Pack medics work with government health workers or 
soldiers of the DKBA demonstrate that trust can be created through systems of 
reciprocity with people otherwise considered part of the enemy, but with whom 
cooperation has mutual benefits. But partnerships are also often explained by shared 
belonging to a community group, generally an ethnic minority group. As Chit Htoo put 
it, "I am Karen and you are Karen". Here the implication is that partnership is possible 
through shared identification and recognition of communal benefits deriving from this 
collaboration. And so partnerships also acquire a socio-moral dimension, and can be 
linked with the collective histories and memories described in Chapter 4: medics and 
their partners find commonalities in their identification as members of ethnic minority 
communities historically oppressed by the Burman-dominated military state. 
As demonstrated through examples above, moreover, partnerships at different levels of 
Back Pack's functioning are facilitated by working with and through socio-political 
systems in different target areas. It is then possible to conceptualise partnerships and 
trust as generated through the socio-political systems - and these systems' respective 
hierarchies and norms - in which individuals are embedded ( e.g. Gilson 2003; 
Illingworth 2002; Misztal 1996; Torche and Valenzuela 2011; Warren 2001). Drawing 
on Scott's analysis of patronage systems in Southeast Asia - which, as described in 
Chapter 4, are integral to ways in which individuals are recruited into Back Pack - it is 
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also possible to see how strong, trusting relationships can be created within vertically 
integrated networks (Scott 1972). Weaker linkages can be created through horizontal 
exchanges of various forms of capital between individuals in different networks (with 
these networks sometimes being on different 'sides' of shifting political divides); but 
these are inevitably more fragile (ibid.). 
However, trust is also affected by factors beyond the cognitive or socio-political. 
Giddens, for one, suggests that trust is more a form of faith, going beyond cognitive 
understanding (Giddens 1990). His writings also imply ways in which a collective 
memory - which can be conceptually related to Fassin's politics of memory and 
embodied history - ensures that the past is inscribed onto the present and future and 
can, in combination with structural factors and power relations, contribute to choices 
people make within a context characterised by risk (Fassin 2007; 2008; Giddens 1994). 
Taking this reasoning a step further and drawing on cases described above, it is possible 
to explore the impact of embodied histories of violence on the ways that individuals and 
groups identify friends and foes, partners and enemies. I will therefore now tum to a 
discussion of how the medics relate to, experience and attribute value to diverse actors 
and systems, and how they, in tum, are categorised by the state and its agents. 
C. Friends and foes: introducing the neutrality debate 
"I don 't know why, but if the P 'Yaw comes and catches you, they will kill you." 
[ 2 7 year-old female medic, Karen State] 
Back Pack leaders and medics emphasise their duty to treat anyone who is sick or 
injured, irrespective of ethnicity, gender, religion or political affiliation. This principle -
referred to at the international level as impartiality - is enshrined in Back Pack's 
Constitution and taught to medics in the field. However, when I spoke to individual 
medics, they often evoked their fear of and lack of trust in the state, personified by its 
soldiers. Hsa Moo and Waw Lay thus explained that, as medics, they have a duty to 
treat anyone, regardless of which 'side' the patient is on; but they also admitted not 
daring to treat Tat1nada1,v soldiers. Recounting his arrest and detention, Waw Lay said: 
" [The Commander] asked me "Are you a ringworm medic?" I told him "No". He 
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asked "Who are you?" I replied "I am the community health worker." "Do you go 
and treat both two sides? I told him "I treat both sides. I have no enemy. I am the 
community health worker. If people come and call me, I go to look after them. We 
go to look after them when they are sick." Then he said "Have you ever come and 
looked after [patients] at my battalion?" I told him "I do not dare to go because you 
do not come and call me. If you come and call me, I will go. We have no enemy." 
[ ... ] Even if they come and call us, we don't dare to go. If the villagers come and 
call us, we dare to go." 
When they were detained, Waw Lay and Hsa Moo were accused of being ringworm 
medics. 'Ringworm' is a pejorative term often used by Tatmadaw soldiers to designate 
members of the Karen resistance - as well as Karen people in general - portraying them 
as dirty, diseased and lowly forms of life. In my discussions with them, both medics 
referred to the Tatmadaw as P 'Yaw, the Sgaw Karen term for Burman. This is common 
in the area, where community members (including medics) refer to Tatmadaw soldiers 
by the term for Burma's dominant ethnic group; but it also highlights a common 
conflation of the state, military and dominant ethnic group, which tend to be jointly seen 
as the source of suffering experienced by ethnic minorities. Both medics also spoke of 
their fear of Tatmadaw soldiers, and blamed them for the death of the woman they had 
gone to treat. There was anger and pain in his voice as Waw Lay described the arrest 
and torture of his cousin's friends. He also spoke of the hatred expressed towards Karen 
people by officers who interrogated him - inadvertently drawing attention to deep-
seated resentment and distrust not being one-sided: 
"They said "I feel pain when I look at them. I want to kill them. I hate every Karen. 
I lost my leg. If it was you, how much will you feel? Is it painful?" For the Officer 
with two stars, he told me that he does not want to talk about Karen. He said "I feel 
pain when I talk about them." He told me about that: whenever KNU arrested 
Burmese soldiers, they sharpened a bamboo and hit them on their heads." 
Fear of a state personified through its soldiers and resentment towards those they see as 
powerful oppressors were affective backdrops to my discussions with Back Pack 
medics. Fear, resentment and distrust go beyond the purely cognitive to fonn the deeply 
ingrained bases of individuals' decisions, behaviours and relationships. Like the 
embodied history of Apartheid that Fassin describes as shaping the framework within 
181 
which actors in South Africa live and interpret HIV/AIDS (Fassin 2007; 2008), Waw 
Lay and Hsa Moo' s lived experiences are framed by an embodied history of state-
driven violence and suffering. This embodied history shapes the ways they live and 
make decisions in their daily lives. Their arrest and detention did nothing to alleviate 
their fear of the state and its soldiers; and after they were released, they threw away the 
medicines that the soldiers gave back to them, out of fear that these had been poisoned. 
Although the theory is, in the words of one medic, that "there is neither enemy nor 
friend in the field of health", embodied histories of violence contribute to the worlds of 
the medics being worlds divided into friends and foes. Many medics I met referred to 
the state and its army interchangeably as "the enemy". Some medics also described 
emotional quandaries when obliged to treat Tatmadaw soldiers: 
"Sometimes, I want to kill them. That' s that man, enemy. But, there's a policy 151 . I 
am a human being, and so is he. I think one time, if I am caught, they would treat 
me like this. I think they would kill me. [ ... ] But, while treating [him], I think 
"Damn that man"" [ 22 year-old male medic, Shan State] 
In a conversation with Htoo Paw, whose story was told in Chapter 4, the senior medic 
referred to the need for impartiality in medical work, but highlighted a common 
discomfort with neutrality (in the wider sense of not 'taking sides'), with the state's 
soldiers seen as the source of a personal and collective history of violence and suffering: 
"Healthcare is like: Burmese villagers or Burmese soldiers, if we saw them with 
trauma, hurt, something else, we should take care of them. And if there is fighting 
and if so1ne soldiers get injured, we should take care. [ ... ] SPDC is our enemy. I 
feel bad. [ ... ] Because they come to our Karen area. They fighting, bum the 
villages, they kill the villagers. We have to flee often - that is [why] we don't like 
them. For example, in the village we will build a house, we have to prepare for a 
long time. We have to collect the money to build our house for a long time. 
Normally we build by wood. When they bum, just thirty minutes. All gone, so we 
have to start it again, so we are so tired. So our village never grew up ' til [now]. 
151 The medic was refen-ing to the policy of impa1iiality, which dictates that medics treat any person who is sick or 
injured and is enshrined in Back Pack's Constitution and organisational policies. 
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[ ... ] When they didn't come to our Karen State, we don't need to hate them, we 
don't need to fighting. We stay freely with our Karen and KNU, Karen our leader, 
we can [stay] like that. [ ... ] The SPDC is all the time we have to afraid [ of] them, 
they have gun." 
Groups opposing the state - defined by the state as outlaws (Gallant 1999) - are instead 
seen as providing protection and often services enabling communities to survive. These 
groups thereby fulfil the benevolent practices of statehood seen as absent in the 
oppressive, predatory soldier-state figure. And even if the medics and their leaders 
recognise that ethnic resistance groups can engage in predatory behaviour or acts of 
injustice, these are seen as isolated rather than systematic acts. 
Many medics working in areas of disputed sovereignty also explain that they would be 
unable to implement healthcare programmes if they did not receive information from 
and travel with an escort from an armed ethnic nationalist group. As one Karen medic 
explained: 
"[KNLA] support us and protect us when we go and work. We can't go and work 
without worry. We ask them when it is needed, like where there will be 
[Tatmadaw] operations or not. For example, we go and for the transportation, we 
have to rely on them. We can't go by ourselves." [58 year-old male medic, Karen 
State] 
In Case 1 above, Waw Lay and Hsa Moo weren't travelling wi_th an armed escort. Their 
Field in-Charge had, however, made contact with a nearby KNLA Battalion on the 
morning of their arrest and had been given information about Tatmadaw troop 
movements. Waw Lay had also been provided with a Travel Order from the KNU 
Township Secretary. This was intended to protect him, should he be stopped at KNLA 
checkpoints. But since the area in which the medics work is under mixed 
administration, they risked being stopped (and indeed were stopped) by Tatmadaw 
troops, for whom this document was proof that the medics were linked to the resistance. 
The Travel Order, which was intended to protect the medics from one party to the 
conflict, therefore increased risks they faced at the hands of another party, highlighting 
the complexity of negotiating multiple and competing authorities. Many other medics I 
met who work in areas of contested sovereignty also highlighted ways in which the 
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socio-political systems they work with and through can have the paradoxical 
consequence of increasing risks they face, since they come to be branded as 'rebels' or 
outlaws (Gallant 1999), even when they themselves are not part of a resistance group: 
"They want to be against us because in our work we have to deal with many 
people, including KNU people. KNU is also Karen people and they understand our 
work and they help us. So the SPDC soldiers see that Back Pack gets support from 
KNU and that they are part of the KNU." [53 year-old male medic, Karen State] 
In contrast, medics in ceasefire areas or areas controlled by state forces, who work with 
and through systems that are allied with and approved by the state - 'in-law' systems 
(Gallant 1999) - can work more safely under cover of those systems. But they have to 
be careful not to reveal that they receive support from an organisation on the Thai 
border - or they can also be branded as 'rebels'. As described in Case 2, Paw Lay is a 
government-certified health worker; but she still fears being punished for her work by a 
state she sees as opposed to anyone trying to help ethnic minorities: 
"In my opinion, people who don't understand Back Pack activities will think it is 
related to KNU but people who understand will see it is just only a health service. 
[ ... ] What [SPDC] don't like means, I think Back Pack works for the community, 
for the villages. They themselves think that this is against them. [ ... ] Why they 
don 't like is that they don't want to help our villagers. Also they don't like the 
other people who are helping the villagers. They just let the villagers die. This is 
their intention. [ ... ] I see that the government is not good; the medicines supported 
to us are not from the government. They are from UNICEF." 
When questioned by outsiders about dangers faced by medics in their work, Back Pack 
leaders generally respond that it is not the medics' work that is the major risk factor : 
their belonging to oppressed communities already exposes them to danger. In the words 
of one leader, "all people live in fear, so it is no difference." On one level, this is true. 
This situation - with indigenous medics working in their own communities where, in 
Poe Say's terms, "danger is nature" - is therefore quite different from one where an 
NGO emphasises the safety of its staff in relation to risks faced by beneficiary 
communities (e.g. Fassin 2007b; 2012; Redfield 2012). 
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However, the fact that medics have access via Back Pack to various types of externally-
sourced capital, and systems they work with and through to implement their 
programmes, reinforce their categorisation as illegal enemies by agents of the state. In 
both cases described above, the medics spoke of medicines and training acquired 
through Back Pack as resources enabling them to help local communities; but since 
medical skills and resources aren't usually available to villagers living in remote and 
impoverished areas of Burma, these can be interpreted by state actors as an indication 
that they have links with opposition groups. As in Case 1 above, many medics thus 
highlighted possession of medicines as an indicator, for agents of the state, that they are 
part of 'rebel' groups. The case studies above also highlight non-commercial healthcare 
as an important component of the system of reciprocity between villagers and medics; 
but medics' ability to provide healthcare without taking payment can be seen by state 
actors as proof that they are part of the a resistance group, since government health 
workers don't and can't function in this manner: 
"[Tatmadaw officers] asked "Do you take money when you go to treat?" I told 
them a little bit tricky way. If we tell them very honestly, it is not good. I told them 
that we take money from some who can afford. [ ... ] If you tell them that you give 
the treatment for free, they will say that you are KNU military medic." [ Waw Lay] 
Most medics harnessed into Back Pack's networks have no official qualifications. As 
de1nonstrated by Hsa Moo and Waw Lay's story in Case 1, this means that if they are 
stopped with medication or while providing healthcare, they can be accused of being 
trained by and working for resistance groups. Paw Lay's example in Case 2 is 
significant in this respect. Medics like her, in mixed administration areas, face multiple 
armed groups and authorities, including state actors who can accuse them of being 
'rebels' if they do not have the right documentation. Early on in my fieldwork, Paw 
Lay's Field in-Charge told me that he was deliberately recruiting medics trained by the 
government and with the documents to provide healthcare without fear of arrest. Much 
later, after the detention and subsequent release of Hsa Moo and Waw Lay, I asked him 
again about this. He explained that he planned to send some of his medics - those who 
had only received training from an ethnic health organisation - to attend government 
training so that they could obtain official documents. Although this was one 
individual's response to risks faced by medics in a particular context, this strategy - and 
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the reactions of others to his proposal - highlights challenges and opportunities in a 
dynamic socio-political situation, and will be further discussed in Chapter 7, which 
discusses Back Pack's future in a changing context. 
Like most medics I met, the two medics who were arrested and detained are not 
themselves part of a resistance group. But the networks they work with and through to 
implement health programmes rely on approval of and protection by non-state actors. 
On the one hand, this is a strength of Back Pack's model: development of local-level 
capacities for health is possible by working with and through socio-political systems in 
different target areas. But this also raises difficulties. Indeed, while Back Pack 
advocated the medical neutrality152 of the health workers and attempted to frame the 
issue within International Humanitarian Law, these mechanisms fit with difficulty onto 
a context where, for local armed actors, there is no such thing as neutrality, nor do 
soldiers of the state draw a distinction between civilians and non-civilians (Kalshovan 
2007). International frameworks and mechanisms deployed by Back Pack leaders were 
largely powerless in the face of the Burmese state's sovereignty: the state's armed 
forces were dealing with what was considered an internal security affair, the medics 
being seen as part of illegal 'rebel' forces. When they were freed, the medics were told 
that their release was contingent on ceasefire negotiations between the state and KNU -
in other words, national political developments rather than international protection 
mechanisms or recognition that the medics aren't part of the resistance. At the time of 
their release, it was uncertain whether ceasefire discussions between the government 
and KNU would result in peace. What was certain was that, if conflict between state 
and non-state actors persists, systems through which these medics work will continue to 
be considered by state actors as part of enemy networks. 
152 The framework of medical neutrality is a pariicular interpretation of neutrality, with foundations in medical ethics, 
the laws of war, International Humanitarian Law, and in the history and philosophy of the Red Cross. This 
framework is intended for the protection of health workers in conflict zones. It dictates that medics be impartial in 
providing healthcare; impariiality then theoretically ensures that medics and their equipment/infrastructure not be 
targeted and instead be afforded protection - even if medics and medical equipment are not identified with the Red 
Cross logo, if they are accompanied by an armed escort, if they are themselves pa1i of a military medical group, or if 
they carry a light weapon for their protection, since only if and when health workers are actively involved in fighting 
do they lose their protection under the framework of medical neutrality (Kalshovan 2007). However, the laws of war 
and International Humanitarian Laws on which the framework draws tend to assume a situation where medical 
assistance is provided with consent from and the recognition of different pariies to conflict (Kalshovan 2007), rather 
than a context where internationally-funded medical aid is provided without state consent, in partnership with a party 
to conflict, and in violation of state sovereignty. 
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D. Implications of 'Back Pack is something, Back Pack is nothing' 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the importance of 'unity within diversity' from the 
perspective of Back Pack as a political actor. By emphasising diversity, the organisation 
is positioned as representative of all ethnic minority communities oppressed by the 
state: Back Pack is everything. As described in this chapter, at the level of different 
target areas inside Burma, Back Pack adapts to systems in place and is more akin to a 
network enabling various forms of capital to be channelled to local actors with their 
own systems and ways of functioning: Back Pack is something. At the village level, 
Back Pack effectively disappears and in its place are men and women recruited from 
different mother organisations and known simply as medics providing free healthcare: 
Back Pack is nothing. 
The way that Back Pack adapts to and disappears at the local level was something I had 
trouble grasping at the beginning of my fieldwork. In early conversations, I was 
confused when Karen medics told me they came from KDHW or the Medical Branch of 
the KNLA, when I thought they would identify as part of Back Pack. The medics, in 
tum, were often puzzled by my questions or gave me what seemed at the time like 
strange answers, like 
"I work with Back Pack. I was trained by KDHW. No, I am not part of a political 
group. No, I am not a soldier. Because I work with Back Pack, maybe I am part of 
KNU. I don't know". 
For the leaders, such blurring of the lines is not confusing: they know who 1s 
implementing which programme where. It is normal, since Back Pack's role is to 
support local-level health systems. It is also necessary for access and the medics' 
protection and security. But in the evolving politics of aid to Burma, Back Pack's 
leaders also realised that outsiders and particularly donors could find such blurring 
problematic - and not only because, as mentioned by Poe Say, an evaluator would have 
trouble walking into a village and asking "How many times have you been visited by 
Back Pack?" 
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Issues discussed in this chapter have implications for Back Pack's identity as an NGO, 
and for debates concerning humanitarian neutrality and legitimacy. While Chapter 4 
described an institutional ideology linked to the leaders' politico-moral vision, this 
chapter has described ways in which Back Pack - as a service delivery mechanism - is 
better understood as a network to support local-level systems. Back Pack is also not an 
entity that medics identify with or are identified by on the ground. Back Pack members' 
identification with the organisation is therefore loosest, the deeper one goes into its 
different target areas. This makes sense, given that Back Pack's aim is not to supplant 
but to strengthen local-level systems for the provision of healthcare, with these systems 
functioning under the authority and protection of ethnic nationalist groups - including 
ceasefire as well as resistance groups - as well as civil society organisations. It also 
means that a subtle understanding of mechanisms for aid delivery is necessary; and it 
demonstrates that calling such a network a "hearts and minds programme for the KNU" 
misrepresents what is in fact a complex network tapping into and bridging between 
diverse systems on the ground. 
Ways that Back Pack works also need to be understood in relation to the experiences 
and perspectives of people on the ground - the men and women making up what have 
become local-level systems for the implementation of international humanitarian aid. 
Attention to these experiences and perspectives highlights the extent to which choices, 
behaviours and relationships are influenced by contextual and historical factors. Here, 
an embodied history of state violence and oppression frames individuals' 
understandings of and actions in the world (Fassin 2007; 2008). Examples of how Back 
Pack medics work highlight the ways in which an embodied history of state violence 
acts as a deeply embedded framework, influencing individuals' and groups' decisions of 
who to trust and which partnerships can enable the provision of healthcare to their 
communities. 
As described in Chapters 3 and 4, Back Pack as an organisation is not neutral in that it 
combines the provision of aid with the promotion of a 'motivated truth' calling for 
political change in Burma to end the suffering of ethnic minority communities (Redfield 
2006). As revealed in this chapter, it can be difficult to implement an internationally 
defined principle of neutrality ( or even impartiality), when aid is channelled through 
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local-level systems in a context of protracted conflict, state-driven oppression, and 
competing claims to socio-political legitimacy - and where local-level actors operate in 
a world divided into friends and foes. The question is then whether, in such a context, 
neutrality is a relevant principle for operationalising aid. As demonstrated in following 
chapters, judgements as to the appropriateness of such systems ( and whether or not they 
are 'humanitarian') depend more on the (geo )political decisions of powerful actors in an 
unequal system of 'humanitarian government' than on any consistent implementation of 
humanitarian principles. 
In contexts of disputed legitimacies, moreover, it becomes particularly important to take 
into account the values attributed by people on the ground to systems and flows in 
which they are involved. So instead of 'seeing like a state' (to use James Scott's tum of 
phrase - Scott 1998), it is useful to draw on the approach developed by Abraham and 
van Schendel, who establish 
a distinction between what states consider to be legitimate ("legal") and what 
people involved in transnational networks consider to be legitimate ("licit"). Many 
transnational movements of people, commodities, and ideas are illegal because 
they defy the norms and rules of formal political authority, but they are quite 
acceptable, "licit", in the eyes of participants in these transactions and flows 
(Abraham and van Schendel 2005: 4). 
This implies attention to different regulatory regimes. The latter are defined as "zones 
.. 
within which particular sets of norms or rules may be dominant", which "organize 
routines, make and enforce rules, enable or constrain access to resources, set and 
1naintain borders, identify and exclude actors" (ibid.: 16). Such an approach can then 
distinguish between the legal (in this case what the Burmese state considers legitimate) 
and the licit ( what the men and women involved in cross-border aid consider to be 
legitimate). As illustrated in this chapter, those designated by agents of the state as 
members of illegal, 'rebel' networks hold radically different views of themselves and of 
the systems they work with and through. Patterns of exchange that enable the provision 
of healthcare by medics harnessed into Back Pack are built on long-standing ethnic, 
communal and socio-political networks. These enable the functioning of a system called 
cross-border aid. And they are considered legitimate by actors involved. For these 
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actors, moreover, the state is the source of predation, arbitrary violence, and suffering. It 
is not a source of protection - and definitely not the authority with an uncontested right 
to determine that which is legitimate. 
Within the regulatory regime defined by the Burmese state, socio-political systems and 
groups opposed to the state - and, by association, networks for health working with and 
through these systems - are defined as illegal (Abraham and van Schendel 2005; 
Gallant 1999). But as Abraham and van Schendel argue, "[b ]oth law and crime emerge 
from historical and ongoing struggles over legitimacy, in the course of which powerful 
groups succeed in delegitimizing and criminalizing certain practices" (ibid.: 7). Back 
Pack's system for cross-border aid then also needs to be understood in light of historical 
struggles over the legitimacy of different socio-political actors - and over the legitimacy 
of systems that enable the provision of humanitarian aid in cooperation with these 
actors. As evidenced through following chapters, these struggles include actors at 
different scales, from Burma's disputed borderlands into the offices of donor 
governments. Juxtaposing state and non-state notions of (il)licitness and legitimacy thus 
enables a fuller understanding of how cross-border aid was developed, maintained and 
legitimised or delegitimised over time. Cross-border aid can then be conceptualised as 
an evolving product of contradictions between different legal, social and political forces 
working across international borders, with evolving attributions of legitimacy not 
always matching state definitions of legality. 
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CH 6: International Legitimacy for a Humanitarian Struggle 
On a hot, dusty morning in late 2009, I arrived at Back Pack's compound for my first 
day of fieldwork. Thara Poe Say ushered me into a cluttered office dwarfed by a flat-
screen TV - the main purpose of which, I later realised, was to show Back Pack's 
videos to donors and other international visitors. After I had been served a steaming 
glass of ye nwe jan 153 and Poe Say had enquired about my trip, he asked, "So what will 
you do for us? How long will you stay?" Seeming pleased when I repeated my plan to 
be there for at least a year, he told me that as I am Australian, I would be the lead 
coordinator for a proposal to AusAID; I had three days to compile a request for AUD 
50,000, which would be submitted via an NGO called APHEDA 154. Poe Say then 
handed me his phone and told me to introduce myself to his partner from Burma Relief 
Centre. Flustered, I tried to explain what was happening. The man interrupted: I was not 
needed; GHAP was already working on the proposal. Perhaps not realising my relief, he 
went on to explain that this was an important proposal, intended to "test the water" for 
cross-border aid. As I handed the phone back, Poe Say shrugged, told me that I would 
anyway be useful, and explained that Back Pack had not yet secured enough funding for 
2010 - donors were waiting to see if planned elections would lead to political change in 
Burma. Funding from countries like Australia or the UK would also add to Back Pack's 
"credibility and legitimacy", and to "the world recognising why we suffer in Burma". 
From my first day with Back Pack, I was 1nade aware of _the importance of donor 
funding. I was given an insight into partnerships with different groups, which over the 
years enabled an organisation functioning in the 'legal-illegal' to obtain various types of 
support. And my position as an Australian researcher was highlighted as significant -
on this occasion, it was seen as a potential asset; on a number of others, a threat. As the 
debate around cross-border aid evolved during my fieldwork and as local actors faced a 
shifting and uncertain playing field, I came to appreciate ways in which people I 
153 Burmese tea, literally translated as "hot, plain water". 
154 Australian People for Health, Education and Development Abroad (APHEDA) is an NGO, which was created in 
1984 as the overseas aid agency of the Australian Council of Trade Unions. 
hnp://vvww.apheda.onz..auiabout/J 065142333 4802.html - last accessed 13 July 2012. 
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worked with interpreted and tried to influence these changes. In this chapter, I will 
focus on how, through partnerships with different organisations, Back Pack became an 
important player in the politics of aid to Burma. I will investigate what donor support 
means for Back Pack, as well as possible tensions that can arise when a movement born 
out of a specific socio-political context is institutionalised within particular frameworks. 
A. Local-global partnerships and the institutionalisation of 
humanitarianism 
In 2008, an article published in the international journal Global Public Health by 
representatives of Back Pack, Mae Tao Clinic, Johns Hopkins and others 155 described 
Back Pack as the centre of a system of local-global partnerships: the management in 
Mae Sot coordinates between medics in Burma and regional and international partners; 
the latter enable indigenous medics to access technical, financial and political support 
(Mahn, et al. 2008). The article promoted Back Pack's system as a solution where 
"[t]raditional international humanitarian models have been unable to assist the people 
caught in the black zones of Burma" (ibid.: 183). It highlighted empowerment of local 
actors and fostering of multi-ethnic collaboration, proposing local-global partnerships as 
an improvement on more conventional, top-down humanitarian models. As such, it also 
suggested a drive to obtain international recognition for Back Pack's model. 
By the time I began fieldwork in 2009, what had started as an ad hoc response to a 
situation that Back Pack's founders considered intolerable had evolved into an 
institution labelled as humanitarian and supporting over 80 teams of medics with a 
projected annual budget around AUD 1 million. Back Pack's leaders were familiar with 
debates concerning humanitarian aid to Burma, and known for presentations and 
publications in international forums. They attributed much of their international-level 
success to links with regional and international partners - some of which, like GHAP, 
are identified in the 2008 publication, while others maintain a lower profile. 
155 The article was co-authored by representatives of: Back Pack Health Worker Team; Mae Tao Clinic; Karen 
Depaiiment of Health and Welfai·e; Global Health Access Program; University of Oxford (UK), Depaiiment of 
International Development; Montefiore Medical Center Department of Internal Medicine; Johns Hopkins University 
Center for Public Health and Human Rights; University of Califmnia at Berkeley School of Public Health; and 
University of California at Los Angeles Department of Medicine (Mahn, et al. 2008). 
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Table 1: Major donor governments and intermediary partners in 2009 
Country Government aid agency NGO Intermediary Implementing 
partner(s) partner 
Canada Canadian International Inter Pares Burma 
Development Agency Relief 
(CIDA) Centre 
(BRC) 
United States of United States Agency for International Rescue 
America International Development Committee (IRC) 
Back Pack Health 
(USAID) 
Worker Team 
Denmark Danish International Danish Burma (BPHWT) 
Development Agency Church Aid Relief 
(DANIDA) (DCA) Centre 
(BRC) 
Norway Norwegian Agency for Norwegian Burma 
Development Cooperation Church Aid Relief 
(NORAD) (NCA) Centre 
(BRC) 
To access government funding, Back Pack works· with and through intermediary partner 
NGOs (Table 1 ). This model fits within a wider trend of donors funding local NGOs -
often emerging from social movements and seen as guarantors of community 
participation - via larger NGOs (Atlani-Duault 2005). The system of multi-tiered 
partnerships, which in Back Pack's case involves multiple intermediary NGOs, is seen 
to have a number of advantages. For example, one donor explained: 
"The strength of this approach is that BPHWT is accountable to BRC who have the 
expertise and human resource capacity in place to support and strengthen the 
performance of BPHWT, to closely monitor BPHWT and provide strategic 
guidance. Neither Inter Pares 156 nor CIDA have the resources in place for this. Inter 
156 Inter Pares is a Canadian NGO, which was founded in 1975 with a commitment to address conflict and injustice in 
Canada and around the world. http://www.interpares.ca/en/who/indcx.nhQ - last accessed 27 February 2013. Over the 
past two decades, Inter Pares has channeled substantial supp01i from Canadian private donors and from the Canadian 
government to organisations providing assistance to displaced people on the Thai-Burma border. 
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Pares has the resources necessary to work closely with BRC on programme 
development, monitoring and reporting and strategic planning. CIDA does not 
have dedicated resources that could do what Inter Pares does. CIDA is confident 
that close and supportive monitoring takes place by our intermediary partners. 
CIDA's confidence is based on our examination of reports, monitoring missions, 
evaluations and audits that validate that which is reported. The most significant 
implication is that this approach allows CIDA to support a complex programme 
involving many partners receiving modest levels of funding [ ... ] where CIDA does 
not maintain a country programme." [ CIDA Senior Programme Officer] 
. As argued below, however, multi-level partnerships also have other potential benefits 
for donors - and particularly government aid agencies - who can maintain a convenient 
distance from an inevitably complex and 'messy' operational context. 
Intermediary partners can be conceptualised as brokers, enabling vanous types of 
exchange or 'translations'. Drawing on Bierschenk, Chauveau and de Sardan's analysis 
of the role of brokers in the acquisition, control and redistribution of aid revenue in 
Africa, Masse and Lewis describe ways in which brokers or translators produce 
development realities (Bierschenk, et al. 2000; Bierschenk, et al. 2002; Masse and 
Lewis 2006). They thus highlight how particular ideas can enrol supporters, forge 
political connections, and create common realities from heterogeneous networks, as 
well as how policy models are transformed and translated in relation to the intentions, 
goals and agendas of those who give them an appearance of consensus (Masse and 
Lewis 2006). In this process, inter-institutional and intercultural brokerage roles are 
prominent. In the case of Back Pack's local-global partnerships, brokers' roles are - as 
described by such researchers - essential in creating order, legitimacy and success of 
aid programmes, and in producing particular representations of social realities (Masse 
2005b; Masse and Lewis 2006). Over time, brokers' positions became entrenched and 
formalised through multi-tiered agreements involving funding agencies and different 
levels of partner organisations, and through the politics and practices of aid functioning 
in the realm of what one Back Pack leader called the 'legal-illegal' - a realm, where 
constructions of (il)licitness as conceptualised by Abraham and van Schendel become 
particularly important (Abraham and van Schendel 2005). 
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In Back Pack's case, brokers enable access to funding from government aid agencies , 
which could otherwise not be given to an organisation that is not legally registered. 
Intermediary partners also act as brokers by helping with proposals and reports, and 
communicating with donors. Intermediary partners are often tasked with developing 
technical and organisational capacities of implementing partners. They assist Back Pack 
in learning to interpret the frameworks and requirements of the aid industry. They also 
mediate Back Pack's accountability to donors: Back Pack provides reports on 
programme activities and outcomes to intermediary partners; the latter compile 
information from different implementing partners into broader-spectrum reports for 
their respective government aid agencies. And through monitoring of implementing 
partners' work, they ensure the latter's - and their own - accountability to donors. 
Through the system of multi-tiered partnerships, intermediary partners thus enable local 
partners to access international support and contribute to fitting the 'messiness' of aid 
on the ground into frameworks required by donors. And as described below, multi-
tiered systems and the brokerage networks these involve can also play a role in 
producing and promoting certain representations of aid over others (Mosse 2005b; 
Mosse and Lewis 2006) - in some cases resulting in a type of 'anti-politics machine' 
(Ferguson 1990). 
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, Burma Relief Centre (BRC) has provided extensive 
support to Back Pack since the organisation's foundation. The leaders refer to BRC as 
their first donor and explain that BRC 's vision to "empower the local people" led to a 
natural partnership, while its assistance in dealing with back-donors and other 
international actors adds to their credibility. BRC has played a key role in securing 
back-donor funding since Back Pack's creation. When I began fieldwork, BRC still 
channelled over 60 per cent of funding from major donors and brokered relationships 
with and accountability to these donors. Back Pack leaders also see BRC as facilitating 
collaboration with groups working in diverse ethnic areas and sectors. Back Pack's 
expansion into Chin communities in Western Burma, for example, was mediated by 
BRC, which had worked with Chin medics for a number of years and introduced the 
latter to Back Pack's leaders. As illustrated below, BRC also assists in obtaining 
funding from new donors, advocating for cross-border aid, and fitting Back Pack's 
functioning into the formats required by an evolving aid industry. 
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Other partners like GHAP and International Rescue Committee (IRC) assist the 
development of rigorous evidence-based health programmes. As described in Chapter 3, 
GHAP staff and academics from Johns Hopkins provided Back Pack with the tools and 
framework for the 2004 health and human rights survey, which resulted in Chronic 
Emergency - the first population-based study to statistically correlate human rights 
abuses in Burma to health outcomes. During my fieldwork, I observed many examples 
of GHAP and Back Pack staff collaborating to adapt public health models to medics' 
work contexts. GHAP staff regularly train Back Pack medics in public health models 
and methods. In 2010, they provided support for a programme Impact Assessment 
Survey, working with Back Pack to adapt survey techniques to a context with conflict, 
mobile populations, and other complexities. The same year, GRAP supported Back 
Pack and other groups with a second health and human rights survey; the results again 
demonstrated many statistically significant correlations between abuses and negative 
health outcomes and were internationally disseminated through the Diagnosis Critical 
report (BPHWT 2010). GHAP also continually assists Back Pack's Health Information 
Systems team, guiding staff members in systematising the processing and analysis of 
data from the field, which is then used to plan, monitor and evaluate Back Pack's health 
programmes. 
As well as enabling Back Pack to assess and improve its programmes, collaboration 
with GHAP enables the collation and dissemination of data from areas inaccessible to 
international agencies. Many donors and other international actors describe Back Pack's 
resulting body of information as highly sophisticated and credible; the symbolic capital 
this data represents also provides the basis for the evidence-based programming 
increasingly required by the international aid industry (Gross-Stein 2008; Jordan and 
van Tuijl 2006; Terry 2002). As GHAP's Field Director explained: 
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"Because they' re a very high profile organisation, for them to have high quality 
data to share with people and to utilise is more important, because they are very 
visible. [ . .. ] Too many NGOs in the world operate heuristically: "Oh, it seems to 
be ,vorking, so we ' ll just keep doing this and well, you know, we're trying to do 
good so surely what we're doing is fine."[ ... ] But for an organisation like Back 
Pack, working in tough conditions, to say "We are going to look at the data and we 
are going to use that to make decisions" speaks to their ability, speaks to their 
credibility; it speaks to the quality of what they're trying to do." 
As described in Chapter 3, the health and human rights discourse in which Back Pack's 
work came to be framed through collaboration with GHAP and Johns Hopkins also 
provides a powerful, evidence-based and credible platform for the promotion of a 
particular 'motivated truth' (Redfield 2006). As Back Pack's Director explained, 
"Through GRAP, Back Pack chose to follow the perspective that can be accepted 
by the international community. They not only help make our work become 
systematic but also try to gain international credibility". 
Whereas GRAP assists with public health models and frameworks, organisations like 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Shoklo Malaria Research Unit (SMRU) 157 
provide support for medical skills and knowledge. In 2010, to improve and standardise 
the often-disparate knowledge and skills of medics trained through different systems, 
Back Pack started three-month Senior Medic Refresher Courses. Medical doctors 
working with IRC, SMRU and Mae Tao Clinic led trainings for senior medics. Back 
Pack's Director and former Medical Care Programme Coordinator again highlighted 
international credibility as well as technical competence as benefits of such 
collaboration: 
"The SHIELD158 project's doctor group supports the medics' techniques, skills and 
ability. [ ... ] Although I attended other refresher courses in my past twenty years of 
working, I didn't attend this kind of senior medic training during that time. 
Medicine work always needs refresher courses. Since we became medics, we don't 
have good basic knowledge, so this kind of refresher course is good. [ ... ] Next, 
what benefit we get from SMRU is that SMRU is an international organisation that 
does work related to malaria. They worry that drug resistance to malaria medicine 
will happen globally. So they come to teach us what we really need and our 
157 SMRU was established in 1986 in Shoklo, one of the former temporary shelters for displaced persons on the Thai-
Burma border. It is a field station of the faculty of Tropical Medicine, Mahidol University (Bangkok), and is paii of 
the Mahidol-Oxford Research Unit supported by the Wellcome Trust (UK). htto://www.shoklo-
unit.com/About/index..pho - last accessed 13 July 2012. 
158 Funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the five-year Supp01i to Health, Institution 
Building, Education, and Leadership in Policy Dialogue (SHIELD) Project was jointly implemented by IRC and 
World Education/Consortium (WE/C). Since 2007, Back Pack has received USAID funding through SHIELD. 
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organisation's work in treating malaria has become systematic, but also we also get 
credibility. We got this because this organisation gives recommendation for us." 
Intermediary partners have also contributed to Back Pack's institutional development. 
Over time, Back Pack's management systems evolved to coordinate growing 
programmes and to cope with the requirements of donor funding. At an organisational 
level, this is obvious through progressively bureaucratised systems, increasing office 
staff, and ever more time spent on management tasks. At an individual level, it is 
obvious in the young accountant who spends countless days sitting on the floor of the 
office, sorting through piles of receipts that are brought back by field workers and that 
need to be cross-checked before expenses can be logged into the accounting system IRC 
has trained her to use and then verified in that year's audits. But there are also less 
obvious indicators of Back Pack's evolving institutionalisation, and of sometimes 
divergent interpretations of how a humanitarian organisation should work. 
As illustrated in the discussion of Back Pack's organisational ideology in Chapter 4, 
older leaders often explain that commitment should not be defined in monetary terms 
and that an individual dedicated to the duty to serve the community is never useless, 
without there having to be strictly defined roles or responsibilities. Some NGO partners, 
in contrast, see clearly defined job descriptions and remuneration as key to 
organisational effectiveness, and implicitly or explicitly promote a definition of 
humanitarianism described by analysts as more professionalised and akin to a business 
model ( e.g. Collowald 2002; Le Naelou and Freyss 2004; Pandolfi 2002; Terry 2002). 
One NGO partner who pushed for systematised management processes, including staff 
job descriptions, explained that this had initially met with resistance, as it was seen as 
"destroying volunteerism". Over time, collaboration with such partners did lead to more 
emphasis on systematised management processes, and staff roles and responsibilities 
became more clearly defined. 
In the early 2000s, Back Pack also introduced stipends, which the leaders recognise as 
important for staff and medics to support themselves and their families. But stipends 
can also be read as a compromise between the volunteerism promoted by older leaders 
and the professionalism encouraged by some NGO pa1iners: staff receive remuneration 
but the leaders explain this as calculated on the basis of need, not position; and the type 
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of commitment promoted by older leaders, as described in Chapter 4, highlights 
continued emphasis on an ideology of volunteerism. This type of ideology can be found 
in other humanitarian NGOs 159 (e.g. Redfield 2012), but in Back Pack's case it is also 
linked to the leaders' interpretation of their work as part of a wider politico-moral 
responsibility, itself linked to the struggle for the rights and freedoms of Burma's ethnic 
minorities. The values that these leaders try to institutionalise within their organisation 
are again highlighted as they encounter obstacles in their realisation and/or as they 
interact with partners who have sometimes divergent interpretations of how an 
organisation labelled as 'humanitarian' should work (Atlani-Duault 2005; Verna 2007). 
From 2007 onwards, as part of its sub-grant, IRC provided increasingly tailored training 
in programme management, accounting, monitoring and evaluation, and other skills. 
Added to the assistance from GHAP and BRC, IRC 's support aims to develop the 
capacities necessary for a growing organisation, for which increased donor funding also 
1neans an ever-growing management and administrative burden. This support enhances 
the skills and knowledge of individuals in the organisation; but Back Pack's 
1nanagement recognises that there are still 1najor capacity gaps in terms of dealing with 
the requirements of the international aid industry. As one leader said to an NGO partner, 
"We have grown up as an organisation but we cannot walk alone". And as another NGO 
partner told me, "Donors often have much higher expectations than what the partners on 
the ground can actually deliver". Back Pack members at times also speak of 
intermediary partners as keeping a useful distance between themselves and donors who 
- as one of the accountants put it - "are the most difficult part of the job". Intermediary 
NGOs therefore also protect local organisations from excessive bureaucracy and 
pressure from donors. Back Pack thus continues to draw on intermediary partners to 
access funding and respond to donor requirements; and to an extent, benefits derived 
from these partners in dealing with donors and their frameworks mean that there is little 
to be gained in eliminating those partnerships, even when concerted effort is made to 
provide local staff with the management and administrative skills to "walk alone". 
159 Peter Redfield has notably analysed the ideology of 'volunteerism' - and the ethical dilemmas and fundamental 
inequalities that it can reveal when applied across unequal economies - that is promoted within Medecins Sans 
Frontieres, and that is deemed to be linked with the humanitarian sense of a moral commitment (Redfield 2012). 
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As they sought increasing funding in an ever more competitive and stringent aid market, 
Back Pack's leaders nevertheless became more adept and strategic in dealing with 
donors. In 2007, leaders from Mae Tao Clinic, Back Pack and Burma Medical 
Association 160 initiated Donor Coordination Meetings, to which they invite major 
donors and intermediary partners. Dr Cynthia explained of these meetings that, "if you 
work alone, sometimes you also have a lot of pressure from different donors." The 
Donor Coordination Meetings enable the groups to present a united front and to be more 
effective in balancing donor requirements with their own concerns and limitations. 
Donors themselves recognise the effectiveness of this strategy, with one noting: 
"This is very smart on their part - because you can see, for example at the Mae Tao 
donor meeting, how the donors become competitive and it creates rivalry so that 
the donors become more flexible. " 
The March 20 IO Donor Coordination meeting I attended was the third such gathering 
and included presentations on programmes and management processes, followed by 
discussions between the management of the three organisations, donors and 
intermediary partners. Donors and NGOs provided advice to Back Pack's leaders in 
managing criticisms of cross-border aid - for example, agreeing to support an external 
evaluation of Back Pack's activities to address criticisms that cross-border aid cannot be 
adequately evaluated. Back Pack's leaders attempted to convince donors that did not yet 
provide core funding to start doing so, meaning that funds from different sources would 
feed into a general 'pot ' to finance all Back Pack's programme and management costs. 
Core funding reduces the management's administrative burden; but it also reflects Back 
Pack's aim to develop sustainable health systems rather than providing emergency relief 
through a project-based model. So while Back Pack accesses international humanitarian 
aid funding, it does so to support a model of sustainable community-level capacity 
development. And with donor funding meaning more than just money for Back Pack's 
leaders, core funding is also an indicator of donor support for the organisation as a 
160 Bmma Medical Association (BMA) was founded in Karen State in June 1991 by a group of medical professionals 
from Burma. It serves as a leading body in the coordination of public health policy and promotion of health care 
among refugees, migrants, and internally displaced persons from Burma. Staff from BMA work closely with Mae 
Tao Clinic, Back Pack and ethnic health organisations, and BMA is notably charged with taking the lead in 
coordination and standardisation of health curricula. http://-vvv.rw.bmahealth.org/201 I /07 / 18/capacitv-buildirnd - last 
accessed 19 October 2012. 
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whole, not just aspects of its work. 
At the meeting in 2010, Back Pack's leaders were told that USAID would not support 
core funding; but other major donors were already providing multi-year core funding. 
Many saw this as indicative of the extent to which, as one observer put it, "donors 
answer to Back Pack, not the other way around." This interpretation, however, is too 
simplistic. On the one hand, as described below, Back Pack's success in obtaining 
donor funding can compel the organisation to demonstrate that it fits into donors' 
definitions of humanitarianism and how it should work. And on the other, and as also 
discussed below, support for cross-border aid was historically influenced by donors ' 
political agendas and geostrategic concerns - with Back Pack providing an avenue for a 
particular type of action by donors within a wider system of 'humanitarian 
government', and thereby succeeding in obtaining core funding. 
Back Pack's local-global partnerships thus have a number of outcomes. As described in 
the 2008 publication, partnerships enable financial, political and technical support to be 
channelled via the Mae Sot office to medics in Burma. But international partnerships 
also contribute to systematising Back Pack's management systems, enabling the leaders 
to run more effective programmes and to better manage the stipulations of donor 
funding. This in tum contributes to the institutionalisation of Back Pack, which over 
time acquired more characteristics of an internationally-funded NGO, albeit one 
functioning in the 'legal-illegal' - or, drawing on Abraham and van Schendel ' s 
framework and as argued below, an organisation that is defined as illegal by the 
Burmese state but that came to be endorsed as licit through international support, in 
large part because donors considered the Burmese state to be illegitimate (Abraham and 
van Schendel 2005). 
Partly as a result of its own success in applying for and obtaining international funding 
designated for humanitarian programmes, what started out as an ad hoc response by 
individuals linked to activist movements thus became institutionalised as a humanitarian 
organisation. Partnerships that were in Back Pack's early days largely based on inter-
personal and socio-political connections were increasingly systematised. Within these 
systems, intermediary partners continue to play a key brokering role (Mosse and Lewis 
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2006), providing Back Pack with the language, frameworks and networks necessary to 
secure international funding and political support; and at the international level, they 
contribute to enhancing Back Pack's credibility and legitimacy as a humanitarian actor 
implementing necessary, evidence-based and effective health programmes. 
B. Donor funding and international legitimacy 
In making decisions about where to direct funding, donor governments are influenced 
by factors beyond just humanitarian needs. Among these are frameworks like the 
Millennium Development Goals, within which agencies like the UK's Department for 
Foreign International Development (DfID) determine where and how to - as a DfID 
representative put it - "get the most bang for our buck". But overstating the influence of 
such frameworks can conceal the extent to which government aid agencies - and some 
government aid agencies more than others - are bound by (geo )political and policy 
constraints, and humanitarian aid often becomes a political tool (De Waal 1994; 1997; 
Fassin 2012; Rieff 2002; Saillant 2007; Terry 2002). 
1. The politics of donor funding 
"The support for cross-border aid at the end of the day is a political decision. [ ... ] 
So if you don't want to fund, it that's fine; if you have an issue with it, that's fine; 
but don't say it's a humanitarian problem. And just agree with the fact that this is a 
political disagreement." [Humanitarian Donor Coordinator] 
A government's aid to Burma has historically been framed by its foreign policy towards 
the once-pariah state, as well as assessments of humanitarian space and structural 
impediments to aid (Duffield 2008). In interviews, donors often commented on the 
complexity of a context where they could not even agree on what to call the country, let 
alone how to provide aid to its people. In the lead up to and aftermath of Burma's 
elections, donors became increasingly polarised, to the extent that a Humanitarian 
Donor Coordinator - appointed to mediate often heated discussions between donors and 
attempt to identify durable solutions for displaced Burmese civilians - explained: 
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"Now I can't even get the group to agree on an analysis of the situation. [ ... ] Some 
donors are saying, well, there is no conflict at all, it's all in our heads, and the day 
we stop funding the camps and without cross-border [aid], everything's fine. On 
the other side, you've got donors who are saying it's fire and brimstone and the 
country's about to collapse!" 
As described in Chapter 2, from the 1990s onwards, donor countries including Norway, 
Denmark and Canada funded cross-border aid to Burma. The US started funding cross-
border groups in 2006. The same year, the UK conducted a parliamentary review of its 
Burma programme, subsequently allowing funding for cross-border aid. Donors tended 
to justify support for cross-border aid as a pragmatic solution where communities in 
need were denied aid by government restrictions on access. But they were also 
influenced by political and geopolitical considerations. For example, after the junta's 
crackdown on the 1988 demonstrations, Canada suspended bilateral aid and 
implemented sanctions against the regime; starting in 1991, CIDA provided aid to 
Burmese refugees and migrants through organisations based in border countries; 
pressure from groups like BRC, Inter Pares and the newly-formed Canadian Friends of 
Burma contributed to Canada funding cross-border aid, as a way to foster civil society 
and assist Burmese communities without bolstering a regime considered illegitimate. 
After 2006, the US took over as the largest donor for cross-border aid. USAID 
representatives I met explained that lobby groups and organisations like the Thailand-
Burma Border Consortium had significant influence "on the hill", contributing to 
Congress' decision to earmark USD 4 million a year for cross-border aid. Although 
based on humanitarian need, USAID funding for cross-border groups was also political: 
"We are here to help reach US Government objectives. For Burma, the objective is 
to promote democracy and good governance. USAID works in tandem and with the 
policy space created by the hill. We have to work within what is set out by 
Congress, with the reality on the ground, and with USAID's rules and regulations -
we work within the space that is left after all these constraints are in place. For 
Burma, there has always been a lot of scrutiny that the government will not take the 
money provided for humanitarian assistance. Eastern Burma is different. People 
like Dr Cynthia and Saya Poe Say, the leaders and agents of change on the border, 
they come from a political background and from the opposition - they have goals 
of pr01noting human rights and democracy. They are not going to throw bunches of 
money at the government! So there is a greater degree of trust." [ USAID Burma 
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Programme Manager] 
Historically, some Western donor countries like the US had also implicitly supported 
the struggle of armed ethnic nationalist groups - particularly the KNU/KNLA - as 
legitimate resistance groups and agents of political change (South, et al. 2010). These 
actors, which often provide protection to cross-border groups, were therefore attributed 
politico-moral legitimacy at the international level (Abraham and van Schendel 2005). 
But as the political situation in Burma changed and the wider geopolitical landscape 
evolved, attributions of legitimacy also shifted. By the time of my fieldwork, ethnic 
nationalist groups resisting the regime had lost much territorial and political control. 
Researchers with growing influence in donor and diplomatic circles questioned the 
legitimacy and representativeness of ethnic nationalist groups like the KNU/KNLA 
(South 2011; South, et al. 2010). And Western donor countries increasingly saw the 
government of a resource-rich and geopolitically strategic Burma as more palatable, as 
it made demonstrations of incremental change (Haacke 2012). In this evolving context, 
political factors that had historically influenced government aid programmes in tum 
made it easy for critics to dismiss this support. The Regional Director of the European 
Community Humanitarian aid Office (ECHO), one of the staunchest opponents of 
cross-border aid, was therefore able to position himself as apolitical when he told me 
that donors funding cross-border aid were "blurring their humanitarian and political 
mandates" in bowing to pressure from lobby groups or "thinking that having a rebel 
group there might be useful in the future". 
Following Cyclone Nargis in 2008, claims made by the likes of ECHO's Regional 
Director - that cross-border aid "had a purpose in the past but it is not viable or 
sustainable in the future; there have now been changes and new developments, and we 
should look to alternative approaches, ones that are legal and enable better monitoring" 
- had already gained traction in donor circles. As outlined in Chapter 2, the post-Nargis 
period was said to have demonstrated the viability of providing aid via state-sanctioned 
mechanisms. Major donors like the US, UK, Australia and EU began increasing aid into 
Burma. But again, (geo )political considerations were also at play: post-Nargis aid to 
Burma was also a means to engage a potentially changing regime within a wider context · 
of a shifting global balance of power. By the time of my fieldwork, donor governments 
were hoping that the 2010 elections would initiate change in Burma and balancing 
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pressure from lobby groups with efforts to counterbalance China's growing influence in 
the region (Haacke 2012; Thant Myint U 2012). Donor uncertainties and concerns that 
support for groups seen as linked with 'rebels' might damage programmes inside - and 
their diplomatic efforts - translated into sometimes confusing attitudes towards actors 
on the Thai-Burma border. So while some members of cross-border groups joked about 
initially being told to stick labels proclaiming "From the American people" on any 
piece of equipment bought with USAID funds, they were bemused when later told that 
they should not advertise the fact that they receive US support via IRC. 
Donors are also influenced by assessments of humanitarian need and access, typically 
undertaken by organisations working officially inside the country. Supporters and 
opponents of cross-border aid alike often cite a 2008 report by an Australian researcher, 
Richard Horsey161 . The report identifies Back Pack as the largest supporter of cross-
border health programmes in south-eastern Burma - and Back Pack's leaders 
interpreted many of its criticisms as targeting their organisation. The report notably 
highlights links that groups referred to as Community-Based Organisations have with 
parties to the conflict, questioning them as less representative of communities than of 
political elites of armed groups. As such, and given that cross-border aid relies on 
armed groups for security and logistical support, caution is recommended when funding 
these groups. However, the report justifies cross-border aid as essential for reaching 
vulnerable populations in unstable areas, due to government restrictions on access by 
aid organisations working legally inside Burma. Horsey also argues that the operational 
environment justifies cooperation with non-state armed groups, as long as risk 
mitigation strategies accompany support for cross-border aid. Consequently, many 
donors and INGO staff I spoke to cited this report as justifying support for cross-border 
aid. But since it was also used to back up the anti-cross-border position, many people I 
worked with on the border consider it to have done considerable damage to their cause. 
161 This report was a UNOCHA Review of Humanitarian Assistance to Vulnerable Populations in South-East 
Myanmar. Although supposedly confidential and not for public circulation, the report had been widely leaked by the 
time of my fieldwork and its contents were known to most stakeholders since it had become central to the debate 
around cross-border aid. As such, the contents were shared with me by a multitude of donors, NGOs, activist groups, 
as well as members of organisations on the Thai-Burma border that I worked with during my fieldwork. 
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A second report, which became central to the cross-border aid debate during my 
fieldwork, was co-authored by another Australian researcher, Ashley South (South, et 
al. 2010). The report assesses the impact of actors in Karen State, including cross-
border groups, on community-level self-protection mechanisms. South and colleagues 
argue that while some cross-border groups demonstrate relative independence from 
non-state armed actors, others "are more accurately described as the humanitarian wings 
of armed organisations" (ibid: 40-41 ). The authors go on to argue in general terms that, 
as most donors require grantees to be at least formally neutral, 
A 'legal fiction' is therefore maintained, according to which cross-border aid 
agencies are framed as separate to conflict actors, although in practice their 
activities support armed opposition groups. This is not to argue that cross-border 
assistance materially supports the armed opposition. Indeed, most local agencies 
have developed impressive monitoring and evaluation capabilities, and there is 
very little ' aid leakage ' (i.e. armed groups rarely receive direct material support 
from cross-border aid agencies). Rather, the delivery of large-scale relief assistance 
to IDPs, through the humanitarian wings of armed ethnic groups, risks serving to 
legitimise the latter in the perception of recipients (ibid: 41 ). 
While I was in Burma in May 2010, a friend introduced me over dinner to 
acquaintances working in the Rangoon offices of three major donors. I explained that I 
was working on the Thai-Burma border, whereupon all three launched into a 
surprisingly emotive attack on my presumed political stance. Echoing the report, which 
South had presented to donors in Rangoon that week, one declared: 
"This is why [we] cannot support cross-border aid: because we don't know where 
the money goes and in fact it ends up supporting or at least legitimising insurgent 
groups". 
The conclusion that they and many others drew was: all cross-border groups consist of 
what South et al. describe as "welfare wings of armed ethnic groups" (ibid: 65) -
specifically of the KNU/KNLA; although no evidence of this was provided in the 
report, villagers are then said to perceive aid as coming from armed groups; cross-
border aid thus legitimises these groups at the community level and feeds into the 
dynamics of a conflict that would otherwise not have popular support. 
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The argument that some donors derived from the report - which the Donor Coordinator 
referred to in the quote above - was: without cross-border aid (and without refugee 
camps in Thailand, which were by then often seen, as one donor put it, as "recruiting 
grounds for the KNU"), the KNU/KNLA cannot perpetuate conflict; cutting this support 
will end conflict, abuses and displacement in border areas; the state will allow 
humanitarian access from 'inside'; and conditions for communities will improve. This 
argument has a number of flaws, particularly in ignoring the extent to which abuses and 
conflict in contested areas - such as much of Karen State - were historically driven by 
the junta's attempts to extend predatory control over economically useful populations 
and areas (Callahan 2003). It also suggests an ethically questionable approach, whereby 
communities are to be denied humanitarian assistance in the short term in the hope that 
this will help resolve conflict in the longer term - and can therefore be contrary to the 
ethic of humanitarianism, with people being used as pawns in conflict management 
(Curtis 2001 ). The possibility that Karen communities perceive cross-border aid as 
coming from the KNU/KNLA and that this legitimises the armed group is also not 
substantiated and would require in-depth research with beneficiary communities. 
The common generalisation of cross-border aid, which was often derived from this 
report, as being implemented through "welfare · wings of armed ethnic groups" also 
glosses over a more subtle and complex reality (ibid: 65). As described for Back Pack's 
case in Chapter 5, cross-border aid functions through cooperation with and often under 
the protection of ethnic nationalist groups, including ceasefire as well as resistance 
groups. While aid is delivered by medics recruited from socio-political systems in 
border areas - including, at times, military medical wings of ethnic nationalist groups -
depicting all cross-border groups as welfare wings of armed groups is misleading and 
ignores the multiple ways through which aid is channelled to communities. It also 
downplays the extent to which groups like Back Pack can and do maintain managerial 
independence from ethnic nationalist groups. Particularly important here, however, is 
the extent to which interpretations of the report reflect and fed into a shifting politics of 
aid in a changing (geo )political context. 
Differences and disagreements between donors highlight evolving politics and priorities 
in a changing context, as well as potential tensions and hypocrisies in the aid industry 
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more generally. Back Pack's efforts to secure donor funding also expose the meaning of 
this support for actors on the ground. And the often emotive and polarised reactions to 
researchers' analyses - as well as attitudes to my own position as an Australian 
researcher working with a cross-border group - draw attention to what is at stake in an 
evolving politics of aid. In the Burmese context, the aid debate is linked with decades-
long conflict over the legitimacy of different political and armed actors (Duffield 2008). 
South et al. 's report provoked a backlash by leaders of cross-border groups and their 
partners, who rightly feared that donors would use it as academic justification to not 
fund and even phase out cross-border aid. But the report is also reflective of and fed 
into an evolving politics of aid, in which the attribution of legitimacies was shifting and 
cross-border groups risked losing more than just money: the political and moral 
worldviews of people who have dedicated their lives to what they describe as serving 
their communities were increasingly called into question. So it was that, several days 
after South presented his research to groups on the border, one of the leaders marched 
up to me and told me that if I was going to work with Back Pack, I had to take sides 162 : 
"In this situation, you cannot be neutral. You cannot sit on the fence between good 
and bad. [ ... ] We are not a service provider, we are the victims, we are suffering, 
we cannot be neutral. If people are coming to harm you and beat you, you cannot 
be neutral. As an organisation, we don't come from the sky." 
2. Donor funding as legitimacy 
By the time of my fieldwork, Back Pack received funding from the government donor 
agencies mentioned above, as well as being supported by a Dutch NGO, foundations 
like the Open Society Institute, and private donors. But while the leaders speak of non-
government donors as providing valuable support, their actions highlight the value they 
accord to funding from governments - and from some more than others. In early 2010, 
a representative of a European NGO heard Back Pack's leaders complaining of a 
funding shortfall for much-needed medicines and offered to fill the gap with private 
162 As described in the methodology section of Chapter 2, reactions to my research and changing attitudes to my 
position within Back Pack were reflective of the shifting social and political terrain of humanitarianism (Markowitz 
2001 ), and of a continuing polarisation of discourses concerning aid to Burma (Duffield 2008) . 
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donations; the NGO promised further support from its government aid agency, as the 
latter had "always supported the democratic opposition" and had a "good attitude to 
support cross-border aid". But while the subsequent donation was significant, funding 
from a small European country does not have the same clout as support from more 
powerful donors. As one intermediary partner explained, 
"when AusAid or USAID or someone like that decides to recognise that these 
groups are legitimate and that they are serving a purpose here and providing 
services that other groups cannot, then it's really powerful; it's more powerful than 
just being able to continue doing the programmes because you've raised enough 
money through different avenues". 
The meaning of donor funding for Back Pack's leaders became ever clearer to me, from 
my first day of fieldwork when Poe Say explained: 
"What is important is not only that we get money, but that we get international 
recognition. So we get money from USAID and CIDA, which is important for the 
funding of the programmes but also because we want to show the need and the 
reality of the IDP situation. We need capacity therefore not only in order to get the 
funding but also to get the international recognition. So we applied now to 
APHEDA - to get funding but also to be better recognised at the international 
level." 
In early 2010, there was uncertainty around Canada renewing funding; Denmark 
reduced funds to Back Pack by twenty per cent; and Norway was late in renewing 
support. ECHO and AusAID still refused to fund cross-border aid; and although the UK 
had changed policy, DflD had rejected a first concept proposal by Back Pack and still 
only provided limited funding to cross-border aid. Back Pack leaders and partners 
interpreted donors as hoping that Burma's elections would initiate political change, 
resolve conflict, and lead to greater access via organisations working legally inside. 
They, instead, believed that the elections would lead to increased conflict and abuses. 
With money for refugee and cross-border aid feared to be declining, they wanted to tap 
into the increased funding going into Burma. Funding from DflD - which was doubling 
aid to Burma - in particular would be, one partner said, "ground-breaking because Back 
Pack would be accessing money from Burma and showing that it is part of Burma": 
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other donors provided funding earmarked for cross-border aid or refugees in Thailand; 
but with DfID, Back Pack was applying for money designated for health programmes 
within Burma. DfID funding would prove that Back Pack was "on the map". 
Table 2: Funding sought from new donor governments 2009-2011 
Country Government aid agency NGO Intermediary Implementing 
partner(s) partner 
UK Department for Foreign NG0163 Burma 
International Development Relief 
(DfID) Centre Back Pack Health 
(BRC) Worker Team 
Australia Australian Agency for APHEDA Burma (BPHWT) 
International Development Relief 
(AusAID) Centre 
(BRC) 
During my fieldwork, Back Pack leaders and partners from BRC and GHAP worked 
tirelessly on proposals, responding to criticisms of cross-border aid and lobbying for 
DflD and AusAID funding (Table 2). BRC mediated between Back Pack and the 
intermediary NGO applying for DflD funding, as actors involved attempted to fit Back 
Pack's functioning into DflD's formats. At the end of 2011, DflD finally began funding 
Back Pack along with two civil society groups in Burma - DflD's emphasis being, as 
described in Chapter 7, on convergence between cross-border groups and groups 
working officially inside Burma. DITO staff I met explained funding for Back Pack on 
the basis of humanitarian need and access, as well as the "footprint" DfiD could leave in 
terms of global health goals; but they also emphasised the influence of lobby groups on 
the UK's change of policy in 2006, and on acceptance of Back Pack's proposal. 
163 The DfID proposal was for funding to go to Back Pack as well as two civil society groups operating inside Burma, 
as pati of an emphasis on building trust and convergence between cross-border groups and groups working officially 
inside Burma. DfID funding was to be channelled via an NGO that has worked for a long time inside Burma. Staff of 
the NGO in question did not want their organisation named, for fear of having their position in Burma threatened if 
the gove1nment were to know that they suppo1i a cross-border group seen to be aligned with ' rebel' movements. 
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In contrast, the Australian government remained unswayed by concerted lobbying from 
Back Pack and partners. A lobby trip to Australia in 2009 and continued pressure by 
APHEDA and Burma Campaign Australia were followed by the proposal, which Poe 
Say asked me to write on my first day. AusAID rejected the proposal, on the basis that 
it went against government policy. In May 2011, Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd called 
for a review of aid to Burma; coupled with AusAID' s 2011 Interim Strategy report -
which recognised humanitarian needs of and lack of access to civilians in disputed 
border areas (AusAID 2010) - this prompted scaled-up advocacy by groups on the 
border. Back Pack worked with APHEDA and BRC to submit another proposal. But as 
APHEDA's Thai-Burma Border Project Officer explained, 
"Since this is talking about a policy change that is actually about border relations -
international relations - this is not really an aid decision but a DfAT [i.e. 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade] decision". 
When I met her in mid-2011, AusAID's First Secretary for Development Cooperation 
explained that, first, cross-border aid violates sovereignty and (more importantly) 
Australia has to protect its political and economic position within ASEAN; second, 
Australia has a duty of care and the government is loath to support programmes that put 
aid workers at risk; and third, "we don't know where the aid is going and who delivers 
the aid, in a situation where there are combatants amidst civilians and in a context of 
ongoing armed conflict". Comparing Australia's decision to the UK's, she continued, 
"the UK is much further away from Burma than we are - we are much more 
involved in the stability of the region ... and also - and I don't mean to criticise 
them and I am sure that they would admit so themselves - the UK government is 
much more driven by the Burma lobby groups." 
Considerations of legitimacy, political pressures and geostrategic concerns are again 
pivotal to government funding decisions. By seeking funding from donors for systems 
of aid provision, which as described in Chapter 5 are seen by the Burmese state as 
illegal and part of 'insurgent' networks, Back Pack's leaders are promoting the 
legitimacy of the systems they work with and through. This legitimacy is posited as 
trumping illegality, particularly since the Burmese state is seen as illegitimate (Abraha1n 
and van Schendel 2005). So while the leaders claim "we need to be recognised as legal 
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by the Burmese government", in the same breath they say "but the government itself is 
illegal". Drawing on discourses of human rights, humanitarianism and their own right as 
victims of the regime to help their communities, the leaders thus promote alternatives to 
a framework of state sovereignty. 
Supporters of groups like Back Pack often explain that they are working in a context in 
which the state's illegitimacy and violations of human rights justify an approach that 
would otherwise be considered illegal. But while Back Pack puts forward an alternative 
moral and political framework to that of sovereignty, the leaders and their partners do 
so by drawing on tools lodged in this very framework and by appealing to support from 
donor countries, which continue to function in a world of sovereign nation-states. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, there are precedents of donors supporting humanitarian 
interventions in violation of sovereignty; international frameworks such as the 
Responsibility to Protect potentially give legal backing to such acts; but the 
implementation of these frameworks remains lodged within and dependent on the 
(geo )politics of a system of sovereign states and on attributions of legitimacy by those 
states to such interventions (Chandler 2007; Rieff 2002). As donors look to changes in 
Burma and the wider region, the position of a government like Australia, which has 
significant interest in safeguarding diplomatic relationships with ASEAN member 
states, thus does little to encourage support for cross-border aid - as long as the systems 
that enable cross-border aid to function are labelled as illegal by the Burmese state. 
In a changing (geo )political landscape, cross-border groups were increasingly argued to 
be defending "political agendas that hold onto the past", as ECHO's Regional Director 
put it. Cross-border groups are commonly misrepresented, as one INGO partner 
explained, as "groups that sort of scurry across the border and drop off medicine and 
run back to safety on this side", while Back Pack's medics in fact live and work in their 
communities inside Burma. But these medics aren't the ones speaking to donors and 
other outsiders. Instead, the leaders who are the public face of Back Pack spend much 
of the year in Mae Sot and belong to an older generation with links to democracy 
activism and ethnic nationalist groups. This feeds into a misconception of cross-border 
groups as comprised uniquely of ageing exiles disconnected from changes inside Burma 
since 1988. Back Pack's links with overseas campaign groups, while having a number 
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of benefits, also have drawbacks within the evolving politics of aid. Indeed, lobby 
groups such as Burma Campaign UK or Burma Campaign Australia have attracted 
increasing criticism in recent years for what are seen as unchanging hard-line positions 
- for example, continuing to lobby for international sanctions against the regime 
(Duffield 2008). Through associations with these types of groups and the so-called exile 
movement more generally, Back Pack and partners have thus developed a reputation in 
some circles as "stuck in the past". 
These factors make it easy for some critics to posit themselves as reformers, who -
unlike cross-border groups, they argue - are looking for real and sustainable solutions to 
the wellbeing of Burmese communities. To the extent that there is truth to cross-border 
groups "holding on to the past", it is because they comprise individuals whose 
understandings of the past, present and future are framed by embodied histories of state 
violence (Fassin 2007; 2008). And it is within this moral and political framework that 
donor funding means more than just money. Field workers I met generally knew little 
about Back Pack's funding, beyond the fact that it comes from foreign countries; but 
they often spoke of it as proof that, although they are illegals in the eyes of the Burmese 
state, the outside world has not forgotten them. When one young Karenni medic told me 
"[ w]hat I know is that the state doesn't recognise Back Pack, but it is recognised by 
foreigners", he was in his own way echoing the meaning given by the leaders to 
international government funding. The latter is translated as international legitimacy for 
Back Pack and its vision of and for the world. 
3. Dilemmas of legitimacy for a humanitarian struggle 
a. Technical terms for a political debate 
In October 2011, I met USAID' s Burma Programme Manager in Bangkok. She had 
visited Back Pack several times during my fieldwork but I had never seen USAID' s 
office and was struck by the contrast between the donor's sleek, modem workplace and 
Back Pack's ramshackle compound. The Programme Manager commented on the 
incongruity of the setting as we sat down to discuss US aid to Burma. Later, becoming 
animated, she placed her glass in front of her and said: 
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"We buy into these CB Os ' work as partners because they do great work. But 
sometimes we are so demanding that they break. It ' s like we have this cup and we 
fill it and we fill it and eventually it breaks because we haven't recognised that 
there are absorptive capacity issues or that the cup won't hold that much ... [ ... ] 
First, we as donors need to be thoughtful and honest about what we can and can't 
fund. And second, we need to be specific about what kind of data we need - and 
about the politicised and policy nature of donor money. [ ... ] If we want more and 
better monitoring, we need to be honest with them about what we want them to 
achieve, and we need to ask: is their mandate appropriate to what we are asking 
them to do?" 
The Programme Manager was referring to increasingly stringent demands by donors for 
accountability and transparency, which reflect international trends but also need to be 
understood within the evolving (geo )political context of cross-border aid. Indeed, by the 
time of my fieldwork, the highly political debate around cross-border aid had led to 
prioritisation of the ostensibly apolitical issue of monitoring and evaluation (M&E). 
One of the recurring criticisms of cross-border groups is that their work cannot be 
adequately monitored or evaluated - and this in tum reflects a 'politics of truth' in 
which no matter what evidence the cross-border groups produce, this is discredited by 
critics with a diverging agenda (Robben 1995). 
With technical support from inte1mediary partner NGOs, Back Pack has developed 
sophisticated M&E systems. Internal monitoring is based on the annual logical 
framework, which specifies "overall goals for each programme, specific objectives for 
each programme goal, and precise qualitative and quantitative indicators to measure the 
achievement of these objectives" (BPHWT 2010b: 38). Twice a year, data brought from 
the field is used to measure activities and outputs against planned objectives. The 
findings of these and other activities - like regular assessments of health worker skills 
and knowledge - are included in six-monthly and annual reports to intermediary 
partners and donors. From February 2007 to February 2008, Back Pack also worked 
with an external consultant on an Internal Programme Improvement Project (IPIP -
BPHWT 2008). IPIP and its successor, the Internal Performance Monitoring Team, 
enable Back Pack to assess and improve programmes in the field and management 
processes. In 2010, Back Pack then implemented the Impact Assessment Survey 
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mentioned above. All these activities enable the assessment and improvement of 
programme and management processes; they are also essential to Back Pack's 
demonstrations of accountability and transparency to donors. 
Donors funding cross-border aid argue that accountability is ensured through 
implementing partners' internal systems, tiered partnerships described above, and 
remote monitoring mechanisms developed for a context inaccessible to foreigners . As 
USAID's Programme Manager explained, although "we can't follow the groups to 
monitor their work", "[t]he indicators and the quality information that we get from 
groups like Back Pack show us that the needs are being responded to". In 2010, USAID 
initiated an external evaluation of its SHIELD programme, which included Back Pack 
as a sub-grantee; this concluded that the programme was meeting its goals and led 
USAID to renew funding. Prior to my fieldwork, two external evaluations of Back 
Pack's activities had also been conducted, one by Danish Church Aid and one by CIDA, 
leading both donors to renew funding (Turcot and Munro 2009). 
In private, donor and INGO representatives sometimes speculate that a degree of aid 
'leakage' can occur in any protracted conflict situation. They also recognise that cross-
border groups have to facilitate 'friendships ' with Thai military authorities, for 
example, in order for the system to function. This is accepted, but generally not publicly 
discussed - and donors who discussed such issues with me tended to do so only off-
record: 
"In any kind of complex emergency, there is going to be some kind of leakage of 
aid to non-state armed groups, because they are present in the population and 
they're part of the make-up of the people you're assisting. And of course, we have 
to do everything we can to minimise that. But to be honest, I don't think they need 
us to prolong the conflict. We're not the determining factor in the fact that this 
conflict has been going on for the past fifty years." [Donor] 
So for donors that support cross-border aid, a speculated degree of 'aid leakage' is an 
acceptable (but officially unsaid) side effect of an otherwise legitimate humanitarian 
approach. Donors like ECHO and AusAID, however, claim that legality and security 
issues prevent foreigners from accessing border areas to assess how aid is implemented, 
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rendering independent and reliable assessments of cross-border aid impossible; any 
potential 'leakage', moreover, is much more likely to be seen as feeding into the 
political economy of conflict. Partly as a response to such criticisms, Back Pack's 
leaders at the 2010 Donor Coordination Meeting requested donor support for a joint 
external evaluation of their programmes. They wanted to reduce the burden of multiple 
assessments by different donors, and to identify internal weaknesses. But as one INGO 
partner explained at the meeting: 
"Back Pack have internal monitoring systems, which are good and we trust them. 
But we are dealing with other donors and they don't just trust. .. so we need an 
independent system." 
Ultimately, however, the findings of this evaluation and of other independent 
assessments of cross-border groups' monitoring systems 164 did not change the positions 
of donors opposing cross-border aid. The argument made by one donor I met at the 
dinner in Rangoon was indicative of how an ostensibly technical debate is framed by 
political concerns - and by a different attribution of legitimacy, whereby one side's 
freedom fighter is another's (illegitimate) insurgent: 
"Money is given and crosses the border and no one knows where it goes. It can end 
up being used to buy arms for insurgent groups. As long as I, as a foreigner, cannot 
go to the areas to which the funding goes, and actually witness for myself where 
the money is being spent, [we] will not fund it because it means that actual donor 
monitoring and evaluation cannot take place. [ ... ] What would happen if the [ ... ] 
public ended up finding out that taxpayers' money was being used to fund armed 
groups?" 
Increased emphasis by donors on accountability and transparency is not unique to cross-
border aid or to the Burmese context (e.g. Gross-Stein 2008; Kilby 2011; O'Dwyer and 
164 A consultant conducted the external evaluation of Back Pack's programmes throughout 2010 and 2011. After 
lengthy consultations with the management, field workers, and community members targeted in Back Pack 
programmes, the consultant produced a comprehensive assessment of these programmes, which was shared with 
donors. Meanwhile, consultants were also employed for an external evaluation of the monitoring systems of cross-
border programmes supported by key NGOs on the border. This second, wider evaluation concluded that cross-
border groups had comparatively sophisticated and reliable remote monitoring systems, and made recommendations 
for further improvement; details of the evaluation were included in a report to the relevant donors, but because of 
confidentiality cannot be cited here. 
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Unerman 2008). The global financial crisis, attempts to rationalise aid systems and an 
increasingly stringent and competitive 'aid market' have contributed to a situation 
where, as one donor explained, 
"in the humanitarian world you're seeing a trend towards more quote-unquote 
professional bureaucracy, which means your accountability, paper trail, financial 
trail, is much more important than it was ten or fifteen years ago". 
In addition, major donors are now theoretically bound to frameworks including the 
2003 Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship, which draw on 
the Humanitarian Principles of the Red Cross, and enshrine 
"neutrality, meaning that humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed 
conflict or other dispute where such action is carried out; and independence, 
meaning the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, 
military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where 
humanitarian action is being implemented." [ Objective 2] 165 
This framework creates theoretical homogeneity where, empirically, there has been a 
multiplication of humanitarian practices at . the international level, as well as a 
"humanitarianisation" of international foreign politics and a parallel politicisation of the 
nongovernmental humanitarian field (Dauvin and Simeant 2002; De Waal 2007; 2010; 
Fassin 2012: 224; Leader 1998; Rieff 2002; Saillant 2007). Although frameworks such 
as the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship are supposed to guide practice, the 
terrain between these and their interpretation and implementation continues to be 
negotiated by politics (Rieff 2002; Saillant 2007; Weiss 1999). So as will be further 
discussed in Chapter 7, rather than a unitary set of principles determining humanitarian 
action, actions - themselves to a large extent guided by (geo )political considerations -
determine the principles ( and the interpretation of principles) that then frame them. 
At the time of my fieldwork, international-level frameworks were being made to trickle 
down to a context where aid systems had developed, largely unquestioned, for over a 
I 65 1 , , ., < • • ' t • / I • • ' ' • • ' I • l d 2 d 
,1tto:11www.goodl1u1nanrtanam10nors1un.org;_gns1nnncm1cs---gooc1--nrnct1ct>·gl1010verv1cw.asnx - ast accesse n 
July 2012. 
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decade. These changes were also taking place in parallel with significant (geo )political 
shifts, and were used to frame donors' decisions in apolitical and technical terms. 
Criticisms that cross-border aid could not be adequately monitored or evaluated in fact 
betray a lack of political support for groups like Back Pack and systems they work with 
and through. They are framed as a technical concern that cross-border groups cannot 
prove that they were walking the walk as well as talking the talk of humanitarianism -
but what these groups are really being accused of is of not fitting the type of 
humanitarianism that donors like ECHO are willing to fund in a particular context. 
ECHO's Regional Director highlighted his position and corresponding attribution of 
political legitimacy to some socio-political actors rather than others when, after 
attempting to quiz me about how medics work with the KNLA, he stated that ECHO 
works only with "agencies that are principled" - those that were "willing to discuss with 
the government and to work towards peace and reconciliation". The implication is that 
groups that work under the protection of non-state actors are by definition not 
"principled", nor are they working towards peace and reconciliation. This obviously 
clashes in fundamental ways with the worldviews of the people I worked with, as well 
as denying a history of effective humanitarian action in cooperation with such groups. 
The search for legitimacy at the international level therefore presents dilemmas for 
actors on the border. As a result of changes in the aid industry, shifts in the 
(geo )political landscape, and its drive to obtain powerful donor funding, Back Pack is 
increasingly compelled to demonstrate that it fits into donors' definitions of what 
humanitarianism should be how it should work. The paradox is that, by seeking 
international legitimacy, Back Pack's leaders are opening themselves up to an 
assessment of whether or not their organisation fits labels that they have not defined and 
according to criteria that can clash with their politico-moral worldviews ( e.g. Gross-
Stein 2008; Kilby 2004a; O'Dwyer and Unerman 2008). These labels are defined at a 
level where the political and affective backdrop of a situation of protracted conflict and 
violence can be simplified and abstracted, and donors ' motives for providing aid are 
framed in ostensibly apolitical notions of need and technical concerns. Through an 
evolving politics of aid to Burma and hypocrisies of the aid industry more generally, the 
myth of apolitical aid thus comes to be imposed onto a local level, which is 
fundamentally political. In the eyes of some involved, an organisation like Back Pack 
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has to either adapt or perish: 
"As you know, in the past, when they started to leave their country or when they 
started to establish these organisations, a lot of donors support[ ed] them as 
activists. And then gradually we also changed. We asked for accountability, 
transparency, and then now I think that this is also transition period for them. "Why 
in the past you accept our activism?" [ ... ] Because gradually, the funding becomes 
competitive and then also the way we are working, the world is changing. And then 
if you cannot catch up with the world, you will be behind. So that's the signal. So 
you can stay with activism; you can stay with volunteerism; it's up to you, it's your 
own choice. But for the sake of competitive ... to get competitive money, these 
characteristics are very important." [!NGO partner] 
b. Partnerships and ( de )politicisation 
Through systems of tiered partnerships such as those described above, donor 
frameworks come to be imposed onto local-level organisations receiving funding. But it 
is also through such tiered systems that that the 'messiness' of the ground can be 
abstracted, so that governments at the top of the chain can receive the evidence they 
require to demonstrate the effectiveness of their aid, without this being undermined by 
the politics of local contexts in which aid is implemented. Particularly given the 
changing (geo )political context, even when donors' aid programmes are influenced by 
political factors such as a desire to foster Burmese opposition groups, aid cannot too 
obviously be seen as political tool. So although USAID representatives I met were open 
about the historical appeal of cross-border groups in terms of their country' s political 
agenda, an outsider would be hard-pressed to find public information on USAID 
funding programmes that might be seen to violate the sovereignty of an ASEAN 
member state or that work with the protection of groups like the KNLA, which between 
2001 and 2008 featured on the US government ' s list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations. 
This backgrounding166 of more sensitive issues 1s linked to the sensitivity of cross-
166 For Achino-Loeb, 'backgrounding' is a political process, which determines what is in the shadows and what can 
be seen, whose voices are silenced or heard, and which truths come to be perceived as true (Achino-Loeb 2006). 
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border aid, which as one INGO staff member described is done "with the knowledge of 
the Thai government, if not their tacit approval", but has to remain discrete so as not to 
upset regional and international diplomatic relationships. This tacit approval on the part 
of Thai authorities - and of local authorities in particular - amounts to an implicit 
attribution of legitimacy or licitness to systems and flows officially categorised as 
illegal (Abraham and van Schendel 2005). But the ongoing functioning of these systems 
and their endorsement by powerful government donors depends on their backgrounding 
to the realm of the officially unsaid, particularly in a context of growing diplomatic and 
economic relations between Thailand and Burma, and between Western donor countries 
and ASEAN member states (Haacke 2012). 
Multi-tiered systems can facilitate a trend - reproduced by actors at different levels of 
such systems - for sensitive issues to be backgrounded, ascribed as part of the 
responsibility of those lower in the chain, and largely denied by those at the top. In 
response to my questions about funding aid workers who work under the protection of 
armed non-state actors, a Foreign Affairs representative of a country supporting cross-
border aid laughed nervously and told me that senior government officials probably 
weren't considering or really aware of issues involved; he went on to say that this was 
something he knew about but was unlikely to mention in official communications or 
reports. Other donor representatives I spoke to similarly referred to their awareness of 
the 'messiness' of aid on the ground and of a reluctance by governments to 
acknowledge this - since, for example, "on the [country] political scene, if it is known 
that we are sending people into the border areas with large amounts of cash and in the 
company of armed groups, this will be a cause for concern for the public" 167 . And as 
one member of an NGO explained with regard to a donor government's attitude to 
cross-border aid, 
"I think the less they know about that, probably the better. If we started talking 
about non-state armed groups I think they would just panic and run out of the room 
and that would be it. [There is] this sort of tacit understanding ... they know that 
167 This donor was not refening specifically to Back Pack but to other cross-border groups, which distribute cash 
assistance to communities having been affected by conflict, displacement, crop failure or other shocks to their 
livelihoods. 
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they have to be worked with in order to deliver some of this aid, but. .. there was 
not a whole lot of extensive discussion about that." 
At each of the levels from aid workers on the ground to the offices of government aid 
agencies, the 'messiness' of a situation of protracted conflict and competing political 
and armed actors is thus generally abstracted, until aid programmes fit neatly into 
official reports including depoliticised indicators of reduced mortality and morbidity, 
and the international-level fiction of apolitical aid can be preserved. Brokers at different 
levels of such systems often play a role in producing politically acceptable 
representations of aid (Mosse and Lewis 2006). And thus, in a manner reminiscent of 
Ferguson's anti-politics machine, aid is on one level depoliticised, as is the context in 
which aid is implemented, and powerful actors in an unequal politics of aid can pursue 
agendas framed in technocratic and largely unobjectionable terms (Ferguson 1990) -
while at the same time, international aid remains influenced by (geo )political 
considerations and, for members of the local organisation, humanitarian action is 
inseparable from a specific politico-moral vision. 
Tensions ans1ng when Back Pack attempts to fit into donors ' definitions of 
humanitarianism are also linked to a problem of multiple accountabilities. As noted by 
researchers on accountability in other contexts, obtaining international funding means 
that Back Pack becomes accountable to donors and no longer just to its constituency as 
an organisation born of a particular socio-political context ( e.g. Crawley 1998; Edwards 
and Hulme 1995; Kilby 2004a; 2006; 2011). When I asked one leader who Back Pack is 
accountable to, however, he told me they are accountable to their mother organisations 
inside Burma and, via these, to local communities. For the leaders, ethnic nationalist 
organisations are legitimate and representative authorities. The problem that emerged 
during my fieldwork is that the legitimacy and representativeness of ethnic nationalist 
groups still opposing the government, in particular the KNU /KNLA, ca1ne to be 
questioned within academic as well as diplomatic and donor circles. The work of 
researchers influential in donor circles contributed to a generalisation of cross-border 
groups as "humanitarian wings of armed organisations" (South, et al. 2010: 41 ). In Back 
Pack's case, it also glossed over a more complex reality, where - as described in 
previous chapters - medics are recruited from socio-political systems in Burma, but 
these are better understood as para-state systems, some of which have beco1ne aligned 
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with the state while others are branded as illegal because of continued resistance by 
associated armed groups (Gallant 1999). 
Reports criticising cross-border aid also reinforce a common reduction in donor circles 
of ethnic nationalist organisations to their armed wings. For men and women I worked 
with, however, groups like the KNU are legitimate government-type systems with their 
own administrative structures and cannot be reduced to their armed forces. But at the 
same time as local actors faced significant (geo )political changes, cross-border groups 
were conceptually reduced to "humanitarian wings of armed organisations" (South, et 
al. 2010: 41); ethnic nationalist organisations were reduced to their armed forces; and 
increasing questioning of the legitimacy of former 'good guys' clashed in fundamental 
and often disconcerting ways with the politico-moral worldviews of the medics and 
their leaders. Resulting cognitive dissonance sometimes provoked understandably 
emotive reactions. When I asked one senior medic what he thought of claims that cross-
border aid feeds into the dynamics of conflict, he responded: "the people who say that 
are not human beings." 
A side effect of Back Pack's continued search for international legitimacy at a time of 
growing criticism of cross-border aid is that people on the ground often become 
reluctant to discuss what does not fit into donors' ostensibly apolitical definitions of 
humanitarianism. While they gradually told me more of their stories as they accepted 
me into the office, leaders tend not to publicly mention more political aspects of their 
organisation's history, with the All-Burma Student's Democratic Front all but 
eradicated from the official version of Back Pack's creation - particularly after the 
ABSDF was included in the US list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations in 2001 168 . 
During my fieldwork, criticisms that cross-border aid fuels conflict and the leaders' 
difficulties in fitting their functioning into international frameworks led to the issue of 
how medics work on the ground with para-state systems and non-state actors being 
increasingly backgrounding. 
168 The ABSDF was subsequently removed from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations in 2010. 
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Such backgrounding of systems that local organisations like Back Pack work with and 
through means that the value of these systems and the extent to which they can be built 
on in a future Burma comes to be underappreciated. Instead of generating more open 
discussion about these issues, critical analyses of cross-border aid by foreign 
researchers - since these reflect and fed into an evolving politics of aid, where cross-
border groups went from 'good guys' to drivers of conflict - contribute to 
understandable defensiveness. One donor thus lamented that researchers 
"have contributed to an environment 1n which we can't have an honest 
conversation about civil society organisations and para-state organisations. We 
need to have a conversation that holds to account the civil society organisations in 
terms of their role within the transition to democracy and building of solidarity [ ... ] 
Unlike a lot of other protracted emergencies, here we do have organisational 
capacity and strong civil society. As donors, we can either fracture civil society or 
we can increase solidarity [ ... ] What is happening now is that we are pitting 
organisations against each other when in fact they are working within the same 
sector, in the same country and with the same systems." 
C. Implications of international legitimacy for a humanitarian struggle 
Back Pack can be conceptualised as operating within a particular type of 'humanitarian 
encounter' where, as described by Rossi, actors unequally situated within a shifting 
field of power mobilise different discourses and forms of capital in the pursuit of 
sometimes conflicting agendas (Rossi 2004; 2006). Within this humanitarian encounter, 
brokers at different levels play a key role in mediating flows of capital, in determining 
the success of humanitarian projects, and in producing particular representations of aid 
(Mosse and Lewis 2006). These representations, in tum, tend to fit into definitions of 
humanitarianism promoted by more powerful actors. This system can then tend to 
depoliticise what for those on the ground is a fundamentally political situation. Back 
Pack's leaders are then forced into a new struggle - a struggle against the separation of 
their political and moral vision from the humanitarian discourses and practices through 
which they seek legitimacy for this vision. 
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As discussed in Chapter 1, the international aid industry has witnessed the 
multiplication of frameworks and practices of humanitarianism; and while for advocates 
of humanitarian intervention like Annan or Kouchner, the meaning of sovereignty may 
have changed in parallel with the development of frameworks such as the 
Responsibility to Protect, the mobilisation of such frameworks remains contingent on 
the political decisions of world powers (Chandler 2007; Rieff 2002; Saillant 2006). 
Here again, Abraham and van Shendel' s analysis of attributions of legitimacy to 
transnational flows allows for a better understanding of cross-border aid and of the 
politics of aid more generally (Abraham and van Schendel 2005). Indeed, the 
mobilisation of principles and frameworks of humanitarianism also depends on the 
legitimacy that powerful actors in international 'humanitarian government' accord to 
different humanitarian actions, and on the legitimacy they attribute to the government of 
a country in which a humanitarian intervention takes place. 
So while Back Pack's leaders and their partners defend the legitimacy of their actions -
which is in tum linked with an attribution of legitimacy to the systems they work with 
and through and of illegitimacy to the Burmese state - the licitness of these actions at 
the international level depends on their endorsement by powerful government donors, 
with the latter being key players in contemporary international 'humanitarian 
government' (Fassin 2012; Rieff 2002). Attributions of legitimacy by donors are in tum 
linked to a number of factors - including donor countries' attempts to promote 
international peace and development in line with Western liberal democratic values, 
considerations of a state's respect for the rights of its citizens, but also political and 
geopolitical concerns (Curtis 2001; De Waal 2007; 2010; Duffield 2001). 
Towards the end of my fieldwork, I asked Poe Say whether he thought that Back Pack's 
work could be described as humanitarian resistance. Chuckling at the question, he told 
me that it was better to call it a humanitarian struggle, 
" [b]ecause we are struggle [for] our freedom, for that. .. Because political crisis, it 
means the humanitarian crisis. Some people would like to see, to separate political 
problem and humanitarian problem. You cannot separate like that." 
Through their humanitarian struggle, Back Pack's leaders are also struggling against the 
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depoliticisation of their work and of the situation that created the need for their work in 
the first place. Tensions arise because the leaders seek recognition and legitimacy at an 
international level, where aid programmes tend to be defined within ostensibly 
apolitical frameworks. As described in previous chapters, Back Pack' s positioning as 
representative of victims of the Burmese state is key to the ways in which the 
organisation seeks legitimacy at the international level. But while the leaders seek 
recognition of a history of suffering, as well as trying to promote a 'motivated truth' 
that seeks international support for political change in Burma (Redfield 2006), donors 
more often than not expect technocratic conformity. Internationally funded 
humanitarian programmes might indeed be framed in a discourse of compassion for 
victims, but a politics of compassion can simultaneously undermine attempts to secure 
political recognition of the rights and agendas of those designated as victims (Fassin 
2012). So when aid workers who are also victims draw on the resources provided by 
international humanitarian systems to facilitate their political agency and advance a 
specific politico-moral agenda, this can create tensions in an international system of 
'humanitarian government' that still prefers victims to be apolitical aid recipients and 
that remains dictated by the (geo )political interests of powerful states, themselves 
generally framed in apolitical terms. 
The analogy of the glass, which was used to describe donors' demands for 
accountability and transparency, can also apply to requirements that donors make of 
local-level organisations, when the latter have to fit into their definitions of aid and how 
it should work. It also illustrates the absurdity of contemporary aid systems that support 
organisations, which in Poe Say's words "did not come from the sky", and later require 
them to be apolitical while donors themselves are inevitably influenced by 
(geo )political concerns. The dilemma that the medics and their leaders then face is how 
to grapple with a changing context, in which the legitimacy ascribed to different actors 
is shifting in fundamental and often disconcerting ways. As an NGO staff member 
reminded me one day, "you can't expect people to just step out of their skin and to 
suddenly leave the struggle behind". At a time of significant political change, the 
difficulty of stepping out of one's skin is highlighted and raises important dilemmas, 
which will be further discussed in the following chapter. 
225 

CH 7: Beyond Burma: finding a place in a changing 
Myanmar 
Sunday 7 November 2010 was a fairly sombre day in Back Pack's office. Until then, 
when I asked medics and leaders about the elections, their responses indicated disbelief 
in the government's sincerity. The elections and Border Guard Force (BGF) plan were 
interpreted as attempts by an illegitimate regime to reinforce its grip on power under the 
pretence of democratic legitimacy. Voting was not held in parts of the borderlands, the 
government citing instability and conflict as reasons for disenfranchising entire 
communities 169. Medics from areas where voting was held told staff in Mae Sot of 
villagers being forced to vote for the military-backed Union Solidarity Development 
Party170• Back Pack members thus tended to believe that the elections would make life 
worse for ethnic minorities. As Burmese citizens voted for the first time in twenty years, 
men and women I worked with were glued to their computers and mobile phones for 
updates, but were not optimistic about the outcome. And when new outbreaks of 
fighting in Burma led to mass influxes of civilians into Thailand, it initially seemed 
their predictions were right. As one leader told me: 
"So before elections, most of the INGOs want to go to provide assistance through 
Rangoon, and they will cut the cross-border assistance, because this is started to the 
democracy process in Burma. But we ... particularly me, before the elections, I met 
with any NGOs or the government agency, I told to them tI:iat after elections, there 
will be more fighting in border areas, ethnic areas. They don't believe me! Maybe 
you too, you don't believe me! Because finally, right now, you can see more 
fighting - Shan State, Kachin State, not only the Karen State!" 
169 Prior to the elections, the Electoral Commission was criticised for disenfranchising hundreds of thousands of 
ethnic minority community members by cancelling voting altogether in several townships in Kachin, Karenni, Karen, 
Mon, and Shan States. hUD: //www.crisisgrouo.or2./en/re2:ions/asia/south-easr--asia/rnvan1nar/K teine-ahlbrandt-Fon1.et-
About-the-Sham-Burrnesc-EJections.asox - last accessed 12 January 2013. 
170 The Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) is the military-backed party created in March 2010 to contest 
the Burmese elections. It is led by former military officers including U Thein Sein, who became president when the 
USDP won the 2010 elections. The USDP was created from the former Union Solidarity and Development 
Association (USDA) - a military-backed organisation created in 1993 and criticised for harassing, intimidating, and 
violence against Burmese civilians. The USDA was deemed responsible for the 'Depayin Massacre' in 2003, when 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's convey was attacked and some seventy people were killed (NDD 2006). 
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During following weeks and months, Back Pack's response to increased conflict and 
displacement highlighted the strength of networks developed over a decade, as well as 
dilemmas faced by a 'humanitarian struggle' in a changing (geo )political context. In 
this final ethnographic chapter, I will describe how men and woman I worked with 
reacted to the elections and subsequent events, and how political evolutions impacted 
on Back Pack's operational space. I will pursue themes explored in Chapter 6 by 
discussing efforts to engage with international-level frameworks, and ways in which an 
evolving politics of aid was also leading to attempts to redefine legitimate humanitarian 
action. And I will highlight what this ethnographic example demonstrates in terms of 
possibilities and dilemmas when networks born out of a particular socio-historical 
context are utilised to channel aid during a recognised emergency, but also offer 
considerable potential to be harnessed for the redevelopment of above-ground health 
systems. Indeed, while Back Pack has accessed international humanitarian funding for 
over a decade, it has done so to support the sustainable development of community-
level systems - elegant categories of 'emergency' and 'development' don't fit so well 
onto a local-level context, which is much more fluid. 
Ultimately, the discussion in this chapter agam illustrates the point that - in an 
international context that has witnessed the proliferation of humanitarian actors, 
systems and practices - the debate around cross-border aid and the politics of aid more 
generally can be better understood by analysing attributions of legitimacy to different 
systems by actors unequally situated in an international system of 'humanitarian 
government'. The often-emotive and polarised debate around cross-border aid then 
needs to be understood in relation to evolving attributions of legitimacy - with 
international-level shifts coming to clash with the perspectives of local-level actors 
whose worldviews are informed by an embodied history of state violence, and whose 
actions continue to be framed by a drive to obtain political recognition. 
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A. Views of Burma's elections from the border 
On the day of the elections, a faction of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) 
that had refused to join the Border Guard Force seized Myawaddy, the Burmese town 
across the river from Mae Sot. The next day, fighting broke out with Tatmadaw forces. 
When I an·ived at Back Pack's office and asked if it was true that several hundred 
civilians had fled into Thailand, the leaders told me to go and see for myself: there were 
at least 10,000 people in the Thai military base down the road and more were coming, 
fleeing fighting and mortars that were even landing on Thai soil. I accompanied a group 
of medics who, desperate to help, were taking boxes of Oral Rehydration Salts to the 
makeshift camp. 
Staff of INGOs and UNHCR, who had spent months discussing what might happen 
after the elections, rushed around attempting head counts. Back Pack and Burmese 
community groups cooked food for the displaced civilians, which was distributed by the 
Thai Red Cross. Medics from Mae Tao Clinic and Back Pack set up a temporary clinic. 
A seemingly endless series of coordination meetings were organised by NGOs. After 
one meeting, a Back Pack leader exclaimed: 
"All of the NGOs say they have funding and they can help. But then they say that 
before you give the support, you need to have a meeting and coordinate with 
UNHCR or someone and you need to have an assessment! [ . .. ] Just give them the 
food, stop talking about it! All they want to do is assessm·ents - just go down to 
there to the camp, you will see that they are hungry and they have no food!" 
Two days after the first mass influx, we watched as Thai soldiers told the civilians that 
it was safe to go home and starting rounding them up into trucks to be driven back into 
Burma. One of my Back Pack friends was shaking with anger as she said, "I don't 
believe them! It is not safe, there is still fighting." Myawaddy residents had told us they 
were afraid to go back and didn't trust the Thai army's assurances that fighting was 
over. The clock stuck 6 pm, and the remaining civilians who had been squatting in 
groups in the red dust were made to stand for the Thai national anthem, surrounded by 
heavily armed Thai soldiers. Thai journalists filmed the scene, which was later shown in 
the national press as a demonstration of Thai-Myanmar friendship. 
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Over following weeks, fighting between the Tatmadaw and Karen armed groups spread 
along the border. Initial battles in November and December led to mass influxes of 
civilians into Thailand, where they were given temporary shelter in officially-
designated areas referred to as holding sites. Thai authorities allowed NGOs to provide 
aid, albeit inconsistently, at times allowing access to some but not others. But by 25 th 
December, the Thai military had emptied the last holding site, attracting criticism from 
international organisations claiming that conflict and abuses made it unsafe to send 
civilians back to Burma 171 . Local sources claimed that Thai authorities were afraid that 
holding sites would grow into more permanent camps and were also bowing to pressure 
from the Burmese government. The latter was said to not want the international 
community to see evidence of conflict and - in later weeks and months - also claimed 
that people fleeing fighting had links with and were supporting Karen ' insurgents' 172. 
By early 2011, there were over 10,000 Karen villagers who had fled fighting and were 
hiding along the river separating the two countries, or in fields, villages or monasteries 
on Thai soil. Thai authorities prohibited NGOs from accessing border areas. Members 
of organisations like Back Pack, Mae Tao Clinic and other Burmese CBOs, who 
initially responded on an individual basis, became increasingly organised and worked 
together as part of the Emergency Relief Team (ERT) to provide essential aid including 
food, shelter and healthcare. 
The response of Back Pack members and partners working under the ERT banner 
illustrated their ability to draw on existing networks to respond to a situation where 
international organisations were again denied access, albeit this time also on Thai soil. 
171 htto://v.rww.unhcr.org/ref-'world/docid/4dlc3668?J1trnJ - last accessed 12 January 2012. 
http ://w,vw.hrw.onz/news/2010/12/04/burma-evewitness-accomits-abuses-eastern-fighting - last accessed 12 January 
2012. 
Human rights abuses were reported in connection with the escalated fighting in parts of eastern Burma following the 
elections. Another major concern for civilians made to return into conflict-affected parts of Karen State was the 
increasing number of unmarked landmines planted around villages and fields by state and non-state armed actors. 
Back Pack medics working with ERT treated a number of civilians injured by landmines in these areas. E.g. 
htto://wvv1:v.backpackteam.onz/w1)-contenth.mloads/?0l 1/02/BPf-I\VT%20report%?015 Feb ?01 J. %20FINAL.pdf -
last accessed 12 January 2012. 
172 Back Pack medics working in the area as part of ER T also came across and treated a number of male villagers 
who were accused of being part of the breakaway DKBA faction and tortured by Tatmadaw soldiers. One of the Back 
Pack medics working for ERT in the area was given training to collect basic information about such abuses of human 
rights. He would interview villagers he met and bring back notes, which were written up into reports in the Back 
Pack office. 
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ERT worked 'under the radar', through members of organisations like Back Pack who 
could discretely access displaced villagers by cooperating with community leaders on 
both sides of the border. After holding sites were closed, NGOs that were legally 
registered in Thailand and had to abide by official stipulations on access channelled 
assistance through groups working in the 'legal-illegal'. NGOs secured funding from 
back-donors; ERT members channelled aid to displaced communities173 . This 
arrangement implied an attribution of legitimacy to the ERT' s system by some NGOs 
and, by implication, by their government back-donors. But while the ERT's response 
could then be conceptualised as licit from the perspective of international actors 
endorsing it, it had to remain largely invisible as it was illegal within the regulatory 
regime defined by the Thai state (Abraham and van Schendel 2005). 
Back Pack leaders and medics described it as their duty- in a situation where displaced 
civilians were denied access to official camps 174 and international organisations could 
not assist them - to help people whose experiences of conflict, abuses and displacement 
they related to their own; this duty outweighed risks involved. As Poe Say explained: 
"When the Thai authorities do not allow the people going to the camp, we need our 
own people, our own community, the CBOs~ to establish the assistance, the relief 
agency. Because of they could not allow by the Thai government. So if I say like 
that, you can ask the question: "Why? The CBOs can receive the permission by 
Thai authorities?" No! Even though no, we had to take a risk, we had to take risk 
because of this is our task. The people, they are suffering, we have to helping them. 
Even though they are arrested ... One example, we have three people, they were 
arrested by the Thai police, Thai military. So even though they are arrested, after 
release from the jail, they go again. So this is our task." 
173 NGOs could also mediate between local-level Thai systems and groups working in the 'legal-illegal'. For 
example, one INGO had for a number of years worked with Thai Ministry of Health staff to set up health posts along 
the border. Staff of the INGO introduced members of ERT's health team - which included medics from Back Pack, 
Mae Tao Clinic and Burma Medical Association - to local Thai health workers, enabling them to share information 
for emergency cases and disease control. However, these local-level connections had to remain 'under the radar' to 
be able to function. 
174 After December 2010, displaced civilians were denied access to the holding sites that Thai authorities initially 
established in the aftermath of the elections. They were also prevented from the entering existing temporary shelters 
for people fleeing fighting (commonly referred to as refugee camps) in which UNHCR has a mandate to provide 
protection for civilians fleeing conflict and abuses. 
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Poe Say was referring to an incident when three men - including Kyaw Lwin, one of 
Back Pack's office workers - were arrested while providing assistance as part of ERT. 
By this time, Kyaw Lwin had worked with Back Pack for six years, after travelling 
from the Irrawaddy Delta to Thailand in search of work. After the elections, he 
coordinated relief for displaced villagers. On 8 May 2011, he was on his way to a 
village on the border where families had been hiding since post-election fighting and 
abuses forced them to flee to Thailand. Kyaw Lwin and the other men were in two 
trucks carrying dry food rations when they met a border patrol of the Royal Thai Army: 
"Thai soldiers saw, "Where you sending to? You sending them for KNU and 
DKBA175 , right?" they said. We replied, "No, we are sending for the villagers." 
They didn't believe it. They thought we were mainly sending to them [i.e. KNLA 
and DKBA]." [Kyaw Lwin] 
After two nights in detention, Kyaw Lwin was deported into Burma. When I next saw 
him, he had snuck back into Thailand and returned to Back Pack. He had shaved his 
head to remove the bad luck. He had been unlucky, he explained, since on previous 
occasions Thai authorities had turned a blind eye to him distributing aid along the 
border. On the day of his arrest, however, fighting had broken out in Karen State 
opposite the area where he had gone to distribute food. When Thai soldiers arrived to 
assess the situation, they accused him of supporting Karen armed groups - perhaps, he 
thought, because he had told the soldiers that the supplies came from Mae Tao Clinic, 
and a group of people linked ,:vith the clinic had previously been accused of assisting 
the breakaway DKBA faction when they were caught illegally crossing the border. 
Indeed, before Kyaw Lwin's arrest, the Royal Thai Army's Provincial Task Force had 
issued three warnings to Mae Tao Clinic for claimed illegal activities, including 
providing assistance to Karen armed groups. 
While Back Pack leaders explained the ER T response as an extension of their duty to 
assist suffering communities, some of their INGO partners and donors voiced concern 
175 This refers to the faction of the DKBA that refused to become a Border Guard Force and seized Myawaddy on the 
day of Burma's elections, leading to scaled up fighting and displacement. Soldiers from this faction operated in areas 
of Karen State opposite Thailand's Tak Province. 
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that they were overstretching resources and jeopardising systems developed over a 
decade to support health services inside Burma. Several donors and INGO partners I 
spoke to questioned Back Pack's involvement, comparing it with the organisation' s 
participation in the post-Nargis Emergency Assistance Team. One donor rather 
cynically described the leaders in both cases as 'just making the point that the 
government of Burma sucks". Other donors and INGO staff highlighted risks that were 
exposed by Kyaw Lwin's arrest and deportation. Like Kyaw Lwin, ERT members 
providing aid to newly-displaced Karen villagers were undocumented - and when Back 
Pack members contacted UNHCR for help, there was nothing the UN actors could do to 
prevent Kyaw Lwin's deportation. Like Back Pack's systems in Burma, the ERT in 
Thailand functioned 'under the radar' and through people who are considered illegals. 
In both cases, discourses of humanitarianism and human rights were deployed by the 
leaders to frame their activities. But these frameworks fail to protect those within a 
system that relies on the grey areas of the 'legal-illegal' to function. 
Indeed, even if such systems are endorsed as licit through the support of INGOs and 
government back-donors, this symbolic endorsement does not translate into the 
legalisation of a particular type of humanitarian intervention, which instead continues to 
be framed by state definitions of legality (Abraham and van Schendel 2005). Therefore 
while some INGOs and donors channel assistance via systems like Back Pack or ERT to 
communities that cannot be accessed through state-sanctioned humanitarian 
mechanisms, the resulting system also has the effect of reproducing an unequal 
distribution of risks between actors at different levels. And so, as Fassin describes of aid 
systems elsewhere, an unequal politics of life is revealed through ways in which 
systems for aid provision - here legitimised but not legalised by powerful international 
actors - risk the security and lives of individuals like Kyaw Lwin ( and like Waw Lay 
and Hsa Moo, whose arrest and detention was described in Chapter 5), while protecting 
others higher up in the chain and absolving them of responsibility for what remains 
defined as an illegal activity (Fassin 2007b; 2012). 
The discomfort expressed by some of Back Pack's long-term donors and partners is also 
linked to a shifting politics of aid. As highlighted in Chapter 6, some donors and 
intermediary NGOs were by this stage less willing to be associated with local-level 
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groups seen as displaying activism - or, rather, an activism that clashes with a changing 
(geo )political landscape and parallel shifts in legitimacy. Back Pack's role in the post-
election response, continued criticism of the Burmese government, and increased 
involvement in advocacy against the Thai government's refoulement of Karen villagers 
- which are all consistent with the organisation's politico-moral vision and with the 
interpretation of humanitarians as having a role in witnessing - were thus interpreted by 
some as indications of what one INGO member described as the persistence of a 
political "fever": 
"It's that here, you can see a lot of fever, fever-type of things. It's that when you 
are talking about this conflict, they want to join this. Sometimes maybe you are 
working for other things, but you want to chip in, you want to join. [ ... ] I want to 
interpret it as more like: they came from political community, and so that kind of 
fever, they want to transfer in humanitarian arena." 
This reflects a view of humanitarian NGOs as having to be more professional and 
technocratic, and less political or passionate ( e.g. Collowald 2002; Gross-Stein 2008; Le 
Naelou and Freyss 2004; Pandolfi 2002; Terry 2002). But it also needs to be understood 
in light of shifts in attributions of legitimacy described in these chapters, since the type 
of "fever" displayed by groups like Back Pack does not fit with changing political tides. 
Discomfort with such "fever", moreover, is related to the evolving relationship between 
Thailand and Burma, which impacts on donor and INGO concerns and can potentially 
reshape the operational space of organisations functioning in the grey zones of the 
borderlands. At the time of Kyaw Lwin's arrest, Back Pack's leaders were grappling 
with what some observers call the dilemma of visibility. As explained by a foreigner 
working with the groups, 
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"Mae Tao Clinic has been threatened, what? Three times? Kyaw Lwin has been 
anested. [ ... ] It's not just ERT-related, it's post-election ... it's also everything that 
comes as a result of being post-election and the new Thai election and, you know, 
Thai Foreign Minister going to meet with the Burmese government ... I think it's 
all tied up and it's very difficult to pull the bits apart. But to me what's interesting 
is the constant weighing up of the CB Os about how much they can say." 
As mentioned in previous chapters, Thai authorities cannot officially endorse Mae Tao 
Clinic or cross-border groups like Back Pack, since they are effectively illegal and can 
be seen to violate Burma's sovereignty. But as a senior Thai health official explained, 
"if we ask the authorities that have to take care of the health in this area, they will 
overlook about the issue of illegal". Historically, the groups' ability to function has 
been linked to unofficially-recognised benefits of their work: cross-border aid 
contributes to disease control in border areas and stems influxes of people seeking 
services in Thailand; Mae Tao Clinic relieves the burden of an unregistered Burmese 
population on Thai health systems. But with new governments in Burma and Thailand 
since 2011 and growing diplomatic and economic ties between the countries, the 
situation becomes more complex. Back Pack's effectiveness in attracting international 
attention to the situation in border areas can have potentially adverse impacts on it~ 
operational space - hence the dilemma of visibility. This is all the more the case in that, 
although the leaders' contacts in the Thai military asked them to maintain a low profile 
so as not to negatively impact on Thailand's relationship with Burma, the leaders have 
continued to accompany service provision with high-profile advocacy against the 
Burmese government. 
So in this border area, where international laws and frameworks were historically not 
mobilised to ensure humanitarian access to populations denied assistance by state 
restrictions, humanitarian space is instead shaped by the tacit agreement of local-level 
actors on the Thai side of the border ( and their implicit attribution of licitness to 
systems with recognised benefits), and by the symbolic endorsement entailed through 
international donor funding. But the preservation of this humanitarian space and the 
attributions of licitness on which it depends in tum rely on a precarious balancing act, in 
which political and economic interests are also at stake. As the (geo )political playing 
field shifted during my fieldwork, the nature of an organisation like Back Pack could 
potentially destabilise the balance, since it maintains political activism as an integral 
part of humanitarianism and works with and through socio-political systems labelled as 
illegal by the Burmese state. 
In the post-election period, Thailand has had growing interests in Burma's political 
stability and in improving historically unstable relations with its ASEAN neighbour. As 
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described in Chapter 2, Thai authorities historically fostered links with groups like the 
KNU/KNLA, which were opposed to a government then seen as a potential threat to 
Thai national security and which previously had control over vast areas of the 
borderlands, including trade routes and resource-rich areas (Buszynski 1998; South 
2011). But Thailand's buffer policy was increasingly substituted by what observers 
sometimes call a development policy, with Thailand competing with Burma's other 
neighbours for investment and trade opportunities (Pongsawat 2007; Thant Myint U 
2012). In the lead up to and aftermath of Burma's elections, fighting in border areas 
thwarted multi-billion dollar development projects supported by Thai state-owned and 
private companies, such as the Dawei Deep-Sea Port and Special Economic Zone176 . 
Growing investment and trade were also said to be impeded by Thai authorities 
allowing Burmese groups in places like Mae Sot to use Thailand as a space out of which 
to organise political and armed opposition. As a senior Thai politician told me, the 
"Foreign Ministry in fact is dying to change its policy in Burma, meaning to have a 
friendly approach to Burma, and to be out of the control of Western countries over 
how it looks at Burma [ ... ] And then they believe that it's because of the 
opposition inside Thailand and it's giving this [government] a bad name. Hence the 
threat." 
As these shifts took place, local Thai authorities increasingly criticised Burmese 
opposition groups and denounced NGOs on the border for supporting armed groups and 
perpetuating a situation of instability going against Thai interests. Evolutions in Thai 
authorities' rhetoric thus reflected changes in attributions of licitness or legitimacy, 
themselves linked with shifting political and economic interests. At a meeting in early 
2011 with UNHCR and NGO staff, Thai authorities warned NGOs not to support 
Burmese political groups and alleged that some were providing food support to the 
Karen resistance. The then-Governor of Tak Province highlighted mobile health teams 
working under the umbrella of Mae Tao Clinic, saying that they should cease going to 
the border as this was damaging Thailand's relations with Burma. The Governor's 
statements were sometimes extreme and stakeholders in Bangkok often dismissed them 
176http://w\V\v.globalasia.org/V6N4 \Vjnter 2011 /Pavin Chachavaloornrpun.html?PHPSESSID=?7e?e5fleea77f9e2 
45c9113.;;8886d55 - last accessed 12 January 2012. 
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as not representative of national perspectives. But his words and actions - and those of 
senior military officials who issued warnings to Mae Tao Clinic - influenced local-level 
relations and perceptions. When I met him in mid-2011, the Governor told me that, 
"from the Burmese intelligence and also Thai, [ we are told that] Dr. Cynthia already 
became the leader of the KNU". This would have been laughable had it not pointed to 
ways in which influential local authorities with a stake in expanding economic and 
political ties with Burma were portraying groups providing aid on the border as 
indistinct from non-state armed actors, which were increasingly seen as an impediment 
to these interests. 
B. Redefining humanitarianism? 
"I don't think that being political 1neans that you can 't deliver aid. UNOCHA 177 
doesn't feel that way either. There are guidelines that say when it is and when it 
isn't appropriate to have armed escorts for aid workers ... So I think it ' s very easy to 
say "if you are politically aligned you are bad"; it's easy to say "if you have an 
armed escort you are bad", but I don't think we live in a black and white world." 
[ GHAP Field Director, East-West Border Areas] 
As the politics of aid to Burma evolved and as it faced a potentially changing 
operational space, Back Pack was also continuously refining its version of 
humanitarianism. As described in Chapter 6, success in obtaining international funding 
compels the organisation to demonstrate that it fits into international-level frameworks. 
But engagement with international frameworks is also driven by concern to ensure that 
programmes do not result in unintended negative consequences, as well as attempts by 
the leaders and their partners to grapple with criticisms of their work. 
During the development of the DflD proposal mentioned in Chapter 6, DflD sent many 
questions to which the leaders would sometimes ask me to help write up responses in 
"pretty English". One question in February 2010 related to political neutrality. After 
sitting me down at a computer, Poe Say fetched a document entitled General Principles 
177 UNOCHA is the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Field Director was 
refetTing to UNOCHA's guidelines on the Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys, discussed 
below (UN OCHA 200 I). 
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of Humanitarian Assistance, which Back Pack has signed up to as part of the Forum of 
Community Organisations-Burma (FCOB) - an umbrella group of Burmese 
organisations on the border. Pointed at the clause stating that "All humanitarian 
assistance should be led to democratic changes in Burma", he said that Back Pack 
cannot be neutral (Figure 1 ). But on another level, he speculated, Back Pack is neutral 
because medics do not discriminate in providing healthcare. A couple of days later, the 
leader called me back into his office and asked me to help update the English translation 
of the Principles, including a clause specifying "Humanitarian assistance should do no 
harm to the community". 
Figure 1: FCOB principles of humanitarian assistance 
General Principles of Humanitarian Assistance {Feb. 2010 version) 
1. Hurn anitar1an ass istanc e must be resp e.cted or Human Rights. 
2. Hurn anita rian assistance should be non-discrlminat ory regard less of race_, etht icitV> ge nder or rel igion. 
3. Every step of pro gr a m's activ iti es must be conducted in partners! ip with the community. 
4. Humanita rian assist ance strategies must be su stainable in regards to comrrn . m ity resources. 
5. Systems of accountability must be establ ished at t he beg inning of any partnership for providing 
hu rna nitarian asslsta nee. 
6. Humanita rian assist ance must be avoided on creating co nflicts among the community·. 
7. Humani ta rian assist ance should do no har m to t he comrnunity·, 
8. All hu rnanitarian assistance shou ld be !ed to democratic changes in Burma. 
At a meeting two months later, FCOB members reviewed the Principles. One member 
suggested that Clause 8 could lead to donor criticism on the basis that humanitarian aid 
should supposedly not be political. Another retaliated: "all aid is political; if you decide 
to work with the SPDC, that's political." Clause 8 was kept but modified to better 
reflect the original Burmese version - it then read: "All humanitarian assistance must 
promote democratic practices." 
Discussions of Back Pack's model tie into a broader debate about neutrality, 
impartiality and their interpretations and implications, about the appropriate relationship 
between humanitarianism and politics, and about the legitimacy of systems labelled as 
humanitarian. During my fieldwork, Back Pack's leaders and partners grappled with 
debates that have shaped the history of humanitarianism. But in the evolving politics of 
aid to Burma, these debates often seemed to be taking place in a historical 'bubble' - so 
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much so that the now commonplace contention that aid can 'do harm' was presented as 
almost groundbreaking in donor circles. Powerful actors in an unequal 'humanitarian 
encounter' tended to maintain an apolitical veneer, when in fact humanitarianism has 
become an authoritative discourse framing state interventions and non-interventions, 
and when their own funding decisions were influenced by (geo )political considerations 
(De Waal 2007; 2010; Fassin 2012; Macrae 2002; Randel, et al. 2004; Rieff 2002; 
Spearin 2008; Weiss 1999). Some such actors, moreover, attempted to redefine systems 
as not humanitarian in ways that often denied operational and political realities, and 
relied on anachronistic definitions of humanitarianism. 
The argument that "all aid is political" is far from new at the international level ( e.g. 
Curtis 2001; De Waal 1997; Fassin 2012; Redfield 2011; Rieff 2002; Weiss 1999). But 
as described in these chapters, Back Pack members were grappling with a situation 
where the international-level political determinants of aid were more often than not 
glossed over, and local-level actors whose political viewpoints no longer fit an evolving 
(geo )political playing field were increasingly accused of being too political - or non-
neutral, with the latter becoming synonymous, in the lexicon of some powerful 
stakeholders, with not humanitarian. As a result, Back Pack members often interpreted 
criticisms of their work as meaning that they aren't allowed a political opinion - when 
at the international level, there is a long history of politically engaged humanitarianism. 
The FCOB Principles above emphasise impartiality. As a Programme Coordinator 
explained, 
"As I am health worker, so I have a duty that I have to be responsible for every 
single people who needs healthcare: even SPDC, or even KNLA, or even KNU, or 
even DKBA. So they all are human beings. So I think we have to treat the same." 
Back Pack, however, has not endorsed neutrality as a principle for humanitarian action. 
Discussions with leaders and medics suggested that there is much confusion in relation 
to this principle. This is not surprising, given that international stakeholders have 
historically become increasingly divided about what neutrality means and whether it is a 
viable standard for the operationalisation of aid - and because of their difficulties with 
neutrality, many NGOs have abandoned the principle and focused instead on 
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impartiality (Curtis 2001; Hendrickson 1998; Leader 1998; Macrae 1998; Redfield 
2011; Slim 1997). 
Back Pack leaders and medics often argue that, as victims of the military regime, they 
cannot be neutral. Neutrality, for them, translates into indifference to injustice, 
oppression and suffering. As described in earlier chapters, Back Pack thus rejects the 
interpretation of neutrality as silence and combines assistance with denunciation of 
human rights abuses and oppression - thereby engaging in the type of witnessing first 
popularised by MSF (Redfield 2006; Rieff 2002). On another level, the issue of 
neutrality relates to operational systems. Neutrality then becomes "the assurance given 
by humanitarian agencies that their efforts are not in military support of either side"; 
impartiality, which is often confused with neutrality, "means such effort is rendered to 
the noncombatant population of each side without distinction and according to need" 
(Anderson 2004: 41 ). Many people I spoke to during my fieldwork, however, reduced 
the multi-faceted implications of neutrality178 to the question of whether aid workers 
work with non-state armed actors. This simplistic reduction of neutrality often implied 
that links with armed non-state actors are in themselves problematic, whether or not 
evidence proves that the humanitarian effort advances the cause of those non-state 
actors - thereby forsaking the wider meaning of operational neutrality and potentially 
subordinating the principle of impartiality to a narrow definition of humanitarianism. 
As described in Chapter 6, in the period leading up to and following Burma's elections, 
influential criticisms of cross-border aid drew attention to aid groups' links with non-
state armed actors, and particularly resistance groups. These criticisms generally 
ignored ways in which cross-border groups like Back Pack also work with ceasefire 
groups and thus can to an extent be seen to work with socio-political actors on different 
' sides' of an evolving conflict. Even if cross-border groups are impartial in delivering 
178 Plattner defines three key ingredients to the neutral position: abstention, prevention and impartiality. Abstention 
means no involvement in military or ideological activity. Prevention means that the organisation must ensure that no 
party to conflict is able to use the organisation or its resources to its advantage. And impa1iiality requires the 
organisation to apply equal terms in dealing with different warring parties (Plattner 1996). In the history of 
humanitarianism, debates around neutrality have tended to associate the principle with the Red Cross tradition of 
confidentiality on the one hand, and with operational systems on the other - and so it is that an organisation like MSF 
has historically engaged in humanitarian witnessing while also maintaining its operational neutrality and 
independence from the military or political activities of waiTing paiiies (Curtis 2001; Redfield 2006; 2011 ). 
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aid, it was argued that their activities at the very least legitimise the struggle of armed 
opposition groups (South, et al. 2010) - a claim that, for many involved and from a 
social justice perspective becomes moot, when aid is channelled to populations 
deliberately targeted by state violence, denied their basic human rights, and prevented 
from accessing humanitarian aid (De Waal 1997). In addition, by subordinating the 
provision of humanitarian aid to strategic objectives and the uncertain calculations of 
conflict management, some victims may come to be defined as more deserving than 
others and impartiality is foregone (Curtis 2001 ). Of course, there are no simple 
solutions or self-evidently right answers to the "dialectic between the moral uplift of 
humanitarianism and the pedestrian de1nands of actually delivering the technologies that 
save lives in the "field"" (De Waal 2010: 302). But again, the divergence between 
criticisms of cross-border aid and Back Pack's approach to humanitarianism can be 
understood in relation to diverging attributions of legitimacy. 
For Back Pack's leaders, ways they work with non-state actors are a practical necessity, 
enabling life saving care to be channelled to communities otherwise denied aid by state 
restrictions on humanitarian access: 
"We give our medical services in the armed conflict areas. It is not only in Karen 
area, also in Mon areas where fighting might occur soon. Other areas are also like 
that. There is war and because of this, the situation is not stable. [ ... ] As we are 
working there, though we mainly focusing on helping the people, we have to seek 
protection from the groups that have connection to the community and that protect 
the community. The group can be KNLA. It can be KNU. Or it can be the group 
that is founded to protect the village. [ ... ] I think that the organisations that are 
operating here should help the people who are in need rather than saying 
supporting or not supporting the KNU. If they still think like that, I can't do 
anything. But they need to come and observe the situation. I don't know exactly 
about neutrality. As far as I understand, when we are doing health work, we know 
that we should do no harm. We understand that there must be Do No Harm .. . " 
[ Thar a Law Eh, BP HWT Director] 
By this time, Back Pack's leaders had endorsed the principle of Do No Harm. In August 
2010, after attending a workshop with Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) during which the 
framework was discussed, Back Pack's leaders asked NCA to organise training for their 
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staff. The training was held during a Six-Month Meeting and attended by field workers, 
Programme Coordinators and office staff. The trainer outlined the history of the Do No 
Harm framework and used case studies and discussions to highlight ways in which aid 
can have unintended negative consequences. During a break, she told me that she hoped 
the workshop would lead medics to think about possible impacts of their work. For 
example, she said, if medics are working in conflict zones and need to travel with 
KNLA soldiers, they need to consider whether this can have unintended negative 
consequences. In sessions that I observed, medics discussed tensions that can occur 
when they implement their programmes. Issues identified included, for example, 
possible perceptions of bias when medics travelling from village to village always stay 
with the same families, or when medics do not have enough mosquito nets to distribute 
to everyone in a village and have to prioritise some families over others. But the 
participants did not explicitly identify the ways that medics work with and through 
socio-political systems and links with armed non-state actors as potentially doing harm. 
When I later asked one of the Programme Coordinators what she thought about 
arguments about medics working with political and armed actors, her response - like 
the Director's above - was indicative of why medics and their leaders don't perceive 
this as doing harm: 
"So we are working for our community. So the political group also working for the 
community. So, we both working for community. Sometimes we help each other, 
something like that. So even [if] we don't involved in the political group, but when 
we go to the same direction, so we have to help each other." 
As demonstrated in previous chapters, for the medics and leaders, state-driven 
oppression, abuses, depletion of healthcare systems and restrictions on humanitarian 
access created the need for Back Pack in the first place. Working with socio-political 
and armed actors in their areas enables them to access communities and develop 
capacities for health in remote, unstable and underserved areas. Embodied histories of 
state violence often lead them to sympathise with ethnic nationalist groups opposing the 
state. As suggested by the Programme Coordinator, they tend to see these groups as 
working towards the same goal of improving the welfare of local communities. 
Conversely, embodied histories of violence have taught them that they are targeted by 
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state forces first and foremost because they belong to communities historically targeted 
in a brutal counterinsurgency campaign, which historically drew no distinction between 
civilian and military targets. 
In such a context, as described in Chapter 5, even impartiality becomes difficult to 
apply - although Back Pack adheres to the principle and medics strive to implement it 
in their work. More generally, Back Pack's position might be read as 'solidarist', in that 
the organisation "employ[ s] humanitarian action within a political strategy on behalf of 
victims" and rejects state consent as a basis for intervention (Weiss 1999: 5). This 
positioning needs to be understood in relation to Back Pack members' embodied 
histories and resulting attributions of legitimacy to different socio-political and military 
actors (Abraham and van Schendel 2005; Fassin 2007; 2008). It also makes sense in an 
operational context shaped by decades of conflict and systematic violence targeting 
ethnic minority communities - a context, which results in local medics working in a 
world of friends and foes. The organisation's solidarist-type model is then framed 
within a wider social justice agenda, expressed notably through the discourse of health 
and human rights, but which also serves to potentially legitimise a particular type of 
humanitarian effort at the international level. 
One senior medic I spoke to, when he tried to grapple with the idea that aid workers 
should - like the ICRC model, which he had learned about in a training - identify 
themselves and obtain access by reaching an agreement with different parties to the 
conflict, had real difficulty coming to terms with how this could apply in his context. In 
his view, conflict and his fear of the state and its soldiers make it impossible to 
negotiate with the latter; and if the context were different, there would be no need for 
Back Pack: 
"What I understand is that I will go to help ... Like this? But also we should not 
favour for KNU side nor SPDC side. No favour. That's it. But I am from aid group. 
If we go though [ the middle], people from this side will see me good and at the 
same time, people from that side will see me good. [ ... ] For this to happen, I have 
to make friends with both sides. [ ... ] So now, we are not in between these sides. 
Just go to one side, don't dare to go to the other side. In that case, if we dare to go 
to the other side, we don't need to work these jobs! [ ... ] I am just community. But 
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we are nnder KNU authority. We are in the area that is accessible. So, how to say? 
SPDC sets it as a black zone. [ ... ] If these two groups were at peace, the projects 
that we are doing now would be the projects that the government should do." [38 
year-old male medic, Karen State] 
People I worked with on the border argue that the ICRC model falls short in a context 
where the state has historically denied access to international aid agencies and 
implemented widespread and systematic abuses against civilian populations. As 
described in Chapter 1, this type of dilemma is not unique to the Burmese context. The 
broader debate concerning humanitarian principles is also related to an international 
context, which has evolved significantly and in which conflicts increasingly involve 
non-state actors and situations where civilians are the direct or indirect targets of state 
(and/or non-state) violence (Curtis 2001; Duffield 1998; Macrae 1998; Rieff 2002). The 
ICRC' s model, however, fits uncomfortably with these evolutions (Weiss 1999) - and 
in any case, negotiations between ICRC and the Burmese government historically failed 
to ensure access to populations in conflict areas 179 . In addition, and, as evidenced 
throughout history, there is little consistency in - and a continuing absence of an 
impartial supra-state authority to determine - the implementation of laws of war and 
International Humanitarian Law by state and non-state actors (Rieff 2002; Saillant 
2006). In the Burmese context, concerted lobbying in 2009 and 2010 by human rights 
groups for a Commission of Inquiry into possible war crimes failed to muster enough 
support from powerful governments - again, the terrain between international laws or 
principles and their implementation was mediated by state politics in a changing 
(geo )political context (Chandler 2007; Rieff 2002). 
Medics who had some knowledge of international systems or organisations therefore 
often described these as having failed their communities, in a context where the state 
remains sovereign and, in their experience, continued to oppress its population in 
impunity: 
179 As described in Chapter 2, negotiations by the ICRC historically failed to ensure humanitarian access to political 
prisoners and to civilians in BU1ma's border areas - resulting in an unusual condemnation by the ICRC of the 
government. 
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"Before, for example, MSF went inside and worked. They didn't get along with the 
SPDC, and then they left. For example, it is the same for ICRC. They don't 
implement all that they wanted to do. They don't implement. Those are legal 
organisations! Even though they entered, they couldn't succeed yet. ICRC also had 
many problems with the SPDC. [ ... ] How can we join with them [i.e. the 
government]? The internationals have faced many difficulties when they tried to 
solve. Uprisings - for example, kill the monks 180• [ ••• ] If we join, we will be 
oppressed more. We would have to do what they ask. They will drive us according 
to their wish. Clearly speaking, they can do whatever they like." [Senior male 
medic, Karen State] 
At the international level, there are precedents and frameworks acknowledging the need 
in specific situations for aid workers to work under the protection of armed actors. 
UN OCHA' s guidelines on the Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian 
Convoys, for example, recognise circumstances where the use of armed escorts can 
increase aid workers' capacity to provide aid impartially, particularly where civilians 
are deliberate targets of military operations and authorities restrict aid flow to 
populations in need (UN OCHA 2001 ). Historically and as described in Chapter 1, 
humanitarian NGOs have in a number of cases delivered aid in cooperation with non-
state actors party to a conflict - and indeed · in practice few NGOs tend to end up 
working simultaneously with opposing parties in a conflict ( e.g. De Waal 1994; 1997; 
De Waal 2007). In the Burmese case, some donors historically funded cross-border 
groups as well as other NGOs working 'inside', while others chose to fund only NGOs 
working on one particular 'side' (Duffield 2008). 
As also highlighted in Chapter 1, when donor governments have funded comparable aid 
operations in other conflict situations, this has been a function of political decisions. So 
as Slim notes, "[t]he more imperative emergencies are of course usually determined by 
the Realpolitik imperatives of relief agencies' donor governments" (Slim 1997: 346). 
While powerful donor governments can and do fund humanitarian efforts on the basis 
180 The medic was referring to the 2007 Saffron Revolution, when Burmese monks led peaceful demonstrations, 
which were violently repressed by state forces. According to Human Rights Watch, security forces shot into crowds 
using live ammunition and rubber bullets, beat marchers and monks before dragging them onto trucks, and arbitrarily 
detained thousands of people in official and unofficial places of detention. An unknown number of monks, students 
and other civilians were killed (HR W 2007). 
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of a social justice agenda, such support not only entails endorsement of the legitimacy 
of these efforts - and of the socio-political actors and agenda that they are linked with -
but also depends on the political and geostrategic position of the donor government (De 
Waal 2007; 2010). 
In the Burmese context, donor support for cross-border efforts could historically be read 
as part of a wider goal of promoting systems of rights-based liberal governance, as well 
as being influenced by the domestic politics and geostrategic priorities of donor 
countries (Curtis 2001; Duffield 2001; Macrae and Leader 2002). In the evolving 
politics of aid to Burma, a historically legitimised solidarist model for humanitarianism 
lost ground to a more traditional, state-sanctioned model - one that is also legal within 
the regulatory regimes of the states concerned (Abraham and van Schendel 2005). This 
happened in parallel with changes in international attitudes towards Burma - with the 
legitimacy of ethnic resistance groups increasingly questioned, and engagement 
becoming the dominant model for Western politics and policies towards the once-pariah 
state (Haacke 2012; South, et al. 2010). At the international level, it also needs to be 
understood in relation to the decline of US hegemony - and of the US ability to impose 
a Western model of liberal democracy - and the rise of China as an increasingly 
powerful regional and global force protective of the sovereignty of ASEAN member 
states (De Waal 2010; Haacke 2012). At the time of my fieldwork, international 
political and geostrategic shifts were then compounded by political changes in Burma, 
with the government coming to be seen as more 'palatable' and hopes that increased 
engagement would further expand humanitarian space 'inside'. 
While Back Pack members were attempting to engage with international frameworks in 
a changing (geo )political landscape, donors in Bangkok were becoming increasingly 
divided - with Canada and the EU representing two opposing poles, and powerful 
donors such as the US and UK increasing support for state-sanctioned humanitarian 
assistance. Humanitarian principles emerged as a point of contention. Some donors 
including ECHO - the largest single donor to Burma and leading donor worldwide -
pushed for the adoption of a unitary set of Operating Guidelines for organisations on the 
Thai-Burma border. The Humanitarian Donor Coordinator mediated the drafting of 
these guidelines, which turned out to be a reformulation of the ICRC's Fundamental 
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Principles181 . One donor dismissed these guidelines as others trying to justify post-facto 
their redirection of funding away from border areas and towards programmes 
implemented with approval of the Burmese government. Another described rolling out 
of the principles as a way to "weed out the activists from the serious organisations" -
but as described above, those designated as needing to be 'weeded out' tended to be 
those whose activism no longer fit with the agendas of more powerful stakeholders. The 
Donor Coordinator acknowledged politics as influencing shifts in aid circles: 
"[Donors] were waiting for these elections, everybody screamed that these 
elections weren't great, but it does make the government slightly more palatable 
than it was before. So that definitely legitimises, I think, what donors were wanting 
to do anyway. The other thing is ... I don't think that there's donor fatigue. What I 
do think is that there's a certain fatigue with the way that some of the NGOs are 
perceived as not wanting to go with the flow and go with the changes. [ ... ] They 
[i.e. donors] are willing to go along with the Myanmar wish for no longer 
supporting armed groups, or anything that supports armed groups. And there again, 
I think that's why people need to either get a bit smart about the way they do 
things, or change the way they do things. [ ... ] Because you need to be able to make 
a case that you're not helping the armed groups, you're helping people in need." 
[ Humanitarian Donor Coordinator] 
Groups like Back Pack undoubtedly help people in need. But at a time of political 
change, the fact that cross-border groups work with non-state actors opposing the state 
resulted in them being labelled by a number of influential stakeholders as not 
humanitarian - or unprincipled, as the head of ECHO's Regional Office implied. 
After Burma's elections, the Operating Guidelines were put forward as the framework 
that implementing agencies should adhere to ( although in effect local agencies 
continued to operate the way they always had). The plan was that the Guidelines would 
be rolled out by UNHCR and NGOs through their links with implementing partners. 
They would therefore be rolled out through the type of brokering networks described in 
Chapter 6. The representative of one intermediary NGO, which had supported cross-
181 The Donor Humanitarian Actors Working Group Operating Guidelines are included in Annex 3. 
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border groups including Back Pack for a number of years in full knowledge of the ways 
they work, explained: 
"It's actually to make sure that at least in conflict zones, as a kind of donors' 
perspective, we also need to make sure that we have enough mechanisms about this 
partiality and then humanitarian assistance is not for one side or... to avoid 
accusations. This is my own personal objective. Because as a humanitarian worker, 
I cannot accept any kind of system affiliated with armed groups." 
The idea that armed actors cannot assist humanitarian groups to access populations in 
need of aid denies a history of such actions and, in this type of operational context, can 
go against the wider ethic of humanitarianism as providing assistance to all 
communities in need. But what is even more significant is that this NGO partner, who 
had worked closely with cross-border groups for many years, was rhetorically mirroring 
a shifting discourse, whereby organisations working with armed groups opposed to the 
state were defined as not humanitarian. Another stakeholder I spoke to, after explaining 
that the ICRC model should ideally guide humanitarian action, speculated of groups 
like Back Pack: 
"I'm not sure whether you'd call them humanitarian [ ... ] because right now, 
whether we like it or not, the litmus test of humanitarianism is: can you apply the 
principles?" 182 
These narrow definitions of humanitarianism reduce the wider humanitarian ethic of 
responding to human suffering to reified principles and models; they gloss over a 
complex and evolving history in which humanitarian actions have often taken place 
without state consent and in cooperation with parties to conflict; and they suggest that if 
humanitarian action based on an ICRC-type model and operational neutrality (reduced 
182 Once again, this is not a new debate. At an international conference on politics and humanitarian aid in 2001, 
proponents of the more 'traditional' model of humanitarianism suggested that the word 'humanitarian ' should be 
trademarked, and should refer only to aid provided in accordance with the ICRC's principles for humanitarian action 
(Cmiis 2001). However and while such a definition of humanitarianism would clarify and establish clearer 
distinctions between systems and processes that are today grouped under the label of humanitarianism, this type of 
trademarking and humanitarian principles being the ' litmus test' for humanitarianism does not reflect contemporary 
trends. Instead, the term 'humanitarian' has come to be used to refer to a wide range of systems, practices, actors and 
discourses, which have in common a temporality of emergency, the object of saving lives, and an appeal to an ethic 
of compassion and moral values (Fassin 2012). 
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to not working with non-state parties to conflict) cannot be implemented, local 
populations should be left without assistance. Instead of defining humanitarianism by 
adherence to principles that might not work in a particular situation, a more pragmatic 
and contextualised approach would instead recognise that: 
The sanctity of human life is the first principle of all humanitarians and overrides 
other considerations; but neutrality, impartiality, and consent are second-order 
principles that may or may not be tactical guides. Traditional principles were 
developed as a means to safeguard life, but they no longer provide unequivocal 
guidance and should be modified when necessary (Weiss 1999: 12). 
Analysts of humanitarian aid have commented on the variety of positionings that 
contemporary humanitarian actors adopt, from strict neutrality to solidarity; this variety 
is argued to be beneficial in that it can allow for a division of labour between 
organisations that can then access local populations in different ways (Saillant 2006; 
Slim 1997; Weiss 1999). In an evolving politics of aid to Burma, however, a number of 
powerful actors could be read as attempting to deny the possibility of such variety. And 
instead of all humanitarian actors being guided by a unitary and internationally-
accepted set of principles, the shifting politics and priorities of powerful donors were 
defining principles (and their interpretation) that were then used to assess the actions of 
local-level actors - and to qualify as not humanitarian positions that persisted in going 
against changing political tides. 
Meanwhile, in response to an evolving situation where they faced increasing criticism 
and a potentially evolving operational space, leaders of groups like Back Pack and Mae 
Tao Clinic had already asked INGO partners and UNHCR to provide training in 
international humanitarian law and principles. These leaders explained that they wanted 
to become 1nore familiar with such frameworks and the ways they applied to - and 
could perhaps provide them with protection in - the Burmese and Thai contexts. 
Engagement with concepts that they were initially unfamiliar with but that were being 
wielded in criticisms of their work was also strategically important. As a foreigner who 
had worked with the groups for a long time explained: 
"'I think you need to be able to use the rights terms if you're going to be talking to 
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the people that they have to talk with. So I think that's how it will be useful. I don't 
think it ' s going to make people stop working with opposition groups or armed 
groups, it's just going to help them have the right terms for dealing with what 
they're doing." 
In October 2011, UNHCR facilitated a short training in Back Pack's compound on 
international human rights law and humanitarian principles. The training, attended by 
members of Back Pack and other cross-border groups, had symbolic as well as practical 
implications. Prior to the elections, cross-border groups had little contact with UNHCR, 
to a large extent because of their different spheres of intervention. But the response by 
ERT led to increased dialogue between leaders of groups operating in the 'legal-illegal' 
and UNHCR representatives, who operate within parameters defined by official 
agreements with government authorities. Initial tensions - with UNHCR staff reported 
to have criticised ERT members for being too political and ERT members criticising 
UNHCR for not denouncing Thailand's refoulement of Burmese civilians - gradually 
gave way to increased dialogue. The training in October, held within the compound of 
an unregistered organisation and attended by people who are illegals in the eyes of the 
Burmese and Thai states, could be read as a demonstration of increased engagement 
between organisations operating within different regulatory regimes (Abraham and van 
Schendel 2005). For Back Pack's leaders, this also indicated increased recognition 
( albeit a recognition that was short lived). 
During my fieldwork, Back Pack's leaders and partners therefore tried to find ways to 
relate their work to international frameworks. But the issue was not just whether or not 
aid organisations are neutral and impartial, or whether and how they work with armed 
groups - or indeed how to provide aid through such mechanisms while minimising 
potential negative impacts. Debates that arose during my fieldwork highlight dilemmas 
when networks born of a particular historical and political context are harnessed into 
systems for channelling international aid to communities in need, and are then faced 
with an evolving politics of aid. Indeed, powerful government donors had funded cross-
border aid since the late 1990s, to a large extent backgrounding or leaving unquestioned 
more sensitive or complex issues such as political affiliations of these groups or ways in 
which cross-border aid relies on protection from parties to armed conflict. These issues 
were increasingly forced into the open by critiques of cross-border aid, changes in 
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Burma's political landscape, and evolutions in an aid industry, which places ever more 
emphasis on accountability of local actors to donors' ostensibly apolitical frameworks. 
In this changing context, groups like Back Pack were increasingly implied to not be 
'humanitarian'. And again, although there is no internationally defined unitary model of 
humanitarianism, the (themselves often politically-motivated) decisions of and 
attributions of legitimacy by powerful stakeholders in a changing politics of aid 
contributed to the (re )definition of principles then used to classify local actors as 
legitimate or illegitimate, humanitarian or not humanitarian. 
In the late 1990s, at a time when humanitarian neutrality came to be increasingly 
questioned at the international level, Slim wrote that "[t]he debate surrounding 
humanitarian neutrality and its fellow humanitarian principles is a debate about the 
moral stance or position of third parties in other people's wars" (Slim 1997: 343). But 
even 1nore than this, decisions that international donors and other powerful actors make 
concerning how (and whether) to channel aid in conflict situations also amount to 
outsiders making judgments as to the legitimacy and desirability of different socio-
political systems and institutions: 
it is inevitable that the leverage from resources necessarily entails judgements by 
outsiders about what is right and just, about whose capacities are built, about which 
local groups are favoured (Weiss 1999: 18). 
At the time of my fieldwork, shifting attributions of legitimacy - themselves reflecting a 
changing (geo )political landscape - resulted in groups working with those no longer 
seen as 'freedom fighters' but as illegitimate 'insurgents' being increasingly defined as 
illegitimate and not humanitarian. In this context, the argument that cross-border groups 
can feed into conflict and therefore do hann by legitimising resistance groups in the 
eyes of local communities became particularly influential (South, et al. 2010). Careful 
empirical research would be required to assess whether cross-border aid might indeed 
do harm through links with non-state actors. But the 'politics of truth' (Robben 1995), 
which were evolving in parallel to shifting attributions of legitimacy made lack of 
evidence irrelevant: the very fact that cross-border groups have links with non-state 
actors opposing the state means that in the rhetoric of a number of powerful donors they 
are harmful by definition. 
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C. Back Pack's role in a changing Myanmar 
"After election, the next day, at the same time, there were troops coming. Villages 
ran away. Villages were burnt out. Villagers were shot. Rice stores were burnt out. 
Before the election, we hoped for a lot. Like this, we thought that we would be free 
to go like others. We wouldn't need to be afraid. [ ... ] I think that it's totally 
impossible [to stop Back Pack]. From my point of view, it's absolutely impossible. 
Because the present situation is that the community from our area only get 
healthcare from Back Pack. [ ... ] So, after the elections, if they [i.e. donors] thought 
to stop, I would like to suggest to them to go and observe for themselves." [38 
year-old male medic, Karen State] 
When I left for Australia in early October 2011, many international observers were 
optimistic about indications of incremental change after U Thein Sein's government 
took power in the newly renamed Republic of the Union of Myanmar. But the elections 
also led to increased conflict and displacement in Burma's borderlands. Following the 
outbreaks of fighting in Karen State described above, conflict also re-ignited in Shan 
and Kachin States - with the breakdown of the ceasefire between the Tatmadaw and 
Kachin Independence Army leading to the displacement of an estimated 75,000 
civilians by March 2012, and international organisations denied humanitarian access 183 . 
Human rights abuses targeting ethnic minority communities in border areas continued 
to be reported. And with the lifting of sanctions and opening of Myanmar to trade and 
investment, many observers feared increased development-induced displacement and 
impoverishment of ethnic minority communities. It was also in this context, at the end 
of November, that Hsa Moo and Waw Lay were detained by Tatmadaw troops who 
accused them of being 'ringworm medics'. 
In January 2012, I returned to Mae Sot. I met Hsa Moo and Waw Lay, who as described 
in Chapter 5 had just been released after tentative ceasefire negotiations were initiated 
between the government and KNU/KNLA. At the time, there were many uncertainties 
around the ceasefire discussions and actors on the ground faced a confusing and 
potentially volatile context. Neither Hsa Moo nor Waw Lay knew what the future held 
183 htto ://viwvv.hrw.ondnews/2012/03/20/burrna-reforms-vet-reach-kachin-state - last accessed 14 August 2012. 
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for them, and both were afraid that they would again be caught and accused of being 
'ringworm medics'. For the leaders, who drew on past experiences to interpret present 
uncertainties, initial ceasefires did not mean an end to political conflict or to the 
injustices they have experienced throughout their lifetimes. Poe Say often told me that 
"ceasefire is just ceasefire, they do not have any political solution". The leaders still 
sought recognition of the rights and freedoms of ethnic minority communities of 
Burma, which in their eyes will be ensured through a federal government system along 
the model outlined in the 1997 Constitution of the (hoped for) Federal Union of Burma, 
drafted by the National Council of the Union of Burma184 - a framework that originated 
in the coming together of activist and pro-democracy movements in the 1990s. And it is 
also within this vision and political framework that the leaders try to envisage Back 
Pack's prospects within a future Myanmar, which they continue to call Burma. 
Within this context of uncertainty, Back Pack's leaders drafted a position paper and 
plan for the period of transition. This outline, which is included below, was to provide 
guidance to management staff who were being asked questions by donors and other 
outsiders about Back Pack's future - and whether Back Pack is still needed in an 
ostensibly reformed Myanmar (Figure 2). 
184 1 · · I' ' ' b ' ·r,r• · · · ' ' ·•r 1 d 14 A 2012 h . 1 C ·1 ,lttD'.J 'vVW\v.mc- .urnrn.or2:/ndi/l.Onst1tut10n1ncuocon .~..J?ih - ast accesse ugust . T e Nat1ona ounc1 
of the Union of Burma was founded in 1992 in Manerplaw. The Future Constitution was drafted in 1997. 
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Figure 2: Back Pack position and plan for transition period (January 2012) 
BPHWT PosJtion on Current Political Situatfon 
1. The KN U and Burmese government's initial agreement in pnnciple ceasefi re is in the ear ly stages. 
The po lit ica l dialogue process nHJst continue in the long-term ., in addit ion to communitv 
rebuilding and rehabil itat ion., integration 1 and the implement ation of basic infrastructure. 
2. There is stil l ongoing f ighting in Kach1n St ate and other· ethnic areas. 
3. VV ithout the inclusi on of ai l ethn ic groups in t he peace prncessJ pol itica l dia logue '\Ni ll not be 
successfu l. 
BPHWT Plan for the Period of Transition 
1. \\,'e) the BPKWT,. are not a cross-border· organiz.ation because our health workers Uve and \11i'or k in 
t heir communities vAthin Burma. 
2. .All health workers are trained by their locaJ eth nk health organizations and are thus recognized 
by thei r communities. However., they are not official ly recognized by the centra l and st at e 
gove rnments. 
3. The purchase and delivery of suppnes and medicine currently originates from across the border) 
as \Vei l as funding. This wil l continue in this manner until our health w o rkers and logistic aides are 
guar·anteed the freedo m and safety to access all areas to provide health care. 
4. ff t here is. a genuine pol it ical peace process t hat is mutually respected , t he trainings and 
qua lifications of the health workers must be officially integrated and recognized by the central 
and state gover nments . 
5. Border-based civ il society must be integrated and reco gn ized by the centra l and st at e 
governm ents. 
BPHWT Present Position 
1 . Ongoing crnss-border assist ance rnust continue unti l we integrate . rebuild and rehabilitate our 
comn1u nlt ies. 
2. We must converge the work of a!I CBOs from inside Burrna with those 1n the border regio ns. 
For over a decade, Back Pack's leaders have sustained a system somewhat misleadingly 
referred to as cross-border aid185 by tapping into international humanitarian funding. 
They have done so, however, to support much more than an emergency relief 
mechanism, and have thus strengthened local-level systems for the sustainable delivery 
of primary healthcare services to remote and underserved communities. There are of 
course limitations to the extent to which Back Pack can develop sustainable capacities 
185 The appellation 'cross-border aid' often leads to an interpretation of organisations like Back Pack as comprising 
only people who are based in neighbouring countries, and who cross over into Burma on short missions to provide 
assistance to communities on the ground. Instead, as detailed through this thesis , Back Pack harnesses medics who 
live and work within their own communities, inside Burma's unstable and remote border areas. Only Field in-
Charges come into Thailand twice a year, to pick up supplies and bring back data from their target areas . So while 
Back Pack (the Thailand-based NGO) can be understood as a cross-border organisation, the network for health that it 
supports is a community-level network, albeit one that for reasons described in this thesis historically functioned 
'under the radar'. 
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for health, given the unstable context and issues such as the turnover of medics. But 
over the years, Back Pack developed a strong system for harnessing and strengthening 
resources and networks for health within and between ethnic minority areas. In a 
changing Myanmar, these resources and networks offer significant potential to be 
harnessed into above-ground systems for health in remote areas. As one NGO partner 
often said: it would be absurd to train midwives from Rangoon and send them to work 
in remote Karen villages, when local TBAs and Mother and Child Health workers have 
worked there for years, developing strong relationships with local communities. There 
are also parallels with other situations where existing mobile community-level primary 
healthcare systems have been adapted to evolving contexts in order to continue to serve 
remote communities: 
"If you look at the Thai model, there was a type of Back Pack system in remote 
areas of northern Thailand in the past and they created this because they didn't 
know when roads, electricity, and so on would come to those areas. So they build 
up the capacity of TB As, VHV s, etc. And this was a country that wasn't even in 
conflict, but they had a similar model because they knew that it would take a 
decade or more to get the systems and infrastructure in place so that a mobile 
health model would no longer be needed." [Intermediary NGO partner] 
Some older leaders speculate that in a peaceful Burma, a number of medics 1night cease 
working, particularly those recruited from military systems and whose commitment the 
leaders associate with what they describe as the "struggle period". But there are also 
many medics I spoke to who want to be able to continue to provide healthcare in their 
communities in a post-conflict period and without being in fear of arrest. Towards the 
end of my fieldwork, Poe Say explained that, 
"We are concerned that some people, they will retire. Some people will need to get 
the legal status. So that's why we try to do with the international institutions, we 
try to do with the policy level or the political organisation, we try to do institutional 
level of like the Burma Medical Association and the Mae Tao Clinic in Thailand 
here. [ ... ] But also we try to legitimise all our institutions - like we are providing 
the healthcare here, we are providing the training here by the Back Pack or the 
BMA or Mae Tao Clinic... We have to bring on the table, to recognise our 
curriculum by the new government, by the new future government of Burma. If 
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they need to test, examination, they can do the assessment for the health workers. 
So this, we are planning to do during the transition period: the people here can get 
the legitimacy by the recognition of the paper or the certificate - something like 
that." 
As described in earlier chapters, medics recruited into Back Pack have typically been 
trained through unofficial systems falling under para-state structures of ethnic 
nationalist groups. At the time of 1ny fieldwork, partners like IRC had initiated dialogue 
with Thai institutions, through which it is thought that it might be possible to obtain 
accreditation for Burmese medics like those working for Mae Tao Clinic - but Back 
Pack' s leaders see this as less relevant for their medics, who work in a Burmese, not 
Thai context. Meanwhile, as described in Chapter 5, some Field in-Charges have started 
to recruit medics trained through government systems and who can implement Back 
Pack programmes without fear of arrest. Thara Chit Htoo, the Field in-Charge in who 
recruited Naw Paw Lay (Case 2 in Chapter 5), thus explained that he wants to recruit 
more medics like her, who have attended official training but have not found 
employment within a depleted government healthcare system. After meeting Waw Lay 
and Hsa Moo in February 2012, I saw Chit Htoo again in Back Pack's compound. 
When he joined me on the straw mat where I was chatting with a female medic while 
she fed her baby, I asked him what he thought of the medics' arrest. He explained that 
he wants to send 1nore of his medics to attend government training, because then they 
will then be able to work and travel legally; but he also said that this is only a temporary 
solution to increase the safety of individuals in his target area. In the longer term, and if 
real peace comes to Burma- Chit Htoo said he didn't trust the new government because 
it had not yet brought peace - then the systems that the medics work with and through 
need to be recognised. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, Back Pack works with and through para-state systems, 
some of which are viewed as illegal and part of 'insurgent' networks by state actors; 
although there is local cooperation and blurring of lines between health workers who 
belong to theoretically opposed systems, structural divisions are perpetuated by issues 
of legality, security, fear, distrust and other impacts of decades~long conflict and 
political instability. For a number of years, some donors funding cross-border groups as 
well as civil society organisations (CSOs) working legally in Burma have organised 
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workshops bringing leaders of these groups together. The DfID funding, which Back 
Pack obtained in 2011, also aims to build convergence and trust between cross-border 
groups and organisations working legally in Burma. As explained by a representative of 
the intermediary NGO whose role it is to channel DflD's funding to Back Pack and two 
Karen CSOs, 
"This isn't about convergence between 'inside' and 'outside' - it's all work inside. 
This came from a desire on behalf of people working on the border to make more 
connections with people 'inside'. [ ... ] Here, we are dealing with a protracted or 
chronic emergency. Back Pack is more about building health systems and 
structures - so it is about community development. And this is why in the long 
term, convergence is important - because we don't want to have dual health 
systems." 
According to the DflD proposal, convergence and initial trust building will be achieved 
notably through exchange of information and gradual standardisation of data collection, 
health policies and activities between the groups. This process had only just started by 
the end of my fieldwork, so it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss its 
implementation. The convergence that DfID envisaged, moreover, only focuses on 
building relationships between Back Pack and two CS Os, neither of which are primarily 
healthcare providers nor are they part of the government healthcare system. 
By the time of my return to Mae Sot in early 2012, however, leaders of Back Pack and 
partner organisations were engaging in initial discussions ·about the future of health 
systems inside Burma's border areas and what 'convergence' with government systems 
might entail. But there was still much uncertainty and potential for disagreement about 
what convergence could mean. And as I spoke to the leaders in early 2012, I 
remembered what one of Back Pack's long-term supporters had told me, long before 
Burma's elections: 
"We don't know what the government system is going to look like in the future and 
there is no reason for us to wait to provide healthcare in the meantime. In terms of 
· convergence, we should instead look at the ways in which a potential future 
government system can reach into and adapt to the areas where the community 
system is already in place - rather than waiting to develop this community system 
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or assuming that the community system should adapt itself to a government 
syste1n, the shape of which is still unknown. [ ... ] How do they know what the 
future health system of Myanmar will look like? It might not be unitary - it could 
be federal." 
Back Pack leaders' vision, which is linked to their politico-moral worldview, is for their 
human resources and systems to be integrated and legalised under the ethnic health 
departments; the latter would be recognised, legalised and integrated into official health 
systems in ethnic minority areas. Ethnic health departments are thus not seen as 
"humanitarian wings of armed organisations" (South, et al. 2010: 41), but instead as 
health systems falling under legitimate administrative structures. Back Pack's leaders 
therefore see these ethnic health departments as building blocks for the redevelopment 
of official health systems in border areas. So it was that Back Pack's new Director 
explained to me in early 2012: ethnic health departments need to be recognised, which 
depends on ceasefire and political discussions between the government and ethnic 
nationalist organisations. 
For the leaders, once ethnic health departments are recognised at the national level and 
reintegrated as above-ground health systems at the state level, medics who are presently 
part of Back Pack teams can work under the resulting state-level system as a 
community-based primary healthcare service in remote communities. The individual 
medics will then be certified, legalised and recognised as a community-based system 
working under the structure of and connecting remote communities to a state-level 
health system. This agenda can be more broadly understood as the leaders' drive for 
systems that are framed as licit (through their own attributions of value) to be translated 
into legal systems through a political model, which will enable their integration, 
recognition and legalisation. The politico-moral agenda of the leaders therefore entails a 
search for translation of the licit ( defined by social attributions of legitimacy) into the 
legal ( defined by state attributions - Abraham and van Schendel 2005). 
For the leaders, moreover, blurring of the lines that can occur at a local level between 
civilian and military systems under para-state structures is itself a function of a situation 
of protracted conflict, where ethnic nationalist organisations are reduced to illegal 
msurgency movements. In a Burma in which the rights and freedoms of ethnic 
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minorities are recognised and fulfilled, the leaders argue that medics will no longer need 
armed protection - systems that the medics work with and through will no longer have 
to be on the defensive. Health systems run under these ethnic nationalist organisations 
can then be fully separated from the governance and military systems of the latter, and 
integrated into federal state administrative structures. This vision in tum explains one 
leader's response when I asked him about the viability of sending Back Pack medics to 
government training, in order for them to obtain official certificates and to prevent the 
reoccurrence of cases such as Waw Lay and Hsa Moo's. For him, the priority is not to 
get recognition of the skills and knowledge of individual medics. Instead, health 
systems - including systems for training medics - coming under the ethnic health 
departments need to be recognised, which in tum depends on a political resolution of 
the conflict. The leader explained: 
"We are trying for to the federal state. At the moment we have barriers like the 
2008 Constitution, which does not provide for a federal system but instead for a 
centralised system. For convergence, we should converge the Constitution and not 
just systems like health - we need integration and convergence of the two 
constitutions 186." 
The problem of legitimacy - and the difference between legality and licitness - is again 
key (Abraham and van Schendel 2005). At stake in the evolving politics of cross-border 
aid at a time of significant political change is the leaders' continued search for 
recognition of the oppression and injustices that ethnic minority communities have 
suffered, and of the socio-political systems that they consider legitimate. 
186 The leader was referring to the 2008 Constitution, which was implemented after a much-criticised referendum 
immediately after Cyclone Nargis. Opposition groups have rejected the referendum as rigged and condemned the 
Constitution for safeguarding centralised military rule. Back Pack's leader was contrasting this to the Constitution of 
the Federal Union of Burma, which as described above was developed in 1997 and resulted from the corning together 
of the ethnic nationalist and democracy movements. 
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D. An end to the struggle? 
On my first day back in Back Pack's office in January 2012, Poe Say told me in his 
typical jocular manner about yet another foreign journalist who had come to his office 
looking for a good story. The journalist had asked Poe Say whether Back Pack was 
neutral, and told him that since they are humanitarians, they should be neutral. Poe Say 
told me that he had responded, "we are not service providers: we are the community; so 
we cannot be neutral". I asked him again what he thought about the Do No Harm 
framework. "This is better", he said, but "if we don't do anything, we will do harm". In 
the current context, he went on, many donors and NGOs seemed to have a "wait and 
see" attitude; but better to "work and see, not wait and see". Back Pack, he explained, 
has the capacity and the human resources; if they stop working now and if they don't 
get recognition for the administrative structures of the ethnic health departments, they 
will have wasted over a decade building the capacity of health workers and systems. 
By this stage, the Emergency Relief Team was still supporting 6,000 Karen villagers 
who had fled fighting after the 2010 elections. But these people had fallen off the 
international radar. Back Pack itself had obtained more funding for 2012 than the 
previous year, with support from DflD and scaled up funding from a Dutch NGO. So 
the anticipated loss of donor funding was not immediately apparent. But as the political 
playing field and associated attributions of legitimacy shifted away from actors on the 
border, there remained a fear that men and women who have spent decades struggling 
for the rights and freedoms of their people will be excluded - donors and other powerful 
stakeholders looking towards working with and through systems approved by the new 
government of Myanmar. International observers sometimes scathingly call this a 'fear 
of irrelevance'. But in Back Pack's case, at a practical level, there is genuine concern 
that the efforts gone into developing human resources and systems for primary 
healthcare provision inside Burma will be sidelined rather than harnessed into official, 
above-ground systems. At a less tangible level, these fears also have to be understood in 
relation to the embodied histories of state violence of actors who became part of cross-
border networks and who function within a polito-moral worldview, which for over a 
decade was legitimised at the international level before being called into question at a 
time of significant albeit uneven and uncertain change. 
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Back Pack medics and leaders face an uncertain future, which they inevitably interpret 
in relation to past experiences and an embodied history of state violence, oppression and 
injustice (Fassin 2007; 2008). Many younger men and women I met and worked with 
had trouble even imagining what their lives would be like in a situation of peace and in 
which the rights and freedoms their leaders speak of might be realised. Many spoke of a 
utopian future, where they would retire and live a simple life on a farm or on a fishing 
boat. Many others vowed to keep providing healthcare services to their communities, 
but did not know how or when they might no longer be considered enemies of the state. 
Some older leaders tried to envisage a future working under an officially-recognised 
ethnic health department. One leader joked that I will meet him again when he is 
working for the Ministry of Health in Karen State. But others like Poe Say told me that 
they have to give way to a new generation, more suited to the task of rebuilding welfare 
systems in a post-conflict situation: 
"I believe that the next generation - I believe, I trust to them. [ ... ] Because even the 
people who are setting up the system, [those] who are struggle for the revolutional 
person and [those] who are not revolutional person, it is very different. If I 
involved there, maybe I can see, I will against everything, like that. Because you 
are come from, your experience is very dangerous, very difficulty [ ... ] So that's 
why the revolutional period, the fighting for freedom period, who are working 
here, should be stop during the transitional period." 
The question, however, is when and how to define when the struggle period has ended. 
For Back Pack's leaders, when I left in March 2012, their struggle was not yet over. 
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Conclusion: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid: politics of life 
and politics of value 
Several months after Burma's elections, I was talking to Naw Moo Lay, one of Back 
Pack's office workers. She had been a teacher in Karen State before fleeing to Thailand 
in 1997 when Tatmadaw troops occupied her village. Fourteen years later, she was still 
a 'displaced person' and her two children had never set foot on the land she calls home. 
I asked her if the elections changed anything for her, and if she thought she would 
return to Burma. She shook her head sadly, then said, 
"Because of the SPDC government, I don't want to be a human being in Burma. If 
the political change, or new government. .. new government means, so every people 
can be accept[ed], naw? It mean[s] where's justice, where give a chance to every 
civilian. So I will be a human being." 
The time during which I conducted fieldwork on the Thai-Burma border was one of 
uncertainty for men and women like Moo Lay, whose life experiences are framed by a 
history of state violence, oppression and injustice. Earlier, telling me her story, Moo 
Lay had angrily described the rape of her cousin by a Tatmadaw soldier, just days after 
the young woman had given birth. Relating this experience to her work with Back Pack, 
she told me, "That's why now I want to help my community, my civilians, my people, 
to be safe from the SPDC - or to get justice, real justice". 
This conversation took place five months after Burma's elections. Increased conflict 
and displacement had initially seemed to confirm the prediction that the elections would 
entail further suffering for ethnic minority communities. But as evidence of incremental 
political change in Burma corroborated shifting attributions of legitimacy at regional 
and international levels, cross-border groups faced an evolving operational space and 
(geo )political landscape. There were fears that groups like Back Pack, which offer 
significant potential for the sustainable development of above-ground social and welfare 
systems in Burma, would be sidelined. Shortly after my fieldwork, one of Back Pack's 
long-term donors withdrew funding, redirecting support to what were described as 
peace and reconciliation programmes inside Karen State - programmes implemented 
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with state approval. Concerns expressed by leaders of groups like Back Pack that they 
would lose funding and be excluded from efforts to rebuild official social and welfare 
systems in border areas were often dismissed by observers as a 'fear of irrelevance'. 
As illustrated through this thesis, however, international donor funding can mean more 
than just financial support for local-level humanitarian actors; and efforts to maintain 
and increase such funding cannot just be dismissed - as they sometimes were during my 
fieldwork - as driven by an older generation of leaders refusing to accept change and 
seeking to maintain their current positions and influence. Instead, the evolving politics 
of aid to Burma need to be understood in relation to shifting attributions of legitimacy at 
different scales, and to the ways in which these shifts can, at different times, clash or 
converge with the worldviews of actors involved, as well as contributing to specific 
actors, systems and practices being categorised as humanitarian or not humanitarian. 
A year before I started working with Back Pack, Marc Duffield described ways in 
which political conflict in Burma had expanded into an internationalised battle space 
over the legitimacy of diverse actors competing for the authority to speak and act on 
behalf of Burma's diverse peoples (Duffield 2008). More recently, Ashley South related 
what he describes as the non-neutrality or political affiliations of cross-border groups to 
their attribution of legitimacy to non-state actors resisting the Burmese government -
and in particular, to the Karen National Union and its armed wing, the legitimacy and 
representativeness of which he questions in recent writings (South 2011; South, et al. 
2010). However, these and other researchers have paid relatively little attention to the 
life experiences, worldviews and values behind attributions of legitimacy by local aid 
workers to the systems in which they become involved. In addition, they have not 
acknowledged links between an evolving politics of aid to Burma - and changing 
international attitudes towards cross-border aid - and shifting attributions of legitimacy 
by actors at different scales to the diverse socio-political systems in Burma. Instead, 
recent work by researchers who have addressed the issue of cross-border aid has tended 
to feed into - rather than attempt to understand or overcome - an often emotive and 
polarised debate, in which by the time of my fieldwork it had become almost impossible 
to even attempt to 'sit on the fence'. 
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In this concluding chapter, I will synthesise and draw conclusions from the findings of 
the research described in this thesis. I will relate these findings to conceptual tools 
outlined in Chapter 1, and highlight what this ethnography contributes to 
anthropological understandings of 'humanitarian government' - the latter defined as a 
government of precariousness (Fassin 2012). In particular, I will discuss ways in which 
an appreciation of embodied histories of violence can shed light on agents' ways of 
being in the world, and on their attributions of legitimacy and illegitimacy to the actors, 
systems and flows they encounter in their daily lives. I will highlight ways in which 
tensions and inconsistencies in international humanitarian systems become more 
obvious at a time of (geo )political change. I will describe ways in which shifts in 
attributions of legitimacy over time and at different scales can contribute to specific 
actors, systems and practices being (re )defined as illegitimate or not humanitarian. And 
I will conclude by summarising what is at stake in the debate around cross-border aid 
and - as a way to overcome the polarisation that has marred the Burmese aid debate in 
the past decade - identify how this ethnography contributes to an understanding of 
humanitarianism as an unequal politics of life and politics of value. 
Understanding a 'humanitarian struggle' 
The first part of this thesis explored the 'logics' and worldviews of actors involved in a 
system that came to be known as cross-border humanitarian aid. Back Pack' s history, 
described in Chapter 3, is linked to the history of a socio-political movement. The 
organisation was created in the coming together of key individuals with links to the 
1988 democracy movement or ethnic nationalist groups opposing a military regime 
condemned internationally for systematic and widespread abuses against civilian 
populations. Over time, and with the assistance of partner NGOs who enabled access to 
international financial and political support, what began as an ad-hoc response to a 
situation that Back Pack's founders considered intolerable developed into a strong and 
sustainable network to support primary healthcare systems in conflict-affected and 
remote border areas. 
Back Pack's developing model of hu1nanitarianism fits neatly into international trends 
for aid to be community-based, participatory and sustainable. This model is also linked 
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to an organisational ideology, which has its origins in the founders' reactions to the 
oppression and suffering driven by the military state - which they and subsequent Back 
Pack medics experienced first-hand - and came to be expressed through the language of 
human rights. Through partnerships with international public health experts, Back 
Pack' s work thus came to be framed within a health and human rights discourse, which 
strongly echoes the rights-based, liberal democratic values of international audiences 
appealed to for funding and political support. Ten years after its creation, Back Pack 
was the largest supporter of healthcare to Burma along a model described as cross-
border, and an influential yet controversial player in the politics of aid to Burma. 
In Chapter 4, the impacts of a history of political violence, oppression, injustice and 
competing claims to socio-political legitimacy are explored through different Back Pack 
members ' life stories. The construction processes of which suffering is at the same time 
the object are also acknowledged. Indeed, for those whose life stories are framed by 
direct and indirect state violence, suffering is a reality, which shapes their ways of being 
in and interpreting the world. Yet human suffering and the affects of those identified as 
victims also become resources in an international politico-moral economy within which 
discourses of victimhood can gamer support for specific humanitarian actors, systems 
and practices (Fassin 2004a; 2012; Fassin and Bourdelais 2005; Fassin and Rechtman 
2007; Kleinman, et al. 1997; Kleinman and Kleinman 1991; Rieff 2002; Truchon 2007). 
Although different, the life stories of men and women who become involved in Back 
Pack are similarly framed by what can be conceptualised as an embodied history of 
violence. As described by Fassin, this embodied history is at once personal and 
collective; it ensures the continuity of the past in the present by providing a deeply-
ingrained framework for people's experiences and worldviews; and as such, it is a lens 
through which it is possible to interpret the everyday reasonings, choices and actions of 
individuals and groups (Fassin 2007; 2008). The stories of the Back Pack medics, office 
staff and leaders tell of a deeply ingrained memory of oppression and injustice 
perpetrated by the Burmese military state, personified through its soldiers. This 
memory, which is both personal and collective, provides the affective backdrop to their 
expenences, worldviews and actions. Even when they themselves haven't directly 
experienced state violence, their formative experiences generally tell of having 
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assimilated a fear of the state and its soldiers. Their life stories then reinforce a 
worldview in which the state is the driver of the oppression, injustice and deep-seated 
inequalities, which result in the suffering of ethnic minority communities. 
Conceptualisation of embodied histories of state violence should not, however, lead to a 
systematic reduction of individuals' actions to the type of everyday resistance described 
by James Scott (Scott 1989). Although cross-border aid has been analysed as supporting 
everyday resistance against state-driven oppression (Hull 2008; Phan and Hull 2008), 
1nany of those involved do not perceive their actions in such terms. At the same time, a 
politics of memory of the type described by Fassin can conceal differences between 
individuals and groups (Fassin 2007; 2008). The stories of Back Pack members reveal a 
diversity of structural forces, competing pressures and potentially clashing value 
systems that can influence an individual's life opportunities, choices and trajectory. 
Becoming a medic is in many cases one of few choices available to individuals in a 
context of chronic deprivation and instability. And while for Back Pack's founders and 
leaders, the duty to serve the community is understood as a politico-moral responsibility 
linked to the struggle for the rights and freedoms of Burma's peoples, for younger 
medics this duty is more often understood in relation to mechanisms that enable 
individuals to access higher-level knowledge · and skills. These mechanisms in most 
cases function through the type of patronage systems that Scott describes as ordering 
social relations in many parts of Southeast Asia (Scott 1972). Culturally-specific forms 
of social solidarity can thus be important mechanisms through which individuals and 
groups are linked into - and become committed to - a system labelled as humanitarian 
(Malkki 2007). 
As also described in Chapter 4, tensions that can at times anse fro1n the leaders' 
attempts to foster 'unity within diversity' and to promote the type of commitment that 
they seek in their staff highlight values that the leaders seek to institutionalise, thereby 
also drawing attention to a developing organisational ideology (Atlani-Duault 2005 ; 
Verna 2007). Back Pack's historical evolution resulted in the co-existence of an older 
generation of medics - who share a commitment to the struggle for the rights and 
freedoms of their communities - with a younger generation of medics who are linked 
into Back Pack through a variety of mechanisms and remain part of diverse systems 
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with their own ways of functioning. In addition, as Back Pack became institutionalised 
as an internationally funded NGO, the leaders recruited a growing number of Thailand-
based staff, with sometimes significantly different experiences and motivations to those 
of the founders. Tensions around the issue of resettlement, in particular, highlight the 
existence of potentially competing pressures and values, as well as the specific type of 
commitment sought by the leaders. Out of this heterogeneity, moreover, the leaders 
seek to create a wider unity - but a unity that, in contrast to a state seen as destroying 
ethnic identities, emphasises and promotes diversity. 
Back Pack members from diverse areas and ethnic groups - and sometimes from 
different 'sides' of shifting political divides - identify with a wider community defined 
as ethnic in opposition to a state defined as unjust in its treatment of ethnic minorities. 
The trope of inter-ethnic unity, concretised in the wider Back Pack community, is 
simultaneously inclusive and exclusive: it brings together diverse individuals and 
groups, but constitutes a moral boundary with the state. The latter is personified through 
its soldiers but also often conflated with the dominant Burman ethnic group. So just as 
ethnicity has been analysed as constructing social boundaries, here inter-ethnic unity 
(re)produces a politico-moral boundary with a harmful and illegitimate other (Nagel 
1994; Wimmer 2008). The inclusion of medics working in ceasefire areas is also 
significant in an evolving politics of aid, since Back Pack's support for these areas 
signals a continued need for cross-border aid and demonstrates that the alignment of 
ceasefire groups with the state has not ended local communities' suffering. In addition, 
by bringing together increasingly diverse individuals and groups, Back Pack is posited 
as representing Burma's multi-ethnic but similarly oppressed communities. Back Pack's 
'unity within diversity' thus also contributes to Back Pack's positioning in a shifting 
politics of aid. But to qualify the drive to create 'unity in diversity' as purely 
instrumental would do insufficient justice to the leaders' commitment to the vision they 
try to institutionalise, with their organisation becoming a microcosm ( albeit an 
imperfect one) of a hoped-for democratic and federal Burma. 
The complexity of motivations, competing pressures and sometimes conflicting value 
systems, which is revealed through individuals' life stories, is mitigated through an 
organisational Weltanshauung that is shaped by the founders' politico-moral vision but 
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also reflects and is reinforced by diverse members' common expenences of state 
violence, oppression and injustice (Lissner 1977; Verna 2007). This complexity, 
moreover, is sublimated within public representations of the victim-medic. The duty to 
serve the community is then elevated to the level of a politico-moral project 
encapsulated in the idea of 'humanitarian struggle'. This humanitarian struggle implies 
that the provision of humanitarian aid is part of a wider struggle against oppression and 
injustice. It is thus also a search for social justice through a struggle for the rights and 
freedoms of ethnic minority communities. The subjectivity of the Back Pack medic then 
highlights the state's denial of the rights of its peoples. It also becomes a powerful 
symbol of a hu1nanitarian struggle that historically filled the gap left by the failure of 
international human rights and humanitarian systems to protect and fulfil the rights of 
Burmese communities, and to ensure the provision of aid in a context of state 
restrictions on humanitarian access and violence against civilian populations. 
The subjectivity of the medic can also be seen to transcend the (largely mythical) tropes 
of the passive victim and active aid worker, often found in representations of 
humanitarianism (Fassin 2012; Rieff 2002; Saillant 2007). The medic is simultaneously 
victim of state violence and agent acting to mitigate its effects. The medic as victim 
then has the authority to speak and act on behalf of Burma's suffering communities. 
The medic as victim-humanitarian is also associated with a politico-moral message, in 
which the 'chronic emergency' in Burma is identified as driven by an illegitimate and 
abusive state, and de1nocratic federalism is identified as the solution to ending the 
suffering of ethnic minority communities. The figure of the victim-medic then 
potentially clashes with co1nmon constructions by international humanitarian discourses 
and practices of apolitical (and generally 'innocent') victim subjectivities (Fassin 2012; 
Rieff 2002; Saillant 2007). 
Rony Brauman famously described humanitarianism as defining the limits of that which 
is tolerable (Brauman 1996). But the way in which humanitarian actors, systems, 
discourses and practices define the intolerable - and similarly, the way in which they 
identify and represent victims - is itself a political and moral process (Fassin 2004b; 
2012; Fassin and Bourdelais 2005; Fassin and Rechtman 2007; Saillant 2007). As 
evidenced through these chapters, Back Pack's work continues to be guided by the 
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politico-moral vision of its founders and older leaders (Verna 2007), which is itself 
framed by embodied histories of state violence and a resulting Manichean view of the 
world. Back Pack also combines its role as a provider of humanitarian aid with 
international advocacy, thereby fitting into a broader history of organisations that, 
following the creation of Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) in 1971, see testimony as an 
integral part of humanitarian action (Redfield 2006; Rieff 2002). Back Pack's version of 
humanitarianism is then intricately linked to the promotion of a particular 'motivated 
truth' - a truth, which links evidence derived from a specialised field of knowledge to 
moral values and a call for political action (Redfield 2006). 
Back Pack differs significantly from international organisations like MSF, however, in 
being an evolving product of the socio-political context in which it works. Through its 
very labelling as a Community-Based Organisation, it is posited as representative of the 
communities it serves. The particular 'motivated truth' that it promotes is derived from 
- and legitimised by - its members very real experiences of violence and suffering. And 
unlike the type of humanitarian testimony by international organisations like MSF, 
which has been analysed as potentially crystallising a division between those who speak 
and those who are spoken for (Fassin 2012; Saillant 2007), Back Pack's organisational 
discourses and the subjectivity of the Back Pack medic denies any such distinction: the 
medic is at the same time victim, witness and actor. This ethnographic example 
therefore highlights the need to analyse the particularities of different humanitarian 
models and the processes of witnessing they engage in. While INGOs like MSF might 
indeed crystallise ontological differences between those who speak and act and those 
who are spoken and acted for, other humanitarian organisations - particularly 
organisations that are linked with socio-political movements - can collapse such 
differences. The victims of political violence are then at the same time witnesses of this 
violence and actors in systems to mitigate its effects. The collapsing of these differences 
is, moreover, significant in terms of a specific humanitarian organisation's positioning 
and legitimacy within an evolving politics of aid. 
Like many other organisations grouped under the label of humanitarian, Back Pack's 
advocacy draws on a dualistic discourse of victimhood, in which statistics establish the 
seriousness of the problem while compassion appeals to the public's emotions, moral 
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sentiments and sense of justice (Fassin 2004b; 2012; Fassin and Rechtman 2007). 
Through the health and human rights framework, Back Pack tells of violence and 
suffering through the type of empirically verifiable register increasingly required by an 
international aid industry, which dictates that aid programmes be evidence-based 
(Gross-Stein 2008; Terry 2002). But a more subjective, affective register also appeals to 
international actors' compassion and reactions to injustice. This dualistic discourse links 
values and affects, thereby constructing a political and moral cause, and serving to both 
define and justify a particular model of humanitarianism. It could then be argued that 
the approach to humanitarian action that is justified is based on what Fassin describes as 
"the legitimate principles of humanitarian intervention: the defence of victims and the 
appeal to e1notions." (Fassin 2012: 221). But Back Pack's humanitarianism is also 
framed within and justified by what its leaders see as a legitimate search for justice and 
for the recognition of victims as political actors with - as discussed below - the right 
and power to define the type of political system that will enable the protection and 
fulfilment of their rights. 
In analysing these first ethnographic chapters, I have highlighted the subjectivity of the 
Back Pack medic as, simultaneously, victim of political violence, witness who testifies 
to this violence, and actor who not only mitigates some of its effects but also symbolises 
a politico-moral struggle. In relation to the process of witnessing, the victim-medic can 
then be conceptualised as simultaneously testis, who can testify on basis of observation, 
and superstes, who as a victim and survivor of events can testify on the basis of 
experience (Fassin 2007c; 2012). As Fassin describes of the testis and superstes, "[t]he 
validity of the latter is based on the affects it engages, that of the former on the affects 
from which it distances itself' (Fassin 2012: 205). The dilemma evidenced through 
Back Pack's case is that - in an evolving politics of aid where attributions of legitimacy 
by powerful international actors began to clash with those of local-level actors - an 
organisation born from a particular socio-political context and whose members are in 
the position of superstes was dismissed by some as not credible as a testis, or indeed as 
a humanitarian actor. Back Pack is therefore in a li1ninal position, not only on the 
border and - as discussed below - in terms of attributions of licitness, but also in 
relation to its position as a humanitarian witness and actor. This positioning had 
historically contributed to Back Pack's ability to obtain international funding and 
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political support. But in an evolving politics of aid, it also became a basis for critics of 
cross-border groups to categorise the medics as not humanitarian, when in fact by their 
work and actions they truly are humanitarian. 
The politics of aid through the lens of shifting legitimacies 
The act of humanitarian testimony is related to the problems of neutrality and 
impartiality, which are often inco1Tectly construed as synonyms. As described in 
Chapter 1, the rejection of the Red Cross' interpretation of neutrality as confidentiality 
led to the birth of a humanitarianism that combined political outspokenness with the 
impartial provision of aid (Redfield 2006; 2011). But analysts have questioned how a 
humanitarian actor can act as a witness without becoming confused with political 
groups and systems that also claim to be defending the victim's cause (Fassin 2012; 
Rieff 2002). The issue becomes particularly complex for an internationally funded 
organisation like Back Pack, whose members are products of a history of political 
violence and work with and through socio-political systems in their target areas. It also 
needs to be related to the question of humanitarian intervention, and to an international 
context that has seen a multiplication of often contradictory models and practices of 
humanitarianism - a context in which frameworks such as the Responsibility to Protect 
exist, but without any consensus or supra-state authority to determine their 
implementation in situations where civilian populations are a deliberate target of state 
violence and/or state authorities deny humanitarian access to these populations 
(Chandler 2007; Rieff 2002; Saillant 2006; 2007). 
These debates are not new and the history of humanitarianism can to an extent be read 
as a history of disagreements and divisions concerning humanitarian neutrality, 
impartiality and intervention. By the time I began fieldwork on the Thai-Burma border, 
however, the neutrality debate in particular was often presented as something almost 
novel, the political and ethical questions it raises as breaking new ground. Donors 
increasingly questioned the transparency of organisations they had sometimes supported 
for over a decade, and justified a growing focus on monitoring and evaluation as driven 
by a concern that aid (and cross-border aid in particular) might fuel fighting - or, at the 
very least, legitimise armed non-state actors in the eyes of aid beneficiaries. Donors 
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opposing cross-border aid increasingly justified their position by referring to foreign 
researchers' critiques of cross-border aid - the latter provoking sometimes emotive 
reactions from people I worked with on the border. And local-level humanitarian actors 
were presented with an ostensibly new set of humanitarian principles - which, as 
described in Chapter 7, were a reformulation of the Red Cross' principles - as if these 
were unitary and universal. Throughout the lead up to and aftermath of Burma' s 
elections, it was at times as if debates that had initially emerged from the Biafran crisis 
in the late 1960s and had been reignited in subsequent contexts where aid was 
implemented in cooperation with para-state systems had not happened. It was almost as 
if actors on and beyond the border were operating in a historical 'bubble' . 
Abraham and van Schendel define the borderlands as a space where "[t]he political and 
geographic limits of sovereignty imply the presence of competing authorities, whether 
other states or non-state ideological affiliations" (2005: 23). In Burma's contested 
borderlands, where communities often have to negotiate multiple authorities and armed 
groups, Back Pack medics work with and through diverse socio-political actors and 
systems, which can include resistance and ceasefire groups. As described in Chapter 5, 
Back Pack's model for supporting local-level primary healthcare in an increasingly 
wide and heterogeneous geographical and political space results in a system where, at 
the level of its different target areas, Back Pack is better conceptualised as a network 
enabling various forms of capital to be channelled to ethnic health organisations or civil 
society groups on the ground (Back Pack is something). At the community level, Back 
Pack effectively disappears and in its place are individuals belonging to different 
mother organisations, which have their own systems and ways of functioning (Back 
Pack is nothing). This system enables Back Pack to strengthen local-level capacities and 
systems for health in areas under the control of different socio-political and military 
actors. To outside observers, however, it can be difficult to determine where Back Pack 
ends and a non-state actor begins - and this became increasingly problematic in an 
evolving politics of aid that entails shifting attributions of legitimacy. 
Links between embodied histories of violence and ways that internationally funded aid 
can 'work out' on the ground are illustrated in Chapter 5, through stories of medics 
implementing Back Pack programmes in different parts of Karen State. Both stories 
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demonstrate the difficulty of applying principles of neutrality and impartiality to a 
complex and volatile context shaped by decades of conflict, violence and competing 
claims to socio-political legitimacy. In this context, embodied histories of state violence 
impact on the ways those implementing aid view the world, and on their identification 
of partners and enemies within it (Fassin 2007; 2008). Although in theory "there is no 
friend nor enemy in the field of health", even the bare life (Agamben's zoe) of injured 
or sick patients can be difficult to see without the socialising lens afforded by embodied 
histories of violence and a profoundly embedded fear and distrust of the state, 
personified through its soldiers (Agamben 1998). Reciprocal relationships can be 
created with individuals working within state systems; but state systems and systems 
that Back Pack medics work through remained, at the time of my fieldwork, divided by 
issues of legality and security, as well as fear, distrust and other long-term impacts of a 
history of political violence. Systems that medics work with and through to provide 
healthcare to their communities also contribute to them being labelled by state actors -
for whom there is no such thing as medical neutrality and no distinction between 
civilian and military targets - as part of outlaw or 'rebel' networks (Gallant 1999), even 
if they themselves aren't part of a resistance group and perceive their roles and actions 
in a radically different fashion. 
Comparing and contrasting state definitions of legitimacy ( defined in terms of legality) 
with social definitions of legitimacy ( defined in terms of (il)licitness) enables a fuller 
understanding of the functioning, development and evolution of cross-border aid, and of 
evolving politics of aid more generally. Throughout these chapters, I have drawn on 
Abraham and van Schendel's analysis of the making of (il)licitness in transnational 
networks and flows, and adapted and expanded their conceptual framework to compare 
attributions of legitimacy to cross-border aid - and to the systems that cross-border aid 
works with and through - by different actors, at" different scales, and in relation to 
(geo )political changes over time (Abraham and van Schendel 2005). Attributions of 
legitimacy are linked to the values that actors attribute to such systems. Values ascribed 
by Back Pack members to different actors, systems and practices are shaped by an 
embodied history of violence (Fassin 2007; 2008). Individuals implementing cross-
border aid - who often work with and through groups and systems designated as illegal 
'rebels' by the Burmese state - thus see themselves as working with and through 
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legitimate or licit actors and systems (Abraham and van Schendel 2005). For them, the 
state is a predatory force rather than a legitimate authority. Within Back Pack as an 
organisation, ethnic nationalist groups are posited as legitimate political authorities, 
representative of Burma's diverse ethnic minority communities. But by the time of my 
fieldwork, political and geopolitical changes were mirrored by powerful international 
actors increasingly questioning the legitimacy of such socio-political systems. 
Chapters 6 and 7 shift the scale of analysis to what the leaders describe as their 
international partnerships, and to Back Pack's position in and atte1npts to impact on an 
evolving politics of aid. Intermediary NGO partners act as brokers, enabling access to 
funding and political support for an organisation working in the realm of what one of its 
leaders calls the 'legal-illegal' (Mosse and Lewis 2006). But for the leaders, donor 
funding means more than financial support and indeed confers international credibility 
and legitimacy to their work - and, by association, to the systems that they work with 
and through, and to their vision of and for Burma. As such, donor funding can be read 
as a form of Bourdieusian symbolic capital within the internationalised competition of 
legitimacies described by Duffield (Bourdieu 1986; Duffield 2008). As discussed in 
Chapter 6, however, obtaining increasing amounts of donor funding ear-marked for 
humanitarian aid can compel the organisation to demonstrate in increasingly transparent 
and accountable ways that it fits into definitions of hu1nanitarianism that are elaborated 
at a level far removed from the 'messiness' of a situation of protracted conflict and 
violence - a level where the myth of apolitical aid can to a greater extent be maintained. 
Donor governments - and some donors more than others - thus historically attributed 
legitimacy to Back Pack's humanitarian struggle. Yet a paradox illustrated through this 
ethnography is that obtaining increasing amounts of international donor funding can 
compel an organisation born out of a particular socio-political context to conform to 
donor requests and agendas in ways that can sometimes clash with its members' 
politico-moral worldview. As illustrated in Chapter 6, this becomes particularly evident 
through donors' growing focus on monitoring and evaluation, which involves Back 
Pack in increasingly stringent demonstrations that it is walking the walk as well as 
talking the talk of the type of humanitarianism that donors are willing to fund in a 
particular (geo )political context. And although donors' decisions of which actors and 
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programmes to fund are influenced by (geo )political considerations - as well as 
international frameworks and considerations of humanitarian need - the discursive 
register and mechanisms through which such funding works might be seen to operate an 
anti-politics machine (Ferguson 1990). What those on the ground see as a political and 
moral issue then comes to be largely reduced to a technical problem requiring a 
technical solution, and donors' (geo )political agendas are framed in technical and 
generally unobjectionable terms. 
So while Back Pack's leaders seek legitimacy at the international level for their 
humanitarian struggle, the source that they derive this legitimacy from simultaneously 
forces them into a new struggle: a struggle against the depoliticisation of what is, for 
them, indivisibly a humanitarian project and a politico-moral mission. The leaders' 
humanitarian struggle and their actions within an internationalised politics of aid to 
Burma, however, cannot just be reduced to a reactive model of resistance. Those who 
might be conceptualised somewhat simplistically as resisting powerful forces have their 
own politics and agendas (Brown 1996; Ortner 1995). Back Pack's local-global 
partnerships illustrate the ways in which actors at different levels can wield different 
discourses and forms of capital to pursue their own agendas within a specific type of 
'humanitarian encounter' (Rossi 2004; 2006). This 'humanitarian encounter' involves 
diverse actors with unequal positions within multi-tiered fields of power. And in this 
case, as the (geo )political playing fields shifted in favour of those opposing cross-border 
aid, definitions of humanitarianism that emphasise the type of political neutrality 
historically endorsed by the Red Cross movement came to be imposed onto local actors 
who, when they did not conform to these definitions, were dismissed by more powerful 
actors as unprincipled or not humanitarian. 
The symbolic capital conferred through donor funding for cross-border aid is all the 
more important in an international system where the legitimacy of humanitarian 
interventions or actions is not contingent on international :frameworks alone, but 
depends on their mobilisation and implementation by powerful state actors (Chandler 
2007; Rieff 2002; Saillant 2006; Weiss 1999). In an international system of 
'humanitarian government', which has witnessed the proliferation of often conflicting 
:frameworks and models for humanitarianism, funding from powerful government 
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donors thus becomes a defining factor, conferring legitimacy if not legality to specific 
actors, systems and practices. Funding from powerful government donors can thus be 
read as enabling the definition and delineation of legitimate humanitarianism. 
Historically, international laws and frameworks for humanitarian intervention were not 
mobilised to ensure the provision of aid in parts of the borderlands where the Burmese 
government restricted humanitarian access. International actors were divided as to the 
legitimacy of mechanisms for the provision of aid, which were seen by the Burmese 
state as an illegal violation of sovereignty (Duffield 2008). Support for systems that 
came to be known as cross-border aid was then mobilised on a case-by-case basis. 
Government donors based their decisions to support or not support such systems on a 
range of factors, including political and geostrategic considerations and not just 
international frameworks or impartial assessments of need. As described in Chapter 6, 
in the decade following its creation, Back Pack succeeded in obtaining increasing 
support from powerful government donors. This support conferred legitimacy to a 
'solidarist' model of humanitarian assistance (Weiss 1999), which can then be seen as a 
licit (if not legal) suspension of sovereignty to ensure humanitarian access to 
populations in need of aid (Abraham and van Schendel 2005). But with shifts in the 
dynamics of conflict in Burma's borderlands, with claimed improvements in 
humanitarian space after Cyclone Nargis in 2008, with the argument that humanitarian 
access could/should be ensured by engaging with state authorities, and with engagement 
increasingly seen as a means to promote political change in Burma and counterbalance 
·-
China's growing influence in the region, the legitimacy of cross-border aid came to be 
questioned more and more at regional and international levels. 
These tensions were heightened in the titne leading up to and following Burma's first 
elections in over twenty years. As evidenced throughout this thesis and reiterated 
through the discussion in Chapter 7, Back Pack's leaders' goals extend beyond the 
provision of healthcare for Burma's civilians. For over a decade, these leaders have 
drawn on an international humanitarian system to pursue what is in their eyes 
indistinguishably a moral, political and medical project. In an age where powerful states 
have become key determinants in international 'humanitarian government' (Fassin 
2012; Rieff 2002), the leaders had been able to expand their health program1nes and 
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gain legitimacy for their work - and by implication, for their vision of and for Burma -
at a time when their own attributions of legitimacy were to an extent echoed by or at 
least didn't clash in fundamental ways with attributions of legitimacy by and the 
(geo )political interests of powerful donor governments. 
When the political tides changed in Burma and the wider region, which also entailed 
shifting attributions of legitimacy at the international level, Back Pack's leaders' 
continuing refusal to be just apolitical victims was seen by a number of powerful 
stakeholders as increasingly problematic. By the end of my fieldwork, significant shifts 
were illustrated notably by some donors' attempts to impose a new set of humanitarian 
principles onto actors on the Thai-Burma border. These attempts amounted to 
categorising actors who do not abide by a strict definition of political neutrality (rather 
than impartiality) as not humanitarian, thereby denying the reality and benefits of 
multiple models for humanitarian action (Slim 1997; Weiss 1999), and theoretically 
imposing a model that historically failed to meet the humanitarian needs of 
communities in Burma's borderlands. The irony, moreover, is that this narrow and 
ostensibly apolitical definition of humanitarianism is used to frame and justify trends in 
'humanitarian government' that are themselves inextricably linked with the evolving 
political and (geo )political concerns of powerful donor governments. 
The tensions and often emotive reactions that emanate from an evolving politics of aid 
therefore need to be understood in relation to shifts in attributions of legitimacy at 
different levels, and ways in which these can clash or converge with the worldviews of 
those involved. Back Pack leaders' vision of and for the world has remained consistent 
since they founded the organisation in 1998. What has changed in often disconcerting 
ways is the playing field in which these actors attempt to gain recognition for this vision 
- which also translates into recognition for the suffering that they feel their 
communities have been subjected to by an illegitimate, predatory and abusive state. The 
cognitive dissonance and understandably emotive reactions that can be provoked when 
those seen for decades as the 'good guys' come to be blamed for fuelling conflict in tum 
need to be understood in relation to an embodied history of violence. This embodied 
history, as described throughout this thesis, provides the framework for Back Pack's 
members' understandings of and actions in the world (Fassin 2007; 2008). This history 
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and the re-politicised subjectivity of the victim that is associated with it became one 
register through which Back Pack's leaders seek legitimacy at the international level -
thus demonstrating ways in which actors, far from being passive victims, can adopt a 
critical stance towards an embodied history of violence and utilise this as a basis 
through which to pursue a political and moral agenda. But this history is also what can 
be seen to the impede leaders and medics whose stories and perspectives are described 
through this thesis from trusting that Burma's elections in 2010 and the new 
government's promises of political change are genuine. 
Beyond the debate: humanitarian government as a politics of life and 
politics of value 
This research demonstrates the importance of analysing systems through which 
humanitarian aid works from the perspective of values attributed to these systems by 
actors at different scales of analysis and in relation to wider political and structural 
changes. And it is precisely within the marginal spaces at the peripheries of states' 
definitions of legality - liminal spaces through which systems such as cross-border aid 
function - and at times of significant (geo )political change that the sometimes diverging 
attributions of value by actors at different scales to systems that enable the government 
of human lives are highlighted. 
Attention to the life experiences and embodied histories of those implementing aid 
programmes leads to a better understanding of their attributions of legitimacy and 
illegitimacy to the different actors~ systems and practices that they encounter in their 
lives and work. It also leads to a better understanding of tensions that can arise, when 
donors fund systems for aid delivery that are a product of a particular socio-political 
context and, in so doing, compel these organisations to abide by their ostensibly 
apolitical definitions of humanitarianism. Attention to the controversial issue of 
neutrality, in particular, highlights the contradictions and hypocrisies of an unequal 
syste1n of 'humanitarian goven1ment', within which powerful actors support aid 
systems that are a product of a history of protracted conflict and state violence, and then 
require these systems to be apolitical - when the factors guiding donors' choices about 
where and how to provide aid to people in need (in indeed, which people are in need) 
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involve political and moral decisions. With political and geopolitical changes and linked 
shifts in attributions of legitimacy, these tensions are highlighted. In an international 
context, which has witnessed the multiplication of frameworks for and practices of 
humanitarianism, moreover, the implementation of these frameworks and definitions of 
legitimate humanitarianism need to be understood in light of attributions of legitimacy 
by powerful stakeholders in 'humanitarian government' - with these attributions also 
being impacted by evolving political and (geo )strategic concerns. 
Humanitarianism has often been analysed as relying on a simplification of politically 
complex realities . into a black and white world of easily identified victims and 
oppressors (Fassin 2012; Rieff 2002; Saillant 2007). But this research also highlights 
dilemmas and tensions that can arise at a time of potential but uncertain change, when 
attributions of legitimacy shift and those qualified as victims can come to be redefined 
as undeserving. It also highlights the additional problem of what happens to local-level 
systems, which are used at a particular time to channel international humanitarian aid to 
populations in need of assistance, but which also offer significant potential for the 
reconstruction of official social and welfare systems in a changing socio-political 
context. Concerns as to the future of these systems and what critics dismiss as a 'fear of 
irrelevance' then need to be understood from a pragmatic perspective, but also in light 
of a more sensitive appreciation of the justifiably emotive reactions that can be caused 
by shifts in international attributions of legitimacy. What is at stake in the debate around 
cross-border aid is not just money or power. Also at stake are the values and 
worldviews of men and women who have dedicated their lives to what they see as a 
politico-moral struggle for the rights and freedoms of their communities. 
Fassin highlights how 'humanitarian government', as a government of precariousness, 
can have paradoxical effects such as leading to situations where the mobilisation of 
empathy eclipses the recognition of rights - and particularly of the political rights of 
those represented through the trope of victimhood (Fassin 2012). This ethnographic 
study, however, illustrates ways in which individuals and groups linked with a specific 
socio-political movement can use a humanitarian platform to claim their political rights. 
As illustrated through this thesis, while "humanitarianism was tending to produce a 
subjectivity devoid of historical subject" (Fassin 2012: 222), Back Pack's leaders re-
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appropriate the subjectivity of the victim 1n order to have their version of history 
recognised, to be recognised as legitimate humanitarian and political actors, and to have 
their humanitarian struggle internationally legitimised - a struggle, which entails a 
vision of the type of national political body that will protect and fulfil their rights. 
Through their humanitarian struggle, Back Pack's leaders thus draw on the resources 
offered by a flawed international system to try to protect and fulfil the rights historically 
denied to them at the national level. The subjectivity of the victim becomes a vehicle for 
them to demand that which they see as denied by powerful structural forces: their legal 
rights and freedoms as political subjects and the realisation of a specific politico-moral 
vision (Fassin 2007 c; 2012). Yet the production of political subjects is inscribed, as 
Judith Butler describes, in a tension between subjectivation and subjection (Butler 1997; 
Fassin 2012). 'Humanitarian government' and its forms of capital enable Back Pack's 
humanitarian struggle; but the mechanis1ns of 'humanitarian government' also 
constantly strive to depoliticise and technicalise its subjects and systems, thereby going 
against the quest for recognition of the victim as a specific type of political subject. 
The politics of aid, more generally, can be conceptualised as a politics of life - a 
politics, which as described by Fassin, determines which lives are to be saved but also 
brings into play differential meanings and values of human lives (Fassin 2007b; 2012). 
Back Pack as a humanitarian and political actor can then be read as contesting a politics 
of life in which, as Duffield describes, "people and communities are wantonly exposed 
to danger and the irrelevance of their being" (Duffield 2008: 2). The organisation's 
leaders are challenging structures in which their lives and the lives of their community 
members have been accorded lesser value - as Htoo Paw put it, they are "easy to kill" -
as well as attempting to redefine the meaning accorded to these lives and the systems 
through which human precariousness is governed. 
The recognition that humanitarian discourses and practices can reduce complex political 
and historical situations to technical proble1ns requiring technical solutions has been 
supplemented by descriptions of ways in which the condition of the victim can also be 
reduced to that of zoe or bare life ( e.g. Pandolfi 2002; Redfield 2005). Anthropologists 
have thus drawn on Agamben' s writings to highlight an ontological inequality between 
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the bare life of the victim to be saved and the political life that enables this saving -
between the zae of local populations who passively wait for humanitarian workers and 
the bias of the citizens of the world who as political actors can support or provide 
humanitarian assistance (Agamben 1998; Fassin 2012). Through their humanitarian 
struggle and through the re-politicised subjectivity of the victim-medic, Back Pack can 
instead be seen to seek recognition for the victim as bias - as a political actor. Men and 
women linked with a particular socio-political movement thus became involved in and 
try to impact on a multi-tiered system for the governance of precariousness, mobilising 
various discourses and types of capital in their search for the recognition and realisation 
of a specific politico-moral vision. In so doing, what they are struggling for is also the 
right and power to define lives worth living as bias - a life as a citizen of a specific type 
of political and moral landscape. The politics of aid can then be seen as a politics of life 
and a politics of value, in which different actors unequally situated in shifting fields of 
power struggle to define the values and meanings attributed not only to human lives per 
se, but also to the socio-political systems that enable the government of these lives. 
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Annex 1: Acronyms and Glossary 
ABSDF - All Burma Student's Democratic Front: Also known as the Student Army, 
the ABSDF was founded on 1 November 1988 by student demonstrators who fled to 
border areas and took up arms after the Burmese junta crushed the 1988 democracy 
uprisings and seized power. ABSDF members were initially training and armed by and 
fought alongside ethnic nationalist organisations in border areas. Although weakened in 
the past decades, ABSDF troops continued to be active up until and after Burma's 2010 
elections. 
ALA - Arakan Liberation Army: The Arakan Liberation Army is the armed wing of 
the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP - see below). 
ALP - Arakan Liberation Party: The ALP was formed in 1968. The Burmese junta 
arrested many of its leaders and quashed the movement in its infancy. After being 
granted an amnesty in the early 1970s, ALP President Khaing Moe Linn and Vice 
Chairman Khaing Ba Kyaw re-formed the organisation with support from the KNU (see 
below). The ALP/ALA was reorganised in 1981 under the leadership of Khai Ray Khai, 
with the goal of establishing a sovereign state in Arakan/Rakhine State. 
BGF - Border Guard Force: According to the 2008 Constitution of the Republic of 
the Union of Myanmar, all armed ceasefire groups (i.e. armed ethnic nationalist 
organisations having signed ceasefires with the government) have to either lay down 
their arms or become part of a centrally controlled Border Guard Force. The rejection of 
the BGF plan by a number of ceasefire groups led to increased militarisation in border 
areas as well as the collapse of ceasefires and new outbreaks of conflict in the lead up to 
and aftermath of the 2010 elections. 
BRC - Burma Relief Centre: BRC is a Non-Government Organisation (NGO), 
founded in 1988 by key individuals who had links to the Burmese democracy 
movement and international network of Burma lobby groups. BRC receives 
international funding from NGOs and government aid agencies, and supports work in 
health, education, media training and youth organisation, as well as emergency food 
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distribution in border areas. BRC staff members are based in Thailand and specialise in 
capacity building for Burmese organisations, particularly focusing on: women's rights, 
media, community development, food relief, health, human rights and environment. A 
major focus of BRC's work has been to support inter-sectoral and multiethnic activities. 
CBO - Community Based Organisation: The organisations that I worked with on the 
Thai-Burma border (including the Back Pack Health Worker Team) are commonly 
referred to as Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), i.e. organisations that originate 
from and are representative of the communities within which they work. 
CNA - Chin National Army: The Chin National Army is the armed wing of the Chin 
National Front (CNF -see below). 
CNF- Chin National Front: The CNF was formed on 20 March 1988 with the aim of 
securing the self-determination of Chin people and establishing a Federal Union of 
Burma. The CNF and its armed wing, the CNA, continued to fight the central Burmese 
military government along the Indian-Burma border, rejecting attempted ceasefire 
discussions in the late 1990s and again in 2007 on the basis that the military 
government refused to engage them politically. In January 2012, the CNF signed a 
ceasefire agreement with a Burmese government peace team, ending 23 years of 
conflict. 
CHW - Community Health Worker: Community Health Workers are recruited from 
local communities and typically attend six month-long trainings in basic medical and 
primary health care. Most CHW s who are recruited into Back Pack have been trained 
by ethnic health organisations/ departments. After attending six months' training, they 
work in their communities and/or with an ethnic health organisation/department. 
Community Health Workers can also be trained by civil society organisations - such as 
women's/youth groups or religious organisations - as well as by government health 
systems. 
CHEPP - Community Health Education and Prevention Programme: Back Pack's 
Community Health Education and Prevention Programme (CHEPP) focuses on health 
education and communicable disease prevention. As part of CHEPP, Back Pack medics 
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implement activities 1n health education (notably by conducting Village Health 
Workshops), water and sanitation (including the construction of latrines and water 
gravity flow systems) and school health promotion. CHEPP medics cooperate with 
Village Health Volunteers in implementing health education and communicable disease 
prevention activities. 
DKBA - Democratic Karen Buddhist Army: The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army 
was created in December 1994, when a faction of the Karen National Liberation Army 
(KNLA - see below) broke away, ostensibly in reaction to discrimination by the 
Christian leadership against the Buddhist rank and file of the Karen ethnic nationalist 
organisation. Shortly after its creation, the DKBA signed a ceasefire with the Burmese 
military government and was instrumental in the fall of Manerplaw - headquarters of 
the KNU/KNLA until 1995. DKBA troops received military and financial assistance 
from the government and continued to support government offensives against the 
KNLA throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In November 2010, a faction of the DKBA that 
refused to join the Border Guard Force broke its ceasefire with the government, 
provoking renewed fighting and displacement along the Thai-Burma border. 
Ethnic Health Department or Ethnic Health Organisation: Ethnic health 
departments are the health systems falling under the administration of ethnic nationalist 
organisations operating in Burma's border areas. Historically, the largest and most 
comprehensive ethnic health department has been the Karen Department of Health and 
Welfare (KDHW - see below), which operates under the administration of the Karen 
National Union (KNU). Other ethnic health departments include the Shan Health 
Committee, Mon National Health Committee and Karenni Health Department. The 
terms ethnic health department and ethnic health organisation generally often used 
interchangeably, although some actors on the border prefer to use the former, arguing 
that the latter draws undue attention to links between health and political systems. 
Field in-Charge: Within Back Pack, Field in-Charges are senior medics who are 
responsible for the management and coordination of health programmes in one of Back 
Pack's twenty target areas. Field in-Charges are elected by medics in the target area, 
and are approved by the local ethnic health organisation; they are most often senior 
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medics within these ethnic health organisations. 
IDP - Internally Displaced Person(s): An Internally Displaced Person is a person who 
is forced to flee his or her home but who remains within his or her country's borders. An 
IDP does not fall within the current definition of a refugee in international law, since 
he/she has not crossed an international boundary. As part of its health programmes, 
Back Pack targets IDPs and other vulnerable populations. 
IRC - International Rescue Committee: The IRC (initially known as the International 
Relief Association) was founded in 1933 at the suggestion of Albert Einstein to assist 
Germans suffering under Adolf Hitler's regime. IRC developed over the years into an 
International NGO, its stated mission being to respond to the world's worst 
humanitarian crises and to help people to survive and rebuild their lives. Most of IRC' s 
funding has historically come from USAID - the US government's aid agency - but the 
organisation also receives support from private sources. http:/ /vv\V\V.rescue.org/about -
last accessed 18 February 2013. 
JHU-CPHHR - Johns Hopkins University, Center for Health and Human Rights: 
The Center for Public Health and Human Rights (CPHHR) at the Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health was founded 1n 2004 to advance 
fundamental human rights through research, teaching and advocacy. Based in the 
School's Department of Epidemiology, the Center is headed by Professor Chris Beyrer. 
The foundation of the center and its ongoing work is based on the premise that 
population-level violations of human rights and dignity and of the right to health require 
population-based methods to measure their effects, as well as innovative public health 
approaches to minimise their consequences. The Center partners with grassroots 
organisations, human rights groups, and public health researchers and practitioners. It 
aims to address the needs of underserved minorities, ethnic groups facing state violence 
and discrimination, and stiginatised groups at risk for HIV/ AIDS and other epidemic 
threats. Academics linked with CPHHR have provided technical support to Back Pack 
and other organisations along the Thai-Burma border since the center's foundation. 
http: //vvv,rv-:.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/center-for-public-health-and-
hu1nan-rights/about/ - last accessed 18 February 2013. 
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GHAP - Global Health Access Program: GHAP began with three public health 
experts from the US, who took an interest in healthcare on the Thai-Burma border. They 
founded GHAP shortly after visiting Mae Tao Clinic in 1998. Over the following 
decade, GHAP expanded in size, reach and scope. By 2009, GHAP provided technical 
support to a wide range of organisations delivering healthcare services to Burmese 
communities. The organisation supported community groups working in geographically 
and ethnically diverse areas of Burma's borderlands, as well as organisations on the 
Thai side of the border. In 2010, GHAP was absorbed as the field branch of Community 
Partners International. http://cnintLorg/our-historv - last accessed 18 February 2013. 
KNDO - Karen National Defence Organisation: The KNDO was formed in 1947 as 
the first armed wing of the KNU. It was outlawed in 1949 by the Burmese government. 
The KNDO was later relegated to policing and taxing roles within the KNU, with the 
Karen National Liberation Army (KLNA) becoming the KNU's main armed force. 
During the period of this research, KNDO units comprising local villagers continued to 
work as local policing and protection forces in many contested and conflict areas of 
Karen State. 
KNLA- Karen National Liberation Army: Armed wing of the Karen National Union 
(KNU -see below); the KNLA was formed in 1947. 
KNU - Karen National Union: The KNU was founded in 1947 and is described by its 
members as a democratic organisation supporting peace, democracy, and human rights 
in a federal Burma. It is also claimed to be the leading political organisation 
representing the aspirations of the Karen people. From January 1949 onwards, the KNU 
and its armed wing, the KNLA, engaged in political and armed resistance against the 
Burmese military government. The KNU/KNLA were, however, severely weakened 
after the fall of their headquarters in Manerplaw in 1995 and scaled-up Tatmadaw 
offensives in eastern Burma in the second half of the 1990s. In January 2012, an initial 
ceasefire agreement was signed with Burma's newly elected government, but 
disagreements within the KNU/KNLA have threatened to lead to further splits and the 
peace process remains uncertain. 
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KIA - Kachin Independence Army: The KIA 1s the armed wing of the Kachin 
Independence Organisation (KIO - see below). 
KIO - Kachin Independence Organisation: The KIO was established in 1961. The 
group initially sought an independent homeland but, since 1975, has sought autonomy 
for the Kachin people and integration within a federal Burma. The KIO controlled most 
of Burma's Kachin State during the 1960s-1990s. In 1994, the KIO and its armed wing, 
the KIA, signed a ceasefire with the central government, in exchange for relative 
autonomy and economic development. The KIO then rejected the 2008 Constitution and 
the KIA refused to become part of a centrally controlled Border Guard Force. In June 
2011 , the ceasefire collapsed and fighting resumed between the KIA and Tatmadaw, 
leading to mass displacement in Kachin State. 
Leading Group: The Leading Group is the body with ultimate decision-making power 
for Back Pack's organisational policies and health programmes. Thirteen members are 
democratically elected every three years in Leading Group elections, which are held at 
the end of a Six-Month Meeting in Back Pack's headquarters in Mae Sot. By policy, 
one third of those nominated to be elected for Leading Group positions should be 
women. 
MCH - Mother and Child Health Programme: Back Pack's MCH Programme was 
initiated in 2000 and aims to reduce the high rates of maternal and infant mortality in 
Burma's remote and disputed border areas. MCH workers train and work with an 
extensive network of Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs - see below). In cooperation 
with these TBAs, they support antenatal and postnatal care as well as safe deliveries and 
referral systems for emergency obstetric cases, targeting pregnant women and mothers 
who have little to no access to mother and child healthcare. 
MCP - Medical Care Programme: Back Pack's Medical Care Programme (MCP) 
aims to reduce mortality and morbidity rates in Burma's border areas by diagnosing and 
treating common illnesses - the lead causes of mortality and morbidity in Back Pack 
target areas being: malaria, diarrhea/dysentery, acute respiratory infections, anemia and 
worm infestation. MCP workers also treat war injuries (such as gunshot or landmine 
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injuries), as well as a host of other health conditions. 
MMT - Mobile Medical Team: Prior to the creation of the Back Pack Health Worker 
Team, organisations like Mae Tao Clinic already supported Mobile Medical Teams, 
which provided healthcare in remote and disputed areas of Burma's borderlands. The 
history of the MMTs is described in Chapter 3. 
MNHC - Mon National Health Committee: The MNHC is the ethnic health 
organisation under the administration of the New Mon State Party (MNSP - see below) 
in Burma's Mon State. 
MTC - Mae Tao Clinic: The Mae Tao Clinic (MTC - also known as the Students ' 
Clinic or Dr Cynthia's Clinic) was founded in Mae Sot in 1989 by Dr Cynthia and a 
handful of colleagues who fled Burma after the junta crushed the 1988 student 
demonstrations and seized power. The Clinic initially provided shelter and medical care 
to activists fleeing the military regime, but over the past decades evolved into a 
sprawling assortment of health and other facilities providing services to displaced 
Burmese civilians and migrant workers in Thailand. The history of the Clinic is 
described in Chapter 3. 
NMSP - New Mon State Party: The New Mon State Party (NMSP) was created in 
1962, when it superseded the Mon Peoples' Front (MPF), which sought self-
determination for the Mon people since 1947. Since 1949, the eastern hills of Mon State 
(as well as portions of Thaninthaya Division) were under control of the MPF then 
NMSP and its military arm, the Mon National Liberation Front (MNLF). In 1974, partly 
to assuage Mon separatist demands, the theoretically autonomous Mon State was 
created out of portions of Thaninthayi Division and Bago Division. Armed resistance 
continued until 1995, when NMSP agreed to a ceasefire with the Burmese government. 
NLD - National League for Democracy: The NLD was historically Burma's main 
democratic opposition party. The party was founded on 27 September 1988, in the 
aftermath of the 1988 uprisings and under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, who 
remains its General Secretary. The party won a substantial parliamentary majority in the 
1990 Bunnese general election - but the ruling military junta refused to recognise these 
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results, banned the NLD and placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest. Throughout 
the following decades, the NLD continued to operate as Burma's main opposition party 
- with its offices at times allowed to reopen and at others shut down by the junta. On 6 
May 2010, the party was declared illegal and ordered to be disbanded by the junta after 
refusing to register for the elections slated for November 2010. In November 2011, the 
NLD announced its intention to register as a political party in order to contend future 
elections. In the 2012 by-elections, NLD won 43 seats and party leader Aung San Suu 
Kyi was elected as a Member of Parliament. 
P'Yaw: P 'Yaw means "Burmese" in Sgaw Karen and is commonly used by people from 
Karen communities in the border areas to refer to the Burman-dominated military 
regime, the Tatmadaw, and ethnic Burman people (thereby conflating the government, 
its army and the majority ethnic group). 
Saya/Sayama: Saya (female Sayama) literally means "teacher" in Burmese and is an 
honorific used to designate senior individuals or leaders. 
Senior medic: Within Back Pack, people referred to as senior medics have more 
seniority due to their experience as medics in the field; they have at least two, three or 
more years' experience. 
Six-Month Meeting: The Six-Month Meetings are when in-Charges from Back Pack's 
different target areas travel from their respective areas inside Burma to the head office 
in Mae Sot, on the Thai side of the border. During the Six-Month Meetings, senior 
medics fro1n these different target areas bring back data from the field, report on their 
health programmes, attend trainings and meetings, and collect medicine and other 
resources for the next six months' activities. The Six-Month Meetings culminate in the 
General Meeting, a formal event attended by all Back Pack Leading Group members 
and representatives from different target areas, when programme activities, 
management systems and plans for the next six months are discussed and determined. 
SSA-SIN - Shan State Army-South/North: The Shan State Army (SSA) was an army 
formed in 1964 to resist the military government of Burma in Shan State. It later split 
into two factions, usually known in English as the Shan State Army-South or SSA-A 
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and the Shan State Army-North or SSA-N. While the SSA-N agreed to a ceasefire with 
the Burmese junta in 1989, the SSA-S continued armed resistance, fighting Tatmadaw 
troops in Shan State. Lieutenant-General Y awd Serk, President of the Restoration 
Council of Shan State (RCSS - the political branch of the SSA-S), announced on 21 
May 2011 that there was no more SSA-South and SSA-North and there would be only 
one SSA. The SSA-S and SSA-N (the latter having resumed fighting in March 2011) 
began initial ceasefire discussions with the new Burmese government in early 2012. 
SHC - Shan Health Committee: The SHC is the ethnic health organisation under the 
administration of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS). 
SPDC - State Peace and Development Council: The SPDC was the official name of 
the Burmese military regime from 1997 to 2011. From 1988 to 1997, Burma was ruled 
by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which seized power on 18 
September 1988 after the Tatmadaw crushed the 1988 democracy uprisings. In 1997, 
SLORC was abolished and reconstituted as the ostensibly less ominous-sounding State 
Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The powerful regional 1ni.litary commanders, 
who were members of SLORC, were then promoted to new positions and transferred to 
the capital Rangoon (now Yangon). Several months after the 2010 elections, on 30 
March 2011, Senior General Than Shwe signed a decree officially dissolving the SPDC. 
Target Area: The geographic area in which Back Pack implements health programmes 
is divided into twenty target areas. Each target area has a Field in-Charge. 
Tatmadaw aka Myanmar Armed Forces: The Tatmadaw is the official Burmese name 
of the Myanmar Armed Forces, official state forces administered by the Ministry of 
Defense and composed of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. 
TBA - Traditional Birth Attendant: Traditional Birth Attendants are typically elder 
women in remote communities, who assist women during pregnancy, childbirth and 
early motherhood. TBAs typically have no formal health education, and most TBAs 
who work with Back Pack cannot read or write. They rely on traditional knowledge 
taught to them by their mothers and grandmothers before them. Back Pack works with 
TBAs by training them in safe deliveries and in how to recognise and refer obstetric 
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emergencies. 
Thara/Tharamu: Thar a (fem ale Tharamu) 1s an honorific in S gaw Karen, denoting 
seniority and leadership. 
VHV - Village Health Volunteer: Village Health Volunteers are unpaid community 
members who assist Back Pack teams in the implementation of health programmes in 
their target communities. VHV s are given basic training, and assist in providing and 
monitoring follow-up treatment, in population surveys and registration, in community 
health education and disease prevention, and in identifying and referring emergency 
cases to Back Pack medics or other health providers. 
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Annex 2: BPHWT Organisational Structure and Staffing 
BPHWT Leading Group (10 members) 
Chairperson 
Secretary 
Treasurer 
7 other members 
The Leading Group is elected every three years by all Back Pack members present at the Six-Month 
Meeting in Mae Sot. Each of the twenty target areas has three votes. 
BPHWT Executive board (8 members) 
Director 
Deputy director 
Medical Care Programme (MCP) Coordinator 
Community Health Education and Prevention Programme (CHEPP) Coordinator 
Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Coordinator 
Finance Manager 
Office Manager 
The Executive Board is appointed by the Leading Group and meets monthly to make operational 
decisions for the implementation and coordination of BP HWT activities. 
Field in-Charges (one for each of Back Pack's 20 target areas) 
Field in-Charges are elected by the local medics in their target areas; they coordinate the work of Back 
Pack medics in that area. 
Each Back Pack target area also has a: 
MCP in-charge ( often the Field in-Charge or Second In-Charge) 
CHEPP in-Charge 
MCH in-charge 
These medics manage the implementation of their respective programmes throughout their target areas. 
80+ teams of 3-5 Back Pack medics 
According to Back Pack's health access targets: 
Each team works with 10 Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs), and 10 Village Health Volunteers 
(VHVs); Each team targets 2,000 community members 
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Annex 3: Donor Humanitarian Actors Working Group 
Operating Guidelines 
Statement of intent: 
The Operating Guidelines below are an adaptation of the Red Cross and NGO Code of 
Conduct and the Good Humanitarian Partnership Principles to the local context, drafted 
by members of the Donor-Humanitarian Actors Working Group in Bangkok. 
These Guidelines should be well known and regularly used by all members in their 
humanitarian work, together with other operating standards such as the Principles for 
Humanitarian Partnership and the new Sphere Standards. The members of the 
Donor-Humanitarian Actor Working Group commit to disseminating them over the 
course of the next year (2011/2012) and find ways in which they can measure their own 
activities against them. The members of the Donor-Humanitarian Actors Working 
group also co1nmit to seek input and feedback from the stakeholders of their 
humanitarian action. 
Aim of the dissemination: 
• To make the humanitarian principles in these Operational Guidelines and their 
underpinnings known; 
• To provide the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance and protection a 
template against which they can measure what they are entitled to expect; 
• To provide discussion among donor and humanitarian partners as to how their 
activities are being impacted by the respect for these principles; ► Together 
with other stakeholders to map areas that need improvement. 
Operating Guidelines 
Guided by international law and the Principles of the International NGOs and RC/RC 
Movement's Code of Conduct and the Principles of good humanitarian donorship, and 
all other applicable international standards to which they are already committed, the 
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members of the Donor/Humanitarian Actors Working Group in Bangkok reaffirm the 
following Guiding Principles and endeavour that their staff and implementing partners 
disseminate them to implement effective Humanitarian and Development assistance 
along the Thailand/Burma/Myanmar border. This GP document is intended to improve 
the awareness, dissemination, understanding and implementation of the humanitarian 
principles in the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles and the Red Cross/NGO 
Code of Conduct within the local context. They therefore do not replace but rather 
reinforce the commitments made by the members of the Donor/Humanitarian Actors 
Working Group to the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles and the Red 
Cross/NGO Code of Conduct globally. 
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1. Humanity: We are working together to contribute to improvements in the 
quality of life of displaced persons on the Thailand-Burma/Myanmar border. 
Our assistance and funding is focused on saving lives, alleviating suffering and 
improving human dignity by meeting basic needs whilst working towards 
durable solutions to displacement. 
2. Impartiality and nondiscrimination: We provide assistance regardless of the 
race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. Our aid and funding priorities are calculated on 
the basis of need alone and we base the provision of funding and relief aid upon 
inclusive, participatory and thorough assessments of the needs of displaced 
persons and the local capacities in place to meet those needs. 
3. Independence and neutrality: We formulate our own policies and 
implementation strategies guided by the respect for the dignity of the people to 
be assisted and their assessed needs, independently of any political or other 
interests or influences. Our assistance must not be used to further a particular 
political or religious standpoint. We will take robust steps to prevent assistance 
being used to further non-humanitarian goals. 
4. Do no harm: We are aware that assistance and funding can unintentionally 
cause harm and exacerbate conflict. We support local capacities for 
reconciliation and peace, so that people can be helped to disengage from 
violence and seek legitimate redress from abuses 
5. Respect for human dignity: We work towards re-establishing and maintaining 
the individuals in their inherent dignity and in response to the expressed wishes 
of local communities. We respect the dignity of people, their culture, structures 
and customs in accordance with international law and standards. 
6. Protection: The protection of individuals by preventing or stopping specific 
patterns of abuse and fostering an environment that respects and upholds the 
rights of individuals is a priority of our work. Moreover, protection strategies to 
prevent and respond to gender based violence must be incorporated in all aspects 
of humanitarian assistance. 
7. Transparency and accountability: We are committed to accountability, 
efficiency and effectiveness in implementing our humanitarian and development 
assistance. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and 
those from whom we accept resources. We will seek to report, in an open and 
transparent fashion, upon the impact of our work, and the factors limiting or 
enhancing that impact. We will not tolerate any corruption, theft or misuse of 
humanitarian supplies or equipment and we will report corrupt practices through 
safe and confidential channels. 
8. Participation: We work to involve communities in the design, planning, 
management, implementation and evaluation of programmes funded and 
implemented for their benefit. 
9. Coordination: In order to improve our effectiveness and transparency and to 
avoid duplication of work and assistance, we coordinate our activities with the 
government, the United Nations and all relevant stakeholders at every level. In 
doing so, we also support and promote the central and unique role ofUNHCR in 
the protection of refugees. 
10. Sustainability and durable solutions: We tailor our activities to local 
circumstances and will provide assistance in ways that are supportive of 
recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support to the transition 
from humanitarian relief to recovery to sustainable durable solutions. 
Bangkok, 30 June 2011 
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